Opinion
CV-21-0317-TUC-SHR (LCK)
07-28-2022
Sunshine Stricker, Plaintiff, v. Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Honorable Lynnette C. Kimmins United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Sunshine Stricker brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner). Stricker filed an opening brief, Defendant submitted an answer and countermotion for remand, and Stricker replied. (Docs. 20, 23, 26.) Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of the Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Kimmins for Report and Recommendation. Based on the pleadings and administrative record, the Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after its independent review, remand for further proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Stricker was born in April 1957 and was 59 years of age at the alleged onset date of her disability. (Administrative Record (AR) 347.) She had past, relevant work in property maintenance, as a furniture finisher, leather seamstress, assembly worker, cashier, beading instructor, and shell crafter. (AR 111, 122-23, 154, 402.) Stricker filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) in December 2017, and an application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) in April 2018. (AR 347, 351.) She alleged disability from November 30, 2016, the date she experienced a stroke. (Id., AR 86.) Stricker met the insured status requirements for DIB through December 31, 2017. (AR 82.) Stricker's application was denied upon initial review (AR 164-73) and on reconsideration (AR 174200). An initial hearing was held on November 6, 2019, and a second hearing with medical expert testimony was held on June 3, 2020. (AR 105-26, 127-63.)
The ALJ found that Stricker had severe impairments of hypertension, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, kidney disease, depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder. (AR 82.) The ALJ found that, beginning November 12, 2019, Stricker's impairments met Listing 12.06 (anxiety) at Step Three. (AR 92.) Prior to November 12, 2019, however, the ALJ determined that Stricker had the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform light work limited to simple routine tasks. (AR 85.) At Step Four, prior to November 12, 2019, the ALJ concluded Stricker could perform her past employment as a production worker. (AR 91.) The Appeals Council denied Stricker's request for review. (AR 1.)
The ALJ decision on appeal is dated January 4, 2021. There is a prior, seemingly identical, decision in the record dated July 14, 2020. (AR 50-67.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Commissioner employs a five-step sequential process to evaluate SSI and DIB claims. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520; 416.920; see also Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460462 (1983). To establish disability the claimant bears the burden of showing she (1) is not working; (2) has a severe physical or mental impairment; (3) the impairment meets or equals the requirements of a listed impairment; and (4) claimant's RFC precludes her from performing her past work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). At Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant has the RFC to perform other work that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy. Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007). If the Commissioner conclusively finds the claimant “disabled” or “not disabled” at any point in the five-step process, she does not proceed to the next step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
“The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989)). The findings of the Commissioner are meant to be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1992)). The court may overturn the decision to deny benefits only “when the ALJ's findings are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001). This is so because the ALJ “and not the reviewing court must resolve conflicts in the evidence, and if the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400 (1971)); Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). The Commissioner's decision, however, “cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989)). Reviewing courts must consider the evidence that supports as well as detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion. Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975).
DISCUSSION
Stricker argues the ALJ committed seven errors: (1) failure to address her upper extremity impairment; (2) failure to provide legally sufficient reasons to discount the opinion of Dr. Cynthia Carrillo; (3) failure to address properly the onset date pursuant to SSR 18-1p; (4) failure to provide germane reasons for discounting lay witness statements; (5) finding she could perform past work as a product assembler without substantial evidence; (6) failure to consider the opinion of Dr. Hassman; and (7) failure to provide clear and convincing reasons to discount Stricker's symptom testimony. Stricker contends that a remand for benefits is warranted based on Claims 2, 3, and 7. Defendant concedes the ALJ erred as to Claims 1 and 6, and the ALJ's analysis as to the onset date was deficient.
Defendant argues, however, that the proper remedy is remand for further proceedings. The Court first looks at the two issues Stricker contends warrant a remand for benefits based on the credit-as-true rule, Claims 2 and 7. Although Stricker also asserts that the Court should remand for benefits on Claim 3, an ALJ's failure to comply with an SSR does not fall within the credit-as-true parameters. In the Conclusion, however, the Court will discuss Stricker's request to modify the ALJ's decision with an earlier onset date.
