Opinion
23A-CR-1552
07-18-2024
Jaqwanta Earl Streeter, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT David W. Stone, IV Anderson, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Catherine E. Brizzi Deputy Attorney General
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court The Honorable Angela Warner Sims, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 48C01-2111-F5-3125
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
David W. Stone, IV Anderson, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana
Catherine E. Brizzi Deputy Attorney General
MEMORANDUM DECISION
PYLE, JUDGE
Statement of the Case
[¶1] Jaqwanta Earl Streeter ("Streeter") appeals, following a bench trial, his conviction for Level 5 felony dealing in marijuana. Streeter argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
[¶2] We affirm.
Issue
Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence.
Facts
[¶3] On the evening of November 15, 2021, Anderson Police Department Sergeant Chad Boynton ("Sergeant Boynton") was on patrol. Sergeant Boynton saw a white Chrysler ("the car") that was "illegally parked" and facing "westbound in the eastbound lane of traffic." (Tr. at 58). Sergeant Boynton noticed that the taillights were blinking on the car. As a result, he pulled his police vehicle behind the car and activated his emergency light. When Sergeant Boynton exited his patrol car and approached the car, he had difficulty determining whether there were any occupants in the car due to the "darkness and tint on the windows[.]" (Tr. 59).
[¶4] At that moment, Streeter came out of a residence and walked towards the car. Sergeant Boynton approached Streeter and asked him if the illegally-parked car was his car. Streeter responded that the car belonged to him. Sergeant Boynton asked Streeter for his identification, and Streeter initially refused to give Sergeant Boynton his identification. When Sergeant Boynton explained that he could issue a ticket for Streeter's illegally parked car, Streeter gave Sergeant Boynton his name and address.
[¶5] Anderson Police Department Officer Bryn Cavett ("Officer Cavett") and another officer arrived at the scene. At this time, Sergeant Boynton noticed the strong smell of raw marijuana. Sergeant Boynton was standing five to eight feet away from the car and about eighteen inches away from Streeter. Initially, Sergeant Boynton could not tell if the smell of raw marijuana was coming from Streeter or the car, but he knew that "it was close." (Tr. at 60). Once Sergeant Boynton got closer to the car, he confirmed that the smell of marijuana was coming from the car. Sergeant Boynton asked Streeter if he was carrying a firearm, and Streeter responded that he had his gun on his person. Sergeant Boynton handcuffed Streeter, and Officer Cavett removed the firearm from Streeter's person. Officers also found a large amount of cash on Streeter's person, and Streeter informed Sergeant Boynton that it was around five thousand dollars.
At some point, one of the officers on the scene released the money to a person nearby. Thereafter, the individual tossed a portion of the money back onto the sidewalk for the officers to collect.
[¶6] Soon after, Anderson Police Department Officer Chaz Willis ("Officer Willis"), who had a K-9 unit, walked the K-9 around the car. However, Officer Willis explained to Sergeant Boynton that the canine was not trained to detect the odor of marijuana. Officer Willis also told Sergeant Boynton that he could smell the odor of marijuana coming from the car.
[¶7] Sergeant Boynton and Officer Willis searched the car. On the passenger side, the officers found two bags of "manufactured sealed marijuana" that appeared to have come from a "legal dispensary[.]" (Tr. at 66). One of the two bags had been opened and contained green plant material. In the trunk of the car, officers found two large containers or bags. One bag was a large trash bag. Inside of the trash bag, officers found two large bags full of green plant material. The second large container or bag was a "zipper style plastic bag" similar to the bag used to package bedspreads or comforters. (Tr. at 66). This zipper style bag contained eleven smaller bags full of green plant material. In total, officers had collected over ten pounds of green plant material from the car.
[¶8] Based on the results of the search, the State charged Streeter with Level 5 felony dealing marijuana, Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license. In May 2023, the trial court held a bench trial. At the beginning of the bench trial, Streeter lodged a standing objection to the admission of any evidence seized during the search of his car. Specifically, the following exchange between Streeter's counsel and the trial court occurred:
The State dismissed the two Class A misdemeanors at Streeter's bench trial.
