Opinion
CV1550170376S
06-02-2016
Gary Stocking v. Brian Austin, Jr. et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS, NO. 102
PETER EMMETT WIESE, JUDGE.
I
FACTS
On November 25, 2015, the plaintiff, Gary Stocking, submitted his complaint, alleging violation of state law and federal law by the defendants, Brian Austin, Jr., and Kevin T. Kane. The plaintiff's action seems to be primarily based on a state claim for " Conspiracy to Hinder Prosecution." The plaintiff alleges that, on February 9, 2015, he submitted a complaint to the Executive Assistant Attorney, Austin, against Senior Assistant State's Attorney Russell C. Zentner, for perjury and conspiracy to fabricate evidence in violation of clearly established law.
The plaintiff asserts that he did not receive a response from Austin until April 15, 2015, when Austin replied that he would take no further action to investigate Zentner.
The plaintiff further alleges that, on March 27, 2015, he also submitted a criminal complaint against the probation officer, Michael Sullivan, to the Chief State's Attorney, Kane, at the Division of Criminal Justice. The plaintiff asserts that he did not receive a response from Kane.
The plaintiff claims that the Division of Criminal Justice is an agency within the executive branch which is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of criminal matters, and that the Division must not " Conspire to Hinder Prosecution." The plaintiff also asserts that " [w]hen a person is under the custody of the State, a special relationship is established, and a duty is owed to a particular person rather than the general public."
As to relief, the plaintiff requests punitive damages against the defendants for " Conspiracy to Hinder Prosecution and for the willful deprivation of [his] Fourteenth Amendment Constitutional Civil Rights to due process of law." The plaintiff states that he has brought the present action against both defendants, in their official and individual capacities, for $10 million each. Finally, the plaintiff asks the court to issue a writ of attachment on everything of monetary value owned by the defendants.
This allegation is the only explicit mention of a due process violation.
On December 4, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On December 17, 2015, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion. On December 21, 2015, the defendants filed a reply brief. The matter was heard at short calendar on March 18, 2016.
The defendants did not submit any exhibits.
The plaintiff did not submit any exhibits.
The only exhibit attached to the reply brief, Exhibit A, is a copy of a letter from the Connecticut office of the claims commissioner.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Dismiss
" [A] motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). " Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). " [B]ecause the issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction, it may be a proper basis for granting a motion to dismiss." Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 303 Conn. 402, 413, 35 A.3d 188 (2012). Moreover, " [c]laims involving the doctrines of common-law sovereign immunity and statutory immunity, pursuant to [General Statutes] § 4-165, implicate the court's subject matter jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kelly v. Albertsen, 114 Conn.App. 600, 605, 970 A.2d 787 (2009). Thus, " a motion to dismiss is the appropriate procedural vehicle to raise a claim that sovereign immunity [or statutory immunity] bars the action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Manifold v. Ragaglia, 94 Conn.App. 103, 116, 891 A.2d 106 (2006).
In addition, the doctrine of federal qualified immunity also implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction, and is a proper ground for the motion to dismiss. Chapman v. Chapdelaine, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-12-5005693-S (October 17, 2013, Graham, J.) (56 Conn.L.Rptr. 932, 933, ), citing Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011), and Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn.App. 745, 747, 763, 878 A.2d 384, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 920, 883 A.2d 1252 (2005). " Trial courts addressing motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 10-31(a)(1) may encounter different situations, depending on the status of the record in the case . . . [L]ack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts . . . Different rules and procedures will apply, depending on the state of the record at the time the motion is filed." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 650-51, 974 A.2d 669 (2009). " When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 651.
" In contrast, if the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss . . . other types of undisputed evidence . . . and/or public records of which judicial notice may be taken . . . the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint . . . Rather, those allegations are tempered by the light shed on them by the [supplementary undisputed facts] . . . If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant's motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits . . . or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings . . . If, however, the defendant submits either no proof to rebut the plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations . .., or only evidence that fails to call those allegations into question . . . the plaintiff need not supply counteraffidavits or other evidence to support the complaint, but may rest on the jurisdictional allegations therein." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 651-52.
" Once the question of subject matter jurisdiction has been raised, cognizance of it must be taken and the matter passed upon before [the court] can move one further step in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Harrison, 264 Conn. 829, 839 n.6, 826 A.2d 1102 (2003). " [T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). Nevertheless, it is well established that, " in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 626, 79 A.3d 60 (2013).