Claim 2: Medical Opinion of Dr. Cynthia Carrillo
Stricker argues the ALJ erred in finding Dr. Carrillo's opinion unpersuasive. On July 8, 2019, Dr. Carrillo completed Medical Work Tolerance Recommendations. (AR 648-49.) She found Stricker could not perform even part-time sedentary work; she could work two hours per day, 4 days per week. (Id.) She could stand or walk 5 minutes at a time for a total of 2 hours; could sit 30 minutes at a time for a total of two hours; and would need to change position frequently. (AR 648.) Dr. Carrillo determined Stricker could not use foot controls or climb ladders, and should avoid crouching, kneeling, squatting, pinching with her left hand, extreme heat and cold, sudden changes in temperature/humidity, exhaust fumes/smoke/dust, strong odors, unprotected heights, and moving machinery. (AR 64849.) Stricker could climb 8 flights of stairs per day, and occasionally bend, sit in clerical position, reach above shoulder level, work with arms extended in front, power grip/push/pull, pinch with her right hand, perform fine movements, and feel/touch. (Id.) Dr. Carrillo also concluded that Stricker would miss an average of 10 workdays per month as a result of disability and illness. (AR 648.)
The ALJ found Dr. Carrillo's opinion had extensive support, but it was not persuasive because "many" of the restrictions she found were not consistent with other evidence. (AR 88.) Specifically, the ALJ cited a June 2019 record from Dr. Menezes, in which Stricker reported becoming short of breath after walking a mile at a brisk pace. (Id. (citing AR 796).) At that same appointment, Stricker presented with nonlabored respirations, and the absence of rales, wheezes, and rhonchi. (Id. (citing AR 798).) At a July 8, 2019 appointment, with Dr. Carrillo, Stricker's oxygen saturation was 97%, and respiratory auscultation and effort were normal. (Id. (citing AR 656-57).) The ALJ concluded that Stricker's report of being able to walk a brisk mile was inconsistent with Dr. Carrillo's finding that Stricker could walk only for 5 minutes at a time and could not operate foot controls. (AR 88-89.) The ALJ did not make any inconsistency findings as to the other medical evidence she cited (e.g., oxygen saturation).
The one cited inconsistency is not supported by substantial evidence and does not serve to undermine the whole of Dr. Carrillo's opinion. Although the ALJ referred to inconsistencies with "evidence from other physicians," Stricker's ability to walk a brisk mile was something she reported to her doctor as opposed to objective evidence from a doctor. Additionally, Stricker's report of walking a brisk mile is unqualified as to whether she took breaks during the walk. Stricker previously had stated, in her January 2018 function report, that on a great day she could walk a mile with several rests. (AR 398.) Looking at the evidence as a whole, there is not substantial evidence to support finding Dr. Carrillo's opinion - that Stricker could regularly walk only five minutes at a time -inconsistent with Stricker sometimes being able to walk a mile with rest breaks.
Further, the relevance of Stricker's report to Dr. Menezes was to inform him that walking a brisk mile resulted in shortness of breath. In other words, as of June 2019, Stricker could not walk a brisk mile without triggering a negative result. At that appointment, Stricker participated in an Exercise Treadmill Stress Test (ETT), which was conducted due to an abnormal EKG. (AR 801.) Stricker walked at a speed of 1.7 to 2.5 miles per hour but had to stop after 4 minutes and 39 seconds due to fatigue. (AR 801.) Stricker's response to the ETT was deemed hypertensive and the ETT was considered abnormal. (AR 798.) Several further tests were scheduled to evaluate possible diagnoses. (Id.) Stricker's inability to walk a mile without shortness of breath and/or rests, and inability to perform the treadmill walking test for even five minutes due to fatigue, are not inconsistent with Dr. Carrillo's finding that Stricker could not walk for more than five minutes at a time.
Defendant cites several other reasons to find Dr. Carrillo's opinion inconsistent with other evidence and unsupported, despite the ALJ stating that Dr. Carrillo's opinion had "extensive support" (AR 88). (Doc. 23 at 15-17.) The Court does not examine those arguments because "[w]e review only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely." Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003)).
Even if the ALJ's identified inconsistency was supported by substantial evidence, it related solely to Stricker's ability to walk and operate foot controls. That inconsistency has no relevance to the other portions of the doctor's opinion. Although the ALJ made a general finding that "inconsistencies" rendered Dr. Carrillo's opinion unpersuasive, she did not identify any other inconsistencies or portions of Dr. Carrillo's opinion that were undermined based on record evidence.
