Opinion
Civil Action 2:21-267
01-14-2022
BRIAN JOSEPH STOLTIE, Plaintiff, v. GINA CERILLI, JOHN R. WALTON, GEORGE LOWTHER, ERIC SWARTZ, STEVEN M. PELESKY, DAYTON WOLFE, MR. TRAN, MATTHEW SPRINGER, THOMAS KEMERER, MR. FAGAN, MR. MARTIN, MR. PALMER, MR. CORUSO, CHRISTOPHER DEMOREST, MARK GIAQUINTO, JEFFREY LONG, RICHARD JACK, CHAD BLACK, MR. LOCKWICH, NIKKI CRAMER, COUNTY OF WESTMORELAND, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA L. DODGE United States Magistrate Judge
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss Complaint filed by Defendants Gina Cerilli, Coruso, Nikki Cramer, Fagan, George Lowther, Martin, Palmer and Eric Swartz (ECF 19) be granted.
II. Report
A. Background and Procedural Posture
Plaintiff Brian Joseph Stoltie (“Stoltie”), proceeding pro se, brings action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his civil rights under the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. In Stoltie's eight-count Complaint, which was filed in April 2021, he brings numerous claims pertaining to the conditions of his confinement at the Westmoreland County Prison (“WCP”) between April 28, 2020, when he was first confined there, through on or around November or December 2020. Plaintiff names as defendants numerous individuals who worked at the WCP during the relevant time period, as well as Westmoreland County and one of its commissioners.
Stoltie claims that one or more of the defendants: subjected him to excessive force on October 10, 2020 (Count 1); refused to provide him with a medically ordered low salt diet and a nutritionally balanced meal (Count 2); subjected him to unsanitary cell conditions (Count 3); failed to provide him with adequate mental health care or access to a qualified mental health provider (Count 4); interfered with his legal mail and right to access the courts (Count 5); subjected him to unconstitutional strip and cell searches and confiscated and/or destroyed personal and religious property (Count 6); tampered with, damaged or lost his incoming mail (Count 7); and failed to provide him with adequate clothing necessary to a particular season (Count 8). As relief, Stoltie seeks compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief in the form of an order directing the appropriate defendants to “[i]mmediately terminate the tampering of any privileged legal mail...[and] revise what the facility constitutes as legal mail[, ]” and “arrange for and conduct a complete overhaul of the mental health delivery system[.]” (ECF 12, Compl. ¶ 51.) He also seeks “emotional damages” against defendants Lowther, Swartz, Dayton Wolfe, Matthew Springer, Fagan, Palmer, Coruso, Jeffrey Long, and Robert Jack. (Id. ¶ 54.)
In July 2021, defendants Gina Cerilli (“Cerilli”), Coruso, Nikki Cramer (“Cramer”), Fagan, George Lowther (“Lowther”), Martin, Palmer, and Eric Swartz (“Swartz”) (collectively referred to as the “Moving Defendants”) filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF 19) and supporting Brief (ECF 20). The Moving Defendants assert that Stoltie has no cognizable legal claim against Cerilli. Moreover, they argue that Stoltie's claim of damages for mental anguish against Martin and Cramer in Count 7, and his request for an award of damages for emotional injury against Lowther, Swartz, Fagan, Palmer, and Coruso, fail as a matter of law. Stoltie has filed a Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF 24).
Swartz at times is referred to as Schwartz in the pleadings.
The Moving Defendants are not seeking dismissal of all claims asserted by Stoltie.
Defendants Westmoreland County, Chad Black, Christopher Demorest, Mark Giaquinto, Richard Jack, Thomas Kemerer, Lockwich, Jeffrey Long, Steven M. Pelesky, Matthew Springer, Tran, John R. Walton and Dayton Wolfe have filed an Answer (ECF 21) to the Complaint.
The Court must accept as true the factual allegations of the Complaint for purposes of resolving the motion to dismiss.
Stoltie's Complaint includes numerous factual allegations relating to a number of separate incidents involving various defendants. The Court will address only those allegations that are pertinent to the present motion.
At all relevant times, Stoltie was housed at the WCP. The Complaint identifies each of the Moving Defendants as follows:
• Cerilli: the Westmoreland County Commissioner responsible for ensuring the safety of Stoltie, acting under color of law in the scope of her employment. She is sued in her individual and official capacities. (ECF 12, ¶ III.5.)
