Opinion
No. 2:99CV00103
August 17, 2000.
Hugh Patrick Cline, Jr., Cline, Adkins Cline, for Plaintiff.
Julie C. Dudley, U.S. Attorney's Office, for Defendant.
I. Background and Standard of Review
Plaintiff, Juvada Stratton, filed this action challenging the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, ("Commissioner"), denying her claims for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits, ("DIB"), under the Social Security Act, as amended, ("Act"), 42 U.S.C.A § 423 (West Supp. 2000). Jurisdiction of this court is pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (West Supp. 2000). This case is before the undersigned magistrate judge by referral pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(B) (West 1993). As directed by the order of referral, the undersigned now submits the following report and recommended disposition.
The court's review in this case is limited to determining if substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's factual findings and whether he reached his decision through application of the correct legal standards. See Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence is "evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion. It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence, but may be somewhat less than a preponderance." Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966). "If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is `substantial evidence.' " Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Laws, 368 F.2d at 642).
The record shows that Stratton filed her application for DIB on March 17, 1995, alleging disability as of May 4, 1994, due to carpal tunnel syndrome and residuals from surgery which removed a ruptured and bulging disc in her neck. (Record, ("R."), at 71-74, 88.) Her claim was denied initially and on reconsideration. (R. at 75-77, 78, 80-82.) Stratton then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, ("ALJ"). (R. at 83-84.) The ALJ held this hearing on October 10, 1997, at which Stratton was represented by counsel. (R. at 32-70.)
In a decision dated January 26, 1998, the ALJ granted Stratton a closed period of disability. (R. at 12-25.) The ALJ found that Stratton met the disability insured status requirements of the Act between May 4, 1994, and July 13, 1995. (R. at 20.) The ALJ also found that Stratton had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity during this closed period. (R. at 20.) The ALJ found that the medical evidence established that Stratton suffered from a severe impairment, namely status post cervical fusion at the C5-6 level, but he found that Stratton's condition did not meet or equal the criteria of any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. at 20-21.) The ALJ also found that Stratton suffered from a major depressive disorder, Raynaud's Syndrome and mitral valve prolapse, disorders which he found were not severe. (R. at 20.) The ALJ also found that Stratton's allegations of disabling pain and other symptoms were credible within the closed period mentioned above, but he found that they were not credible thereafter. (R. at 21.) The ALJ next found that during this closed period, Stratton could not lift items weighing more than 10 pounds and could not sustain attention, concentration, persistence or pace on a regular basis. (R. at 21.) The ALJ also found that Stratton could not perform her past relevant work. (R. at 21.)
Based on Stratton's age, education, residual functional capacity and the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found that there existed no jobs in the national and regional economies which Stratton could perform from May 4, 1994, through July 13, 1995. (R. at 21.) The ALJ next found that Stratton's condition had improved sufficiently by July 13, 1995, to allow her to return to work activity. (R. at 21.) The ALJ indicated further that after July 13, 1995, Stratton retained the residual functional capacity for unskilled, sedentary work, which would not require her to lift items weighing more than 10 pounds. (R. at 21.) Therefore, the ALJ found that Stratton was disabled within the meaning of the Act between May 4, 1994, and July 13, 1995, but not thereafter. (R. at 21-22.) See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, 404.1579 (1999).
Stratton pursued her administrative appeals, (R. at 8), and the Appeals Council denied Stratton's request for review on June 9, 1999. (R. at 5-7.) Stratton then filed this action seeking review of the unfavorable aspect of the ALJ's decision, which now stands as the Commissioner's final decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (1999). The case is before this court on the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment filed on November 16, 1999. Stratton's counsel presented oral argument before the undersigned on August 16, 2000.
II. Facts
Stratton was born on February 9, 1948, which at the time of the ALJ's decision in this case classified her as a "younger individual" under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(b). (R. at 35, 71.) Stratton completed the seventh grade in school, and she has past relevant work experience as a nursing aide. (R. at 35-36, 92.) At her hearing, Stratton testified that she injured her back in May 1994 when she was moving a patient. (R. at 37.) Stratton indicated that this injury resulted in a ruptured disc in her back, for which she continued to receive workers' compensation benefits. (R. at 37.) She returned to work for three months in September 1995. (R. at 37.)
