Opinion
No. CV-10-6005002
June 1, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (NO. 110)
In this action, Sarah Stott claims that she is entitled to underinsured motorist benefits under an insurance policy issued by the defendant, Peerless Insurance Co. to the plaintiff's parents, Ralph and Karen Stott. The defendant, Peerless Insurance argues it is entitled to summary judgment on two grounds: (1) at the time of the motor vehicle accident giving rise to this action, the plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle that she owned and that vehicle was not insured under the policy issued to the parents; and (2) the plaintiff's claim for underinsured motorist benefits is prohibited by the anti-stacking provisions of § 38a-336(d). In response, the plaintiff counters that she is entitled to underinsured motorist benefits under the policy and that she is not attempting to unlawfully stack insurance policies.
FACTS
The plaintiff's action is for underinsured motorist benefits pursuant to General Statutes § 38a-336. For the purposes of this motion, there are no disputes as to the material facts but rather there are disputes as to the application of the law to these facts.
On July 1, 2009, the plaintiff was driving her 2004 Volkswagen Jetta on Butts Bridge Road in Canterbury, CT. At the same time, tortfeasor Steven M. Poppie (Poppie) was driving his 2000 Chevrolet Cavalier in the opposite direction when he negligently and carelessly crossed into the plaintiff's lane and caused a head-on collision. The plaintiff suffered significant injuries as a result of this collision. At the time of the collision Poppie's vehicle was covered by an insurance policy issued by Progressive Insurance Co. with liability limits (per person) of $20,000. At the time of the collision Sarah Stott's Jetta was covered by an insurance policy issued by defendant Peerless, which policy provided UIM benefits of $100,000 per person.
At the time of the collision, Sarah Stott resided with her parents, Ralph and Karen Stott. Her parents insured the automobiles that they owned under a separate policy issued by the defendant Peerless. Sarah's Jetta was not a covered vehicle under the parent's policy. The parent's policy provided for UIM coverage limits of $250,000 (per person).
The gravamen of the plaintiff's complaint is that she is an insured under her parent's policy and therefore she is entitled to additional UIM coverage under the parents' policy in the amount of $150,000. The parties have not raised the issue of whether Poppie's liability coverage or the UIM coverage attaching to the Jetta has been exhausted. For the purposes of this motion the court assumes that both of those coverages have been exhausted.
The parties do not dispute the language contained in the parent's policy or that Sarah Stott was residing with her parents at the time of the accident.
The defendant filed an answer and eleven special defenses to the claims of the plaintiff. In its answer, the defendant denied that the plaintiff was entitled to underinsured motorist benefits under the policy. The following special defenses are relevant to the summary judgment motion presently before the court: (1) the plaintiff is not entitled to underinsured motorist benefits under the policy because she was driving an automobile she owned and, therefore, pursuant to General Statutes § 38a-336(d) her exclusive remedy is the policy covering her vehicle; (2) underinsured motorist benefits for the bodily injuries sustained by the plaintiff are specifically excluded by the terms of the policy because she was driving a motor vehicle she owned that was not insured for coverage under the policy; (3) under the terms of the policy, the plaintiff is not entitled to underinsured motorist benefits because the plaintiff's vehicle was covered by other insurance that provided coverage similar to the policy; and (4) the plaintiff's action violates the "anti-stacking" provisions of § 38a-336(d) because she has already recovered the highest applicable limit for any one vehicle under any insurance providing coverage on either a primary, secondary or excess basis.
DISCUSSION
"Practice Book § [17-49] requires that judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case . . . The facts at issue are those alleged in the pleadings . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . The party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts . . . A motion for summary judgment is properly granted if it raises at least one legally sufficient defense that would bar the plaintiff's claim and involves no triable issue of fact." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Washington v. Blackmore, 119 Conn.App. 218, 220-21, 986 A.2d 356, cert. denied, 296 Conn. 903, 991 A.2d 1104 (2010).
"Issues of insurance coverage and contractual disputes are particularly appropriate for summary judgment because the meaning of the insurance contract presents questions of law unsuitable for jury resolution." Edelman v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 93 0533463 (December 11, 1997, Aurigemma, J.) ( 21 Conn. L. Rptr. 107, 109), aff'd, 53 Conn.App. 54, 728 A.2d 531, cert. denied, 249 Conn. 918, 733 A.2d 229 (1999).
The defendant argues it is entitled to summary judgment on two grounds: (1) at the time of the motor vehicle accident giving rise to this action, the plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle that she owned and that vehicle was not insured under the policy at issue; and (2) the plaintiff's claim for underinsured motorist benefits is prohibited by the anti-stacking provisions of § 38a-336(d). In response, the plaintiff counters that she is entitled to underinsured motorist benefits under the policy and that she is not attempting to unlawfully stack insurance policies.
