Opinion
1-13-1958
41 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2581, 34 Lab.Cas. P 71,238 Walter L. STEPHENSON, Individually and in a representative capacity for and on behalf of Local Union 440, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, an unincorporated association, its officers and members, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CITY OF PALM SPRINGS, a municipal corporation; August Kettman, as Chief of Police of said City of Palm Springs; Doe 1 to Doe 10, inclusive, Defendants and Appellants. * Civ. 5592.
Jerome J. Bunker, City Atty., Palm Springs, Sheppard, Mullin, Richter, Balthis & Hampton, George R. Richter, Jr., Edwin H. Franzen, Los Angeles, for appellants. Lewis Garrett, Lionel Richman, Los Angeles, for respondents.
Walter L. STEPHENSON, Individually and in a representative capacity for and on behalf of Local Union 440, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, an unincorporated association, its officers and members, Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
CITY OF PALM SPRINGS, a municipal corporation; August Kettman, as Chief of Police of said City of Palm Springs; Doe 1 to Doe 10, inclusive, Defendants and Appellants. *
Jan. 13, 1958.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 30, 1958.
Hearing Granted March 13, 1958.
Jerome J. Bunker, City Atty., Palm Springs, Sheppard, Mullin, Richter, Balthis & Hampton, George R. Richter, Jr., Edwin H. Franzen, Los Angeles, for appellants.
Lewis Garrett, Lionel Richman, Los Angeles, for respondents.
BARNARD, Presiding Justice.
The plaintiffs brought this action to enjoin the defendants from enforcing a certain ordinance passed or adopted by the defendant city. The complaint alleged among other things, that the plaintiffs had entered into a written agreement with H & S Electronics Service Corporation containing a provision which required the employer to employ only members of the plaintiff Union except where the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq., applied, and where that Act applied requiring the employees to become Union members within 31 days and to maintain such membership as a condition of employment. It was further alleged that said employer maintained its sole place of business in the defendant city, conducted its business in said city, and hired employees in said city. The defendants demurred to this complaint on the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The court overruled the demurrer, allowing the defendants 20 days in which to answer A stipulation was then filed in which the defendants waived their right to answer, and it was stipulated that the matter be submitted for final decision and judgment on the basis of the pleadings theretofore filed. A judgment was then entered restraining the defendants from enforcing said ordinance, and the defendants have appealed from that judgment.
The ordinance in question reads in part as follows: 'Right to Work. '2920. Public Policy. It is declared to be the public policy of the City of Palm Springs that the right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor organization. 'Sections 920 to 923, inclusive, of the Labor Code of the State of California have been construed by its courts to protect the rights of persons to work despite membership in a labor organization. On the other hand, those sections have been construed by the Supreme Court of California as not prohibiting or preventing a closed shop or union shop which has the effect of denying the right to work because of non-membership in a labor organization. It is the intention of this ordinance to prohibit closed shop and union shop agreements of any type which are neither prohibited nor authorized by state laws and to prevent any person being deprived of his employment because of his non-membership in a labor organization. '2921. Prohibited Agreements. No person shall be denied the opportunity to obtain or retain employment because of non-membership in a labor organization, nor shall the city, or any corporation, individual or association of any kind enter into any agreement, written or oral, which excludes any person from employment or continuation of employment because of non-membership in a labor organization.'
It further provides that any act or any provision in any agreement in violation of this ordinance shall be illegal and void; that any person or association who violates or attempts to induce another to violate any provision of this ordinance or enters into any agreement having that effect, or who attempts to enforce in this city any provision in an agreement made elsewhere, which provision is declared illegal by this ordinance, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to the penalties provided by another city ordinance; and that no provision of this ordinance shall prevent the granting of injunctive relief to any person injured or threatened to be injured by any act declared illegal by this ordinance.
The appellants contend that this ordinance would be valid if it were a state rather than a municipal law, citing Lincoln Federal Labor Union No. 19129, A. F. of L. v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Company, 1949, 335 U.S. 525, 69 S.Ct. 251, 93 L.Ed. 212; Whitaker v. State of North Carolina, 1949, 335 U.S. 525, 69 S.Ct. 251, 93 L.Ed. 212; American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 1949, 335 U.S. 538, 69 S.Ct. 258, 260, 93 L.Ed. 222; Local Union No. 10, etc. v. Graham, 1953, 345 U.S. 192, 73 S.Ct. 585, 97 L.Ed. 946. It is then contended that municipal laws are valid unless they conflict with general laws; that this ordinance does not conflict with the general laws because the state has not occupied this field; that it does not directly conflict with nor duplicate any state statute since it prohibits only such closed shop agreements as are neither prohibited nor authorized by state laws; and that it does not conflict with the provisions of sections 920 to 923 of the Labor Code since the Supreme Court has held in Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists Union, 16 Cal.2d 379, 106 P.2d 403, and other cases that those sections do not outlaw closed shop agreements. It is further contended that the federal law does not apply to this action since there is no affirmative showing that interstate commerce is affected; and that even if the federal law did apply the ordinance is valid since section 14(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act makes the provisions of that Act inapplicable in any state or territory in which an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization is prohibited by state or territorial law. In that connection it is argued that by enacting section 14(b) Congress intended that municipalities should be allowed to enact right to work laws, and that city ordinances are 'state laws' within the meaning of section 14(b). It is further argued that even if this ordinance is invalid insofar as it applies to interstate commerce it is still valid to the extent that it applies to intrastate commerce.
