Opinion
No. 5-240 / 04-1488
Filed May 25, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, Dale E. Ruigh, Judge.
Maureen Stonewall appeals from the district court's order dismissing her petition for writ of certiorari challenging the Board of Supervisor's final approval of the Hoover Subdivision. AFFIRMED.
Brian Danielson of Hinshaw, Danielson, Kloberdanz Haney, P.C., Marshalltown, for appellant.
Elizabeth Nigut of Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor Fairgrave, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Heard by Mahan, P.J., Zimmer, J., and Hendrickson, S.J.
Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2005).
Maureen Stonewall appeals from the district court's order dismissing her petition for writ of certiorari challenging the Board of Supervisor's (Board) final approval of the Hoover Subdivision. She contends the district court erred in determining the Board acted legally in approving the Hoover Subdivision. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In March 2003, Russell and Kelly Roseland sold a ten-acre tract of land, including existing improvements, to Brian Hoover for $142,000. The land had been subdivided into two lots several years prior to Hoover's purchase. Lot A comprised less than one acre and was occupied by a single-family dwelling and some outbuildings. Lot B comprised the remaining nine acres of land, a second single-family dwelling, and several outbuildings. However, Lot B consisted mostly of unimproved farmland situated to the east of the houses and buildings. This land had been used as pasture for at least the ten years preceding the sale, and had been previously been planted in row crops.
After purchasing the land, Hoover applied to establish Hoover Subdivision. The proposed subdivision included three rectangular lots. Lots 1 and 2 each consisted of approximately 2.56 acres and covered the western half of the ten-acre tract. Lot 3 was situated over the eastern half of the tract and occupied approximately five acres.
At the time Hoover applied for the subdivision, the two single-family dwellings and the outbuildings remained on the property. However, Hoover demolished the house and outbuildings situated on Lot A shortly after submitting his proposal. Because of zoning ordinance requirements, Hoover is precluded from rebuilding on what was formerly Lot A. The house and outbuildings on Lot B remain standing, and are the only existing improvements on the tract. The three lots comprising the Hoover Subdivision could currently accommodate two dwellings; the existing house on Lot 1 and a new dwelling on Lot 2. Hoover has stated he intends to continue using Lot 3 as pasture for the indefinite future.
John Kunc, Marshall County's director of planning and zoning, conducted an investigation of the proposed subdivision. He brought Hoover's application to the Marshall County Zoning Commission and recommended the application be approved. The Commission held a public hearing and recommended approval of Hoover Subdivision to the Board of Supervisors. The Board held a public hearing and approved the subdivision on July 15, 2003.
Maureen Stonewall is the fee simple owner of farm land adjacent to Hoover Subdivision. Ten days after the Board approved the subdivision, Stonewall filed a writ of certiorari, challenging the Board's approval of the subdivision and requesting it be annulled and decreed void. The writ was issued August 13, 2003.
Trial was held in February 2004. The parties submitted to the court an agreed statement of the facts. Kunc's deposition was submitted, and the court heard testimony from Stonewall and Kunc. On August 18, 2004, the district court annulled the writ and confirmed the final approval of the Hoover Subdivision.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
We review a decision on writ of certiorari for correction of errors at law. IBP, Inc. v. Harpole, 621 N.W.2d 410, 413 (Iowa 2001). The lower court's findings of facts are binding if supported by substantial evidence, although its conclusions of law are not. Zimmermann v. Iowa Dist. Court, 480 N.W.2d 70, 74 (Iowa 1992). Review of trial court discretion by certiorari is very limited, being merely to determine whether there has been an abuse thereof. Farley v. Glanton, 280 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Iowa 1979).
