Opinion
No. CV02-0516931S
September 18, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiffs bring this action for conversion against three Southington police officers. The suit had previously been commenced in federal court on September 13, 1999, but when the matter was resolved there, the district judge dismissed the state claims without prejudice. The plaintiffs thereupon commenced this suit for conversion pursuant to the accidental failure of suit statute, General Statutes § 52-592(a). The defendants have now moved for summary judgment, in part on statute of limitation grounds, contending that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Practice Book § 17-49; Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424, 450 (2003).
The undisputed facts in this case show that the police officers came to the plaintiffs' residence to resolve a domestic dispute. The police officers removed weapons from the residence. In addition, the complaint alleges that the officers were "without a warrant of any kind." (Amended complaint, paragraph 5.) It also alleges that the police officers "seized large quantities of personal property from the home of the plaintiffs, some of which has not been returned to the present day despite the fact that such property is not contraband and despite the fact that the plaintiffs have repeatedly demanded its return." (Amended complaint, paragraph 6.) The plaintiff Edmund Sterniak stated that one of the policemen "ripped the woodwork right off the wall to pull out another little safe there." (Deposition at 148, line 11.) In his handwritten Exhibit 2, Mr. Sterniak relates that in "Feb. 96," a cardboard file box was "unnecessarily destroyed" by one of the officers, who told his wife "that he can do anything he wants and you Sterniak's can't do a dam thing about it."
These events occurred on or about February 24, 1996, and the federal complaint was filed on September 13, 1999. The defendants have moved for summary judgment on the ground of the three-year statute of limitations. General Statutes § 52-577. This statute "is an occurrence statute, CT Page 10269-j meaning that the time period within which a plaintiff must commence an action begins to run at the moment the act or omission complained of occurs . . . When conducting an analysis under § 5-577, the only facts material to the trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment are the date of the wrongful conduct alleged in the complaint and the date the action was filed." (Citations omitted; quotation marks omitted.) Collum v. Chapin, 40 Conn. App. 449, 451 (1996).
Here the facts of record and the plaintiffs' allegations show that the alleged conversion occurred, if at all, in February 1996 and the federal complaint was not brought until September 1999, beyond the three-year period. The plaintiffs argue that the statute did not commence to run until the completion of the pending criminal case against Mr. Sterniak. At oral argument on this motion, the plaintiffs further contended that the statute did not run until they had made demand for the return of their property.
"The tort of conversion occurs when one, without authorization, assumes and exercises ownership over property belonging to another, to the exclusion of the owner's rights." (Citations omitted; quotation marks omitted.) Hi-Ho Tower, Inc. v. Com-Tronics, Inc., 255 Conn. 20, 43 (2000). Here the plaintiffs clearly make a claim that the unauthorized use of their property occurred at the date of its removal from their home, and not at a later time. In other words, the affront to their rights occurred immediately, not after the prosecution terminated or at the time a demand was refused. Cf. Maroun v. Tarro, 35 Conn. App. 391, 396 (1994) (discussing possession of goods wrongful from the outset), with Luciani v. Stop Shop Companies, Inc., 15 Conn. App. 407, 409 (1988) (originally rightful possession becomes wrongful thereafter). The statute of limitations, where the conduct was allegedly wrong from the first, commences to run at once and not after a demand for return of the goods. Heffernan v. Marine Midland Bank N.A., 727 N.Y.S.2d 60 (A.D. 2001). The statute of limitations here was triggered on February 24, 1996 and required the filing of a complaint by February 24, 1999. The actual date of filing was September 13, 1999.
The plaintiffs' citation to State v. Krukowski Superior Court, CT Page 10269-k judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket No. CR 19 54245 So. (February 16, 1996, Bishop, J.), is not in point. There the defendant invited the police into his home prior to the seizure. Here the allegations are that the police entered the plaintiffs' home without any authority and unlawfully took and carried away the plaintiffs' personalty.
As alleged and based on the record here, the plaintiffs were obliged to commence their suit within three years of February 24, 1996. Because the plaintiffs failed to meet the statutory deadline, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground of statute of limitations.
The court does not rule on the alternate ground of collateral estoppel.
Henry S. Cohn, Judge