At her hearing, Stratton testified that she completed the eighth grade. (R. at 35.)
Stratton testified further that she suffered from chronic pain in her back and that she had been recently diagnosed with lupus. (R. at 38.) She also said that she suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome. (R. at 40.) Stratton also testified that she could not lift items weighing more than 10 pounds. (R. at 41.) She indicated further that she could sit or stand for up to only 15 minutes at a time without interruption. (R. at 41-42.)
In rendering his decision, the ALJ reviewed medical records from Community Hospital Support Services; Dr. Daniel P. Robertson, M.D.; Holston Valley Hospital and Medical Center, ("Holston Valley"); Allied Performance and Rehabilitation Resources; Indian Path Medical Center, ("Indian Path"); Norton Community Hospital; Dr. Kathleen Caizzi, M.D.; Dr. Fred R. Knickerbocker, M.D.; and Dr. Rupinder Kaur, M.D. Stratton's attorney also submitted additional medical reports from Norton Community Hospital to the Appeals Council.
Since the Appeals Council considered this evidence in reaching its decision not to grant review, (R. at 5-7), this court also should consider this evidence in determining whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings. See Wilkins v. Secretary of Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 953 F.2d 93, 96 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
The record indicates that Stratton was awarded workers' compensation benefits in Virginia beginning May 12, 1994, for an injury she suffered at work on May 4, 1994. (R. at 96-101.) Stratton received a cervical myelogram at Holston Valley on July 19, 1994. (R. at 173-87.) This radiological study indicated that she suffered from disc protrusions at the C3-4 and C4-5 levels. (R. at 180-82.) It also indicated that she had minimal cord flattening at the C5-6 level. (R. at 180-82.) She underwent nerve conduction studies on July 29, 1994, at Indian Path. (R. at 167, 230-31.) This examination revealed that Stratton suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome. (R. at 231.)
Stratton underwent physical therapy at Community Hospital Support Services between May 16, 1994, and July 8, 1994. (R. at 122-29.) Stratton was treated at Blue Ridge Neuroscience Center for neck and right arm pain between July 8, 1994, and March 1, 1995. (R. at 130-52.)
The record indicates further that Stratton underwent a discectomy operation on November 10, 1994. (R. at 160-61, 218-29.) She was discharged in good condition, at which time she was instructed not to lift anything heavier than a book and to wear a collar brace at all times. (R. at 219.)
Stratton received physical therapy at Allied Performance Rehabilitation Resources, Inc., between August 31, 1994, and January 19, 1995. (R. at 188-217.) On January 19, 1995, Rachel Trachy, a physical therapist, indicated that Stratton continued to suffer from pain and from muscle spasms, but she stated that Stratton no longer used her hard collar brace. (R. at 190.) She noted that, at that time, Stratton retained a "poor tolerance" for reaching, for backing up while driving and for lifting objects weighing more than five pounds. (R. at 190.) A radiological report dated February 3, 1995, indicated that there existed no evidence of "residual or recurrent disc extrusion" following the operation. (R. at 155-56.) A myelogram of the cervical spine taken on February 20, 1995, indicated that Stratton suffered from minimal cord deflection at the C3-4 level, but it indicated no evidence of cord flattening or lateral nerve impingement. (R. at 151.) It also indicated that the previous surgery was successful and that the disc fusion had taken. (R. at 151-52.) A CT scan of Stratton's brain taken on February 24, 1995, was normal. (R. at 252.)
On March 1, 1995, Dr. Robertson indicated that Stratton appeared "comfortable not wearing her collar and [was] not complaining of any pain and smiling and talking, moving her head about freely." (R. at 130.) He instructed her to continue with physical therapy and to take medication for pain as needed. He did not indicate that Stratton had any restrictions and he noted that follow-up was not necessary. (R. at 130.) There are no records indicating that Stratton engaged in physical therapy after this date.