III. Analysis.
Certiorari permits the district court to review the acts or proceedings of an inferior tribunal, board, or officer acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. Aladdin, Inc. v. Black Hawk County, 522 N.W.2d 604, 606 (Iowa 1994). Its purpose is to determine whether the challenged action exceeds the tribunal's jurisdiction or is otherwise illegal. Id. Illegality exists, for purposes of certiorari, when the findings upon which the tribunal makes its conclusions of law do not have evidentiary support, or where the tribunal fails to apply the proper law. Carruthers v. Board of Sup'rs, 646 N.W.2d 867, 870 (Iowa Ct. App, 2002). We presume the tribunal properly performed its duty under the law, unless clear evidence to the contrary appears. Id. The fact that a different or opposite result may have been fully justified by the record is of no importance. Carstensen v. Board of Trustees, 253 N.W.2d 560, 562 (Iowa 1977). The burden of showing illegality rests upon the asserting party. Carruthers, 646 N.W.2d at 870.
We apply a liberal approach to subdivision decisions by granting local governing bodies more discretion in applying platting ordinances. Id.
This approach takes account of the likelihood that not every conceivable flaw, although it may be of considerable practical moment, can be anticipated by specific language in ordinances and statutes. It also allows the platting function to be used more effectively as an accompaniment of zoning. . . . On balance, we incline toward a reasonably liberal reading of subdivision legislation, subject to the watchful eyes of the courts under their de novo review. At the same time, we hold that councils must not approve or disapprove on whim but rather on the facts of each case and on the manifest objects and purposes of the legislation.
Oakes Constr. Co. v. City of Iowa City, 304 N.W.2d 797, 806 (Iowa 1981) (citations omitted).
The land on which the Hoover Subdivision is situated is classified as agricultural. The Marshall County Zoning Ordinance states that agricultural areas are intended to preserve rural character by restricting the development of new rural on-farm dwellings by requiring large lot development. Subdivisions may be created in these areas if they are so allowed in the Marshall County Comprehensive Land Use Plan.
The Marshall Comprehensive Land Use Plan (Comprehensive Plan) states in regard to agricultural lands:
Preservation of prime agricultural land has long been a major use issue for Marshall County and existing federal and state policies recognize agricultural land as a natural resource to be protected. Marshall County shall continue to foster land use policies and regulations which conserve productivity and preserve the availability of high value agricultural lands for the production of food and fiber. Marshall County recognizes and stresses the importance of comprehensive planning and growth management strategies for agricultural land preservation.
(A) Policy: High value agricultural land should strongly be encouraged for retention in agricultural use and/or non-agricultural development should be strongly discouraged, except in identified growth areas. (Article IV, Section 13)
(B) Policy: Future non-agricultural development shall be directed toward identified growth areas so that impacts on existing agricultural operations and high value agricultural land are minimized and efficient development patterns are created. (Article IV, Sections 1-9 and 12)
(C) Policy: Marshall County shall encourage "innovative" development concepts which minimize potential conflicts with land and operations. Such concepts may include cluster or planned unit developments. (Article IV, Sections 2, 3, and 12)
Stonewall argues the Hoover Subdivision does not conform to the Comprehensive Plan, and therefore its approval was illegal.
The district court concluded the approval of the Hoover Subdivision is consistent with the Comprehensive Plan. The court noted that prior to Hoover's application for subdivision, the land in question contained two family dwellings and ten-acres of land that had been used as pasture. At this time, a house currently exists on Lot 1 of the Hoover Subdivision, and a second house could be erected on Lot 2. A maximum of two dwellings could be erected in the subdivision. Therefore, "approval of the Hoover Subdivision does not result in the loss of any significant high value cropland and does not alter the rural character of this 10-acre tract of land in any meaningful way."
We find no error in the district court's dismissal of Stonewall's petition for writ of certiorari. Nothing in the Comprehensive Plan specifies circumstances in which a subdivision must be disallowed. Rather, the governing entities are to consider a developments impact on conserving productivity and preserving the availability of high value agricultural lands. Here, approval of the Hoover Subdivision does not cause the loss of high value agricultural lands. As the district court notes, use of the land will remain essentially the same. We find no error in the defendants' interpretation of the law. We conclude substantial evidence supports the defendants' assertion that the subdivision is not inconsistent with the Comprehensive Plan. Accordingly, we affirm.