The Court finds the inconsistency that the ALJ identified was not supported by substantial evidence. Further, the ALJ found the entirety of Dr. Carrillo's opinion unpersuasive, but she found it was supported as a whole, and she did not identify an inconsistency relevant to most of the opinion. For example, Dr. Carrillo concluded Stricker could work only eight hours per week, and she would miss 10 days per month on average. (AR 648-49.) The ALJ did not identify any evidence that contradicted those findings. For these reasons, the ALJ erred in finding the whole of Dr. Carrillo's opinion unpersuasive.
Claim 7: Stricker's Symptom Testimony
Stricker argues the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons to reject her symptom testimony. In general, “questions of credibility and resolution of conflicts in the testimony are functions solely” for the ALJ. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982)). However, “[w]hile an ALJ may certainly find testimony not credible and disregard it . . . [the court] cannot affirm such a determination unless it is supported by specific findings and reasoning.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2006); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345-346 (9th Cir. 1995) (requiring specificity to ensure a reviewing court the ALJ did not arbitrarily reject a claimant's subjective testimony); SSR 16-3p. “To determine whether a claimant's testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007).
Initially, “the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment ‘which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.'” Id. at 1036 (quoting Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 344). The ALJ found Stricker had proven impairments that could produce "some of"' the symptoms alleged. (AR 88.) Because the ALJ did not identify any alleged symptoms that could not reasonably have been caused by Stricker's impairments, the Court assumes the ALJ found part one of the test satisfied. Next, “unless an ALJ makes a finding of malingering based on affirmative evidence thereof, he or she may only find an applicant not credible by making specific findings as to credibility and stating clear and convincing reasons for each.” Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883; Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding an ALJ can reject claimant testimony if he finds evidence of malingering). The ALJ did not make a finding of malingering. Therefore, to support her discounting of Stricker's assertions regarding the severity of her symptoms, the ALJ had to provide clear and convincing, specific reasons. See Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883.
Stricker provided testimony about her symptoms in a January 2018 Function Report and during the November 2019 hearing. In the function report, Stricker stated that "her mind is not always there - forgetfulness - confusion - occasional dizziness." (AR 393.) Her daily activities included eating meals, watching television, listening to the radio, sewing, sketching, reading, playing games, and caring for cats. (AR 394, 397.) Her activities were dependent on her energy level. (AR 397.) She reported sleeping a lot more than in the past, including taking naps. (Id.) She was independent with personal care and prepared her own meals, which took 10-20 minutes. (AR 395.) She cleaned the trailer twice a week, took clothes to the laundromat once a month, did occasional repairs, and grocery shopped once a week for essentials. (AR 396.) She did not drive due to her medication and confusion that could lead to her getting lost. (Id.) She did not spend time with others because she was not interested, and it caused anxiety. (AR 397-98.) She reported an ability to lift 10 pounds and to walk one mile (with several rests) on a great day. (AR 398.) On a good day, she could concentrate for one to two hours and follow instructions, but other days she could not do either. (Id.)
During the hearing, Stricker testified that she completed her own personal hygiene, cooked, and did chores in the house. (AR 113.) She did not mop, sweep, or do yard work, and would shop and do laundry only with help. (Id.) She spent time reading, sketching, watching television, and walking for 5 to 10 minutes. (AR 113-14.) She stopped driving after her stroke due to poor reaction time and an inability to make decisions; she would take a taxi or get a ride with a friend. (AR 115, 117-18.) She reported that she could walk or stand 5 to10 minutes at a time, and could comfortably sit a maximum of thirty consecutive minutes. (AR 116.) Her lifting was limited to ten pounds. (Id.) If she exerted herself too much, she would become short of breath. (AR 117.) She reported side effects from the stroke to be dizziness, extreme fatigue, forgetfulness, and disorientation. (Id.) She state that she no longer was able to work with her hands because of skin cancer surgery on one hand that precluded pinching with her fingers on that hand. (AR 118-19.) Also, she testified that "the brain is not going to tell me what needs to be done" for work, "[i]t's jumbled up," and she couldn't remember what she needed to do. (Id.) She stated that she did not do anything alone if she could get hurt, such as walking a long distance or gardening because she could fall. (AR 120.) She needed her housemate to remind her to take her medication, check her blood pressure, and attend doctor's appointments. (Id.)
