Stoneroad v. Johnson

Full title: DANIEL CLAYTON STONEROAD, Plaintiff v. GREGORY D. JOHNSON, et al.…

Court: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Date published: Apr 6, 2020

CIVIL NO: 1:18-CV-02276 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 2020)

Opinion

CIVIL NO: 1:18-CV-02276

04-06-2020

DANIEL CLAYTON STONEROAD, Plaintiff v. GREGORY D. JOHNSON, et al., Defendants

Chief Magistrate Judge Schwab

(Judge Rambo) () REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Introduction.

The plaintiff Daniel Clayton Stoneroad claims that the defendants violated his constitutional rights in connection with state proceedings. After screening the complaint, it was concluded that with one exception (a Sixth Amendment claim against the Chief Public Defender of Dauphin County), the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Stoneroad was granted leave to file an amended complaint, and he filed an amended complaint. That amended complaint was not, however, a complete complaint and it did not comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although Stoneroad was given leave to file a second amended complaint, he has not done so. Accordingly, it is recommended that all Stoneroad's claims be dismissed except the Sixth Amendment claim against the Chief Public Defender of Dauphin County.

II. Background and Procedural History.

Stoneroad began this action on November 27, 2018, by filing a complaint naming as defendants: (1) Gregory D. Johnson, a magisterial district judge in Dauphin County; (2) Troy Petry, Deputy Court Administrator for Dauphin County's magisterial district judges; (3) Dauphin County: (4) Bradley Winnick, Chief Public Defender of Dauphin County: (5) Matt Miller, Director of the Dauphin County Work Release Center; (6) an office manager of Magisterial District Court 12-3-02 ("unknown office manager"); and (7) Jaculine Gillardi, an assistant public defender in Dauphin County. Stoneroad names Johnson, Petry, Winnick, the unknown office manager, and Gillardi in both their official and individual capacities. He names Miller in his official capacity only.

It is difficult to discern what Stoneroad is alleging for several reasons. First, there is a page missing from his complaint. That missing page—page 7—appears from the context of the pages before and after it to be the page where Stoneroad would have started the factual allegations that form the basis of his claims. Without those initial factual allegations, it is difficult to piece together what Stoneroad is alleging. Second, Stoneroad failed to comply with the requirement that "[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d)(1). Although Stoneroad used numbered paragraphs in his complaint, those paragraphs are lengthy (some longer than a page) and contain numerous allegations, which make it difficult to discern what he is alleging. Third, it appears that Stoneroad incorrectly assumed that the court is aware of what happened in connection with his state proceedings. Based on those circumstances, it is difficult to discern what exactly Stoneroad is alleging. Nevertheless, from the allegations in the complaint, the exhibits attached to the complaint, and the state court docket sheets, the court has done its best to try to piece together what Stoneroad is alleging.

By an order dated May 6, 2019, the undersigned screened the complaint and set forth the following summary of the state proceedings against Stoneroad:

It appears that Stoneroad's claims concern three charges of driving with a suspended or revoked license—two from 2016 and one from 2018. Judge Johnson found Stoneroad guilty of all three charges. See Commonwealth v. Stoneroad, Docket No. MJ-12302-TR-0000286-2016 (Dauphin Cty.); Commonwealth v. Stoneroad, Docket No. MJ-12302-TR-0002549-2016 (Dauphin Cty.); and Commonwealth v. Stoneroad, Docket No. MJ-12302-TR-0000078-2018 (Dauphin Cty.). In one of the cases—MJ-12302-TR-0000286-2016—Judge Johnson held the trial in Stoneroad's absence. See Doc. 1 at 26 (Order Imposing Sentence) ("THIS IS TO NOTIFY YOU THAT: On July 13, 2016, your trial on the above charge(s) was held in the Magisterial District Court listed above in your absence pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 455."). In addition to fines and costs, Judge Johnson sentenced Stoneroad in that case to a maximum term of six-months imprisonment in the Dauphin County Prison. Id. As to the other charge from 2016, Stoneroad pleaded guilty and Judge Johnson sentenced him to 90 days confinement. See

Commonwealth v. Stoneroad, Docket No. MJ-12302-TR-0002549-2016 (Dauphin Cty.). As to the charge from 2018, Judge Johnson found Stoneroad guilty and sentenced him to 90 days confinement. See Commonwealth v. Stoneroad, Docket No. MJ-12302-TR-0000078-2018 (Dauphin Cty.).
In all three cases, Stoneroad appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County for a trial de novo. See Commonwealth v. Stoneroad, Docket No. CP-22-SA-0000221-2016 (Dauphin Cty.) (appealing MJ-12302-TR-0000286-2016); Commonwealth v. Stoneroad, Docket No. CP-22-SA-0000218-2016 (Dauphin Cty.) (appealing MJ-12302-TR-0002549-2016); Commonwealth v. Stoneroad, Docket No. CP-22-MD-0001544-2016 (Dauphin Cty.) (addressing Stoneroad's "Nunc Pro Tunc Request for Sentence Reduction or a New Trial Or Notice of Appeal" apparently as to MJ-12302-TR-0000286-2016 and MJ-12302-TR-0002549-2016); Commonwealth v. Stoneroad, Docket No. CP-22-SA-0000127-2018 (Dauphin Cty.) (appealing MJ-12302-TR-0000078-2018). In the Court of Common Pleas, on November 28, 2016, Judge Clark found Stoneroad not guilty as to the two charges stemming from 2016 and ordered him immediately released from the Dauphin County Prison. See Doc. 1 at 27; see also Commonwealth v. Stoneroad, Docket No. CP-22-SA-0000221-2016 (Dauphin Cty.); Commonwealth v. Stoneroad, Docket No. CP-22-SA-0000218-2016 (Dauphin Cty.); and Commonwealth v. Stoneroad, Docket No. CP-22-MD-0001544-2016 (Dauphin Cty.). As to the 2018 charge, on September 10, 2018, Judge Clark found Stoneroad guilty, gave him credit for 87 days he had served in the Dauphin County Prison and ordered him to serve three days on house arrest. See Commonwealth v. Stoneroad, Docket No. CP-22-SA-0000127-2018 (Dauphin Cty.).

