Opinion
No. 2022-09519 Index No. 608054/20
05-29-2024
Marc Strauss, appellant, v. Kathleen Valkenburg, etc., et al., respondents.
Wisell & McGhee, LLP, Kew Gardens, NY (John T. Wisell of counsel), for appellant. Vigorito, Barker, Patterson, Nichols & Porter, LLP, New York, NY (Joshua R. Cohen of counsel), for respondents.
Wisell & McGhee, LLP, Kew Gardens, NY (John T. Wisell of counsel), for appellant.
Vigorito, Barker, Patterson, Nichols & Porter, LLP, New York, NY (Joshua R. Cohen of counsel), for respondents.
VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P. PAUL WOOTEN WILLIAM G. FORD JANICE A. TAYLOR, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Catherine Rizzo, J.), dated October 11, 2022. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was to compel the defendants to allow the plaintiff's expert to extract the plaintiff's metadata or electronic audit trail of his own medical records from the defendants' electronic medical records.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
On September 21, 2021, the plaintiff moved, inter alia, to compel the defendants to allow the plaintiff's expert to extract the plaintiff's metadata or electronic audit trail of his own medical records from the defendants' electronic medical records. In an order dated October 11, 2022, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion, finding that "it appears that the plaintiff is in receipt of the plaintiff's metadata/electronic audit trail" based on the searches already "run by the defendants." The plaintiff appeals.
CPLR 3103(a) directs that generally "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof" (Forman v Henkin, 30 N.Y.3d 656, 661 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "The words, 'material and necessary,' are... to be interpreted liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity" (Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 406; see Vargas v Lee, 170 A.D.3d 1073, 1075). "Accordingly, in this context, the word 'necessary' means needful and not indispensable" (Vargas v Lee, 170 A.D.3d at 1075 [alterations, emphasis, and internal quotation marks omitted]). "Similarly, in this context, if there is any possibility that the information is sought in good faith for possible use as evidence-in-chief or for cross-examination or in rebuttal, it should be considered matter 'material' in the action" (id. [alterations and internal quotation marks omitted]).
Nonetheless, "although broad," the right to disclosure "is not unlimited" (Forman v Henkin, 30 N.Y.3d at 661). Thus, "competing interests must always be balanced; the need for discovery must be weighed against any special burden to be borne by the opposing party" (Vargas v Lee, 170 A.D.3d at 1076 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Forman v Henkin, 30 N.Y.3d at 662).
"The supervision of discovery is generally left to the trial court's broad discretion" (D'Alessandro v Nassau Health Care Corp., 137 A.D.3d 1195, 1196 [alterations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Hamed v Alas Realty Corp., 209 A.D.3d 628, 629). "The Supreme Court's discretion is broad because it is familiar with the action before it, and its exercise should not be disturbed on appeal unless it was improvidently exercised" (Hamed v Alas Realty Corp., 209 A.D.3d at 629 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Vargas v Lee, 170 A.D.3d at 1076).
The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in determining that the requested materials were material and necessary within the meaning of CPLR 3103(a) (see Vargas v Lee, 170 A.D.3d at 1075). However, unlike in Vargas v Lee, here, the defendants "substantiate[d] [their] claim" that the requested audit trails "had already been provided," which the court credited (id. at 1077; see Harms v TLC Health Network, 215 A.D.3d 1295, 1296). Thus, under the circumstances of this case, in which the defendants provided three rounds of responsive material to the plaintiff's demand while under the court's supervision, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was to compel the defendants to allow the plaintiff's expert to extract the plaintiff's metadata or electronic audit trail of his own medical records from the defendants' electronic medical records.
In light of the foregoing, we need not reach the defendants' remaining contention.
BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., WOOTEN, FORD and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.