I
The court first addresses whether the terms of the policy at issue excludes the plaintiff from collecting underinsured motorist benefits. "An insurer's responsibility to provide uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage is mandatory, not discretionary." Orkney v. Hanover Ins. Co., 248 Conn. 195, 201, 727 A.2d 700 (1999). General Statutes § 38a-336(a)(1) provides in relevant part: "Each automobile liability insurance policy shall provide insurance, herein called uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage . . . for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and underinsured motor vehicles . . . because of bodily injury . . . No insurer shall be required to provide uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage to (A) a named insured or relatives residing in his household when occupying, or struck as a pedestrian by, an uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle or a motorcycle that is owned by the named insured, or (B) any insured occupying an uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle or motorcycle that is owned by such insured."
Our Supreme Court has stated that "[w]hen an insurer seeks to limit its liability for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage based on [a] regulation issued pursuant to [General Statutes (Rev. to 1989)] § 38-175c [now § 38a-336], it may do so only to the extent that the regulation expressly authorizes . . . Similarly, where an insurer seeks to limit its liability based on the statute itself, rather than on the regulation, it should only be permitted to do so to the extent that the statute expressly authorizes. In order for a policy exclusion to be expressly authorized by [a] statute [or regulation], there must be substantial congruence between the statutory [or regulatory] provision and the policy provision." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gigilo v. American Economy Ins. Co., 278 Conn. 794, 804 n. 9, 900 A.2d 27 (2006). Our courts have determined that "owned vehicle" exclusions are expressly authorized by both § 38a-336(a)(1) and Section 38a-334-6(c)(2)(A) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. Loika v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 44 Conn.Sup. 59, 64-65, 667 A.2d 1308, aff'd, 39 Conn.App. 714, 667 A.2d 78 (1995), cert. denied, 236 Conn. 902, 670 A.2d 322 (1996).
Section 38a-334-6 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides in relevant part:
(c) Exclusions. The insurer's obligation to pay may be made inapplicable . . .
(2) if the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle is owned by
(A) the named insured or any relative who is a resident of the same household or is furnished for the regular use of any of the foregoing . . .
An underinsured motor vehicle is defined as "a motor vehicle with respect to which the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident is less than the applicable limits of liability under the uninsured motorist portion of the policy against which claim is made under [§ 38a-336(b)]." General Statutes § 38a-336(e).
The defendant argues that the terms of the policy exclude the plaintiff from collecting underinsured motorist benefits because she owned the vehicle she was driving at the time of the collision and that vehicle was not covered by the policy. Specifically, the defendant argues that the "owned auto" provision in the policy excludes the plaintiff from underinsured motorist coverage. The defendant argues it is undisputed the plaintiff owned the Jetta she was driving at the time of the collision and that the Jetta was not covered by the policy. Therefore, the defendant argues, as the plaintiff's claim falls within the owned auto exclusion of the policy, she is not entitled to collect underinsured motorist benefits for her bodily injuries.
To support its argument, the defendant relies principally on Smith v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 214 Conn. 734, 573 A.2d 740 (1990), which, according to the defendant, "upheld the validity of the owned auto exclusion in the context of an underinsured motorist claim." In that case, the plaintiff Celestine Smith was a passenger in an automobile owned and operated by Eric Harrington when it was involved in a one-car accident. Id., 736. E. Harrington's insurer paid Smith $30,000, but this amount did not fully compensate her, so she pursued a claim for underinsured motorist benefits from a policy covering two vehicles owned by Robert Harrington, E. Harrington's father. Id. Smith argued that because R. Harrington's policy provided liability coverage to E. Harrington, it must also provide underinsured motorist benefits to her as an occupant of E. Harrington's vehicle. Id., 736-37. The court rejected that argument because R. Harrington's policy specifically excluded from liability coverage "any vehicle other than your covered auto which is owned by any family member," and, therefore, it did not provide liability coverage for E. Harrington while he was driving his own vehicle. Id., 737.
In response, the plaintiff counters that she is an "insured" as that term is defined by the policy and is, therefore, entitled to recover underinsured motorist benefits under that policy. The plaintiff contends that § 38a-336 requires the defendant to provide underinsured motorist benefits coverage for the protection of persons insured under the policy, and that this coverage attaches to the insured person, not the insured vehicle. According to the plaintiff, she is an insured under the policy because she is a family member residing in the household, and, therefore, she is entitled to collect underinsured motorist benefits under that policy. The plaintiff asserts, moreover, that Smith is factually distinguishable from the present case because, unlike the plaintiff in Smith, she is an insured under policy at issue.