• Lowther: the Deputy Warden of Security at WCP, responsible for ensuring that rules and regulations are followed and for ensuring Stoltie's safety, acting under color of law in the scope of his employment. He is sued in his individual and official capacities. (ECF 12, ¶ III.7.)
• Swartz: the Deputy Warden of Treatment at WCP, responsible for ensuring that rules and regulations are followed and for ensuring Stoltie's safety, acting under color of law in the scope of his employment. He is sued in his individual and official capacities. (ECF 12, ¶ III.8.)
• Fagan: a Sergeant at WCP, responsible for ensuring that rules and regulations are followed and for ensuring Stoltie's safety, acting under color of law in the scope of his employment. He is sued in his individual and official capacities. (ECF 12, ¶ III.14.)
• Martin: a Corrections Officer at WCP, responsible for the inmates' mail and ensuring its delivery as well as ensuring mail policy and procedures are followed, acting under color of law in the scope of his employment. He is sued in his individual and official capacities. (ECF 12, ¶ III.15.)
• Palmer: a Corrections Officer at WCP, responsible for ensuring that rules and regulations are followed and for ensuring Stoltie's safety, acting under color of law in the scope of his employment. He is sued in his individual and official capacities. (ECF 12, ¶ III.16.)
• Coruso: a Corrections Officer at WCP, responsible for ensuring that rules and regulations are followed and for ensuring Stoltie's safety, acting under color of law in the scope of his employment. He is sued in his individual and official capacities. (ECF 12, ¶ III.17.)
• Cramer: a Corrections Officer at WCP, responsible for ensuring that rules and regulations are followed and for ensuring Stoltie's safety, acting under color of law in the scope of his employment. He is sued in his individual and official capacities. (ECF 12, ¶ III.24.)
Stoltie's Complaint raises a number of issues about his treatment at WCP. This includes the food service's lack of attention to his food allergies, the medical department's failure to attend to his mental and physical health issues, a physical assault and torture-like treatment he sustained that was allegedly carried out by the prison staff, the refusal to provide warm clothes for his outdoor exercise offered at 2:00 a.m. and 6:30 a.m., confiscation and destruction of personal property, and prison staff tampering with, opening, and destroying his personal and legal mail. (ECF 12, ¶¶ 27-42.) Stoltie claims that he requested formal grievances for his various complaints but was denied access to the forms. He alleges that he was consistently told by prison staff that his request slips were “lost or discarded, or your informal attempts are denied.” (ECF 12, ¶ 27; see also ECF 12-1 to 12-5 (requests for grievance slips).) Thus, he claims that the prison's custom of denying access to grievance forms left him unable to exhaust his administrative remedies. (ECF 12, ¶ 25.)
Due to Stoltie's frustration with WCP's grievance process, he sent correspondence to the Westmoreland County Commissioner's office once and directly to Commissioner Cerilli on two occasions. Stoltie has attached to his Complaint the letters that he sent to Cerilli. In a letter directed to her dated July 6, 2020 (ECF 12, Ex. 1-B), Stoltie states that he is seeking assistance because he made several requests for a grievance form and did not receive them through the grievance chain of command. He also explains that his issue is the failure to receive a newspaper to which he subscribes. In a second letter dated October 13, 2020 (ECF 12, Ex. 4-A), he states that he is again seeking Cerilli's assistance in obtaining a grievance form to address a number of issues, including but not limited to excessive use of force, cruel and unusual punishment, inadequate mental health care and “much more.” The Complaint also attaches an inmate request slip (ECF 12, Ex. 3-A) in which he requests a grievance regarding an assault in which he was “gassed, assaulted and tazed” multiple times. Cerilli's name is listed at the bottom of the slip as a person to whom a copy was sent. Stoltie did not receive a response from Cerilli to any of his communications.
Stoltie states that “Defendant's [sic] profuse refusal to allow Plaintiff to properly exhaust the chain of command, both informally and formally, and the refusal to provide Plaintiff with the request[ed] grievance form, renders [P]laintiff[‘s] administrative remedies unavailable and/or exhausted...” Id. None of the eight counts in the Complaint, all of which are asserted against all “Defendants, ” allege that Cerilli's failure to respond to Stoltie's letters, or the denial of access to grievance forms, violated his civil rights.