The ALJ found that, as to the period before November 12, 2019, Stricker's symptom testimony was "inconsistent because clinical evidence did not support all her statements," and it was "not fully supported . . . for the reasons explained in this decision." (AR 86, 88.) In contrast, with respect to the period beginning on November 12, 2019, the ALJ found Stricker's symptom testimony consistent with the evidence. The ALJ provided no other discussion on Stricker's testimony.
“The ALJ must specifically identify what testimony is credible and what testimony undermines the claimant's complaints.” Morgan v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). The ALJ wholly failed to comply with this directive. The ALJ's opinion discusses some of the clinical evidence; however, she failed to link the evidence to Stricker's symptom testimony. (AR 86-88.) Further, if the objective medical evidence fully explained a claimant's symptoms, then credibility would be irrelevant. Credibility factors into the ALJ's decision only when the claimant's stated symptoms are not substantiated by the objective medical evidence. SSR 16-3p. Thus, it is error for an ALJ to discount credibility solely because a claimant's symptoms are not substantiated by the medical evidence. Id.; Lightv. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). In sum, the ALJ erred by failing to identify clear and convincing reasons, supported by substantial evidence, to reject Stricker's symptom testimony prior to November 12, 2019.
Defendant cites inconsistencies between Stricker's testimony and specific medical opinions. (Doc. 23 at 24.) The Court does not examine this argument because it was not a reason relied upon by the ALJ in discounting Stricker's symptom testimony. See Orn, 495 F.3d at 630 (citing Connett, 340 F.3d at 874).
Conclusion
A federal court may affirm, modify, reverse, or remand a social security case. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). When a court finds that an administrative decision is flawed, the remedy should generally be remand for “additional investigation or explanation.” INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2006) (quoting Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985)); see also Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2004). However, a district court should credit as true medical opinions and a claimant's testimony that was improperly rejected by the ALJ and remand for benefits if:
(1) the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the testimony; (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a
determination of disability can be made; and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were such evidence credited.Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 594 (9th Cir. 2004); Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014) (precluding remand for further proceedings if the purpose is solely to allow ALJ to revisit the medical opinion he rejected). The Court concluded that the first requirement had been satisfied, because the ALJ rejected Stricker's symptom testimony and the opinion of Dr. Carrillo without legally valid reasons. But the Court finds that "further administrative proceedings would be useful"; therefore, credit as true is not applicable in this case. See Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Varney v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1988)).
Even if the Court found the second factor satisfied, it is not clear that the ALJ would be required to find Stricker disabled as of November 2016, her alleged onset date. First, although Stricker testified to significant symptoms, none of her symptom testimony pairs directly to a finding of disability. There is no vocational expert testimony indicating that if Stricker's symptom testimony was adopted as her RFC, she was unemployable. Second, with respect to the opinion of Dr. Carrillo, it was offered in July 2019, at Stricker's first appointment with that doctor. Dr. Carrillo did not provide any time frame for her findings. Therefore, it is not clear the ALJ would necessarily find Stricker disabled three years prior to Dr. Carrillo's opinion solely based on the limitations identified by that one doctor.
In the event the Court found that Stricker was not entitled to a remand for benefits, she requested a remand for further proceedings; Defendant concurred with that alternative request. Defendant agrees that upon remand the Appeals Council will affirm the finding that Stricker was disabled as of November 12, 2019. With respect to the period prior to that date, the ALJ will be directed to issue a new decision. Defendant asserted that the ALJ must consider two categories of evidence that she failed to acknowledge in her decision: Stricker's skin cancer must be evaluated beginning at Step Two (Claim 1); and the ALJ must consider the opinion of Dr. Hassman (Claim 6).
