Opinion
No. C0-97-962.
Filed November 14, 1997.
Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, File No. 976750.
Richard I. Diamond, (for Appellants)
Jerome B. Pederson, Todd Wind, Steve J. Quam, (for Respondent The Bakken)
Jay M. Heffern, Minneapolis City Attorney, William C. Dunning, Assistant City Attorney, (for Respondent City of Minneapolis)
Considered and decided by Norton, Presiding Judge, Schumacher, Judge, and Willis, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellants Donald and Donna Stelzner challenge the district court's denial of their motions for a writ of mandamus against respondent City of Minneapolis to enforce its zoning code and for a temporary restraining order against respondent The Bakken from building an extension to its museum. We affirm.
FACTS
In 1976, Earl Bakken bought the property at 3537 Zenith Avenue in Minneapolis, which is in an R-1 single family zoning district, and converted the 13,000 square foot building located there into a library and museum of electricity and medicine ("the museum") that is run by The Bakken, a non-profit corporation. In 1983, the Stelzners bought the property at 3528 Calhoun Parkway West, which is adjacent to the museum. Initially, the museum was primarily a research facility, available for use by the public only on weekdays and only by appointment. In 1993, the museum was opened to the public on Saturdays for an admission charge. In February 1997, The Bakken presented to the city its plans to start work on a 10,000 square foot expansion in May 1997, which would include adding to the museum a laboratory, a classroom, an expanded library, a parking lot, and new walkways to a pond for storm water runoff.
In a letter to the city dated March 12, 1997, the Stelzners' counsel argued that the addition to the museum should not proceed without a zoning variance. In a letter dated March 27, 1997, the Minneapolis zoning supervisor responded that The Bakken's facility was permitted use in the R-1 district as a public library and museum. In April 1997, the Stelzners filed a complaint against The Bakken in federal court. The federal action was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, and the Stelzners immediately filed this action in state court seeking a judgment (1) compelling the city to enforce the zoning code with respect to the museum property, (2) declaring that the museum violates the zoning code, (3) enjoining The Bakken from making improvements to the museum that will create a nuisance, and (4) requiring the city to acquire the Stelzners' property by inverse condemnation. The Stelzners moved for a writ of mandamus against the city and a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction against The Bakken. The district court denied the Stelzners' motions. The Stelzners appealed, and this court granted their motion for accelerated review.
DECISION
1. Writ of Mandamus.
A writ of mandamus may be issued to an inferior board "to compel the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station." Minn. Stat. § 586.01 (1996). A county taxpayer may petition for a writ of mandamus to compel a county board to enforce its zoning ordinances. Haen v. Renville County Bd. of Comm'rs , 495 N.W.2d 466, 469 (Minn.App. 1993), review denied (Minn. Mar. 30, 1993). A writ of mandamus "is an extraordinary legal remedy awarded, not as a matter of right, but in the exercise of sound judicial discretion and upon equitable principles." Coyle v. City of Delano , 526 N.W.2d 205, 207 (Minn.App. 1995).
The district court denied the Stelzners' motion for a writ of mandamus, and generally no appeal lies from an order granting or denying a motion for a writ of mandamus. State ex rel. Quale v. Penney , 144 Minn. 463, 464, 174 N.W. 611, 611 (1919). The Stelzners argue that this case is appealable under Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 103.03(e), as an order that determines the action. But the district court order here does not "prevent a judgment from which an appeal might be taken," as required by rule 103.03(e). The Stelzners argue in the alternative that this court should address the mandamus issue "in the interest of justice," pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. 105.01. The Stelzners, however, did not petition for review of an otherwise unappealable order within 30 days after the filing of the order as rule 105.01 requires.
2. Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).
On appeal from an order denying a motion for a TRO, this court must determine whether the district court clearly abused its discretion. Earth Protector, Inc. v. City of Hopkins , 474 N.W.2d 454, 455 (Minn.App. 1991).
The trial court must consider five factors before granting or denying a temporary restraining order or temporary injunction:
1. The relationship between the parties before the dispute arose;
2. The harm plaintiffs may suffer if the injunction is denied, compared to the harm inflicted on the defendant if the injunction is granted;
3. The likelihood that the party will prevail on the merits;
4. Public policy considerations; and
5. Administrative burden imposed on the court if the injunction issues."
Id. (citations omitted).