Doc. 6 at 3-5 (footnote omitted).¹

1 This summary was based on the state docket sheets and the exhibits attached to Stoneroad's complaint. We took judicial notice of the state court docket sheets in Stoneroad's cases. See Orabi v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 537 (3d Cir. 2014) ("We may take judicial notice of the contents of another Court's docket."); Wilson v. McVey, 579 F. Supp. 2d 685, 688 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (taking judicial notice of the state court docket). At the time of the Order of May 6, 2019, the docket sheets were available on the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania Web Portal, https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/DocketSheets/MDJ.aspx (as visited on May 2, 2019). Now, however, some of the docket sheets in Stoneroad's state cases are no longer available on the Unified Judicial System's Web Portal, https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/DocketSheets/MDJ.aspx (last visited March 27, 2020). It is noted that in his amended complaint, Stoneroad states that he agrees with the above summary of his cases with the exception that he did not plead guilty to any of the cases, but at most, he pleaded "no contest." Doc. 9 at ¶ 18.

As to the 2016 charges, Stoneroad complains that Judge Johnson sentenced him to six months in jail without holding a hearing on one charge and coerced him to plead guilty to another charge. Given the missing page of Stoneroad's complaint, it is difficult to discern exactly what Stoneroad alleges happened. But it appears that at some point, Stoneroad appeared at Judge Johnson's office where he was put in a meeting room. According to Stoneroad, a few minutes later, Judge Johnson entered the room and told Stoneroad that he had been sentenced to six months in prison. Stoneroad objected saying that he was not served with any paperwork, and he asked for proof that he had been notified by certified mail. Judge Johnson responded that he had no intention of holding a hearing as to the charge that led to the six-month sentence or the other charge then pending against Stoneroad. According to Stoneroad, Judge Johnson said if Stoneroad did not then and there plead guilty to the other charge, he would resolve that case also, and run the sentence consecutive to the six-month sentence already imposed without the opportunity for work release.

Feeling coerced, Stoneroad signed the guilty plea, but he objected that he was going to appeal. Judge Johnson responded that he did not care, that Stoneroad did not deserve a hearing and would not get one on either charge, and that he did not need to hold a hearing because given that Stoneroad had prior convictions, he was guilty. After Stoneroad again told Judge Johnson that he was going to appeal, Judge Johnson ordered Constable Kolva to take Stoneroad to the Dauphin County Prison. According to Stoneroad, Kolva witnessed the entire exchange between Stoneroad and Judge Johnson and will testify on Stoneroad's behalf.

As set forth above, Stoneroad appealed Judge Johnson's decisions to the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas. But according to Stoneroad, he received a hearing before Judge Clark only after he filed a federal habeas corpus action. Stoneroad alleges that during the hearing, Judge Clark said Stoneroad should not have been in jail and that he had no intention of getting caught up in a procedural train wreck. Judge Clark dismissed both 2016 charges against Stoneroad and released him.

Stoneroad alleges that even though he was cleared and released by Judge Clark, he was unable to get back the money that he had paid relating to his stay at the Dauphin County Prison and the work-release center. According to Stoneroad, there was no court order requiring the payment of costs during the period he was illegally incarcerated. Stoneroad contends that although the money was collected legally, after his charges were dismissed, he was entitled to the immediate return of the money he had paid. He complains that there is no policy for the return of such money, and he suggests that Dauphin County should bear the costs associated with incarcerating him illegally.

As to the 2018 charge, Stoneroad alleges that on March 6, 2018, he "went to his last pending case." Doc. 1 at 8. He alleges that "[a]gain the notice of hearing was not sent certified mail" and "as before," he attempted to postpone the hearing because he recently had surgery. Id. He suggests that his request to postpone the hearing was denied, but he later suggests that the hearing was postponed.

Stoneroad also complains that Judge Johnson had an ex parte conversation with the arresting officer and the district attorney. According to Stoneroad, the charge against him was amended, but the district attorney never served him with the amended charge. Stoneroad objected to the amendment, and he asserted his right to counsel. He suggests that the hearing was postponed as a result of the district attorney amending the charge but not serving him with the amendment. Stoneroad alleges that although he was "accused of being the one to postpone the hearing," the "extension of time should have been placed on the Commonwealth." Doc. 1 at 8.

Stoneroad alleges that he has been legally handicapped since January of 2018. He asserts that because he has staples, rods, screws, and pins in his back, he could not drive. According to Stoneroad, he called the public defender's office and requested to complete an application for counsel over the phone, to have the paperwork faxed to him, or to apply for counsel online. But the policy of the Dauphin County Public Defender was that a defendant must apply in person. Although Stoneroad explained his issue, he was told there are no exceptions.

Because he could not get to the public defender's office without risking injuring himself, he called Judge Johnson's office, but he was told he could not request an extension of time due to his condition. "Again their remark was you better be at the hearing regardless or we will issue a warrant on u by the office manager." Doc. 1 at 8 (spelling and grammar errors in original).

According to Stoneroad, Judge Johnson's office forced him to violate his neurosurgeon's restrictions on his activities. Stoneroad complains that the district attorney's office, the state police, and the Dauphin County parole department can find funds for technology to assist in obtaining convictions and collecting fines, "but a legally handicapped individual that just had major reconstructive surgury cant get a extention of time or an ability to obtain legal counsel but by going to the PDs office." Doc. 1 at 9 (spelling and grammar errors in original).

Stoneroad alleges that by the time the hearing on the 2018 charge in the Court of Common Pleas was scheduled, he was healed enough to apply for counsel in person at the public defender's office, and defendant Gillardi was appointed to represent him. But Stoneroad was not happy with Gillardi's representation of him. According to Stoneroad, Gillardi didn't return his calls, and he met Gillardi only 15 minutes before he was called before the court. Stoneroad also alleges that Gillardi failed to withdraw a plea agreement as he had instructed her to do.

The complaint contains six counts raising claims based on the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Although not set forth in counts, the complaint also mentions in passing numerous other potential causes of action. Stoneroad seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as an injunction to prevent the defendants from harassing him.

The complaint was screened, and it was determined that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Stoneroad was, however, granted leave to file an amended complaint as to some, but not all his claims. More specifically, given that his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the judicial defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that Judge Johnson is entitled to judicial immunity from the claims against him in his individual capacity, Stoneroad was not given leave to amend as to those claims because to do so would futile. But considering the liberal-amendment standard, Stoneroad was granted another opportunity to comply with the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 and attempt to state claims upon which relief can granted by filing an amended complaint.

Stoneroad was informed of the standards that apply to filing an amended complaint:

Any amended complaint must be titled as an amended complaint and must contain the docket number of this case. Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(a). "The plaintiff is advised that any amended complaint must be complete in all respects." Young v. Keohane, 809 F. Supp. 1185, 1198 (M.D. Pa. 1992). "It must be a new pleading which stands by itself as an adequate complaint without reference to the complaint already filed." Id. "Also in general, an amended pleading—like [any] amended complaint here—supersedes the earlier pleading and renders the original pleading a nullity." Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 220 (3d Cir. 2017). In other words, if an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint will have no role in the future litigation of this case. Any amended complaint must also comply with the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including the requirements that the complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction," "a short and plain statement of the claim," and "a demand for the relief sought." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1)-(3). Further, "[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d)(1). "A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances." Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b). And to the extent it would promote clarity to do so, "each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate count." Id.

Doc. 6 at 45 n.7.

Stoneroad filed an amended complaint. See doc. 9. Despite not being given leave to amend as to his claim against Judge Johnson, Stoneroad continues to name Judge Johnson as a defendant. Stoneroad also names in his amended complaint two Jane Does, identified as staff of District Court 12-3-02, and Troy Petry, identified as a Dauphin County District Magistrate Supervisor. Stoneroad also names Robert Kolva in his official capacity only as a defendant in the amended complaint. He further names as defendants Dauphin County, the Dauphin County Land Bank, the Dauphin County Prison, the Dauphin County Work Release Center, and Matt Miller in his official capacity as the Director of the Dauphin County Work Release Center. Stoneroad also names Bradley Winnick, the Chief Public Defender of Dauphin County; Edward Marsico, the Dauphin County District Attorney; and the Pennsylvania State Police.

Despite being told that any amended complaint must be complete without reference to the original complaint, Stoneroad states in his amended complaint that he is incorporating his "entire first complaint" by reference. Doc. 9 at 2, ¶ 1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c) provides that "[a] statement in a pleading may be adopted by reference elsewhere in the same pleading or in any other pleading or motion." "Courts have historically been reluctant to allow an incorporation by reference if it fails to provide adequate notice of the incorporating party's claims, defenses, or factual allegations." Cooper v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 02-2138, 2002 WL 31478874, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2002). "But nothing in Rule 10(c) precludes a party from incorporating all of an earlier pleading." Id. Still, "[a]ny pleading containing an incorporation by reference must also comport with Rule 8(a)(2)'s requirement that the claim for relief must state a 'short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.'" B & E Dimensional Stoneworks, LLC v. Wicki Wholesale Stone, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-1297, 2012 WL 511519, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2012). And "a district court may require a plaintiff to prepare a single, amended pleading when it would facilitate managing the case." Rieco v. Bronsburg, 674 F. App'x 110, 113 (3d Cir. 2017).

Here, as set forth above, when screening the original complaint, it was difficult to discern what Stoneroad was alleging. Nevertheless, from the allegations in the complaint, the exhibits attached to the complaint, and the state court docket sheets, the court did its best to try to piece together what Stoneroad was alleging. In connection with his amended complaint, however, Stoneroad states that, contrary to what the state court docket in one of his cases showed, he never pleaded guilty in state court. He states that, at most, he pleaded no contest and that he was under duress. Doc. 9 at 5, ¶ 18

Moreover, in his amended complaint, Stoneroad does not state the facts about what happened that allegedly violated his rights. Thus, the undersigned determined that his amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See doc. 11. But because Stoneroad is proceeding pro se, he was given one final opportunity to amend his complaint, and a deadline was set for him to file a second amended complaint. Id. It was noted that if Stoneroad decides to file a second amended complaint, given that the factual basis of his original complaint is difficult to discern, Stoneroad shall not incorporate by reference his original complaint into any second amended complaint. Id. It was also noted that if Stoneroad files a second amended complaint, he should not join unrelated claims and defendants in violation of Fed.R.Civ.P. 20, which governs permissive joinder of parties. Id.

In his amended complaint, Stoneroad again requested the appointment of counsel. But given that this case was in the early stages, and for the reasons set forth in the Order of May 6, 2019, denying Stoneroad's previous request for counsel, Stoneroad's request for counsel was denied without prejudice to re-examination of this issue, if necessary, at a later stage in this case.

Stoneroad was given leave to file a second amended complaint on or before October 23, 2019. He requested and was granted extensions of time to file a second amended complaint, with the last extension providing Stoneroad until February 13, 2020, to file a second amended complaint. Stoneroad has not, however, filed a second amended complaint.

Given the circumstances above and for the reasons that follow, it is recommended that all Stoneroad's claims be dismissed except the Sixth Amendment claim against the Chief Public Defender of Dauphin County. III. Screening of In Forma Pauperis Complaints—Standard of Review.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court shall dismiss a complaint brought in forma pauperis if it determines that certain specified conditions are met. More specifically, the court must dismiss a complaint that "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

When determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court "must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe the complaint in the light favorable to the plaintiff, and ultimately determine whether plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint." Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). In making that determination, the court "consider[s] only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the [plaintiff's] claims are based upon these documents." Id. at 230.

"Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a 'short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The statement required by Rule 8(a)(2) must give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and of the grounds upon which it rests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but more is required than labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). "A complaint has to 'show' such an entitlement with its facts." Id.

In considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court "'must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'" Krieger v. Bank of Am., N.A., 890 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Flora v. Cty. of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2015)). But a court "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). A court also need not "assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

Following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:

First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief."

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679).

A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and "'however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).

IV. Discussion.

Despite being instructed that his amended complaint must be complete in itself, Stoneroad incorporated his original complaint into his amended complaint. Because Stoneroad is proceeding pro se, we will analyze both the complaint and the amended complaint. The complaint will be analyzed first, and then the amended complaint will be analyzed.

A. The Complaint.

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims.

In his complaint, Stoneroad claims that the defendants violated his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. His constitutional claims are properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). Section 1983 "does not create any new substantive rights but instead provides a remedy for the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right." Id. To establish a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must establish a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005).

a. The Eleventh Amendment bars the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for damages against the judicial defendants in their official capacities.

The Eleventh Amendment bars Stoneroad's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for damages against the judicial defendants—Judge Johnson, the unknown office manager, and Deputy Court Administrator Petry—in their official capacities.

"Our federalist system of government accords respect for the sovereignty of the States in a variety of ways, including the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, which immunizes States from suits brought in federal court by both their own citizens and citizens of other States." Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 81 (3d Cir. 2016). The Eleventh Amendment provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

U.S. Const. Amend. XI. Although its text appears to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, the Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted "to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms." Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)). That presupposition is that each state is a sovereign entity in our federal system and it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty that a sovereign is not amenable to suit unless it consents. Id. Thus, "the Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting States." Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000). "The Eleventh Amendment's protection . . . is not limited to the States alone, but rather extends to entities that function as 'arms of the State.'" Maliandi, 845 F.3d at 81.

A state, however, may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to suit, and Congress may abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it unequivocally intends to do so and it acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority. College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999). The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see 42 P.C.S.A. § 8521(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not override a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).

"The Pennsylvania constitution provides for the vesting of the Commonwealth's judicial power in a 'unified judicial system' which includes all of the courts in Pennsylvania." Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 672 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Pa. Const. art. V, § 1.). "Moreover, the constitution provides that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will exercise 'general supervisory and administrative authority' over the unified judicial system." Id. (quoting Pa. Const. art. V, §§ 1, 2, and 10.) "All courts and agencies of the unified judicial system . . . are part of 'Commonwealth government' and thus are state rather than local agencies." Id. (citing Pa. Const. art. V, § 6(c); 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 102; 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 301).

Here, Stoneroad has sued Judge Johnson, the unknown office manager, and Deputy Court Administrator Petry in both their individual and official capacities. Official-capacity suits are "only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978). In an official-capacity suit, the entity of which the officer is an agent is the real party in interest. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). As such, claims against state officials in their official capacities for damages are treated as suits against the state and are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 318 (3d Cir. 2013).

The judicial defendants are state officials and employees. Thus, the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Judge Johnson, the unknown office manager, and Deputy Court Administrator Petry in their official capacities for damages are really claims against the Commonwealth and, as such, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Dougherty v. Snyder, No. 1:CV-10-1071, 2011 WL 1871226, at *12 (M.D. Pa. May 16, 2011) (concluding that judge and associate court administrator sued in their official capacities were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity).

b. Stoneroad has failed to plead that he has standing to seek injunctive relief against the judicial defendants.

Claims against a state official in his or her official capacity for prospective injunctive relief are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Here, although Stoneroad requests an injunction to prevent harassment by the defendants, he does not allege facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that he has standing to seeking injunctive relief against the judicial defendants.

"Standing to seek injunctive relief requires a plaintiff to show (1) 'that he is under threat of suffering "injury in fact" that is concrete and particularized'; (2) 'the threat must be actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical'; (3) 'it must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant'; and (4) 'it must be likely that a favorable judicial decision will prevent or redress the injury.'" Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Attorney Gen. United States, 825 F.3d 149, 165-66 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009)). "Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief, however, if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974). And in the context of criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court has "consistently refused to 'conclude that the case-or-controversy requirement is satisfied by' the possibility that a party 'will be prosecuted for violating valid criminal laws.'" United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1541 (2018) (quoting O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 497). Instead, it is '"assume[d] that [litigants] will conduct their activities within the law and so avoid prosecution and conviction as well as exposure to the challenged course of conduct.'" Id. (quoting O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 497).

Here, it would be speculation to conclude that Stoneroad would again violate the law and would again appear before Judge Johnson or interact with the unknown office manager or Deputy Court Administrator Petry. O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 497 ("attempting to anticipate whether and when these respondents will be charged with crime and will be made to appear before either petitioner takes us into the area of speculation and conjecture"). Thus, Stoneroad has not alleged that he is under threat of suffering an actual or imminent threat from the judicial defendants that is concrete and particularized. And so, he has not sufficiently pleaded that he has standing to seek injunctive relief against the judicial defendants.

c. Judge Johnson is entitled to Judicial Immunity from Stoneroad's claims for damages against him in his individual capacity.

The Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims against a state official in his or her individual or personal capacity. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991). Thus, the court turns next to Stoneroad's claims against Judge Johnson in his individual capacity. Stoneroad alleges that Judge Johnson violated his constitutional rights by sentencing him to prison for six months on one charge without holding a hearing, by coercing him to plead guilty to another charge, and by sentencing him to confinement without appointing him counsel on yet another charge.

"Although § 1983 purports to subject '[e]very person' acting under color of state law to liability for depriving any other person in the United States of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,' the Supreme Court has recognized that § 1983 was not meant to 'abolish wholesale all common-law immunities.'" Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 134-35 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)). There are two kinds of immunity under § 1983: qualified immunity and absolute immunity. Id. at 135. Although most public officials are entitled only to qualified immunity, public officials who perform "special functions" are entitled to absolute immunity. Id. (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978)). "[A]bsolute immunity attaches to those who perform functions integral to the judicial process." Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2006). "This immunity was and still is considered necessary 'to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation.'" McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1084 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 512).

A functional approach is used to determine whether absolute or qualified immunity applies. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988). The inquiry focuses on the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it. Id. "The Supreme Court long has recognized that judges are immune from suit under section 1983 for monetary damages arising from their judicial acts." Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000). The Court has described the reasons for recognizing judicial immunity as follows:

[T]he nature of the adjudicative function requires a judge frequently to disappoint some of the most intense and ungovernable desires that people can have . . . . [T]his is the principal characteristic that adjudication has in common with legislation and with criminal prosecution, which are the two other areas in which absolute immunity has most generously been provided. If judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke such suits. The resulting timidity would be hard to detect or control, and it would manifestly detract from independent and impartial adjudication.

Forrester, 484 U.S. at 226-27 (citations omitted).

A two-part inquiry is used to determine whether judicial immunity is applicable. Gallas, 211 F.3d at 768. First, because immunity applies only to actions taken in a judge's judicial capacity, a determination must be made whether the challenged actions of the judge were taken in his or her judicial capacity. Id. The relevant factors "relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.'" Id. at 768 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)). "Our task is to 'draw the line between truly judicial acts, for which immunity is appropriate, and acts that simply happen to have been done by judges,' such as administrative acts." Id. (quoting Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227).

"Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Id. In this regard, "we must distinguish between acts in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction,' which do not enjoy the protection of absolute immunity, and acts that are merely in 'excess of jurisdiction,' which do enjoy that protection." Id. at 769 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 n.6). The Supreme Court has explained that distinction:

"Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority exercised is a usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible. But where jurisdiction over the subject-matter is invested by law in the judge, or in the court which he holds, the manner and extent in which the jurisdiction shall be exercised are generally as much questions for his determination as any other questions involved in the case, although upon the correctness of his determination in these particulars the validity of his judgments may depend."

Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 n.6 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351-52 (1871)). "Generally, therefore, 'where a court has some subject matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes.'" Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443-44 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1122 (6th Cir.1997)); see also Gallas, 211 F.3d at 771) (holding that "a judge does not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction when the judge enters an order at least colorably within the jurisdiction of her court even though a court rule or other procedural constraint required another judge to act in the matter").

Judicial immunity shields a judge from liability for judicial acts even if those acts were taken in error, if they were done maliciously, if they were in excess of the judge's authority, if the judge committed grave procedural errors, or if the judge's actions were unfair or controversial. Gallas, 211 F.3d at 769. A judge will be subject to liability only when he or she has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Id. "In sum, our analysis must focus on the general nature of the challenged action, without inquiry into such 'specifics' as the judge's motive or the correctness of his or her decision." Id.

With respect to judicial immunity, there is no distinction between courts of limited jurisdiction and courts of general jurisdiction, Figueroa, 208 F.3d at 441, and the doctrine of judicial immunity applies equally to judges of courts of limited jurisdiction, such as magisterial district judges, as to judges of courts of general jurisdiction, Martin v. Bicking, 30 F.Supp.2d 511, 512 (E.D. Pa. 1998).

Stoneroad complains about actions taken by Judge Johnson in his judicial capacity as a magisterial district judge presiding over proceedings involving summary offenses. And magisterial district judges in Pennsylvania have subject-matter jurisdiction over such proceedings. 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1515. Stoneroad alleges that "Johnson clearly stepped out of his judicial capacity by failing to hold the manditory [sic] required hearings as his job is for, to refuse to give plaintiff a hearing as requested is a stright [sic] forward refusal to do his job he is being paid for by the taxpayers and required by his code of ethics also." Doc. 1 at 3. But because nothing in the complaint suggests that Judge Johnson was acting in a non-judicial capacity or in the complete absence of jurisdiction, even if Judge Johnson erred, he is entitled to judicial immunity from Stoneroad's claims for damages.²

2 In Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984), the Supreme Court held that "judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity." Later, however, as part of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by adding the following language "except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." Brandon E. ex rel. Listenbee v. Reynolds, 201 F.3d 194, 197 (3d Cir. 2000) (italics in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). "The foregoing amendatory language to § 1983 does not expressly authorize suits for declaratory relief against judges." Id. "Instead, it implicitly recognizes that declaratory relief is available in some circumstances, and then limits the availability of injunctive relief to circumstances in which declaratory relief is unavailable or inadequate." Id. at 197-98.
Here, as stated earlier, Stoneroad has not sufficiently pleaded that he has standing to seek injunctive relief against Judge Johnson. Moreover, Stoneroad does not allege that Judge Johnson violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable. Thus, the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 bars Stoneroad's claim for injunctive relief as to Judge Johnson.

d. The complaint fails to allege personal involvement on the part of defendant Petry and the unknown office manager.

The complaint fails to sufficiently allege personal involvement on the part of defendants Petry and the unknown office manager to state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for damages against them in their individual capacities.

Liability in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is personal in nature, and to be liable, a defendant must have been personally involved in the wrongful conduct. Thus, respondeat superior cannot form the basis of liability. Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 290 (3d Cir. 2018). In other words, "each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). And so, a constitutional deprivation cannot be premised merely on the fact that the defendant was a supervisor when the incidents set forth in the complaint occurred. See Alexander v. Forr, 297 F. App'x 102, 104-05 (3d Cir. 2008). Rather, "[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.

The Third Circuit has "recognized that 'there are two theories of supervisory liability, one under which supervisors can be liable if they established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the constitutional harm, and another under which they can be liable if they participated in violating plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the persons in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in their subordinates' violations.'" Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010)).

"Where a supervisor with authority over a subordinate knows that the subordinate is violating someone's rights but fails to act to stop the subordinate from doing so, the factfinder may usually infer that the supervisor 'acquiesced' in (i.e., tacitly assented to or accepted) the subordinate's conduct." Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1294 (3d Cir. 1997) (footnote omitted), abrogated on other grounds, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006). "A plaintiff makes sufficient allegations of a defendant's personal involvement by describing the defendant's participation in or actual knowledge of and acquiescence in the wrongful conduct." Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015).

To set forth a claim for supervisory liability under the policy-and-practice strand of supervisory liability, a plaintiff must:

(1) identify the specific supervisory practice or procedure that the supervisor failed to employ, and show that (2) the existing custom and practice without the identified, absent custom or procedure created an unreasonable risk of the ultimate injury, (3) the supervisor was aware that this unreasonable risk existed, (4) the supervisor was indifferent to the risk; and (5) the underling's violation resulted from the

supervisor's failure to employ that supervisory practice or procedure.

Id. at 227 (quoting Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001)). "Put another way, the inmate must identify the supervisor's specific acts or omissions demonstrating the supervisor's deliberate indifference to the inmate's risk of injury and must establish a link between the supervisor, the act, and the injury." Id.

Here, the complaint contains allegations regarding the general duties of defendants Petry and the unknown office manager. See Doc. 1 at 5-6, ¶¶8-9. The complaint also contains conclusory allegations that defendant Petry failed to supervise his office and failed to change mailing policies as Stoneroad had requested. Id. at 17, ¶ 32. The complaint further contains conclusory allegations that the unknown office manager conspired to discriminate against Stoneroad as a handicapped individual by refusing to extend a hearing, that she failed to enforce rules regarding certified mail, and that she denied him counsel. Id. at 16, ¶ 31. He also alleges that she displayed an "unbecoming and unprofessional attitude" toward him. Id. Stoneroad does not, however, allege facts showing what specifically either defendant Petry or the unknown office manager did with respect to his cases. In other words, he has failed to show that defendant Petry and the unknown office manager were personally involved in actions that resulted in the violation of his rights. Thus, the complaint fails to state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against defendant Petry or the unknown office manager in their individual capacities.

e. The complaint fails to state a First Amendment claim upon which relief can be granted.

In Count 1 of his complaint, Stoneroad claims that Judge Johnson, the unknown office manager, and "any and all Dauphin County employees or official[s] that were assigned and or part of these proceeding concerning any of these dockets and rights violation knew plaintiff or should have known that he had a right to speak and was denied this right by being refused any hearing." Doc. 1 at 11, ¶ 18. As set forth above, Judge Johnson is entitled to judicial immunity. Also, as set forth above, the allegations in the complaint fail to disclose what exactly the unknown office manager did that allegedly violated Stoneroad's rights. Further, Stoneroad is not clear against which other named defendants, if any, he is seeking to assert a First Amendment claim. For these reasons, the complaint fails to state a First Amendment claim upon which relief can be granted.

f. The complaint fails to state a Fourth Amendment claim upon which relief can be granted.

In Count 2 of his complaint, Stoneroad claims that defendants Judge Johnson, the unknown office manager, Dauphin County, and Miller as well as "other county employees and officials" failed to return the money that he had paid to the work-release program after he was cleared of criminal charges and released. He contends they refused to make a policy as to the return of such money.

The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Here, Stoneroad is complaining about the failure to return money to him, not a search or seizure of his property. Thus, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated by his allegations about the failure to return his money.

Although not mentioned in Count 2, in other parts of his complaint, Stoneroad mentions, in passing, false arrest and false imprisonment claims that would involve the Fourth Amendment. Kokinda v. Breiner, 557 F. Supp. 2d 581, 592 (M.D. Pa. 2008) ("A claim under § 1983 for false arrest/false imprisonment is grounded in the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable seizures."). "To state a claim for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable cause." James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012). "To state a claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that []he was detained; and (2) that the detention was unlawful." Id. at 682-83 (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007) ("The sort of unlawful detention remediable by the tort of false imprisonment is detention without legal process." (citations omitted) (emphasis deleted)). Although Stoneroad mentions false arrest and false imprisonment in passing, he does not allege who arrested him. Nor does he allege that any arrest or detention was without probable cause. Accordingly, the complaint fails to state Fourth Amendment false arrest and false imprisonment claims upon which relief can be granted.

g. The complaint fails to state a Fifth Amendment claim upon which relief can be granted.

In Count 3 of his complaint, Stoneroad claims that defendants Judge Johnson,³ the unknown office manager, Petry, and Dauphin County denied him due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

3 As set forth above, Judge Johnson is entitled to judicial immunity.

The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. V. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, however, applies only to the federal government and federal officials. Shoemaker v. City of Lock Haven, 906 F. Supp. 230, 237 (M.D. Pa. 1995). "It does not apply to the acts or conduct of the states, their agencies, subdivisions, or employees." Id.

The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause is not applicable in this case because the defendants here are state, not federal, actors. Thus, the complaint fails to state a Fifth Amendment due process claim upon which relief can be granted.

h. The complaint states a Sixth Amendment claim upon which relief can be granted against defendant Winnick, but it fails to state a Sixth Amendment claim upon which relief can be granted against any other defendant.

In Count 4 of his complaint, Stoneroad claims that Judge Johnson and "others," who he does not identify, conspired to not give him a counseled hearing in connection with all three charges, allowed the district attorney "to be present at the only docket he was even allowed to be present," and refused to allow "a legally handicapped individual proper representation." Doc. 1 at 12-13. He also mentions the Public Defender's "policy that blocked handicapped persons and other[s] from obtaining counsel due to unavoidable circumstances and inability to personally be present in the PDs office." Id. at 13. He contends that his cases were mandatory minimum sentence cases that required the appointment of effective defense counsel, but he suggests that in two of the three dockets he was not appointed counsel and in the third, his court-appointed counsel was ineffective.

As set forth above, Judge Johnson is entitled to judicial immunity. Although Stoneroad asserts that "others" conspired to not give him a counseled hearing, he does not specify who those "others" are. Doc. 1 at 12. But given that the issue is, at least in part, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it is reasonable to assume that this count concerns defendant Gillardi—an assistant public defender and Stoneroad's court-appointed counsel in the Court of Common Pleas as to the 2018 charge—and defendant Winnick—the Chief Public Defender.

The complaint, however, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against defendant Gillardi. Stoneroad complains about Gillardi's actions as his defense counsel. But the conduct of a defense attorney representing a client in a criminal case does not, by itself, rise to the level of state action, a necessary element of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (holding that a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding).

A public defender may act under color of state law when engaged in a conspiracy with a state official. See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984). "The essence of a conspiracy is an agreement." United States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 1989). "To demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy under § 1983, 'a plaintiff must show that two or more conspirators reached an agreement to deprive him or her of a constitutional right under color of law.'" LeBlanc v. Stedman, 483 F. App'x 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Phila., 5 F.3d 685, 700 (3d Cir.1993), abrogated on other grounds by United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003)). "It is not enough that the end result of the parties' independent conduct caused the plaintiff harm or even that the alleged perpetrators of the harm acted in conscious parallelism." Perez v. Gamez, 1:13-CV-1552, 2013 WL 6073877, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2013). Rather, the plaintiff must show that the defendants acted in concert with the specific intent to violate the plaintiff's rights. Davis v. Fox, 3:12-CV-1660, 2013 WL 5656125, at * 5 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2013).

Because direct evidence of a conspiracy is rarely available, the existence of a conspiracy may be inferred from the circumstances. Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009). Still, to state a conspiracy claim upon which relief can be granted, a plaintiff must allege "facts from which a conspiratorial agreement can be inferred." Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178 (3d Cir. 2010). "To properly plead such an agreement, 'a bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice.'" Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).

Here, Stoneroad has not alleged facts leading to a reasonable inference of a conspiracy between defendant Gillardi and any state actor. Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against defendant Gillardi.

Stoneroad also contends that the policy of defendant Winnick, the Chief Public Defender, that applicants for counsel must appear in person deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because given his handicap, he could not appear in person at the public defender's office. But Stoneroad only alleges that he has been handicapped since January of 2018. Thus, it cannot be reasonably inferred that the policy of the Public Defender caused him not to have counsel in 2016. Further, as defendant Gillardi was appointed as counsel as to Stoneroad's 2018 trial in the Court of Common Pleas, it appears that he is alleging that the Public Defender's policy caused him to be without counsel only as to the 2018 charge in front of Judge Johnson.

Although a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding, a public defender "may" act under color of state law "while performing certain administrative and possibly investigative functions," Polk, 454 U.S. at 325; see also Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 319 F.3d 465, 469 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a public defender acted under color of state law when allocating resources and determining policies). Here, Stoneroad is challenging what may be considered an administrative policy of defendant Winnick. Thus, Winnick may have been acting under color of state law.

Construed liberally, the complaint alleges that Winnick's policy resulted in a violation of Stoneroad's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. "[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver," the Sixth Amendment requires that "no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (footnote omitted); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (reaffirming "actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel"). Here, Stoneroad alleges that Winnick had a policy that all applicants for counsel had to appear in person at the public defender's office to be represented by that office, that he could not appear in person because of his handicap, and that as a result he was denied counsel in connection with a trial before Judge Johnson that resulted in his incarceration. Given these allegations, the complaint states a Sixth Amendment claim upon which relief can be granted against Winnick.

i. The complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim upon which relief can be granted.

In Count 5 of his complaint, Stoneroad claims that defendant Johnson and "other defendants" violated the Eighth Amendment. His allegations regarding the Eighth Amendment are unclear. The Court is mindful that a complaint filed by a pro se litigant, like Stoneroad, is to be liberally construed and "'however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106). Nevertheless, it is unclear upon what acts Stoneroad is basing an Eighth Amendment claim. Moreover, as set forth above, Judge Johnson is entitled to judicial immunity. And Stoneroad does not specify who are the other defendants he is claiming violated the Eighth Amendment. See Doc. 1 at 13. Thus, the complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim upon which relief can be granted.

j. The complaint fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim upon which relief can be granted.

Stoneroad contends that Judge Johnson and "unknown defendants" violated his right to due process by refusing to provide a full and fair counseled hearing and access to the courts. Judge Johnson is entitled to judicial immunity. And Stoneroad does not specify who are the other defendants he contends violated his right to due process or what specifically they did to deny him a fair hearing or access to the courts. Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a due process claim upon which relief can be granted.

2. The complaint fails to state any other claims upon which relief can be granted.

a. The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").

Although Stoneroad mentions the ADA, the complaint does not contain a count for a violation of the ADA. And it is not clear who Stoneroad is seeking to hold liable for a violation of the ADA or the exact conduct that he his claiming violated the ADA. Accordingly, the complaint fails to state an ADA claim upon which relief can be granted.

b. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 , 1985, and 1986.

Although Stoneroad mentions in passing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985 and 1986, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under any of these statutes.

42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides in pertinent part that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Stoneroad has failed to assert against whom he is bringing such a claim or the basis for any such claim.

Stoneroad also cites to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, which contains three subparts. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1), which deals with preventing an officer from performing his or her duties, is not relevant here. And only the second part of §1985(2), which "applies to conspiracies to obstruct the course of justice in state courts," Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 725 (1983), is potentially relevant in this case. That part of § 1985(2) is limited to conspiracies based on racial or some other class-based invidiously discriminatory animus. Davis v. Twp. of Hillside, 190 F.3d 167, 171 (3d Cir. 1999). 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) "permits an action to be brought by one injured by a conspiracy formed 'for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.'" Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting § 1985(3)). Section 1985(3) is also limited to conspiracies based on racial or some other class-based invidiously discriminatory animus. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). Here, Stoneroad has failed to assert against whom he is bringing a § 1985 claim or the basis for any such claim. Further, because Stoneroad has not alleged a racial or other class-based discriminatory animus, and because he has not set forth allegations from which a conspiracy can reasonably be inferred, any claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and (3) are without merit.

Stoneroad also cites to 42 U.S.C. § 1986, which provides a cause of action for failing to prevent a conspiracy under Section 1985. "Section 1986, therefore, is derivative of section 1985." Dennison v. PA Dept. of Corrections, 268 F.Supp.2d 387, 402 n.10 (M.D. Pa. 2003). Since the complaint fails to state a § 1985 claim upon which relief can be granted, it follows that the complaint fails to state a § 1986 claim upon which relief can be granted.

c. Criminal statutes.

Stoneroad also cites to criminal statutes—18 U.S.C. § 241 (conspiracy against rights); and 18 U.S.C. § 242 (deprivation of rights under color of law). But those criminal statutes do not provide a private right of action, and there is "no federal right to require the government to initiate criminal proceedings." Rodriguez v. Salus, 623 F. App'x 588, 590 (3d Cir. 2015); see also Colon-Montanez v. Pennsylvania Healthcare Serv. Staffs, 530 F. App'x 115, 118 (3d Cir. 2013) (concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 241 and §242 "provide no private right of action for use by a litigant such as Colon-Montanez").

d. Other claims.

Stoneroad makes a passing reference to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et. seq. But he fails to allege any facts that could plausibly support a claim under that statute. He also makes passing references to the Pennsylvania Constitution, fraud, and perjury. But again, he fails to set forth any such claims in separate counts, to state against whom he is brining any such claims, or to state the basis for any such claims.

B. The Amended Complaint.

1. Judge Johnson and Staff of the State Court.

Stoneroad names Judge Johnson in his amended complaint. As set forth above, the claims against Judge Johnson in his official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and Judge Johnson in entitled to judicial immunity as to the claims against him in his individual capacity.

Stoneroad names two Jane Does as defendants and identifies them as staff of District Court 12-3-02. He also names Troy Petry in his amended complaint and identifies him as a Dauphin County District Magistrate Supervisor. He names these defendants in their individual and official capacities. But as set forth above, the claims against staff of the state court in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. And as with his complaint, in his amended complaint, Stoneroad fails to allege what specifically the staff did that violated his rights. Accordingly, the amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against the Jane Doe defendants and defendant Petry in their individual capacities.

2. Defendant Kolva.

Stoneroad names Robert Kolva in his amended complaint, alleging that Kolva, a constable of Lykens Borough, took him into custody at the direction of Judge Johnson. Stoneroad acknowledges that Kolva "did his job as correctly as he could determine at the moment" and that Kolva "did the best he could to resolve the matter to no avail." Doc. 9 at ¶ 8. Thus, Stoneroad named Kolva only in his official capacity, and not his individual capacity. Id. But an official capacity claim against Kolva is really a claim against the entity of which he is an officer. Here, that entity is Lykens Borough.

A municipality, such as Lykens Borough, cannot be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Rather, "under § 1983, local governments are responsible only for 'their own illegal acts.'" Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (emphasis in original). "[A] § 1983 claim against a municipality may proceed in two ways." Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019). One way for a plaintiff to present a claim against a municipality is to allege "that an unconstitutional policy or custom of the municipality led to his or her injuries." Id. Another way for a plaintiff to present a claim against a municipality is to allege that his injuries "were caused by a failure or inadequacy by the municipality that 'reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.'" Id. (quoting Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019)).

To plead a claim against a municipality under the policy-or-custom strand of municipal liability, "a plaintiff must allege that 'a [local] government's policy or custom . . . inflict[ed] the injury' in question." Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). '"Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.'" Id. (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). '"Custom, on the other hand, can be proven by showing that a given course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute law.'" Id. (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990)).

"To satisfy the pleading standard, [a plaintiff] must identify a custom or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was." McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). "Although a policy or custom is necessary to plead a municipal claim, it is not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss." Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798. "A plaintiff must also allege that the policy or custom was the 'proximate cause' of his injuries." Id.

Here, Stoneroad has not alleged facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that a policy or custom of Lykens Borough violated his rights.

Another way for a plaintiff to present a claim against a municipality is to allege that his or her injuries "were caused by a failure or inadequacy by the municipality that 'reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.'" Forrest, 930 F.3d at 105 (quoting Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798). "The latter avenue arose in the failure-to-train context, but applies to other failures and inadequacies by municipalities, including those related to supervision and discipline of its police officers." Id.

A plaintiff asserting a municipal liability claim based on a failure or inadequacy of training, supervision, or discipline "need not allege an unconstitutional policy." Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798. Rather, he must show that the municipality's failure to train, supervise, or discipline "its employees 'reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.'" Id. (quoting Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2001)). In this regard, the plaintiff must show "a failure or inadequacy amounting to deliberate indifference on the part of the municipality." Forrest, 930 F.3d at 106. "This consists of a showing as to whether (1) municipal policymakers know that employees will confront a particular situation, (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling, and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights." Id.

Here, Stoneroad has not alleged facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that a failure or inadequacy of training, supervision, or discipline by Lykens Borough caused a violation of his rights.

In sum, the amended complaint fails to state a claim against defendant Kolva in his official capacity upon which relief can be granted.

3. Dauphin County.

Stoneroad also names Dauphin County in his amended complaint. But as with his claim against Kolva in his official capacity, Stoneroad has failed to allege facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that a policy or custom of Dauphin County violated his rights or that a failure or inadequacy of training, supervision, or discipline by Dauphin County caused a violation of his rights. Thus, the amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Dauphin County

4. The Dauphin County Work Release Center and Matt Miller.

The amended complaint names the Dauphin County Work Release Center as a defendant. It also names the Dauphin County Work Release Center's Director—Matt Miller—in his official capacity as a defendant. Because Stoneroad sued Miller in his official capacity only, the claim against Miller is really a claim against the Dauphin County Work Release Center. And Because the Dauphin County Work Release Center is a part of the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, Stoneroad's claims against the Dauphin County Work Release Center and against Miller in his official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Lawson v. Dauphin Cty. Work Release, No. 1:15-CV-02450, 2016 WL 6090758, at *5, *5 n.5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2016) (taking judicial notice that the Dauphin County Work Release Center is a department of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County and concluding that, therefore, it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as an arm of the State), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 6082127, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2016).

5. The Dauphin County Land Bank.

Stoneroad names the Dauphin County Land Bank in his amended complaint. He alleges that the Dauphin County Land Bank, which was formed on August 7, 2013, claims to reclaim abandoned properties and bad neighborhoods. According to Stoneroad, it uses inmates of the Dauphin County Prison to buy and flip real estate without paying the inmates to do so. Stoneroad also contends that although the Dauphin County Land Bank claims that all county residents own the Land Bank, he never received a W-9, a stock certificate, or a tax break from it. Stoneroad requests an audit and investigation of the Dauphin County Land Bank as well as his "individual share" of the proceeds from the Dauphin County Land Bank. Stoneroad fails, however, to allege facts from which it can be inferred that he has a claim against the Dauphin County Land Bank. Further, it does not appear that his claim against the Dauphin County Land Bank has anything to do with the other claims or defendants in his amended complaint. Accordingly, the claim against the Dauphin County Land Bank is improperly joined in this case. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(2) (providing that persons may be joined in one action as defendants if "any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and . . . any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action").

6. The Dauphin County Prison.

Stoneroad names the Dauphin County Prison as a defendant in the amended complaint. The Dauphin County Prison, however, is not a proper defendant in this action. "Courts have repeatedly recognized that a prison or correctional facility is not a person for purposes of civil rights liability." Pigford v. Cumberland Cnty. Prison, No. 3:11-CV-598, 2011 WL 1375267, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2011) (citing cases); see also Vazquez v. Dauphin Cty. Prison, No. 1:19-CV-0217, 2019 WL 2577381, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 24, 2019) ("Only 'persons' are subject to suit under § 1983, and entities such as the [Dauphin County Prison] do not qualify as 'persons.'"). Thus, the Dauphin County Prison is not properly named as a defendant in this civil-rights action.

7. Bradley Winnick.

Stoneroad names Bradley Winnick, the Dauphin County Public Defender, in his amended complaint. He does not allege facts as to what Winnick is specifically alleged to have done or not done. But as set forth above, Stoneroad incorporates his complaint into his amended complaint, and the complaint states a Sixth Amendment claim upon which relief can be granted against Winnick. Thus, it will be recommended that that Sixth Amendment claim against Winnick not be dismissed.

8. Edward Marsico.

Stoneroad names Edward Marsico, the Dauphin County District Attorney, as a defendant in his amended complaint. He seeks to hold Marsico liable in both his individual and official capacity. According to Stoneroad, Marsico did not have jurisdiction to prosecute him for Driving Under the Influence because there was no victim and no damage, and, therefore, there was no crime. It is also alleged that Marsico's staff knew that Stoneroad did not have a hearing and yet they stalled the inevitable dismissal of his case. Stoneroad further alleges that Marsico failed to train and supervise his staff.

As set forth above, liability in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is personal in nature, and to be liable, a defendant must have been personally involved in the wrongful conduct. Thus, respondeat superior cannot form the basis of liability. Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 290. Stoneroad has not, however, alleged facts from which is can be inferred that Marsico was personally involved in prosecuting him or violating his rights. Accordingly, the amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Marsico in his individual capacity.

The amended complaint also fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Marsico in his official capacity. As explained previously, a claim against a defendant in his official capacity is a claim against the entity of which he is an official. Thus, Stoneroad's claim against Marsico in his official capacity is a claim against Dauphin County. And as previously explained, a municipality, such as Dauphin County, cannot be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Rather, "under § 1983, local governments are responsible only for 'their own illegal acts.'" Connick, 563 U.S. at 60 (quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S.at 479 (emphasis in original)).

Here, Stoneroad contends that Marsico failed to train and supervise his staff. As previously set forth, a plaintiff asserting a municipal liability claim based on a failure or inadequacy of training, supervision, or discipline must show that the municipality's failure to train, supervise, or discipline "its employees 'reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.'" Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798 (quoting Brown, 269 F.3d at 215). In this regard, the plaintiff must show "a failure or inadequacy amounting to deliberate indifference on the part of the municipality." Forrest, 930 F.3d at 106. "This consists of a showing as to whether (1) municipal policymakers know that employees will confront a particular situation, (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling, and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights." Id.

Stoneroad's conclusory allegation that Marsico failed to train or supervise his staff does not state a claim upon which relief be granted. Stoneroad does not allege facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that a failure on the part of Dauphin County amounting to deliberate indifference caused a violation of his rights. Thus, the amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Marsico in his official capacity.

9. The Pennsylvania State Police.

Stoneroad names the Pennsylvania State Police as a defendant in the amended complaint. The Pennsylvania State Police is an agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 71 Pa.C.S.A. § 61. As such it has Eleventh Amendment immunity from claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Atkin v. Johnson, 432 F. App'x 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2011) ("The District Court correctly determined that the Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages against the PSP, a state agency that did not waive its sovereign immunity."). Thus, the claim against the Pennsylvania State Police should be dismissed.

V. Recommendation.

Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that all Stoneroad's claims be dismissed except the the Sixth Amendment claim against defendant Winnick.

The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the

disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.

Submitted this 6th day of April, 2020.

S/Susan E . Schwab

Susan E. Schwab

Chief United States Magistrate Judge