In the present case, the defendants argue that the court should dismiss the plaintiff's action on the grounds that (1) the plaintiff lacks standing, (2) the state law claims are barred by sovereign immunity or statutory immunity, and (3) the federal claims are barred by qualified immunity. As to standing, the defendants contend that a private citizen lacks standing to challenge a prosecutor's decision not to investigate or prosecute a criminal complaint because a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.
The plaintiff counters that although private citizens lack standing to challenge a prosecutor's decision not to investigate, the plaintiff filed the criminal complaint while he was an inmate in state custody, and a special relationship was established which required the state to investigate the plaintiff's criminal complaints. As to federal eleventh amendment immunity, the plaintiff contends that the protection has been largely terminated for liability purposes in state courts, and that states may generally be sued under state tort law for improper conduct by officers. The plaintiff further argues that when employees of the state act outside the scope of their official duties and violates clearly established statutory or constitutional law, they can be sued in their individual capacity.
B. Standing
" Standing . . . is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Webster Bank v. Zak, 259 Conn. 766, 774, 792 A.2d 66 (2002).
" Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy . . . When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue . . . Standing requires no more than a colorable claim of injury; a [party] ordinarily establishes . . . standing by allegations of injury. Similarly, standing exists to attempt to vindicate arguably protected interests . . .
" Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring suit or is classically aggrieved . . . The fundamental test for determining aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in [the subject matter of the challenged action], as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged action] . . . Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) May v. Coffey, 291 Conn. 106, 112, 967 A.2d 495 (2009).
A plaintiff " has no constitutionally protected right to a proper investigation." Johnson v. Ruiz, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:11CV542 (JCH), (D.Conn. January 10, 2012). In addition, our Appellate Court has observed that " a [private] citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution . . . That is because a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kelly v. Dearington, 23 Conn.App. 657, 661, 583 A.2d 937 (1990).
Recent Superior Court cases have also applied the rule that a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another. See, e.g., Taylor v. Bowler, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-15-5038518-S (August 7, 2015, Huddleston, J.) (60 Conn.L.Rptr. 758, ); Pearl v. Mickelson-Dera, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-13-6022964-S, (May 16, 2014, Gleeson, J.).
The rule that a plaintiff has no standing to pursue a claim for the proper investigation or prosecution of another is not limited to actions brought by private citizens, and even applies to inmates. The federal courts have held, more generally, that " a victim of allegedly criminal conduct is not entitled to a criminal investigation or the prosecution of the alleged perpetrator of the crime. See Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 87 [102 S.Ct. 69, 70 L.Ed.2d 65] (1981) (per curiam) (inmates alleging beating by prison guards lack standing to challenge prison officials' request that magistrate not issue arrest warrants); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 [93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536] (1973) ('in American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another'); McCrary v. County of Nassau, 493 F.Supp.2d 581, 588 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) ('A private citizen does not have a constitutional right to compel government officials to arrest or prosecute another person.'); Osuch v. Gregory, 303 F.Supp.2d 189, 194 (D.Conn. 2004) ('An alleged victim of a crime does not have a right to have the alleged perpetrator investigated or criminally prosecuted.')." Johnson v. Ruiz, supra, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:11CV542 (JCH).
In the present case, the plaintiff has not shown that he is authorized to bring suit by statute, nor has he demonstrated that he has a specific, personal, and legal interest in bringing a claim for " Conspiracy to Hinder Prosecution." As established by applicable state and federal law, the plaintiff has no protected right to a proper investigation or prosecution of either Zentner or Sullivan. Thus, the plaintiff lacks standing as to his conspiracy to hinder prosecution claim. The plaintiff also lacks standing as to his fourteenth amendment due process claim to the extent that it is premised on the alleged conspiracy to hinder prosecution.
Nevertheless, even though the plaintiff lacks standing, in the interest of judicial thoroughness, and to the extent that the due process claim is not premised on the conspiracy to hinder prosecution claim, the defendants' federal and state immunity grounds will also be addressed. More specifically, the remaining issues are: (1) whether federal sovereign immunity bars any federal claims brought against the defendants in their official capacity; (2) whether federal qualified immunity bars any federal claims brought against the defendants in their individual capacity; (3) whether Connecticut sovereign immunity bars any state claims brought against the defendants in their official capacity; and (4) whether statutory immunity bars any state claims brought against the defendants in their individual capacity.