A CT scan of Stratton's head taken on March 1, 1995, was normal. (R. at 130.) A separate CT scan revealed that Stratton had inner body fusion at the C5-C6 level with a small posterior osteophyte for the superior margin of C6, a central disc protrusion at the C3-C4 level which was stable and a shallow annular bulge at the C4-C5 level. (R. at 130.) At the same time, there existed no evidence of direct cord or nerve root compression. (R. at 130.)
Dr. Caizzi evaluated Stratton in a report dated March 29, 1995. (R. at 260-63.) In her evaluation, Dr. Caizzi indicated that Stratton had significant limitation in her range of motion, and she sent Stratton for specific functional capacity evaluation. (R. at 262.) Linda Phillips, B.S., completed a Functional Capacity Evaluation Summary form on March 31, 1995. (R. at 256-59.) The summary was based upon a series of tests which Phillips administered. Based upon these tests, Phillips concluded that Stratton could perform work at the sedentary level. She indicated that Stratton could lift items weighing up to 10 pounds occasionally. (R. at 259.) Phillips also indicated that Stratton could sit for up to 50 minutes and walk or stand for up to 60 minutes "with no apparent difficulty." (R. at 259.) Phillips suggested that Stratton's observed behavior during testing "suggest[ed] significant symptom magnification." (R. at 259.)
Dr. Fred R. Knickerbocker, M.D., evaluated Stratton in a letter dated January 18, 1996. (R. at 275-76.) He indicated that he had examined Stratton and that he had reviewed her past medical records and radiological studies. (R. at 275-76.) He indicated that he did not believe that Stratton had a "persistent nerveroot irritation or disc problem." (R. at 276.) He also indicated that "[i]f it were not for her subjective complaints of pain, I find no reason why she could not return to work." (R. at 276.) He suggested that she be tested for chronic myofascial syndrome. (R. at 276.)
In a letter dated June 5, 1996, Dr. Caizzi indicated that Stratton was "neither psychologically or physically able to maintain any gainful employment." (R. at 274.) She also noted that Stratton had reached her "plateau for recovery." (R. at 274.) She did not indicate the basis for these conclusions. On April 23, 1997, Dr. Caizzi indicated that "[d]espite intense rehabilitation, [Stratton] continues with neck and arm pain and numbness." (R. at 277.) She again suggested that Stratton was unable to return to her original work duties. (R. at 278.) On May 21, 1997, Dr. Caizzi indicated that Stratton suffered from mitral valve prolapse, Raynaud's disease and myofascial syndrome with accompanying shoulder, neck and arm pain. (R. at 293.) Radiological studies of Stratton's knees conducted on September 4, 1997, indicated that she suffered from minimal degenerative stress changes. (R. at 283.)
Dr. Kaur provided a psychological evaluation of Stratton dated June 22, 1995. (R. at 298-99.) In this evaluation, Dr. Kaur concluded that Stratton suffered from major depression. (R. at 299.) In a letter dated July 5, 1995, Dr. Kaur indicated that Stratton suffered from major depression, single, moderately severe, and said that Stratton's prognosis was "guarded." (R. at 292.) Dr. Kaur provided no further assessment of Stratton's work-related abilities. Dr. Kaur prescribed antidepressant medication. (R. at 297.) Dr. Caizzi indicated that Stratton continued to take this medication until at least October 22, 1997, and that it successfully controlled her symptoms. (R. at 300.)
Vocational expert Donna Bardsley testified at Stratton's hearing. (R. at 65-69.) She testified that Stratton's past work as a nursing assistant was medium, semi-skilled work. (R. at 66.) The ALJ then asked Bardsley to assume a hypothetical individual of Stratton's age, educational background, past work experience and who could lift items weighing up to 12 pounds, with grip strength of 27 pounds. (R. at 66.) The ALJ also asked Bardsley to assume that this hypothetical individual should not do repetitive pushing or pulling, could occasionally reach over her head and that she could not engage in holding her head down for a prolonged period. (R. at 66.) He also asked Bardsley to assume that this individual could do no repetitive grasping or fine dexterity movements. (R. at 67.) Bardsley testified that there existed no jobs that such an individual could perform. (R. at 67.)