The main question here presented is as to whether this ordinance is in conflict with the existing law and the declared public policy of the state, and as to whether this field of legislation has been sufficiently covered by the state to make such local legislation invalid. The appellants argue from certain cases involving such matters as licenses, permits, filing of claims, eminent domain and compensation of elective officers, that there is no occupation of the field by the state unless the legislature has adopted a detailed scheme completely covering the entire field; that this state has adopted no detailed or comprehensive regulation of collective bargaining or of relations between unions and management; that the holding in the Shafer case, supra, is based on the common law rather than on statute; and that it follows that the field of right to work legislation has not been occupied by the general laws of this state. There are many statutes in this state regulating collective bargaining and governing the relations between unions and management, in addition to sections 920 to 923 of the Labor Code. All of those statutes and provisions should be considered in determining whether the state has so occupied the field as to make this local ordinance invalid. As the court said in Wilson v. Beville, 47 Cal.2d 852, 306 P.2d 789, 793: 'Determination of the question whether the Legislature has undertaken to occupy exclusively a given field of legislation depends upon an analysis of the statute and a consideration of the facts and circumstances upon which it was intended to operate. (Citations.) Where the Legislature has adopted statutes governing a particular subject matter, its intent with regard to occupying the field to the exclusion of all local regulations is not to be measured alone by the language used but by the whole purpose and scope of the legislative scheme.'
There is a direct conflict between the public policy of the state as declared in section 923 of the Labor Code and the public policy of the city, as declared in this ordinance. The public policy of the state as thus declared is to leave the negotiation of terms and conditions of labor entirely to voluntary agreement, and that individual workmen shall have complete freedom in negotiating with respect to such terms and conditions of employment. The public policy of the city as so declared is to do away with voluntary agreement insofar as a closed shop is concerned, and to limit the workman's freedom in negotiating with respect to that part of the terms and conditions of employment. Some of the provisions of this ordinance would appear to be similar in effect to some of the provisions found in sections 920 to 923 of the Labor Code, but when viewed as a whole the ordinance clearly is an attempt to cover in a different way the same field as that covered by the statutes. As interpreted by the Supreme Court in Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists Union, 16 Cal.2d 379, 106 P.2d 403, those sections of the Labor Code do not place any restraint upon the efforts of workers to secure a closed shop contract from an employer. It was also held in that case that the validity of closed shop contracts has been recognized by the courts of this state for many years, and that the legislature by its enactment of other provisions of the Labor Code has shown its approval of the propriety of such contracts. It would reasonably seem that decisions of the Supreme Court, and the law of the state thereby established, are a part of the facts and circumstances which should be considered by a lower court in determining whether a particular field of legislation has been occupied by the state. While there is no statute in this state expressly authorizing or prohibiting a closed shop agreement it rather clearly appears from the decision in the Shafer case and in other cases that this particular field has been sufficiently covered by state law, and no room is left for such local legislation as that here in question with respect to that particular subject and field of activity. In view of the now existing state law it would be mere sophistry to say that, because the state has not by statute expressly declared closed shop contracts to be unlawful or expressly authorized them, it has not covered that field and that this city is therefore free to make such contracts illegal. The statutory declaration of public policy by the state that negotiations of terms and conditions of labor shall be left to a voluntary agreement between the parties has an affirmative effect, and it cannot reasonably be said that the state has taken no action with respect to the matter of closed shop agreements, leaving that field open for local legislation. Under state statutes, as presently interpreted by the Supreme Court, the public policy and laws of the state permit the making of closed shop contracts and the efforts of workers or their representative to secure such contracts from employers, and in a real and practical sense this local legislation forbidding the making of such contracts conflicts with and is contrary to existing state public policy and law.
A further consideration is that this ordinance is so vague and indefinite that the persons to be affected thereby could not reasonably be expected to know whether or not it was intended to apply in a given situation. A man of common intelligence would necessarily have to guess at its meaning as applicable to any contract act or activity. While the express intention of the ordinance is to prohibit only such closed shop agreements as are neither prohibited nor authorized by state laws, that provision in itself is most confusing and uncertain. Whether any particular act or activity is or is not covered by state law, or whether any such act is or is not allowed in view of the effect of certain federal laws, and many other questions which would normally arise, are left with no standard by which the ordinary man could know whether or not his acts were lawful within the meaning of the ordinance. This uncertainty and vagueness is accentuated by the criminal provisions of the ordinance. Under well settled principles a criminal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it as to what conduct on their part would render them liable to its penalty. In this respect this ordinance violates one of the first essentials of due process of law. While the ordinance contains a clause declaring its provisions to be severable, it is so indefinite as to give no adequate warning as to the circumstances under which any particular act or activity will subject a person to criminal punishment. As the court said in Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 51 S.Ct. 582, 586, 75 L.Ed. 1264: 'The Legislature could not thus impose upon laymen, at the peril of criminal prosecution, the duty of severing the statutory provisions and of thus resolving important constitutional questions with respect to the scope of a field of regulation as to which even courts are not yet in accord.'
Other phases of this problem need not be considered at length, including the effect of this ordinance in connection with certain federal legislation such as the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., the Labor Relations Act, and the Taft-Hartley Act; the probable effect on interstate commerce in many cases and in varying circumstances; and the effect on intrastate business with its many implications and problems involving agreements made outside of the city and activities carried on both in and out of the city. It is clearly apparent that under the complicated and interrelated conditions of modern business and industrial life, this should be and is a matter of widespread rather than local interest and concern, and that a contrary conclusion, permitting hundreds of varying and inconsistent local ordinances, would lead to indescribable confusion.
We are here concerned solely with the validity of this particular ordinance and not with the wisdom or desirability of legislation of this nature in a wider field. Because this ordinance conflicts with existing state public policy and law, and because of its vague and indefinite terms, we conclude that the demurrer to the complaint was properly overruled.
The judgment is affirmed.
MUSSELL, J., and WAITE, J. pro tem., concur. --------------- * Opinion vacated 340 P.2d 1009.