Opinion
Civil Action No: 02-2772, Section: "J" (1)
December 11, 2002
MINUTE ORDER
Before the Court are the following motions: Defendant Saks Fifth Avenue's Motion to Transfer (Rec. Doc. 6); and plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Rec. Doc. 8). Defendant has filed an opposition to the Motion to Remand; no opposition (due December 10, 2002) has been filed to the Motion to Transfer.
The motions were originally set for oral argument on December 18, 2002; however, having reviewed the record, the memoranda of counsel, and applicable law, the Court finds that this matter may be disposed of on the briefs; accordingly, oral argument is cancelled.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Stewart alleges that she was the subject of discrimination and retaliation based upon her sex and race in her capacity as an employee of defendants May Department Stores ("May"), Saks and Company ("Saks"), Premier Salons, Inc. ("Premier"), and Supervisor Danny Dupre ("Dupre") (collectively "defendants"). Stewart is an African-American female residing in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana. May and Saks are both foreign corporations with principal places of business in Orleans Parish, Louisiana. Premier is a foreign corporation with its principal place of business in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana. Dupre resides in Livingston Parish, Louisiana.Stewart was originally hired by Saks d/b/a Parisian Department Store ("the store") in July, 1999. In March, 2001, May bought the store and changed its name to Foley's, and Stewart became an employee of May. In February, 2002, Premier bought the store, and Stewart became an employee of Premier. Dupre was employed as a supervisor of Saks, then of May, and then of Premier. Stewart alleges that Dupre consistently subjected her to discrimination based upon her sex and race, and subsequently subjected her to retaliation after she filed a cause of action.
On February 4, 2002, Stewart first filed a lawsuit ("first lawsuit") alleging race discrimination in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana based upon a charge she allegedly filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in February, 2001.
Stewart alleges that her employer retaliated against her on October 18, 2001 in attempting to fire her. On June 24, 2002, Stewart filed a Petition for Damages ("second lawsuit") in the Civil Court for Parish of Orleans making the same allegations of race discrimination as filed in the first lawsuit with the added claim of retaliation. Also on June 24, 2002, Stewart was granted leave to and did file a First Supplemental and Amended Complaint in the first lawsuit adding the alleged claim of retaliation. The second lawsuit was removed to this Court on September 9, 2002.
The Petition for Damages filed in the second law suit and the First Supplemental and Amended Complaint filed in the first lawsuit allege the exact same claims of discrimination and retaliation. However, the Petition for Damages in the second lawsuit alleges that defendants violated state law, namely LSA-R.S. 23:331 et seq., and LSA-R.S. 51:2231 et seq. The First Supplemental Amended Complaint filed in the first lawsuit alleges that defendants violated federal law, namely Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 2000e, et seq., as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("Title VII").
On October 16, 2002, defendants filed with this court a Motion to Transfer the second lawsuit to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana where the first law suit is pending. On October 21, 2002, Stewart filed with this Court a Motion to Remand the second lawsuit to state court claiming that it contains no federal cause of action.
For the reasons which follow, the Court finds Saks' Motion to Transfer should be granted, and accordingly, it does not reach the issues raised in plaintiff's Motion to Remand.
While it is true that courts generally consider subject matter jurisdiction as a preliminary matter, as other federal district courts have recognized, federal courts need not decide a motion to remand a removed case before ruling on a motion to transfer to another district.See, Gould v. National Life Ins. Co., 990 F. Supp. 1354 (M.D. Ala. 1998). In fact, "an array of non-merits questions . . . may [be] decide[d] in any order. . . ." Galvan v. Federal Prison Industries, Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Ruhrgas A.G. v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 1567 (1999)) see also, Buchanan v. Manley, 145 F.3d 386, 389 n. 5 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (ruling on venue without having first conclusively established subject matter jurisdiction, noting that court may dismiss on non-merits grounds before finding subject matter jurisdiction) (citations omitted).