The ALJ must reevaluate Stricker's symptom testimony (Claim 7). The ALJ provided no meaningful explanation for finding Stricker's symptom testimony unsupported prior to November 12, 2019, but consistent with the evidence as of November 12, 2019. Stricker offered testimony at a hearing on November 6, 2019. The ALJ concluded her testimony was not supported on the day she offered it, but she fully credited her testimony six days later when she was examined by a neuropsychologist. Because a claimant's symptom testimony cannot be discounted solely based on objective medical evidence, that corroborating exam is insufficient as a basis to discount her symptom testimony. Further, the examination had no causal effect on the symptoms Stricker was experiencing. Therefore, the ALJ's unexplained decision, rejecting Stricker's symptom testimony up until the exam date, is illogical on its face. Next, the Court determined the ALJ's decision to reject the opinion evidence of Dr. Carrillo was not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, upon remand, the ALJ must reconsider Dr. Carrillo's opinion with respect to the period prior to November 12, 2019 (Claim 2).
Stricker contends the ALJ failed to discuss her lay witness testimony offered by William Fischbach and Barbara Mayhew (Claim 4). Pursuant to Ninth Circuit caselaw from 1993, "[i]f the ALJ wishes to discount the testimony of the lay witnesses, he must give reasons that are germane to each witness." Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993). This requirement satisfies the regulation that the ALJ would "consider observations by non-medical sources as to how an impairment affects a claimant's ability to work.” Id. (quoting Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987)). Defendant argues that caselaw no longer applies because the regulations have changed, citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.920c, 416.920c, which provides: "[w]e are not required to articulate how we considered evidence from nonmedical sources using the requirements in paragraphs (a)-(c) in this section." This regulatory change does not provide that an ALJ need not articulate any reason for discounting evidence from lay witnesses, it only states that the ALJ's consideration need not follow the requirements for evaluating medical opinions. This regulatory change is not inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's germane-reasons standard. See Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-20-00532-TUC-SHR-MSA, 2022 WL 464911, at *7 (D. Ariz. Jan. 11, 2022) ("the germane-reasons standard 'has always been a different (and lower) standard than that required for evaluating medical opinions.'") (quoting Alice B. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-05897, 2021 WL 6113000, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2021)), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 458517 (D. Ariz. Feb. 15, 2022); see also Kimberly T. v. Kijakazi, No. 3:20-CV-1543-SI, 2022 WL 910083, at *7 (D. Or. Mar. 29, 2022) ("Because there are no provisions of the new regulations that unambiguously remove the ALJ's obligation to address lay witness testimony, it follows that the ALJ must continue to give germane reasons for discounting lay witness testimony."); but see, e.g., John E.L. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:20-CV-5776-TLF, 2021 WL 5150359, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 5, 2021) (finding ALJ not required to offer any discussion regarding lay witness testimony under the 2017 regulations). Therefore, upon remand, the ALJ must consider the lay witness testimony and offer germane reasons if she decides to reject it.
The ALJ found Stricker disabled only as of November 2019, which was three years after the alleged onset date, and almost two years after the expiration of her insured status. Therefore, the onset date is critical. Defendant acknowledges that the ALJ's evaluation of the onset date for disability was "deficient," but she did not identify the issues. The ALJ selected the onset date based on a medical expert, who based her opinion on a November 12, 2019 neuropsychological examination. (AR 146.) It is evident that Stricker's symptoms did not manifest for the first time during her November 2019 examination. The expert agreed that if Stricker exhibited the identified symptoms prior to November 12, 2019, Stricker could have met the listing at an earlier date. (AR 147.) However, the doctor stated that, in the records she reviewed, such symptoms were not described in-depth in the 2016 time-period. (Id.)
As asserted by Stricker, the ALJ should comply with SSR 18-1p in evaluating the onset date (Claim 3). The onset date is not limited to the date of diagnosis as to an impairment. See Morgan v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 1991). Further, the Ninth Circuit has recognized the progressive nature of mental impairments, which may require that the onset date of impairment be inferred with the assistance of a medical expert. Id. The need for a medical expert is one reason the Court will not attempt to identify an earlier onset date. Even if the ALJ concludes Stricker does not meet a Listing prior to November 12, 2019, she must consider whether Stricker is disabled at Step Four or Five. Finally, in light of the extensive re-evaluation needed upon remand, the Court concludes it need not assess the ALJ's Step Four finding (Claim 5).
RECOMMENDATION
The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court remand this matter for further proceedings. Upon remand, the ALJ should obtain further evidence as necessary and evaluate the entirety of the record as directed in the Conclusion.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party's objections within fourteen days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the district court. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-21-317-TUC-SHR.