C. Standard and Scope of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In resolving a motion to dismiss, the court does not determine whether the plaintiff will be likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). A complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, it must provide more than labels and conclusions. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).
Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
When ruling upon a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must “generally consider only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim.” Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). A court may take judicial notice of documents filed in other court proceedings because they are matters of public record. See Liberty Int'l Underwriters Can. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 955 F.Supp.2d 317, 325 (D.N.J. 2013).
Finally, because Stoltie is representing himself, the allegations in the Complaint must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se litigant's pleadings to state a valid claim upon which relief could be granted, it should do so despite the litigant's failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read “with a measure of tolerance”). Thus, the Court may consider facts and make inferences where it is appropriate. But “any pleading must still contain sufficient factual allegations that, when accepted as true, ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Heffley v. Steele, 2:17-cv-1624, 2019 WL 5092127, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2019), aff'd, 826 Fed.Appx. 227 (3d Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). See also Baez v. Mooney, 2021 WL 816013, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 808726 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2021).
D. Discussion
The Moving Defendants raise two issues in their partial motion to dismiss. As it relates to Commissioner Cerilli, they argue that Stoltie's claims against her should be dismissed because the Complaint fails to identify how she violated any of Stoltie's constitutional rights. They further assert that Stoltie cannot assert a claim against her regarding issues related to the prison grievance process as she is not part of the “chain of command policy” for grievances that is referenced in the Complaint. (See ECF 20, p. 3-4; ECF 12, ¶ 27.)
Defendants Martin, Cramer, Lowther, Swartz, Fagan, Palmer and Coruso contend that Stoltie cannot state a claim against them for emotional damages. (See ECF 19; ECF 20, p. 3.) In Count 7 of the Complaint, Stoltie asserts that Martin and Cramer mismanaged and permanently destroyed his mail and that their actions were “malicious and sadistic in nature, subjecting Plaintiff to mental anguish...” (ECF 12, ¶ 49.) Further, Stoltie's prayer for relief seeks emotional damages against Lowther, Swartz, Fagan, Palmer, and Coruso, which presumably relates to any role they are alleged to have had in the various allegations of mistreatment in the Complaint. (See ECF 12, ¶ 54.)
Stoltie's prayer for relief does not list Martin or Cramer as defendants against whom he is seeking an award of emotional damages. (See ECF 12, ¶ 54.) Nevertheless, given that the Moving Defendants raise the issue in relation to Martin and Cramer, and given Stoltie's assertion that he was subjected to “mental anguish” because of Martin and Cramer's actions, the Court will address this issue with regard to Count 7.
1. Claim against Commissioner Cerilli
Stoltie has sued Cerilli in her individual and official capacities. He alleges that he sent her two letters and a third to the Commissioner's office complaining of his lack of access to a grievance procedure at WCP but received no response. He also claims that she is responsible for ensuring his safety at WCP. Further, in his response to the motion to dismiss, he claims that Cerilli had “a duty as a matter of law to protect the health and safety of inmates and that she knowingly disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm at the prison.” (ECF 24, p. 1.)
Section 1983 “provides a cause of action against state actors who violate an individual's rights under federal law.” Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 380 (2012). Section 1983 does not create substantive rights but instead “provides only remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere in the Constitution or federal laws.” Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
A plaintiff must plead a defendant's personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of his constitutional right. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). That is because, as stated in the text of § 1983 itself, only a person who “subjects, or causes to be subjected” another person to a civil rights violation can be held liable under § 1983. Thus, each defendant is liable only for his or her own conduct. See, e.g., id.; see also Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016); Barkes v. First Correctional Medical, 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014) (rev'd sub. nom. on other grounds 575 U.S. 822 (2015)); C.N. v. RidgewoodBd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 173 (3d Cir. 2005) (“To impose liability on the individual defendants, Plaintiffs must show that each one individually participated in the alleged constitutional violation or approved of it.”) (citing C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
The doctrine of respondeat superior, which makes an employer or supervisor automatically responsible for the wrongdoing of its employees, does not apply under § 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); see, e.g., Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. For that reason, supervisordefendants cannot be held liable for every illegal act that takes place in a correctional facility. They are only liable for their own conduct.