[STREETER'S COUNSEL]: . . . [Streeter]'s main objection is a [m]otion to [s]uppress as to state and federal constitutional grounds Article 1, Section 11 and the Fourth Amendment and so he is objecting as to any and all uh seizures of any items and so that's his objection throughout. If the Court overrules any of those objections any foundation as to an item uh we would agree so that we are not contesting the lab report if . . . the item comes in. We are not contesting . . . any other supporting documentation or anything as far as the chain of the custody or anything else past that.
THE COURT: Okay.
[STREETER'S COUNSEL]: If that makes sense.
THE COURT: Yes.
* * * * *
THE COURT: Defense doesn't object to what it is and how it came to be[,] it[] just questions whether it was legal or not for it to be obtained in the first place.
[STREETER'S COUNSEL]: Absolutely.(Tr. at 51). The trial court admitted State's Exhibit 1, which contained Sergeant Boynton's bodycam footage. The State also moved to admit State's Exhibit 2 and 3, which contained the marijuana collected by officers during the search of the car. The trial court admitted State's Exhibit 2 and 3 over Streeter's objection. The trial court also admitted State's Exhibit 6, which contained the police lab reports of the items that officers had collected from the car. State's Exhibit 6 confirmed that the green plant material collected from the car tested positive for marijuana.
[¶9] Sergeant Boynton testified at the bench trial. Specifically, Sergeant Boynton testified that he had participated in "well over two hundred" marijuana investigations. (Tr. at 54). Sergeant Boynton further testified that he was able to distinguish between the smell of raw and burnt marijuana. Sergeant Boynton testified that the area where he had initiated the traffic stop was known as the "Swain residence" and was a "hotspot" and was known as a "high narcotics[] activity area[.]" (Tr. at 57). Sergeant Boynton also testified that when he had approached the car, the smell of raw marijuana "was very clearly emanating from within the vehicle." (Tr. at 64).
[¶10] At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court found Streeter guilty of Level 5 felony dealing in marijuana. At his sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Streeter to four (4) years, with three (3) years executed at the Indiana Department of Correction and one (1) year suspended to probation.
[¶11] Streeter now appeals.
Decision
[¶12] Streeter argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence seized from the search of his car in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. We review the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion, which occurs only when the admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013). "We neither reweigh the evidence nor reevaluate the witnesses' credibility; rather, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the [judgment], and we will affirm that [judgment] unless we cannot find substantial evidence of probative value to support it." Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1265 (Ind. 2015). "However, when a party argues the admission of evidence constituted a constitutional violation, we apply a de novo standard of review." Miller v. State, 201 N.E.3d 683, 687 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022).
[¶13] Streeter first challenges the admission of the evidence seized during the search of his car under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
[¶14] "The fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is to protect the legitimate expectations of privacy that citizens possess in their persons, their homes, and their belongings." Taylor v. State, 842 N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ind. 2006). This protection has been "extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment." Bradley v. State, 54 N.E.3d 996, 999 (Ind. 2016). "As a deterrent mechanism, evidence obtained in violation of this rule is generally not admissible in a prosecution against the victim of the unlawful search or seizure absent evidence of a recognized exception." Clark, 994 N.E.2d at 260. "When a search is conducted without a warrant, the State has the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement existed at the time of the search." Bradley, 54 N.E.3d at 999 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
[¶15] "The automobile exception is well established, allowing officers to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle where[:] (1) the vehicle was readily mobile or capable of being driven when the police first seized it; and (2) probable cause existed that the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of a crime." Cleveland v. State, 129 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019), trans. denied. Under this exception, "an operational vehicle is inherently mobile, whether or not a driver is behind the wheel or has ready access." State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281, 1286 (Ind. 2010).
[¶16] Here, Sergeant Boynton testified that the car was "illegally parked" and that the taillights were blinking on the car. (Tr. at 58). Based on this testimony, we find that the car was readily mobile or capable of being driven.
