Opinion
No. CV 10 5033455 S
January 6, 2011
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
The issue presented to the court is whether the plaintiff's claims for money damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief against prison officials are barred by sovereign immunity. The court grants the defendants' motion to dismiss because the suit is barred by sovereign immunity.
FACTS
The plaintiff in this matter, Maco Streater, is an inmate at Osborn Correctional Institution. The defendants, Edward Moldonado, Michelle Pidgeon, and Captain Vinton are prison officials at the Enfield Correctional Institution. On September 16, 2010, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants due to insufficient service of process and that the plaintiff's claims were barred by sovereign immunity. On September 27, 2010, the plaintiff moved for an extension of time to respond to the motion to dismiss. The defendants did not object to that motion. On November 4, 2010, the plaintiff filed a request to amend his complaint. The defendants did not object to that request.
The plaintiff's amended complaint alleges, inter alia, the following facts, which the court assumes to be true for the purpose of deciding this motion. Inmates at the Enfield Correctional Institution are housed in a dormitory for three months upon their arrival. After that period, they are transferred to a room, where they may remain with good behavior. On May 18, 2010, the plaintiff, who was then living in a room, was transferred back to a dormitory on Vinton's orders. The plaintiff believed that there was no cause for the transfer, and expressed his displeasure to Vinton. Vinton allegedly retaliated by terminating the plaintiff's job. The plaintiff then filed a grievance with Maldonado and Pidgeon. Maldonado and Pidgeon referred the grievance to Vinton for investigation. The plaintiff was then transferred to Osborn Correctional Institution. That transfer was allegedly in retaliation for the plaintiff's filing a grievance. The grievance filed by the plaintiff has not been resolved.
On December 10, 2010, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint on the grounds of insufficient service of process and sovereign immunity. The defendants also filed a memorandum of law in support of their motion on that day. The plaintiff did not file an objection to the motion to dismiss. On December 22, 2010, the plaintiff filed a "motion for amendment of process." The court took the papers on defendants' renewed motion to dismiss and the plaintiff's motion for amendment of process at short calendar on January 3, 2011.
ANALYSIS
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bacon Construction Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 294 Conn. 695, 706, 987 A.2d 348 (2010). "[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).
The defendants argue that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's amended complaint because they are shielded from suit by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The court need not address the defendants' argument regarding service of process because, as discussed below, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's claims.
"[W]e have long recognized the validity of the common-law principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent . . . We have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cox v. Aiken, 278 Conn. 204, 211, 897 A.2d 71 (2006).
"[T]he sovereign immunity enjoyed by the state is not absolute. There are [three] exceptions:(1) when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waives the state's sovereign immunity; . . . (2) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights; . . . and (3) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer's statutory authority . . . For a claim made pursuant to the first exception, this court has recognized the well established principle that statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed . . . Where there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they are given the effect which makes the least rather than the most change in sovereign immunity . . . For a claim made pursuant to the second exception, complaining of unconstitutional acts, we require that [t]he allegations of such a complaint and the factual underpinnings if placed in issue, must clearly demonstrate an incursion upon constitutionally protected interests . . . For a claim under the third exception, the plaintiffs must do more than allege that the defendants' conduct was in excess of their statutory authority; they also must allege or otherwise establish facts that reasonably support those allegations . . . In the absence of a proper factual basis in the complaint to support the applicability of these exceptions, the granting of a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds is proper . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 349-51, 977 A.2d 636 (2009).
As to the first exception: "[A] plaintiff who seeks to bring an action for monetary damages against the state must first obtain authorization from the claims commissioner . . . General Statutes § 4-160(a) provides as follows: `When the Claims Commissioner deems it just and equitable, the Claims Commissioner may authorize suit against the state on any claim which, in the opinion of the Claims Commissioner, presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private person, could be liable.' When sovereign immunity has not been waived, the claims commissioner is authorized by statute to hear monetary claims against the state and determine whether the claimant has a cognizable claim . . . This legislation expressly bars suits upon claims cognizable by the claims commissioner except as he may authorize, an indication of the legislative determination to preserve sovereign immunity as a defense to monetary claims against the state not sanctioned by the[claims] commissioner or other statutory provisions . . . Since we are not aware of any legal barrier to the presentation of the plaintiff's claim to the [claims] commissioner or to his favorable action upon it, we cannot assume that recourse to that procedure would necessarily have been futile or inadequate." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 351-52.
As to the second exception, where a prisoner alleges a violation of his constitutional rights, "[i]t is a settled principle of administrative law that, if an adequate administrative remedy exists, it must be exhausted before the Superior Court will obtain jurisdiction to act in the matter . . . The exhaustion doctrine reflects the legislative intent that such issues be handled in the first instance by local administrative officials in order to provide aggrieved persons with full and adequate administrative relief . . .
"Under Connecticut's administrative scheme, if a complaint is brought to the attention of the [department of correction] and it investigates the matter and makes conclusions based on information provided in part by an inmate, that does not relieve the inmate of [his] responsibility to follow the proper procedures if [he] decides to bring a federal [or state] action based on such claims . . . Furthermore, the department's directives set forth the procedures for an inmate to set into motion the grievance process . . . [G]rievances that are rejected may be appealed." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Richardson v. Commissioner of Correction, 87 Conn.App. 46, 48-49, 863 A.2d 754 (2005).
In this case, the plaintiff's amended complaint does not allege that the plaintiff received authorization from the claims commissioner to proceed with this suit for money damages. The court is therefore without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's claims for money damages against the state. The plaintiff's claim for money damages is, therefore, dismissed. As to the second exception, even if the plaintiff's amended complaint alleges facts that would show a constitutional violation, it does not allege facts showing that he exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. As to the third exception, the plaintiff's amended complaint does not allege facts showing that the defendants acted in excess of their statutory authority. Since the plaintiff has not alleged facts that would fall within the two exceptions to sovereign immunity with respect to injunctive or declaratory relief, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear such claims.
The court therefore, dismisses the plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff's amended complaint alleges neither that he sought or was granted authorization to sue the state from the claims commissioner, nor that he exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to any alleged constitutional violation, nor that the defendants were acting in excess of their statutory authority. For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint in its entirety.