The Court of Appeals has identified two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates. First, liability may attach if the supervisor, “with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989)). Second, “a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced” in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct. Id. (citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190 (3d Cir. 1995)). “Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208.
a. Individual Capacity Claim
As previously discussed, to the extent that Stoltie seeks to impose liability on Cerilli for the actions of any of the other defendants based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, his claims against her fail as a matter of law. Thus, it is necessary to examine the Complaint to determine if Stoltie has pleaded any facts regarding Cerilli's own actions or personal involvement in the alleged violations of his civil rights.
While each of the counts in the Complaint are brought against all defendants, Stoltie does not allege that Cerilli participated with any of the other defendants in any of their allegedly improper conduct. Moreover, none of the eight counts allege that Cerilli's failure to respond to his communications represents a civil rights violation. Rather, the Complaint only states that Stoltie sent several letters to Cerilli about his difficulty in obtaining a prison grievance and did not receive a response. Cerilli is excluded by Stoltie as being in the grievance “chain of command.” He does not allege that as a county commissioner, Cerilli was involved in any way in the process of supplying grievance forms, resolving a grievance or considering an appeal from a grievance determination. Moreover, he does not allege that Cerilli created the grievance policy, had any role in its implementation or purposely denied him access to a grievance procedure.
Stoltie has not stated a claim against Cerilli based solely on her receipt of correspondence or her inaction related to the grievance process. Inmates “do not have a constitutionally protected right to a grievance process.” Jackson v. Gordon, 145 Fed.Appx. 774, 777 (3d Cir. 2005). Because access to prison grievance procedures is not a constitutionally mandated right, “allegations of improprieties in the handling of grievances do not state a cognizable claim under § 1983.” Glenn v. DelBalso, 599 Fed.Appx. 457, 459 (3d Cir. 2015). See, e.g., Walker v. Mathis, No. 15-cv-5134, 2016 WL 2910082, *9 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2016). Thus, Stoltie's allegation that he sent several letters to Cerilli about his difficulty in obtaining a prison grievance and did not receive a response fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim against her.
Moreover, there are no other allegations of Cerilli's actual participation in the conduct that form the basis for Stoltie's claim that his constitutional rights were violated. Allegations of personal involvement after-the-fact (for example, by denying a grievance or being the recipient of a complaint letter) are insufficient to give rise to a claim under § 1983. That is because the failure to investigate alleged misconduct after it has occurred does not state a plausible claim that a defendant had any personal involvement in the alleged misconduct. See, e.g., Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208; Paluch v. Sec'y PennsylvaniaDep't Corr., 442 Fed.Appx. 690, 695 (3d Cir. 2011); Brooks v. Beard, 167 Fed.Appx. 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006); Alexander v. Fritch, No. 2:07-cv-1732, 2010 WL 1257709, at *16 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2010), aff'd, 396 Fed.Appx. 867 (3d Cir. 2010).
While Stoltie also alleges in the Complaint that Cerilli had a duty to ensure his safety, he does not set forth any facts that support a breach of that duty that led to his alleged harm. As such, the Complaint fails to state a claim against Cerilli based on her individual participation in or approval of the alleged constitutional violations.
The Complaint also fails to state a claim against Cerilli based upon any supervisory liability. In his response to the motion to dismiss, Stoltie asserts that Cerilli is a “policymaker” and the policies at the prison violated his rights. However, he fails to identify any specific prison policies that she established or maintained that allegedly caused the constitutional harm of which Stoltie complains. While Stoltie accuses Cerilli of having a “policy of inaction, ” this is not a sufficiently articulated prison policy. Thus, the Moving Defendants are correct that there are no allegations in the Complaint that Cerilli was involved in implementing a policy or custom that violated any of Stoltie's rights or that the other defendants were carrying out a policy, custom or practice implemented by Cerilli that caused Stoltie harm.
While these allegations are not part of the Complaint, the Court will consider them in the context of whether Stoltie will be granted leave to amend his Complaint.
In addition, there are no allegations in the Complaint that Cerilli directed any of the other defendants to violate Stoltie's civil rights or that as the person in charge, she had knowledge of and acquiesced in the alleged unconstitutional conduct of any of the other defendants. While the October 13, 2020 letter attached to the Complaint does, in fact, generally reference Stoltie's “issues of immediate concern, ” Stoltie fails to allege that Cerilli directed or acquiesced in this conduct. Similarly, although the request slip on which Cerilli is copied alleges that he was “gassed, assaulted and tazed multiple times” and that he was being deprived of his civil rights, he does not allege anywhere in the Complaint that Cerilli directed or acquiesced in this conduct. As previously discussed, allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence must be made with “appropriate particularity.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208.