[¶17] Further, we have consistently held that probable cause exists to search a vehicle when an officer detects the odor of marijuana. See Moore v. State, 211 N.E.3d 574, 581 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023) (holding that an officer's "detection of the odor of marijuana immediately upon his arrival at the open window of the car driven by [the defendant] provided probable cause for him to search the car under the automobile exception"). See also Marcum v. State, 843 N.E.2d 546, 548 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006) (holding that two officers' testimony that they had smelled marijuana coming from a vehicle provided probable cause to search the vehicle).
[¶18] Here, our review of the record reveals that Sergeant Boynton testified that when he had approached the car, the smell of raw marijuana "was very clearly emanating from within the vehicle." (Tr. at 64). Further, Sergeant Boynton testified that Officer Willis could also smell the odor of marijuana coming from the car. Therefore, we conclude that Sergeant Boynton had probable cause to search the car after he and Officer Willis had both smelled the strong odor of marijuana coming from the car. See Marcum, 843 N.E.2d at 548. We hold that the search of the car did not violate the Fourth Amendment and was lawful under the automobile exception.
In support of his claim that the automobile exception did not apply here, Streeter cites to Scott v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1207 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002), reh'g denied, trans. denied, for the proposition that an exigency requirement applies to the automobile exception. However, in Myers v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1146 (Ind. 2005), the Indiana Supreme Court noted that the automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement. Myers, 839 N.E.2d at 1152 (citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999)). Streeter's arguments under the Fourth Amendment also direct us to cases discussing searches incident to arrest. However, we have found that this search was lawful under the automobile exception and need not address Streeter's arguments under the search incident to an arrest exception.
[¶19] However, Streeter also challenges the admission of the evidence seized during the search of his car under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, which provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated[.]" IND. CONST. ART. 1, § 11. "The purpose of this section is to protect those areas of life that Hoosiers consider private from unreasonable police activity." State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1206 (Ind. 2008), reh'g denied. Although Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution contains language nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, we interpret Article 1, Section 11 independently. See Shotts v. State, 925 N.E.2d 719, 726 (Ind. 2010). "[W]e focus on the actions of the police officer, and employ a totality-of-the-circumstances test to evaluate the reasonableness of the officer's actions." Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1034 (Ind. 2013) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The reasonableness of a law enforcement officer's search or seizure requires balancing three factors: (1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred; (2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities; and (3) the extent of law enforcement needs. Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005).
Streeter did not argue that the search was unlawful under the Litchfield factors, but instead, argues generally that the search was unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances.
[¶20] Here, our review of the record reveals that there was a high degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation had occurred. Specifically, Sergeant Boynton testified that he was familiar with the smell of marijuana through his training and experience. Sergeant Boynton further testified that he had participated in over two hundred cases involving marijuana. Most importantly, Sergeant Boynton testified that there was a strong odor of marijuana coming from the car. See Moore, 211 N.E.3d at 583 (holding that the smell of marijuana by an officer "established a high degree of suspicion of criminal activity").
[¶21] Turning to the other Litchfield factors, the degree of intrusion on Streeter was moderate. Sergeant Boynton had initiated a traffic stop because the car was illegally parked. Once officers conducted the search of the car because of the officers' detection of the odor of marijuana, the intrusion was moderate. Officers did not dismantle any part of the car or cut into the seat cushions during their search. See Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 946 (Ind. 2020) (finding that a search of a car is a moderate intrusion when the search is no more extensive than a visual inspection of the interior of the vehicle), cert. denied. Further, the extent of law enforcement needs were high because the search was consistent with law enforcement's responsibility to deter crime, to intercept criminal activity, and to apprehend its perpetrators. Washington, 898 N.E.2d at 1206. Specifically, Sergeant Boynton testified that the Swain residence was a hotspot and was known as a high narcotics activity area.
[¶22] The officers' search of the car was not unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances and did not violate Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted into evidence the marijuana collected by officers from the search of the car.
[¶23] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.