C. Federal Sovereign Immunity (Fourteenth Amendment Due Process)
The plaintiff appears to seek relief for claims arising under federal law based upon the alleged violation of his fourteenth amendment due process rights. Any federal claims for monetary damages against the defendants in their official capacity may be barred by federal sovereign immunity.
" The elements of, and the defenses to, a federal cause of action are defined by federal law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 Conn. 128, 134, 913 A.2d 415 (2007). As such, " [w]hen sovereign immunity is claimed as a defense to a cause of action pursuant to [42 U.S.C.] § 1983, federal sovereign immunity jurisprudence preempts analysis under state law." Id., 133. " Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has taken the view that Congress did not intend to defeat traditional notions of sovereign immunity in enacting § 1983. Quern v. Jordan, [440 U.S. 332, 341, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979)]. Instead, these principles inform the meaning of the term 'person' as used in § 1983." Sullins v. Rodriguez, supra, 140.
Although the plaintiff argues that his action is not brought pursuant to § 1983, and even though the plaintiff did not explicitly bring the present action pursuant to § 1983, the plaintiff seeks monetary damages for the violation of a federal constitutional right. " [U]nder the federal constitution, a claim for monetary damages for an alleged violation of constitutionally guaranteed rights can only be made pursuant to a federal statute such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or through a ' Bivens -type' analysis." (Footnote omitted.) Tremblay v. Webster, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 530898 (March 1, 1996, Hendel, J.) (16 Conn.L.Rptr. 260, 260, ); see also Lyddy v. Bridgeport Board of Education, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:06CV1420 (AHN), (D.Conn. September 11, 2007) (" [T]here is no direct cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment"). " Section 1983 provides a civil claim for damages against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States . . . Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere." (Citation omitted.) Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1240, 114 S.Ct. 2749, 129 L.Ed.2d 867 (1994). As such, it is assumed that the federal claims are brought pursuant to § 1983.
" [A] state 'is not a person within the meaning of § 1983 and thus is not subject to suit under § 1983 in either federal court or state court.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 311, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). A state official sued in his official capacity for monetary damages is also not subject to suit under § 1983. '[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office . . . As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.' (Citation omitted.) Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989)." Braham v. Newbould, 160 Conn.App. 294, 308-09, 124 A.3d 977 (2015).
" 'A suit generally may not be maintained directly against the State itself, or against an agency or department of the State, unless the State has waived its sovereign immunity.' Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 684, 102 S.Ct. 3304, 73 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1982). Suits seeking monetary damages may not be brought against the state or its agencies and departments, pursuant to § 1983; rather, only suits for injunctive relief may be maintained against the state. Quern v. Jordan, [ supra, 440 U.S. 338] (1979). State officers acting in their official capacity may, typically, only be sued for injunctive or declaratory relief. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 757, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999)." Richards v. Connecticut Dept. of Corrections, 349 F.Supp.2d 278, 288 (D.Conn. 2004).
As recently explained by our Appellate Court, " [t]he United States Supreme Court in Will [v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, supra, 491 U.S. 71 n.10] recognized, however, on the basis of its prior decisions in Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985), and Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), that a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Braham v. Newbould, supra, 160 Conn.App. 309.
" The distinction [between official and individual capacity suits] hinges upon from whom the plaintiff seeks a remedy. Official capacity suits seek, in all aspects other than the party named as defendant, to impose liability on the government. Personal capacity suits, in contrast, aim to impose liability directly on officials for actions taken under color of state law." Yorktown Medical Laboratory, Inc. v. Perales, 948 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1991). " [W]hen the face of a complaint fails to state clearly whether a government official is being sued in his official capacity, or his individual capacity, or both, courts look to [t]he course of proceedings to determine the nature of the liability to be imposed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Frank v. Relin, 1 F.3d 1317, 1326 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, Relin v. Frank, 510 U.S. 1012, 114 S.Ct. 604, 126 L.Ed.2d 569 (1993). Under federal law, an action may be brought against the defendants in both the official capacity and the individual capacity. See, e.g., Yorktown Medical Laboratory, Inc. v. Perales, supra, 90. In addition, an unambiguous statement in the complaint regarding the capacity in which the defendants are sued may be determinative. See Sullins v. Rodriguez, supra, 281 Conn. 141 (" In this case, the plaintiff's complaint is unambiguous. It states that the defendant 'is sued in his individual capacity.' Such an articulation of the defendant's capacity is sufficient to commence a § 1983 claim against a state officer in his individual capacity").