The plaintiff argues, moreover, that the exclusion provision relied on by the defendant is not authorized by § 38a-336 and, therefore, is invalid. The plaintiff contends that the Stotts' policy excludes "any motor vehicle owned by that insured," whereas the statute authorizes insurance providers to exclude only "an uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle or a motorcycle that is owned by the named insured." According to the plaintiff, the argument set forth by the defendant was considered and rejected in Chmielewski v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 218 Conn. 646, 591 A.2d 101 (1991). In that case, our Supreme Court determined that an exclusion in the insurance provider's policy was invalid because it was not authorized by the statutory exclusion. Id., 675. Specifically, the court reasoned that "[i]n order for a policy exclusion to be `expressly authorized' by the statute, there must be substantial congruence between the statutory provision and the policy provision." Id., 674. Finally, the plaintiff argues that our courts have declared that the term "underinsured motor vehicle" can refer to the insured's motor vehicle only when it is the tortfeasing vehicle. According to the plaintiff, as she was not the owner or operator of the tortfeasing vehicle, the statutory exclusion does not apply.
Turning to the policy at issue, the plaintiff argues that she is an "insured" and, therefore, entitled to recover underinsured motorist benefits under that policy. Specifically, the plaintiff directs the court to the following definitions in the policy:
DEFINITIONS ****
F. "Family member" means a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of your household. This includes a ward or foster child.
PART C — UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE ****
B. "Insured" as used in this part means:
1. You or any "family member."
2. Any other person "occupying" "your covered auto."
3. Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of "bodily injury" to which this coverage applies sustained by a person described in 1. or 2. above.
It is stipulated that the plaintiff is the daughter of the named insureds and that she resides in the same household as the named insureds. The court agrees that the plaintiff is an "insured" as that term is used in the uninsured motorist coverage section of the policy.
The defendant argues, however, that the plaintiff's underinsured motorist claim "falls squarely within the `owned auto' exclusion of the [p]olicy and therefore, there is no underinsured motorist coverage applicable. Specifically, the defendant points to the following exclusion provision in the policy:
PART C — UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE **** EXCLUSIONS
A. We do not provide Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Coverage for "bodily injury" sustained:
1. By an "insured" while "occupying," or when struck by, any motor vehicle owned by that "insured" which is not insured for this coverage under this policy. This includes a trailer of any type used with that vehicle.
This exclusion is similar to that found in § 38a-336(a)(1)(A). Because the defendant seeks to limit its liability based on that statute, in order for this exclusion provision to be authorized, there must be substantial congruence between it and the statutory provision. It bears repeating that our courts have determined that "owned vehicle" exclusions are expressly authorized by § 38a-336(a)(1). Furthermore, as the defendant points out, the Superior Court has held that this very exclusion provision is permitted by § 38a-336(a)(1). See, e.g., Reeve v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV 06 5001442 (May 22, 2007, Aurigemma, J.) ( 43 Conn. L. Rptr. 413, 414); Steadward v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 04 0490188 (March 8, 2006, Silbert, J.) [ 40 Conn. L. Rptr. 848]; Correa v. Ragozine, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 00 0443038 (August 17, 2001, Devlin, J.).
The court holds that under the facts of this case and the application of the policy language in question that the plaintiff is an insured under the terms of the policy issued by the defendant to the plaintiff's parents. The court further holds, however, under the undisputed facts of this case, that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was occupying a vehicle she owned, which vehicle was not insured for UIM coverage under the parents' policy. Therefore the court finds that the defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this ground.
II
Additionally, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's action violates the anti-stacking provisions of General Statutes § 38a-336(d), which provides: "Regardless of the number of policies issued, vehicles or premiums shown on a policy, premiums paid, persons covered, vehicles involved in an accident, or claims made, in no event shall the limit of liability for uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage applicable to two or more motor vehicles covered under the same or separate policies be added together to determine the limit of liability for such coverage available to an injured person or persons for any one accident. If a person insured for uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage is an occupant of a nonowned vehicle covered by a policy also providing uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, the coverage of the occupied vehicle shall be primary and any coverage for which such person is a named insured shall be secondary. All other applicable policies shall be excess. The total amount of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage recoverable is limited to the highest amount recoverable under the primary policy, the secondary policy or any one of the excess policies. The amount paid under the excess policies shall be apportioned in accordance with the proportion that the limits of each excess policy bear to the total limits of the excess policies. If any person insured for uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage is an occupant of an owned vehicle, the uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage afforded by the policy covering the vehicle occupied at the time of the accident shall be the only uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage available."