The ALJ then modified the hypothetical by indicating that the hypothetical individual no longer had the restrictions against repetitive grasping or holding the head down for a prolonged period. (R. at 67.) The ALJ testified that there existed a number of jobs in the national and regional economies that such an individual could perform. (R. at 67-68.) Among these jobs were sedentary positions and jobs as a packager, sorter, inspector, assembler, information clerk and cashier. (R. at 67.) Bardsley also testified that the hypothetical individual could perform no jobs if she had a marked amount of depression and a marked restriction in her ability to concentrate, remember and maintain a persistent pace. (R. at 69.) Bardsley further testified that a moderate amount of depression resulting in moderate restriction in the ability to concentrate, remember and maintain a persistent pace would not affect an individual's ability to perform the sedentary jobs she had listed. (R. at 68-69.)
III. Analysis
The Commissioner uses a five-step process in evaluating DIB claims. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1999). See also Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460-61 (1983); Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264-65 (4th Cir. 1981). This process requires the Commissioner to consider, in order, whether a claimant 1) is working; 2) has a severe impairment; 3) has an impairment that meets or equals the requirements of a listed impairment; 4) can return to her past relevant work; and 5) if not, whether she can perform other work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1999). If the Commissioner finds conclusively that a claimant is or is not disabled at any point in this process, review does not proceed to the next step. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) (1999).
Under this analysis, a claimant has the initial burden of showing that she is unable to return to her past relevant work because of her impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512, 404.1520 (1999). Once the claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. To satisfy this burden, the Commissioner must then establish that the claimant has the residual functional capacity, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience and impairments, to perform alternative jobs that exist in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 423(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2000). See also McLain v. Schweiker, 715 F.2d 866, 868-69 (4th Cir. 1983); Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65; Wilson v. Califano, 617 F.2d 1050, 1053 (4th Cir. 1980).
In a decision dated January 26, 1998, the ALJ granted Stratton a closed period of disability. (R. at 12-25.) The ALJ found that Stratton met the disability insured status requirements of the Act between May 4, 1994, and July 13, 1995. (R. at 20.) The ALJ also found that Stratton had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity during this closed period. (R. at 20.) The ALJ found that the medical evidence established that Stratton suffered from a severe impairment, namely status post cervical fusion at the C5-6 level, but he found that Stratton's condition did not meet or equal the criteria of any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. at 20-21.) The ALJ also found that Stratton suffered from a major depressive disorder, Raynaud's Syndrome and mitral valve prolapse, disorders which he found were not severe. (R. at 20.) The ALJ also found that Stratton's allegations of disabling pain and other symptoms were credible within the closed period mentioned above, but that they were not credible thereafter. (R. at 21.) The ALJ next found that during this closed period, Stratton could not lift items weighing more than 10 pounds and could not sustain attention, concentration, persistence or pace on a regular basis. (R. at 21.) The ALJ also found that Stratton could not perform her past relevant work. (R. at 21.)
Based on Stratton's age, education, residual functional capacity and the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found that there existed no jobs in the national and regional economies which Stratton could perform from May 4, 1994, through July 13, 1995. (R. at 21.) The ALJ next found that Stratton's condition had improved sufficiently by July 13, 1995, to allow her to return to work activity. (R. at 21.) The ALJ indicated further that after July 13, 1995, Stratton retained the residual functional capacity for unskilled, sedentary work, which would not require her to lift items weighing more than 10 pounds. (R. at 21.) Therefore, the ALJ found that Stratton was disabled within the meaning of the Act between May 4, 1994, and July 13, 1995, but not thereafter. (R. at 21-22.) See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, 404.1579 (1999).