Simply put, the Complaint fails to provide any facts on which Cerilli's supervisory liability could be based. As such, Stoltie has failed to state any plausible § 1983 claim against Cerilli.
At the same time, however, Stoltie does allege that Cerilli had a duty to ensure his safety, and his communications to her suggest that she may have had notice of alleged civil rights violations. One of his letters states that he was being subjected to excessive use of force, cruel and unusual punishment, inadequate mental health care and “much more.” While these assertions are insufficient to adequately plead a plausible § 1983 claim against Cerilli, the Court cannot conclude with certainty that an amendment of the Complaint would be futile. Therefore, it is recommended that the claims against Cerilli be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.
The Moving Defendants have also raised the affirmative defense of qualified immunity in support of their motion to dismiss claims against Cerilli in her individual capacity. State officials are entitled to qualified immunity from liability claims for damages if their conduct did “not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 364 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, (1982)). The Court concludes that it is premature to determine if Cerilli is entitled to qualified immunity until Stoltie is provided with an opportunity to amend his claim against her.
b. Official Capacity Claim
Stoltie's claim against Cerilli in her official capacity should be dismissed as well. “It is well-established that ‘official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'” Richardson v. Prisoner Transp. Servs. of Am., No. 3:15-cv-01061, 2015 WL 9243836, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:15-cv-1061, 2015 WL 9223468 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2015) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Westmoreland County is named as a defendant in this case. “[I]t is common practice to dismiss redundant § 1983 claims against official-capacity defendants when the governmental entity that employs them is also named as a defendant.” Richardson, 2015 WL 9243836, at *3. In Richardson the plaintiff sued the county, the board of commissioners, three county commissioners, the warden and two assistant wardens. The Court dismissed all claims against the individual official-capacity defendants. See id. See also M.S. ex rel. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 43 F.Supp.3d 412, 419 (M.D. Pa.2014); K.S.S. v. Montgomery County Bd. of Comm'rs, 871 F.Supp.2d 389, 396 (E.D. Pa.2012) (treating claims against county board of commissioners as official-capacity claims against the individual commissioners and dismissing claims as redundant). Thus, all claims against Cerilli in her official capacity should be dismissed with prejudice.
According to Westmoreland County's website, Cerilli is an employee of the county who is charged with oversight of WCP. See https://www.co.westmoreland.pa.us/1277/Commissioner-Secretary.
While Stoltie seeks an injunction against some of the defendants, he does not include Cerilli in his claim for injunctive relief.
2. Claim for Emotional Damages
The Moving Defendants assert that Stoltie's claims for damages for mental anguish against Martin and Cramer in Count 7 and for emotional injury against Lowther, Swartz, Fagan, Palmer, and Coruso fail as a matter of law. As they note, “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of Title 18).” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e (West).
With respect to Martin and Cramer, Count 7 of the Complaint states:
Defendants violated Plaintiff['s] First and Sixth Amendment rights along with other state and federal law by tampering with, damaging, and losing detainees' incoming mail. More specifically, Defendants Mr. Martin and Nikki Cramer, have both shredded Plaintiff's mail and not copied contents correctly before doing so. Said
actions are malicious and sadistic in nature, subjecting Plaintiff to mental anguish and an unnecessary financial burden to plaintiff's family and loved ones.(ECF 12, ¶ 49.) In his response to the motion to dismiss, Stoltie claims that he has suffered “actual injury” by causing him to miss deadlines and depriving him of access to legal knowledge. (ECF 24, p. 2.) This clearly does not represent physical injury. As such, Stoltie cannot seek damages for mental anguish against Martin or Cramer with respect to the claim alleged in Count 7. However, Stoltie is not precluded at this stage of the proceedings from claiming other damages as a result of the alleged conduct of these defendants. See Lofton v. Wetzel, No. 1:12-cv-1133, 2013 WL 4813169, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2013).
Stoltie alleges that WCP mail policy requires all mail to be photocopied and detainees receive the photocopy of the mail. All originals are shredded with the exception of pictures. (ECF 12, ¶ 37.) Stoltie does not cite to prison code for this policy.