The test set forth in Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 362 A.2d 871 (1975), which is used to determine whether a state action against defendants is in the individual or official capacity, is not applicable to federal § 1983 claims. " [A]lthough the test set forth in Spring [ v. Constantino, supra, 563, ] and Miller [ v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 301] is an appropriate mechanism for our state courts to determine the capacity in which the named defendants are sued in actions asserting violations of state law, to employ that test to divest state courts of jurisdiction to hear otherwise cognizable § 1983 claims would be to erect a constitutionally impermissible barrier to the vindication of federal rights. See Howlett v. Rose, [496 U.S. 356, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 110 L.Ed.2d 332 (1990)]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullins v. Rodriguez, supra, 281 Conn. 128.
In the present case, the complaint explicitly states that the defendants are sued in both their personal and official capacities. As such, the plaintiff's federal claims are brought in both the individual and official capacities.
Furthermore, because the state has not waived sovereign immunity, the defendants, as state employees, are immune from claims seeking monetary damages resulting from the performance of their official duty. Here, because the plaintiff is only seeking monetary damages, and has not requested injunctive or declaratory relief, the federal claims against the defendants in their official capacity are barred by federal sovereign immunity.
D. Federal Qualified Immunity (Fourteenth Amendment Due Process)
The remaining federal claims against the defendants in their individual capacity may be barred by qualified immunity. " 'Qualified immunity' protects an official from liability under federal causes of action but is not generally understood to protect officials from claims based on state law." Jenkins v. New York, 478 F.3d 76, 86 (2d Cir. 2007). " [A] claim for qualified immunity from liability for damages under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 raises a question of federal law . . . and not state law. Therefore, in reviewing these claims of qualified immunity we are bound by federal precedent, and may not expand or contract the contours of the immunity available to government officials . . . Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Morgan v. Bubar, 115 Conn.App. 603, 625, 975 A.2d 59 (2009). Qualified immunity reflects the " concern that for the public benefit, public officials be able to perform their duties unflinchingly and without constant dread of retaliation." Amore v. Novarro, 624 F.3d 522, 530 (2d Cir. 2010). The standard " is forgiving and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
" In Saucier [ v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)], this Court mandated a two-step sequence for resolving government officials' qualified immunity claims. First, a court must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged . . . or shown . . . make out a violation of a constitutional right . . . Second, if the plaintiff has satisfied this first step, the court must decide whether the right at issue was 'clearly established' at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct." (Citations omitted.) Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). In reconsidering this analysis, the court in Pearson v. Callahan, supra, concluded: " [W]hile the sequence set forth . . . is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory. The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand." Id., 236. In interpreting the two-step qualified immunity sequence, our Supreme Court stated: " A [governmental] defendant will be entitled to qualified immunity if either (1) his actions did not violate clearly established law or (2) it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that his actions did not violate clearly established law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brooks v. Sweeney, 299 Conn. 196, 217-18, 9 A.3d 347 (2010).
" In determining whether a particular right was clearly established at the time an official acted, courts typically consider (1) whether the right in question was defined with reasonable specificity; (2) whether the decisional law of the Supreme Court and the applicable circuit court support the existence of the right in question; and (3) whether under preexisting law a reasonable defendant official would have understood that his or her acts were unlawful." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bradway v. Gonzales, 26 F.3d 313, 318 (2d Cir. 1994). The determination of whether the right at issue was clearly established must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition. Saucier v. Katz, supra, 533 U.S. 201; see also Zieper v. Metzinger, 474 F.3d 60, 67-68 (2d Cir. 2007) (recognizing that the qualified immunity analysis must be undertaken in a " particularized" sense). " The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Distiso v. Wolcott, 352 Fed.Appx. 478, 481 (2009), citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).
Finally, it is well-established that " [q]ualified immunity shields the defendants only from claims for monetary damages and does not bar actions for declaratory or injunctive relief." Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 48 (2d Cir. 1999).