In her brief, Stratton argues that substantial evidence does not exist in the record of this case to support the ALJ's decision that her condition had improved sufficiently by July 13, 1995, to allow her to return to work. (Objection To Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, ("Plaintiff's Brief"), at 12-13.) Specifically, Stratton argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating her subjective complaints of pain. (Plaintiff's Brief at 5-12.)
As stated above, it is the ALJ's responsibility to weigh the evidence, including the medical evidence, in order to resolve any conflicts which might appear therein. See Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456; Taylor v. Weinberger, 528 F.2d 1153, 1156 (4th Cir. 1975). "Thus, it is not within the province of a reviewing court to determine the weight of the evidence, nor is it the court's function to substitute its judgment for that of the [Commissioner] if his decision is supported by substantial evidence." Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456.
The ALJ found that as of July 13, 1995, Stratton had "experienced medical improvement." (R. at 18.) Under the regulations, medical improvement is defined as any decrease in the medical severity of the impairment which was present at the time of the most recent favorable decision that a claimant was disabled or continued to be disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(1) (1999). The medical improvement also must be related to the claimant's ability to do work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(2) (1999). Furthermore, it is the Commissioner who bears the burden of demonstrating medical improvement. See Lively v. Bowen, 858 F.2d 177, 181 n. 2 (4th Cir. 1988). This burden flows from fundamental principles of res judicata; the Commissioner may avoid issue or claim preclusion only if he can show that, because of medical improvement, the determination of a claimant's exertional capacity does not address identical factual issues previously decided in the claimant's favor. See Lively, 858 F.2d at 181 n. 2. While this case involves an award of a closed period of disability and does not involve multiple claims, the analysis is the same. See Shepherd v. Apfel, 184 F.3d 1196, 1199-1200 (10th Cir. 1999); Pickett v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 288, 292, 293 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1987); Jones v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 522, 523-24 (7th Cir. 1993); Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1274 (3rd Cir. 1987); cf. Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying five-step analysis in closed-period cases). The ALJ determined that Stratton was disabled as of May 4, 1994, due to post cervical fusion at the C5-6 level. (R. at 20.) This Court must determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision that these impairments had decreased in medical severity by July 13, 1995, and that the improvement in Stratton's condition, to the extent that it existed, was related to her ability to work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(1), (2) (1999).
While I cannot find that the Fourth Circuit has addressed this issue in a published opinion, the court has cited the medical improvement rule in unpublished opinions in closed period cases similar to this one without discussion. See White v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1184, 1996 WL 438943 (4th Cir. 1996); Wyatt v. Bowen, 887 F.2d 1082, 1989 WL 117940 (4th Cir. 1989).
The ALJ found that by July 13, 1995, Stratton could perform unskilled, sedentary work. (R. at 21.) "Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) (1999).
Under §§ 404.1527(e)(2) and 404.1546, an ALJ is not bound by any findings from a medical source as to a claimant's residual functional capacity. Rather, the responsibility for determining a claimant's residual functional capacity rests with the ALJ, and the ALJ can determine the value to give a medical source's opinions according to the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). While an ALJ may not reject medical evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason, see King v. Califano, 615 F.2d 1018, 1020 (4th Cir. 1980), an ALJ may under the regulations assign no or little weight to a medical opinion based on the factors set forth at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d), if he sufficiently explains his rationale and if the record supports his findings.
Stratton alleges that she suffered from severe depression in July 1995 and that she was totally disabled as the result. I note that although Dr. Kaur concluded that Stratton suffered from major depression, (R. at 299), Dr. Kaur also indicated that the condition was "moderately severe." (R. at 292.) It is also apparent from the record that Stratton's depression was adequately treated with medication and was under control by October 22, 1997. (R. at 297, 300.) "If a symptom can be reasonably controlled by medication or treatment, it is not disabling." Gross v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1163, 1166 (4th Cir. 1986). Furthermore, I note that the vocational expert testified to a number of sedentary jobs which could be performed by an individual with a moderate amount of depression resulting in moderate restrictions on the ability to sustain attention, concentration, persistence or pace. (R. at 68-69.)
