Opinion
2:23-cv-03138-RMG-MGB
08-17-2023
William Allen Stone, Plaintiff, v. Georgetown County, Georgetown County Sheriff,[1]Officer David Law, Officer Brandon K. Sonko, 15th Circuit Solicitor's Office, Thomas Groom Terrell, III, Michell Barbara Nelson-Padgett, Allen Bradley Stone, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff William Allen Stone (“Plaintiff”), through counsel, originally filed this action alleging state law claims and violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Georgetown County Court of Common Pleas. (Dkt. No. 1-1.) On June 30, 2023, Defendants removed the action to federal court. (Dkt. No. 1.) Currently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss in Part filed by Defendants Georgetown County and Georgetown County Sheriff's Office (“GCSO”) (collectively, “Defendants”). (Dkt. No. 4.) Under Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends Defendants' Motion be granted.
BACKGROUND
This action arises out of an alleged altercation between Plaintiff and his son, Defendant Allen Bradley Stone, which resulted in Plaintiff's arrest in June of 2021. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 20-21.) Plaintiff was charged with assault and battery and detained pursuant to an arrest warrant. (Id. at 21-22.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant GCSO failed to conduct a legitimate investigation into the underlying altercation and the charges were eventually dismissed. (Id. at 23-24.) The Amended Complaint alleges the following causes of action:
Count I: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against GCSO, Officer Law, Officer Sonko, 15th Circuit Solicitor's Office, Solicitor Terrell;
Count II: Abuse of Process against All Defendants;
Count III: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against All Defendants;
County V: Slander against Michell Barbara Nelson-Padgett and Allen Bradley Stone; and
Count VI: Malicious Prosecution against All Defendants.(Id. at 26-31.)
The fourth and fifth causes of action are misnumbered in the Amended Complaint.
On July 7, 2023, Defendants Georgetown County and GCSO filed a Motion to Dismiss in Part. (Dkt. No. 4.) They seek to dismiss all claims brought against Georgetown County and the § 1983 claim brought against GCSO. (Id.) In support, they argue that Plaintiff fails to allege any claims against Georgetown County and that GCSO is immune from the § 1983 claim under the Eleventh Amendment. (Id.) They ask that the claims at issue be dismissed with prejudice. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff filed a response on July 30, 2023. (Dkt. No. 26.) In his response, Plaintiff consents to the dismissal of Georgetown County and opposes the dismissal of the § 1983 claim against GCSO. (Id.) Defendants filed a reply brief on July 31, 2023. (Dkt. No. 28.) The Motion has been fully briefed and is ready for the Court's review.
STANDARD
Defendants seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. No. 4 at 3.) On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a “complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “In reviewing a motion to dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) . . . [a court] must determine whether it is plausible that the factual allegations in the complaint are ‘enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'” Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “A plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the district court must “take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “In considering a motion to dismiss, [the court] accept[s] the complainant's well-pleaded allegations as true and view[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Stansbury v. McDonald's Corp., 36 Fed.Appx. 98, 98-99 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir.1993)). However, while the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, it need not accept the “legal conclusions drawn from the facts, . . . unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions or arguments.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999); Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 298).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, Plaintiff consents to the dismissal of Georgetown County. (Dkt. No. 26 at 1.) He does not expressly object to Defendants' request that the dismissal be with prejudice. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends any claims brought against Georgetown County be dismissed, with prejudice.
While Plaintiff asserts that GCSO “should remain a party to this action,” he does not acknowledge Defendants' assertion that it is immune from the § 1983 claim under the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining an action against a state. See, e.g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam) (citations omitted); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1890). It is well-established in South Carolina that a sheriff's office is an agency of, and a sheriff “dominated by,” the state, such that a suit against the sheriff in his official capacity is a suit against the State. Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F.Supp. 947, 955 (D.S.C. 1988), aff'd. 878 F.2d 379 (1989) (discussing sheriff as an agent and alter ego of the state). “As an agency of the state, the Georgetown County Sheriff's Department is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution which divests this court of jurisdiction to entertain a suit brought against the State of South Carolina or its integral parts.” Carter v. Georgetown Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 3:09-cv-779-CMC-JRM, 2009 WL 1393509, at *3 (D.S.C. May 18, 2009); see also Lewis v. Sarvis, No. 2:13-cv-3465-RMG, 2015 WL 4167503, at *6 (D.S.C. May 27, 2015) (“[T]he Defendant Georgetown County Sheriffs Office is a state office, and as such enjoys Eleventh Immunity from suit in this Court.”), adopted in part, rejected in part, 2015 WL 4167556 (D.S.C. July 9, 2015).
Notably, by voluntarily removing a case to federal court, a defendant waives any immunity from suit in federal court with respect to any claims it otherwise would have been subject to in state court. Lapides v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613, 619 (2002) (“A State's voluntary appearance in federal court waives sovereign immunity for claims where a state has consented to suit in its own courts for such claims); see also Cameron v. Cox, No. 10-cv-1278-HFF-SVH, 2011 WL 1235308, at * 4 (D.S.C. Jan. 21, 2011), adopted by, 2011 WL 1212177 (D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2011). Through enactment of the SCTCA, South Carolina has generally consented to suit for tort claims filed against it in state court. Briggs v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, No. 13-cv-1348-RMG, 2014 WL 1278173 at *21 (D.S.C. Mar. 27, 2014).
Such voluntary removal does not waive a defendant's immunity to any § 1983 claims, however. See Passaro v. Virginia, 893 F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir. 2019) (rejecting argument that the Commonwealth waived its sovereign immunity to a Title I claim by removing case to federal court); Stewart v. North Carolina, 393 F.3d 484 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that where a state retains its sovereign immunity from suit in state court, it does not lose that immunity by removing the case to federal court).
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against Defendant GCSO. Plaintiff offers no argument on the immunity issue. Rather, he claims that GCSO “is liable for the individual actions of the officers” and “discovery is needed on this issue prior to a complete dismissal” of GCSO. (Dkt. No. 26 at 6.) Such arguments do not overcome GCSO's immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Further, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Governmentofficial defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in Part (Dkt. No. 4) be GRANTED. Specifically, the undersigned recommends the following claims be dismissed, with prejudice: (1) all claims against Defendant Georgetown County; and (2) the § 1983 claim against Defendant GCSO. Georgetown County should be dismissed from this action.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 835 Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).