In the present case, the plaintiff has not alleged a coherent claim for the violation of fourteenth amendment due process rights. Viewing the complaint in a favorable light, it appears that the plaintiff alleges that the defendants' conspiracy to hinder investigation and prosecution also violated the plaintiff's due process rights.
The plaintiff only references the fourteenth amendment due process violation in his request for relief, and he does not identify which facts support such a claim.
The review of relevant federal and state law does not indicate that it is clearly established law that a prosecutor's failure to investigate or prosecute criminal conduct deprives the plaintiff of due process. In fact, such conduct does not even implicate the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See generally Harrington v. County of Suffolk, 607 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2010); McCullough v. Syracuse Police Dept., United States District Court, Docket No. 7:15CV0638 (DNH/TWD), (N.D.N.Y. June 5, 2015), adopting report and recommendation, United States District Court, Docket No. 7:15CV0638 (DNH/TWD), (N.D.N.Y. August 26, 2015).
Although our appellate courts have recognized that prosecutorial impropriety may deprive a plaintiff of his due process rights to a fair trial, the issue in such cases is " whether the prosecutor's conduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Campbell, 149 Conn.App. 405, 434-35, 88 A.3d 1258, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 907, 93 A.3d 157 (2014). Here, the plaintiff has not alleged that the defendants' prosecutorial impropriety deprived him of his due process rights to a fair trial.
Moreover, even if the defendants' conduct violated a clearly established law, it was objectively reasonable for the defendants to believe that they did not violate clearly established rights because " [p]rosecutors . . . have a wide latitude and broad discretion in determining when, who, why and whether to prosecute for violations of the criminal law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kinchen, 243 Conn. 690, 699, 707 A.2d 1255 (1998). In view of the broad discretionary nature of the defendants' conduct, the plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would show that the defendants' conduct was not objectively reasonable under the present circumstances.
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, federal qualified immunity protects the defendants from any individual capacity claims that are based on a violation of federal law.
E. State Sovereign Immunity (Conspiracy to Hinder Prosecution Claim)
" The doctrine of sovereign immunity protects state officials and employees from lawsuits resulting from the performance of their duty." Hultman v. Blumenthal, 67 Conn.App. 613, 620, 787 A.2d 666, cert. denied, 259 Conn. 929, 793 A.2d 253 (2002). " We have long recognized the common-law principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent . . . We have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer [or agent] concerning a matter in which the officer [or agent] represents the state is, in effect, against the state . . . Therefore, we have dealt with such suits as if they were solely against the state and have referred to the state as the defendant . . . The doctrine of sovereign immunity protects the state, not only from ultimate liability for alleged wrongs, but also from being required to litigate whether it is so liable." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tuchman v. State, supra, 89 Conn.App. 751.
" If the plaintiff's complaint reasonably may be construed to bring claims against the defendants in their individual capacities, then sovereign immunity would not bar those claims. Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 307. The fact that the state is not named as a defendant, however, does not conclusively establish that the action is not within the principle which prohibits actions against the sovereign without its consent . . . To determine whether an action is against the state or against a defendant in his individual capacity, we look to the four criteria established by our Supreme Court in Somers [ v. Hill, 143 Conn. 476, 123 A.2d 468 (1956)] and as explained further in Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 362 A.2d 871 (1975). If all four criteria are satisfied, the action is deemed to be against the state and, therefore, is barred. Id., 568. The criteria are: (1) a state official has been sued; (2) the suit concerns some matter in which that official represents the state; (3) the state is the real party against whom relief is sought; and (4) the judgment, though nominally against the official, will operate to control the activities of the state or subject it to liability." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kenney v. Weaving, 123 Conn.App. 211, 216, 1 A.3d 1083 (2010).
Here, the first Spring criterion is satisfied because all of the defendants are state officials, and the complaint identifies both defendants by their official titles. The second criterion is met because the present action involves interactions with the plaintiff that only occurred during the course of the defendants' employment, and the claims against the defendants concern a matter in which they represented the state, namely, the investigation and prosecution of criminal complaints. The fourth criterion is satisfied because any judgment against the defendants would operate to control the activities of the state, specifically, the duties of a state attorney in investigating alleged criminal matters and prosecuting individuals.