Transfer prior to deciding a remand motion is particularly appropriate in this case where a related suit is already pending in the transferee district, the remand motion will not suffer any prejudice as a result of the transfer, and transfer at this juncture permits the court who would ultimately try the case to rule on the remand motion. See, Gould, 990 F. Supp. at 1358.
DISCUSSION
"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2002). In determining whether transfer is indicated under this provision, courts consider the factors set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 843 (1947). These factors include both "private interest" and "public interest" factors. The private interest factors are: [1] the "relative ease of access to sources of proof; [2] availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; [3] possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and [4] all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive."Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. at 843. The public interest factors to be considered are: [1] the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; [2] the "local interest in having localized controversies decided at home"; [3] the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law that must govern the action; [4] the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws, or in the application of foreign law; and [5] the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty. Id. at 67 S.Ct. at 843. Courts also consider judicial economy — that is, whether a transfer would avoid duplicative litigation and prevent waste of time and money.Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616, 84 S.Ct. 805, 809 (1964).In addition to the foregoing general venue considerations, the Fifth Circuit has recently held that the "special venue factors [of Title VII] clearly indicate that Congress thought employment discrimination controversies should be litigated in judicial districts that had direct and immediate connection with the parties, the events and the evidence bearing on their controversy." In re Horseshoe Entm't, 305 F.3d 354, 359 (5th Cir. 2002). In that case, the Fifth Circuit issued a writ of mandamus ordering the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana to transfer litigation arising under Title VII to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana based on the venue provisions of Title VII. Id. at 260. In making this determination, the Court observed that the Western District was where the alleged acts of discrimination took place, where the plaintiff and witnesses resided, where the defendant maintained an office, and where relevant employee records were located. Id. at 355-56. The Court went on to state that the plaintiff's choice of forum should not be given decisive weight. Id. at 359-60.
The venue provisions of Title VII are set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (f)(3) as follows:
Each United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this title [ 42 USCS §§ 2000e et seq.]. Such an action may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office. For purposes of sections 1404 and 1406 of title 28 of the United States Code, the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office shall in all cases be considered a district in which the action might have been brought.
Applying the Gilbert factors and Horseshoe rationale to the case at bar, the Court concludes that this case should be transferred to the Middle District of Louisiana. The Middle District is where the store in which Stewart works is located, where the alleged acts of discrimination and retaliation took place, where most of the witnesses reside, and where Stewart resides. Thus, the private interest factors — access to sources of proof, the convenience of witnesses, and other issues that would make trial of this case easy, expeditious and inexpensive — all point to the Middle District as the better venue choice. Likewise, the public interest would best be served by the avoidance of duplicative litigation that would result from maintaining this suit in the Eastern District when a nearly identical suit, filed first, is pending in the Middle District. Finally, to the extent plaintiff's claim is federal in nature and subject matter jurisdiction is ultimately found to lie in federal court, such jurisdiction is premised on Title VII, and underHorseshoe, Title VII actions should be litigated in judicial districts that had direct and immediate connection with the parties, events and evidence bearing on their controversy.
While the "first to file" rule generally contemplates suits filed by two different plaintiffs, the rationale informing that rule is applicable to the case at bar.
The "first to file" rule is grounded in principles of comity and sound judicial administration. The federal courts long have recognized that the principle of comity requires federal district courts — courts of coordinate jurisdiction and equal rank — to exercise care to avoid interference with each other's affairs. The concern manifestly is to avoid the waste of duplication, to avoid rulings which may trench upon the authority of sister courts, and to avoid piecemeal resolution of issues that call for a uniform result. This concern applies where related cases are pending before two judges in the same district . . . as well as where related cases have been filed in different districts.Save Power v. Syntek Fin. Corp, 121 F.3d 947 (5th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the convenience of parties and witnesses and the interest of justice require this matter to be transferred to the Middle District of Louisiana; therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant Saks Fifth Avenue's Motion to Transfer (Rec. Doc. 6) should be and is hereby GRANTED, and the instant action, including the Motion to Remand (Rec. Doc. 8) is TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana.