Summary
holding trained officer had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle for suspicion of driving while intoxicated when he observed car touch or cross center line and fog line five or six times in a relatively short distance at night
Summary of this case from Velasquez v. StateOpinion
No. 05-08-01579-CR
Opinion Filed June 16, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the County Court at Law, Rockwall County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. CR08-0625.
Before Justices MORRIS, RICHTER, and LANG-MIERS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Tina Marie Stone filed a motion to suppress all evidence resulting from her detention and arrest. After the trial court denied the motion, appellant pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated with an open container of alcohol. In one issue, appellant asserts the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress because the police did not have reasonable suspicion to detain her. The facts and procedural history of this appeal are well known to the parties so we do not relate them in detail here. Because all dispositive issues are clearly settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. The trial court's judgment is affirmed. At approximately 10:00 p.m., Officer Dennie Mees, a patrol officer with the Rockwall Police Department, was driving behind appellant and saw appellant "drive over" the center stripe and the fog line of the road five or six times within one-half to three-quarters of a mile. Mees stopped appellant to investigate whether appellant was driving while intoxicated or was distracted while driving. After stopping appellant, Mees arrested appellant for driving while intoxicated with an open container of alcohol. Appellant filed a motion to suppress arguing Mees did not have reasonable suspicion to stop her. Mees testified he had over three years experience in patrol, including making traffic stops and performing investigations, and had completed the basic peace officer's course as well as fifteen weeks of field training. After Mees testified about appellant's driving, appellant offered evidence that a portion of the road was under construction and that she operated her vehicle normally under the conditions. Mees testified he took the road conditions into consideration when he decided to stop appellant. Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress because Mees did not have reasonable suspicion to stop her. We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review. St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). We do not engage in our own factual review; rather, the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Amador v. State, 275 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009). We give almost total deference to a trial court's determination of historical facts, particularly when the trial court's findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. St. George, 237 S.W.3d at 725; Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). We afford the same deference to mixed questions of law and fact if resolving those questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007); Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. We review de novo the application of legal principles to a specific set of facts, including the trial court's determination of reasonable suspicion and probable cause. State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008); Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87. When, as here, the trial court does not enter findings of fact, we infer the necessary factual findings that support the trial court's ruling if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the ruling, support the implied fact findings. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 241. A law enforcement officer is justified in detaining a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is violating the law. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005); Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968)). "Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that a particular person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity." Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). The reasonable suspicion determination disregards the subjective intent of the officer making the stop and looks solely to whether there was an objective basis for the stop. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492. Further, the reasonable suspicion determination is made by considering the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 492-93; Woods, 956 S.W.2d at 37-38. Appellant argues Mees did "not provide any articulable reasons or facts that would justify a belief that Appellant was possibly intoxicated or otherwise in need of assistance" and "there are a myriad of reasons for a vehicle drifting across a lane dividing line." However, the State was not required to prove intoxication was the most likely reason for appellant's weaving. Curtis v. State, 238 S.W.3d 376, 379-79 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007); Woods, 956 S.W.2d at 38 (recognizing "there may be instances when a person's conduct viewed in a vacuum, appears purely innocent, yet when viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, those actions give rise to reasonable suspicion"). Rather, the question is whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, Mees had a reasonable suspicion appellant was intoxicated. Curtis, 238 S.W.3d at 379-80. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision, Mees testified (1) he had over three years experience as a patrol officer and had received the requisite training; (2) he was driving behind appellant at 10:00 p.m.; (3) appellant's tires touched or passed over the center line and the fog line five or six times over a relatively short distance; (4) he considered the road conditions in evaluating appellant's driving; and (5) he stopped appellant to determine whether she was intoxicated or was distracted. Based on the totality of the circumstances, Mees's specific, articulable facts, in light of his experience and personal knowledge, together with inferences from those facts, were sufficient to support findings by the trial court that Mees had a reasonable suspicion appellant could be intoxicated and that Mees had authority to stop and temporarily detain appellant. See Curtis, 238 S.W.3d at 281. The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to suppress. We resolve appellant's sole issue against her. We affirm the trial court's judgment.