"The purpose of [underinsured motorist] coverage simply is to provide an insured who is injured in an accident with the same resources he would have had if the tortfeasor had liability insurance equal to the amount of the insured's uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage . . . The purpose is not to guarantee full compensation for a claimant's injuries . . . Indeed, underinsured motorist protection is not intended to provide a greater recovery than would have been available from the tortfeasor . . . The public policy established by the uninsured/underinsured motorist statute is to assure that every insured recovers the damages he or she would have been able to recover if the uninsured or underinsured motorist had maintained an adequate policy of liability insurance . . . equal to the amount of the insured's uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fuchs v. Allstate Ins. Co., 96 Conn.App. 284, 291, 899 A.2d 709 (2006).
"[Section 38a-336(d)] . . . was intended to bar the judicially approved practice of `stacking.'" Lane v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 125 Conn.App. 424, 434, 7 A.3d 950 (2010). Our courts define "stacking" as referring "to the ability of the insured, when covered by more than one insurance policy, to obtain benefits from a second policy on the same claim when recovery from the first policy alone would be inadequate . . . [Stacking] is derived from the presumption that when the named insured purchases uninsured motorist coverage on more than one automobile, he intends to buy extra protection for himself and his family, regardless of whether his injury occurs in any one of his insured vehicles or elsewhere." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 435.
"An insurance policy is to be interpreted by the same general rules that govern the construction of any written contract and enforced in accordance with the real intent of the parties as expressed in the language employed in the policy . . . The policy words must be accorded their natural and ordinary meaning." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Voris v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 297 Conn. 589, 595, 999 A.2d 741 (2010). "If the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, then the language, from which the intention of the parties is to be deduced, must be accorded its natural and ordinary meaning . . . Under those circumstances, the policy is to be given effect according to its terms." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Medical Ins. Co. v. Kulikowski, 286 Conn. 1, 5, 942 A.2d 834 (2008).
The defendant argues that the plaintiff's claim for underinsured motorist benefits is barred due to the "other insurance" provision in the policy, which prohibits stacking. The defendant argues that this provision in the policy is substantially similar to the prohibition against stacking found in § 38a-336(d). According to the defendant, the plaintiff's personal automobile insurance policy is the only insurance policy applicable to her Jetta. Therefore, the defendant argues, both the anti-stacking provisions in the policy and the prohibition against stacking in § 38a-336(d) bar the plaintiff from receiving any underinsured motorist benefits under the Stotts' policy.
In response, the plaintiff counters that she was insured under two separate insurance policies, each of which charged its own premium, and, therefore, she is entitled to the benefits for which she is paying. In support of this argument, the plaintiff relies on a recent Appellate Court case, Lane v. Metropolitan Property Casualty Ins. Co., supra, 125 Conn.App. 424. In that case, the plaintiff's truck was an identified and insured vehicle under two insurance policies, and both of those policies provided uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage with a per person amount of $100,000. Id., 427-28. The plaintiff paid a separate premium on both policies. Id., 428. Both policies also contained "other insurance clauses," which provided that if the insured is covered by another insurer providing uninsured motor vehicle coverage, then the total liability is limited to the single coverage with the highest limit of liability. Id., 428. The defendants argued that in accordance with the other insurance clauses in the policies, the plaintiff could collect a maximum of $100,000 in total from the defendants. Id. The plaintiff argued that such clauses are invalid if they restrict the full indemnification of the plaintiff, and the defendants countered that § 38a-336(d) permits recovery on uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage only up to the limit of a single policy. Id., 429. The court, noting the "unusual facts of this case," held that § 38a-336(d) does not apply to circumstances "where an insured has two separate policies with uninsured motorist coverage purchased by the insured for the same vehicle." Id. Furthermore, the court asserted that this reading of § 38a-336(d) did not contravene the statutory prohibition against stacking. Id., 435. The court reasoned that "the rationale for stacking . . . is derived from the presumption that when the named insured purchases uninsured motorist coverage on more than one automobile, he intends to buy extra protection for himself and his family, regardless of whether his injury occurs in any one of his insured vehicles or elsewhere." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Therefore, the court concluded that "when two policies are written on the same vehicle, the legislative prohibition on stacking is inapplicable." Id., 435-36. Finally, the court held that the other insurance clauses in the defendants' policies did not bar the plaintiff from collecting the policy limits of both policies combined. Id., 441. The court reasoned that an insurer may reduce the limits of its uninsured motorist coverage only as permitted by section 38a-334-6 of the Regulation of Connecticut State Agencies, which does not authorize a reduction in coverage because of "other insurance." Id., 438-40.