The district court noted that (1) "the most pertinent fact regarding the parties' relationship is that The Bakken and the Stelzners own adjoining properties," (2) the museum has existed since 1976, and the Stelzners have lived on the adjacent property since 1983, (3) the parties peacefully coexisted until The Bakken announced expansion plans for the museum in February 1997, and (4) before February 1997, the Stelzners did not challenge The Bakken's use of its property under the zoning code.
A party seeking injunctive relief must establish that it will be irreparably harmed by the defendant's conduct and that there is no adequate remedy at law. Id. at 456. The district court concluded that the Stelzners did not establish that denial of a TRO will result in irreparable harm and concluded that The Bakken will suffer significant harm if a TRO is unreasonably issued because Minnesota has a limited construction season.
The Stelzners argue that the district court abused its discretion by determining that they did not suffer irreparable harm, arguing that the inadequacy of damages is presumed in cases involving interests in land. The Stelzners rely on Shaughnessy v. Eidsmo , 222 Minn. 141, 23 N.W.2d 362 (1946), which stands for the proposition that damages for the breach of a contract for the sale of land are considered inadequate, and therefore, proof of damages is not required. Id. at 150, 23 N.W.2d at 368. That court explained that the justification for that rule is that, because there is no open market for land, it would be rare that a buyer could get substantially similar land or that the seller could readily sell to another buyer. Id. Shaughnessy is inapposite because it involved the sale of land, while this case involves an alleged diminution in the value of land based on a neighbor's use of its property.
The Stelzners contend they "will suffer significant harm in terms of additional noise, air pollution, traffic, headlight glare, lack of privacy, destruction of trees and screening, diminution of their property value and the like." There need not be certainty of harm to justify relief, but a court of equity will not interfere "unless it clearly appears by competent evidence that a nuisance will be brought into existence by the acts of the parties sought to be restrained, and that the party complaining will be injured unless the injunction is granted." Nelson v. Swedish Evangelical Lutheran Cemetery Ass'n , 111 Minn. 149, 153, 126 N.W. 723, 724 (1910). The Stelzners submitted no competent evidence to support their assertions. On the other hand, The Bakken submitted an affidavit of the museum's director, David Rhees, stating that (1) the museum's operation generates no noise; (2) the proposed parking lot will be at an elevation below the Stelzners' property so that they will not experience direct headlight glare; (3) the project plans call for shrubbery to block headlight glare; (4) the proposed parking lot lights will have downward pointed slots, located on the side away from the Stelzners' house; (5) the number of school buses will not materially increase after the completion of the project because the museum can only handle one or two buses at a time; and (6) the plans do not call for removing the trees on the museum property. The district court concluded that the Stelzners failed to establish that they would suffer irreparable harm by the denial of a TRO.
The Stelzners argue that the sums The Bakken expended in preparation for the museum's expansion "[do] not amount to a relative harm" because The Bakken did not announce its expansion plans until February 1997, and the Stelzners spent over $100,000 improving their property in 1995 and 1996. But the record also shows that The Bakken earlier had constructed a gazebo, a medicinal garden, and a special underground 1,200-square-foot vault to preserve its rare books and scientific instruments.
The Stelzners argue that The Bakken's acts in violation of the zoning code cannot be a basis for denying injunctive relief. The district court, however, concluded that significant questions exist regarding the viability of the Stelzners' zoning claims. The Minneapolis zoning code specifies uses that are permitted in an R-1 single-family district, which includes educational and cultural institutions such as "public libraries" and "public museums." Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances § 538.120 (1997). The zoning code does not define public library or public museum, and it does not distinguish between public and private establishments.
Courts generally should construe a term according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Frank's Nursery Sales, Inc. v. City of Roseville , 295 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn. 1980). Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "public" as:
Pertaining to state, nation, or whole community; proceeding from, relating to, or affecting the whole body of people or an entire community. Open to all; notorious. Common to all or many; general; open to common use. Belonging to the people at large; relating to or affecting the whole people of a state, nation, or community; not limited or restricted to any particular class of the community.
Henry Campbell Black, et al., Black's Law Dictionary 1227 (6th ed. 1990). The museum is open to any member of the community who is willing to pay admission and visit during specified hours. Moreover, "zoning ordinances should be construed strictly against the city and in favor of the property owner * * * to use his land as he wishes." Frank's , 295 N.W.2d at 608-09.
The Stelzners argue that the definition of "public library" in Minn. Stat. § 134.001, subd. 2 (1996), should be applied to the Minneapolis zoning code. The district court stated that application of that definition of public library would require that other cultural institutions in R-1 districts in Minneapolis be found to be impermissible uses and that the drafters of the zoning code did not intend such a result. The zoning code provides:
Unless clearly in conflict with definitions or other provisions of this Code or otherwise clearly inapplicable, definitions established for the State of Minnesota by statute or case law shall apply to this Code.
Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances § 3.50 (1997). Section 134.001, subd. 2, provides:
" Public library" means any library that provides free access to all residents of a city or county without discrimination, receives at least half of its financial support from public funds and is organized under the provisions of this chapter. Except as provided in section 134.195, it does not include libraries such as law, medical, school and academic libraries organized to serve a special group of persons, or libraries organized as a combination of a public library and another type of library.
Id.
Statutes in pari materia, which relate to the same thing or have a common purpose, should be construed in light of one another. State v. McKown , 475 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Minn. 1991). But application of the doctrine of in pari materia is not appropriate where the statutes in question do not have a common purpose. See id. at 66. Chapter 134 of Minnesota Statutes provides for the establishment, operation, and funding of public libraries under the control of governmental units. By contrast, the Minneapolis zoning code was enacted to promote and protect the welfare of the city and to foster a rational pattern of relationships among residential, business, and manufacturing uses. Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances § 522.20 (1997). The district court did not clearly abuse its discretion by refusing to apply the definition of public library provided in Minn. Stat. § 134.001 to the zoning code, because the statute and the zoning code were adopted for different purposes and the statute does not apply to museums.
The Stelzners argue that the museum has become a nuisance by reason of the manner of its operation and because it is located in a residential district. See Robinson v. Westman , 224 Minn. 105, 111-12, 29 N.W.2d 1, 6 (1947) (concluding that legitimate business that is not nuisance per se may become nuisance in fact because of manner in which it is operated, such as contaminating air through noxious odors, causing disturbing noise, or otherwise endangering safety and security of neighbors, particularly if located in residential district).
Anything which is injurious to health, or indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, * * * is a nuisance. An action may be brought by any person whose property is injuriously affected or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by the nuisance, and by the judgment the nuisance may be enjoined or abated, as well as damages recovered.
Minn. Stat. § 561.01 (1996). "Not every discomfort arising from the use of adjacent property justifies an injunction." Lynch v. Shiely , 131 Minn. 346, 348, 155 N.W. 390, 390 (1915). Consideration must be given to the neighborhood and the usual disturbances prevalent in the neighborhood in determining whether a noise is sufficient to constitute a nuisance. Village of Wadena v. Folkestad , 194 Minn. 146, 149, 260 N.W. 221, 222 (1935). The district court noted that West Calhoun Parkway is a significant daily recreation resource for many people and concluded that the likelihood that the Stelzners will be successful on their nuisance claim weighs against granting them a TRO.
The Stelzners argue that the public policy of protecting their right to enjoy their property is more important than "permit[ting] commercial enterprises to expand substantially in violation of the zoning districts in which they are located." As discussed above, it is not clear that The Bakken is violating the zoning code, and zoning ordinances should be construed "in favor of the property owner * * * to use his land as he wishes." Frank's , 295 N.W.2d at 608-09.
Finally, the district court agreed with the Stelzners that a TRO would require little judicial supervision. The court nevertheless concluded that the primary factors to be considered favor respondents. The district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in denying the Stelzners' motion for a TRO against The Bakken.
Affirmed.
I respectfully dissent on the issue of whether The Bakken is a public library and a permitted use under the zoning ordinance. I concur with the majority on all other issues.
The Bakken is located in an R-1 Single-Family District that allows the existence of public libraries and public museums in the neighborhood. Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances § 538.120. The zoning ordinance does not define public library or public museum. The Stelzners contend that The Bakken is not a public library and, therefore, may be a violation of the Minneapolis zoning ordinance. I agree.