As for Lowther, Swartz, Fagan, Palmer and Coruso, who are the Moving Defendants listed in paragraph 54 of the Complaint, the Court must determine whether Stoltie identifies any of them as having caused physical injury that could support a claim for emotional damages. As stated above, Stoltie alleges various instances of mistreatment at WCP that he claims violated his civil rights. Most of his factual allegations do not include a claim that he sustained an actual physical injury (for example, ignoring dietary restrictions, mismanaging prescription drugs, denying warm clothes, destroying mail, confiscating personal items), though admittedly, there may be some potential for physical injury in at least some of these claims. Nevertheless, Stoltie does describe some instances of physical abuse or infliction of pain that are addressed below.
At paragraphs 30 through 34 of the Complaint, Stoltie recounts being gassed with “OC spray, ” cuffed, physically restrained with a knee to the neck, kneed in his left side and repeatedly tazed. While he lists Cramer as one of the participants, Stoltie also states “I do not know at present time which Defendants are personally responsible for the excessive force or repeated use of tazer.” (ECF 12, ¶ 30.) Stoltie also alleges certain other actions that resulted, or may have resulted, in physical injury. Some are attributed to other defendants and not to the Moving Defendants. In other incidents, Stoltie fails to identify the specific defendant(s) who participated in an action that caused physical injury.
In paragraph 38 of Complaint Stoltie states he was only provided out of cell recreation at 2:00 a.m. and 6:30 a.m. when the temperature was often near or below freezing. His requests for warmer clothing to wear during outside recreation were ignored or denied. He also alleges that “a previous injury to my right leg made exercise in the cold temperatures impossible without inflicting severe pain.” (ECF 12, ¶ 38.) Stoltie further asserts that the lack of exercise exacerbated Stoltie's blood pressure and cholesterol issues. (Id.) Again, Stoltie does not identify any specific defendant with respect to these allegations.
In Mitchell v. Horn the plaintiff argued “that the allegations in his conditions-of-confinement claim-that he was deprived of food, drink, and sleep for four days-describe physical injuries.” 318 F.3d 523, 533 (3d Cir. 2003). The Court of Appeals held that Mitchell had not stated a claim for physical injury, but nevertheless granted him leave to amend his complaint in order to do so. Id. The Third Circuit also “agree[d] with other circuits that have read 1997e(e) to require more than a de minimis physical injury before an emotional injury may be alleged.” Id.
The factual allegations in Stoltie's Complaint either fail to allege a physical injury or lack specific allegations against the Moving Defendants to the effect that their actions resulted in a physical injury that is more than de minimis. Therefore, the Court recommends that any claims for emotional damages as to the Moving Defendants be dismissed without prejudice with leave to amend.
E. Amendment
The Court must also determine whether amendment of the Complaint would be futile. See Hockenberry v. SCI Cambridge Springs/Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 1:18-cv-325, 2019 WL 2270345, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 28, 2019) (stating “[t]he U.S. Court of Appeals for Third Circuit has instructed that if a civil rights complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Court should permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile”). Here, the Court cannot conclude that amendment would be futile as to the individual capacity claim against Cerilli or the claim for emotional damages claim against Lowther, Swartz, Fagan, Palmer, and Coruso. However, for the reasons discussed herein, amendment of the official capacity claim against Cerilli and the damages claim against Defendants Martin and Cramer that is related to Count 7 would be futile.
F. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Moving Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF 19) be granted as follows:
1. The claim against Defendants Martin and Cramer for emotional damages related to Count 7 should be dismissed with prejudice.
2. The claims against Defendant Cerilli in her official capacity should be dismissed with prejudice.
3. The claims against Defendant Cerilli in her individual capacity should be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. Any amendment must plead specific facts that establish the personal involvement of Cerilli in the alleged constitutional violations.
4. The claim for emotional damages against Lowther, Swartz, Fagan, Palmer, and Coruso is dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. Any amendment must plead specific facts as to each of these defendants that support a claim that their actions caused physical injury to Stoltie.
It is also recommended that the Court conclude that under the circumstances presented here, Stoltie may, if he so chooses, file an amended complaint to attempt to cure the pleading deficiencies set forth above with respect to those claims that are dismissed without prejudice. Alternatively, Stoltie may choose to proceed with Complaint (ECF 8) as it stands except for those claims dismissed by the Court upon the resolution of the Moving Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF 19).
Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, the parties have fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).