The court noted, however, that not all "other insurance" clauses are invalid: "Public policy is not violated when `other insurance' clauses are used for the purpose of establishing the order of payment between insurers. When the insured is afforded full indemnification for a loss, there is no public policy issue controlling how insurers divide coverage among themselves." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lane v. Metropolitan Property Casualty Ins. Co., supra, 125 Conn.App. 439 n. 10.
In the alternative, the plaintiff argues that she is not attempting to stack insurance policies, but merely seeks to recover the maximum amount payable under the insurance policies by which she is covered. The plaintiff points out that the Stotts' policy contains a limit of $250,000/$500,000, which is the highest amount available to her, and, therefore, pursuant to § 38a-336(d) she is entitled to recover a maximum of $250,000. According to the plaintiff, she is entitled to recover $20,000 from Poppie's liability policy, $80,000 in underinsured motorist benefits from her personal automobile insurance policy and $150,000 in underinsured motorist benefits from the Stotts' policy.
Turning to the policy at issue, the defendant directs the court to the following provision:
PART C — UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE **** OTHER INSURANCE
If there is other applicable insurance available under one or more policies or provisions of coverage that is similar to the insurance provided under this endorsement:
A. Any recovery for damages under all such policies or provisions of coverage may equal but not exceed the highest applicable limit for any one vehicle under any insurance providing coverage on a primary, secondary or excess basis.
B. Subject to Paragraph A. above, with respect to "bodily injury" to an "insured":
1. While "occupying" a vehicle owned by that "insured," only the Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Coverage applicable to that vehicle will apply, and no other policies or provisions of coverage will apply.
This provision is clear and unambiguous. It specifies that when an insured is an occupant of an owned vehicle, the underinsured motorist coverage afforded by the policy covering the vehicle occupied at the time of the accident shall be the only uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage available. This provision substantially comports with the prohibition against stacking found in § 38a-336(d), which provides that "[i]f any person insured for . . . underinsured motorist coverage is an occupant of an owned vehicle, the . . . underinsured motorist coverage afforded by the policy covering the vehicle occupied at the time of the accident shall be the only . . . underinsured motorist coverage available." In the present case, the plaintiff occupied a vehicle she owned at the time of the accident and the policy covering that vehicle provided for underinsured motorist benefits. Thus the plaintiff is limited to the underinsured motorist coverage for the policy covering the Jetta.
Furthermore, the plaintiff is not entitled to secondary and excess coverage because § 38a-336(d) distinguishes between occupants of owned vehicles and nonowned vehicles and specifies that such coverage is available only when the insured occupies a nonowned vehicle: "If a person insured for . . . underinsured motorist coverage is an occupant of a nonowned vehicle covered by a policy also providing . . . underinsured motorist coverage, the coverage of the occupied vehicle shall be primary and any coverage for which such person is a named insured shall be secondary. All other applicable policies shall be excess." The plaintiff in the present case occupied her Jetta, which she owns, at the time of the accident and, therefore she is barred from collecting underinsured motorist benefits from the Stotts' policy on a secondary or excess basis.
The plaintiff's reliance on Lane v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Ins. Co., supra, 125 Conn.App. 424 is misplaced because the present case is easily distinguished from that case. In Lane, the claimant paid separate premiums on two insurance policies for his truck, and that truck was an identified and insured vehicle under both of those policies. For a brief period of time, the truck was covered under both policies because the coverage under the second policy commenced before the coverage under the first policy expired. The court, emphasizing the "the unusual facts of this case"; id., 429; held that § 38a-336(d) does not apply to circumstances "where an insured has two separate policies with uninsured motorist coverage purchased by the insured for the same vehicle." Id. The facts in the present case are materially different from the facts in Lane because the plaintiff's Jetta was an identified and insured vehicle under only one policy. The broad reading of Lane urged by the plaintiff would conflict with the statutory prohibition against stacking. Indeed, the court in Lane expressly stated that "[i]n holding that an insured with two separate primary uninsured motorist insurance policies that cover the same vehicle for uninsured motorist benefits may collect the policy limits of both policies combined, we do not intend to abrogate the rule that an insured may not recover double payment of damages under overlapping insurance coverage." Id., 433 n. 5. This indicates that the holding in Lane should be narrowly construed and is limited to cases where a claimant pays separate premiums on two or more separate polices that provide underinsured motorist benefits coverage for the same vehicle.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the defendant's motion for summary judgment.