Where, as here, the zoning code does not provide a definition for the terms "public library" or "public museum," the code provides:
Unless clearly in conflict with definitions or other provisions of this Code or otherwise clearly inapplicable, definitions established for the State of Minnesota by statute or case law shall apply to this Code.
Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances § 3.50. The construction of a statute is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. Barton v. Moore , 558 N.W.2d 746, 751 (Minn. 1997). The court construes municipal ordinances in the same manner it interprets statutes. Chanhassen Estates Residents Ass'n v. City of Chanhassen , 342 N.W.2d 335, 339 n. 3 (Minn. 1984).
The Stelzners base their argument on the definition of "public library" located in Minn. Stat. § 134.001 (1996). That statute provides:
" Public library" means any library that provides free access to all residents of a city or county without discrimination, receives at least half of its financial support from public funds and is organized under the provisions of this chapter. Except as provided in section 134.195, it does not include libraries such as law, medical, school and academic libraries organized to serve a special group of persons, or libraries organized as a combination of a public library and another type of library.
Id. , subd. 2. Similarly, "public library" is commonly defined as, "A noncommercial library often supported with public funds, intended for use by the general public." The American Heritage Dictionary 1464 (3rd ed. 1992).
On its face, The Bakken does not meet the statutory definition of "public library." The public can gain entrance to The Bakken only by paying an admission fee. Historically, The Bakken was a research facility, open to the public only by appointment. In recent years, The Bakken opened its doors to the public on Saturdays. Further, The Bakken is a non-profit corporation funded solely by private money. These characteristics come closer to what does not constitute a library under Minn. Stat. § 134.001: a library "organized to serve a special group of persons, or libraries organized as a combination of a public library and another type of library."
The definition of "public" also supports a conclusion that The Bakken is not a public library. Black's Law Dictionary defines "public" as:
Pertaining to state, nation, or whole community; proceeding from, relating to, or affecting the whole body of people or an entire community. Open to all; notorious. Common to all or many; general; open to common use. Belonging to the people at large; relating to or affecting the whole people of a state, nation, or community; not limited or restricted to any particular class of the community.
Black's Law Dictionary 1227 (6th ed. 1990). The trial court concluded that The Bakken was a "public library" simply because it is open to the public. The Bakken, however, is only "open to the public" by appointment and on Saturdays and, by its very nature, is not "open to common use." Nor does it "belong to the people at large"; The Bakken is a private, non-profit corporation funded solely by private money.
The majority reasoned that the statute and ordinance need not be read together because they have distinct purposes and are not in pari materia. See State v. McKown , 475 N.W.2d 63, 65-66 (Minn. 1991) (holding that court is not bound to construe statues together as in pari materia when they have separate and distinct purposes and are not so related as to require interpretation in light of one another). Although I do not dispute that the statute and ordinance arguably have different purposes, the fact that they are not in pari materia does not preclude the court from looking to the statutes for guidance, albeit nonbinding, when construing the undefined term of "public library" in the ordinance. See El Nashaar v. El Nashaar , 529 N.W.2d 13, 14 (Minn.App. 1995) (relying on probate court's definition of "hearing" when seeking to define "full hearing" in context of domestic abuse proceeding); see also Anderson v. Lake , 536 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Minn.App. 1995) (applying El Nashaar 's definition of "full hearing" in domestic abuse context to criminal harassment restraining order).
Further, when presented with a question for which dispositive Minnesota law does not exist, the court routinely refers to circumstantially similar authority that is persuasive in the court's analysis, but is not binding. See Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas Co. , 344 N.W.2d 856, 861 (Minn. 1984) (referring to wide survey of foreign jurisdictions' decisions when considering whether to adopt negligence standard of liability for gas distributors; considered case law persuasive, but not binding); see also State v. Russell , 477 N.W.2d 886, 896 n. 1 (Minn. 1991) (Coyne, J., dissenting) (noting state court's practice of referring to federal equal protection case law when interpreting equivalent state "equal protection clause").
Most importantly, the court can rely on the statutory definition of "public library" because the zoning code itself incorporates statutory definitions where none exist in the code. Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances § 3.50.
For these reasons, I believe the trial court erroneously interpreted the zoning ordinance and used reasoning that is contrary to the statutory definition of "public library" as well as the standard definition of "public." I respectfully dissent.