The record indicates that, while Stratton suffered from a disc bulge in 1994, her condition improved steadily after she received fusion surgery in November 1994. Dr. Robertson's evaluation of March 1, 1995, indicates that her condition had improved. (R. at 130.) Additionally, Linda Phillips' functional capacity evaluation supports the conclusion that by March 31, 1995, Stratton retained the capacity for sedentary work. (R. at 259.) Phillips' evaluation was ordered by Dr. Caizzi. (R. at 262.) Additionally, Phillips suggested that Stratton was likely exaggerating her symptoms, the degree of pain she suffered and the extent of her impairment. (R. at 259.) Dr. Knickerbocker indicated in January 18, 1996, that he did not believe that Stratton had a "persistent nerveroot irritation or disc problem." (R. at 276.) He indicated further that "[i]f it were not for her subjective complaints of pain, I find no reason why she could not return to work." (R. at 276.)
Stratton argues that the ALJ erred by finding that her allegations of disabling pain were not credible for the period after July 13, 1995. (R. at 21.) In particular, Stratton argues that the ALJ found her testimony regarding her subjective complaints not credible based, in part, on the incorrect finding that social security records contradicted Stratton's testimony that she had not worked since 1995. The determination of whether a claimant is disabled by pain or other subjective symptoms is a two-step process under the Act. See Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 594-95 (4th Cir. 1996); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b), (c) (1999). First, there must be objective medical evidence showing the existence of an impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the actual pain, in the amount and degree alleged by the claimant. See Craig, 76 F.3d at 594-95. Only after the existence of such an impairment is established must the ALJ consider the intensity and persistence of the claimant's pain and the extent to which it affects the ability to work. See Craig, 76 F.3d at 594-95. Although a claimant's allegations about pain may not be discredited solely because they are not substantiated by objective evidence of the pain itself or its severity, they need not be accepted to the extent they are inconsistent with the available evidence. See Craig, 76 F.3d at 595.
Based on my review of the ALJ's opinion and the record, I do not find Stratton's argument on this issue persuasive because I believe that the ALJ's decision on this issue did not turn on Stratton's credibility, but rather on his finding that the objective medical evidence did not show that Stratton suffered from an impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain alleged. (R. at 18.) As the ALJ's decision noted, radiological studies taken after Stratton's fusion surgery indicated that Stratton no longer suffered from any significant cervical disc impairment. In particular, these studies showed no nerve root compression. (R. at 18, 130, 155-56.) See Craig, 76 F.3d at 594-95; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b), (c) (1999). This conclusion is supported by the evaluations of Dr. Robertson, (R. at 130), and Dr. Knickerbocker. (R. at 275-76.) Therefore, I find that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding on this issue.
As the result of the above analysis, I find that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision that Stratton was not disabled after July 13, 1995. Therefore, I recommend that the court grant the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment and affirm the Commissioner's decision awarding a closed period of benefits.
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
As supplemented by the above summary and analysis, the undersigned now submits the following formal findings, conclusions and recommendations:
1. Substantial evidence exists in this record to support the Commissioner's finding that after July 13, 1995, Stratton's condition had improved and that she had the residual functional capacity for sedentary work;
2. Substantial evidence exists in the record of this case to support the ALJ's conclusion that there existed a significant number of jobs in both the regional and national economies which Stratton could perform after July 13, 1995; and
3. Substantial evidence exists in this record to support the Commissioner's finding that Stratton was not disabled after July 13, 1995.
RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
The undersigned recommends that this court grant the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment and affirm the Commissioner's decision.Notice to Parties
Notice is hereby given to the parties of the provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(C):
Within ten days after being served with a copy [of this Report and Recommendation], any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate [judge]. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate [judge] with instructions.
Failure to file timely written objections to these proposed findings and recommendations within 10 days could waive appellate review. At the conclusion of the 10-day period, the Clerk is directed to transmit the record in this matter to the Honorable Glen M. Williams, Senior United States District Judge.
The Clerk is directed to send certified copies of this Report and Recommendation to all counsel of record at this time.