Opinion
No. 04-04-00083-CV
Delivered and Filed: November 17, 2004.
Appeal from the 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas, Trial Court No. 03-1092-CV, Honorable Gus J. Strauss, Judge Presiding.
Reversed and Remanded.
Sitting: Alma L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, Catherine STONE, Justice, Sandee Bryan MARION, Justice.
OPINION
In this appeal we determine whether Guadalupe County has the inherent authority to reject a plat application in the interest of public health and safety in the absence of a specific statute or a properly adopted county regulation. We conclude that it does not, and reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
James Stolte is the owner and developer of a 154.641-acre tract of land lying in Guadalupe County, Texas. Seeking to subdivide the tract into fifty-five lots, Stolte filed a plat application with the Guadalupe County Commissioners Court. The application was denied on the grounds that (1) the County did not want a 0.911-acre dedication, (2) several lots had less than 100 feet of road frontage on Muehl Road, and (3) the number of driveways onto Muehl Road was excessive. Stolte filed a second application, which also was denied. Stolte then sued the County, and asked the trial court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the County to "acknowledge approval" of the plat application. Stolte again filed his plat application, this time removing the proposed 0.911-acre dedication. The application was again denied.
Stolte filed a motion for summary judgment in which he requested that the trial court issue a writ of mandamus directing the County to approve the plat application, refund to him $345.00 as required by Texas Local Government Code section 232.0025(i), and pay him all taxable court costs. The trial court denied the motion, and concluded the County has the inherent authority, pursuant to Texas Local Government Code Chapter 232, "to reject a plat application in the interest of public health and safety in the absence of a specific and properly adopted county regulation addressing such issue." The trial court allowed Stolte to appeal the interlocutory order pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(d), and stated the controlling question of law as: "whether a county has the legal authority to reject a plat application due to the width of the lot or due to the number of driveways accessing a public road in the absence of a specific and properly adopted county regulation addressing such issues." The trial court found that the parties agreed there were no material issues of fact, and the facts asserted in Stolte's motion and the County's response were true and not in dispute.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under traditional summary judgment standards, a party moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing as a matter of law that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to one or more essential elements of the plaintiff's cause of action. Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex. 1989); Nixon v. Mr. Property Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985); Medina County Comm'r Court v. The Integrity Group, Inc., 21 S.W.3d 307, 309 (Tex.App.-San Antonio, 1999, pet. denied). If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must then raise a genuine issue of material fact on that element. Gonzalez v. City of Harlingen, 814 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
A party can invoke the district court's constitutional supervisory power over a commissioners court only when the commissioners court acts beyond its jurisdiction or clearly abuses the discretion conferred upon the commissioners court by law. Commissioners Court of Titus County v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 80 (Tex. 1997); Medina County, 21 S.W.3d at 309. A writ of mandamus may issue to compel a public official to perform a ministerial act. Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex. 1991). An act is ministerial when the law clearly spells out the duty to be performed by the official with sufficient certainty that nothing is left to the exercise of discretion. Id.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, the County first argues that because Stolte "effectively stipulated" that the design of his subdivision creates a safety hazard, he should be precluded from arguing that the County and trial court abused their discretion in denying his plat application. Nowhere in the County's response to Stolte's motion for summary judgment is there a statement of fact that his design creates a safety hazard. Instead, the County's response and attached affidavits reference "safety concerns" and "safety issues" and, in its response, the County accused Stolte of "arguing" that he is entitled to "develop a subdivision whose design/configuration clearly gives rise to hazards to public safety. . . ." We do not consider Stolte's failure to dispute the "concerns" raised in the County's response as rising to the level of a stipulation or a judicial admission. Even if it did, this does not resolve the legal issue presented by the trial court.
The County next argues it has the inherent authority to regulate subdivisions for the public's safety pursuant to Texas Local Government Code section 232.101, which provides as follows: By an order adopted and entered in the minutes of the commissioners court and after a notice is published in a newspaper of general circulation in the county, the commissioners court may adopt rules governing plats and subdivisions of land within the unincorporated area of the county to promote the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the county and the safe, orderly, and healthful development of the unincorporated area of the county.
Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 232.101(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
Stolte readily concedes the County has the right to enact rules and regulations for the public's safety and welfare pursuant to section 232.101(a). Stolte also acknowledges that Chapter 232 authorizes the County to adopt other rules. See Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 232.102; 232.103; 232.104. However, Stolte argues that because the County has not in fact enacted any rules and regulations regarding lot frontages or the number of driveways, the County has no authority to deny his plat application. The County does not dispute Stolte's assertion that it has no such rules or regulations. Instead, the County contends Cowboy Country Estates v. Ellis County, 692 S.W.2d 882 (Tex.App.-Waco 1985, no writ), supports its argument under section 232.101. We disagree with the County.
Unlike the trial court below, the court in Cowboy Country Estates dealt with specific statutes addressing the specific dispute between the parties. For example, one of the issues on appeal was whether the development was a "subdivision" within the meaning of the applicable statutes examined by the court. Id. at 885-86. On that issue, the court held, "The manifest overall purpose of the statutes concerned is to give counties the power to control subdivisions to protect its citizens in matters of public health and sanitation, drainage, and maintenance of public roads." Id. at 886. The issue of inherent authority was not before the Cowboy Country Estates court. Therefore, this case does not support the County's argument that it has inherent authority to regulate subdivisions in the absence of a specific statute or rule. Instead, we hold that a county's authority to grant or deny plat applications must be based on a specific statute or rule. Those statutes and rules are contained in the Texas Local Government Code and other rules properly enacted under section 232.101. See The Integrity Group, Inc. v. Medina County Comm'r Court, No. 04-03-00413-CV, slip op. at 2 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Oct. 20, 2004, no pet. h.) ("A commissioners court's power relative to the plat approval process is found in Chapter 232 of the Texas Local Government Code.").
Local Government Code section 232.003 sets forth subdivision requirements, none of which specifies the number of driveways or lot frontages. But see id. § 232.003(8) (allowing commissioners court to adopt reasonable specifications that provide for drainage in the subdivision); see also Elgin Bank of Texas v. Travis County, Texas, 906 S.W.2d 120, 123 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, writ denied) ("Section 232.003 authorizes the commissioner's court to adopt rules regulating the design and construction of roads."). Although section 232.003 is the only section under Chapter 232 that sets forth specific subdivision requirements, a county may adopt other rules governing plats and subdivisions. See Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 232.101; 232.102; 232.103; 232.104. For example, the Local Government Code authorizes the County to enact rules and regulations for the public's safety and welfare. See Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 232.101 ("Rules"); 232.102 (major thoroughfare right-of-ways); 232.103 ("Lot Frontages"); 232.104 ("Set-backs"). A county may also impose additional requirements pursuant to other statutory authority. See Medina County, 21 S.W.3d at 310. Here, the County has adopted other rules applicable to plats, which are contained in the Guadalupe County Subdivision Rule Book. The County Engineer admitted in his deposition that the County's rule book contains no requirements regarding minimum lot frontage, number of driveways, or the distance between driveways, and the County has not adopted any such rules pursuant to Local Government Code Chapter 232.
"The commissioners court of the county in which land is located must approve . . . a plat required by Section 232.001." Id. § 232.002(a); see also Medina County, 21 S.W.3d at 309. A commissioners court cannot require additional substantive requirements not contained within the statute for a plat if the submitted plat meets all statutory requirements. Medina County, 21 S.W.3d at 309; Projects American Corp. v. Hilliard, 711 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1986, no writ); see also Elgin Bank, 906 S.W.2d at 122. The County does not contend Stolte's plat application does not meet any specific statutory requirement. Therefore, the County's authority to approve Stolte's plat under section 232.002 is not discretionary. See Medina County, 21 S.W.3d at 309; Projects American Corp., 711 S.W.2d at 389; see also The Integrity Group, slip op. at 2 (". . . if the developer meets the statutory requirements, the commissioners court's duty to approve the plat becomes ministerial.").
The County's final argument is that it should not be required to imagine every possible scenario under which land may be developed. We do not discount the County's concern for the welfare of its residents, and we understand the County's concern that a large number of driveways entering onto a county road may pose safety issues for residents along that road. However, a county's authority to grant or deny a plat application is limited by statute or other properly adopted rules, and in this case, there is no statute or other rule governing lot frontages or driveways. Therefore, the County's duty to grant the plat application was ministerial in nature and the trial court erred in denying Stolte's motion for summary judgment and his request for mandamus relief.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.