The third criterion, whether the state is the real party against whom relief is sought, is the critical element in the present case. " Analysis under [the third criterion] requires scrutiny of the complaint because it has been established that the right of a plaintiff to recover is limited to the allegations of [the] complaint . . . The court may also look to the summons for the manner in which the plaintiff references the defendants and the addresses provided for the defendants. Miller v. Egan, [ supra, 265 Conn. 308-09] . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hanton v. Williams, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV09-5030962-S, (June 3, 2011, Wilson, J.). In addition, the third criterion may be satisfied when " damages sought by the plaintiff are premised entirely on injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendants in performing acts that were part of their official duties." Cimmino v. Marcoccia, 149 Conn.App. 350, 359-60, 89 A.3d 384 (2014). See also Somers v. Hill, supra, 143 Conn. 480; Macellaio v. Newington Police Dept., 142 Conn.App. 177, 181, 64 A.3d 348 (2013); Kenney v. Weaving, supra, 123 Conn.App. 216-17.
In the present case, the plaintiff has brought claims against the defendants regarding the investigation and prosecution of criminal matters. These acts were performed as part of the defendants' official duties. In addition, in the summons, only the defendants' work addresses are listed. As such, the state is the real party against whom relief is sought, and the third criterion is also satisfied.
Thus, because all four criteria are satisfied, the conspiracy to hinder prosecution claim is really against the state. Even though the four criteria are satisfied, the plaintiff may, nevertheless, avoid the bar of the doctrine of sovereign immunity by showing that a recognized exception applies. " Exceptions to this doctrine [of sovereign immunity] are few and narrowly construed under our jurisprudence . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, 284 Conn. 701, 711, 937 A.2d 675 (2007). " [T]he sovereign immunity enjoyed by the state is not absolute. There are [three] exceptions: (1) when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waives the state's sovereign immunity . . . (2) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights . . . and (3) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer's statutory authority." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 349, 977 A.2d 636 (2009). " In the absence of a proper factual basis in the complaint to support the applicability of these exceptions, the granting of a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds is proper." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 350.
" For a claim made pursuant to the first exception, this court has recognized the well established principle that statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed . . . Where there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they are given the effect which makes the least rather than the most change in sovereign immunity." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 349-50. Furthermore, " [i]n the absence of a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, the plaintiff may not bring an action against the state for monetary damages without authorization from the claims commissioner to do so." Id., 351. If the plaintiff does not receive authorization from the claims commissioner, then " the action must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of sovereign immunity." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tuchman v. State, supra, 89 Conn.App. 752. In the present case, the plaintiff only seeks monetary damages, and did not request injunctive or declaratory relief. As such, sovereign immunity bars the plaintiff's state claims unless either the state has statutorily waived immunity, or the claims commissioner has authorized the plaintiff to initiate the action for money damages against the state. Here, the plaintiff has not alleged or argued that the state has statutorily waived immunity. Moreover, even though the plaintiff has notified the court that he has filed a claim with the claims commissioner, seeking permission to file the present action, it is the plaintiff's burden to prove subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff has not submitted any documents in support. The letter from the office of the claims commissioner, submitted as defendants' Exhibit A, merely acknowledges that the plaintiff has filed his claim. Thus, the undisputed evidence shows that the claims commissioner has not authorized the plaintiff to initiate the action for money damages against the state.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's state claims, including conspiracy to hinder prosecution, must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
When sovereign immunity applies, the court does not need to address statutory immunity. The Supreme Court has held that " where a state official is sued in both her official and individual capacities, if sovereign immunity does not apply to the claim against her in her official capacity, the statutory immunity may then apply to the claim against her in her individual capacity. Thus, before determining whether and to what extent the defendants are shielded by the statutory immunity provided by § 4-165, it is appropriate to determine whether the claims against them are barred by the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity." Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 162-63, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 325, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). " If the defendants have established their defense of sovereign immunity, they need not demonstrate their compliance with § 4-165." Martin v. Brady, 64 Conn.App. 433, 438, 780 A.2d 961 (2001), aff'd, 261 Conn. 372, 802 A.2d 814 (2002). " [Statutory] immunity provided by § 4-165 does not apply if the doctrine of sovereign immunity does apply." Hultman v. Blumenthal, supra, 67 Conn.App. 620. Likewise, " statutory immunity provided by § 4-165 applies where sovereign immunity does not apply." Shay v. Rossi, supra, 165.
III
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's entire complaint.
SO ORDERED.