Opinion
No. CV 04-4001367-S
October 6, 2005
RULING ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On this probate appeal, the facts are not in dispute and the only question is one of law. For these reasons, the court will review the decision of the probate court de novo and resolve the matter on the cross motions for summary judgment filed by the parties. See Practice Book § 17-49; Scott v. Scott, 90 Conn.App. 883, 887, 879 A.2d 540 (2005). The only issue is the propriety of the probate court's conclusion that it should dismiss the plaintiff's application for an accounting, pursuant to the Uniform Gifts to Minor's Act, of the defendant's actions as custodian of the estate of the father of the parties on the ground that a Nevada decision in a case involving the same parties had res judicata effect. See General Statutes §§ 45a-557 et seq. (now entitled "Uniform Transfers to Minors Act"); id., § 45a-559d(c) (authorizing an action for an accounting).
Because the question is one of law, the fact that the probate court wrote a memorandum of decision, and thus that there is at least a partial record of the probate proceedings, does not require use of the abuse of discretion standard of review. Cf. Andrews v. Gorby, 237 Conn. 12, 15-16, 675 A.2d 449 (1996).
The probate court properly concluded that the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution "requires a state court to accord to the judgment of another state the same credit, validity and effect as the state that rendered the judgment would give it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nastro v. D'Onofrio, 76 Conn.App. 814, 814, 822 A.2d 286 (2003). The court thus must look to Nevada law to determine whether its decision has res judicata effect. See Business Alliance Capital Corp. v. Fuselier, 88 Conn.App. 731, 739, 871 A.2d 1051 (2005). Nevada law is similar to Connecticut's in requiring, for res judicata to apply, a final decision on the merits. See Executive Management v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 114 Nev. 823, 835, 963 P.2d 465 (1998). Cf. McCue v. Birmingham, 88 Conn.App. 630, 635, 870 A.2d 1126, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 905, 876 A.2d 14 (2005).
The only reasoning offered by the Nevada district court in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss on June 19, 2003 was as follows: "This [June 28, 2001] release [of the defendant by the plaintiff entitled "Agreement to Compromise"] has been taken up by the Connecticut Probate Court and has been approved; therefore, there is no issue to resolve." The Nevada court repeated the same reasoning in its August 7, 2003 order denying the plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the judgment.
The court cannot decisively conclude that the dismissal of the Nevada case was a decision on the merits. It appears that the Nevada court was exercising some type of discretionary authority to dismiss the case because of its belief that the matter had already been decided. But the decision of the Nevada court is simply too summary and its reasoning too elusive to characterize it with certainty.
The Nevada decision is apparently not a dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction, which might otherwise deny it full faith and credit effect. See Nastro v. D'Ononfrio, supra, 76 Conn.App. 819. It would appear to be the obligation of the Nevada courts to address subject matter jurisdictional issues at the outset especially given that the Nevada defendant raised lack of subject matter jurisdiction in his motion to dismiss. See Lewis v. District Court, 113 Nev. 106, 108, 930 P.2d 770 (1997) (under the Uniform Child Custody Act). Thus, the failure of the Nevada court even to acknowledge the jurisdictional issue is noteworthy. The Nevada courts may well have had subject matter jurisdiction based on Nevada Revised Statute § 167.021(3), which provides that: "A transfer that purports to be made and which is valid under the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act or a substantially similar act, of another state is governed by the law of the designated state and may be executed and is enforceable in this state if at the time of the transfer, the transferor, the minor or the custodian is a resident of the designated state or the custodial property is located in the designated state." Furthermore, the plaintiff, having presumably filed the action in Nevada with the good faith belief that the court there had jurisdiction, is in a poor position to argue now that the same court actually lacked jurisdiction.
Although the Nevada court later stated, in its September 25, 2003 order granting the defendant's motion for attorneys fees, that there was "a complete lack of properly pled facts in this case supporting any of the claims filed for improper management, improper commingling or the like," this statement, which clearly does address the merits of the plaintiff's Nevada lawsuit, was not part of the basis for the Nevada court's dismissal. In ruling on the motion for attorneys fees, the Nevada court was applying a different standard — whether the case "was brought without reasonable grounds" — that may well have required more of an inquiry into the merits than did the ruling on the motion to dismiss.
Although there is apparently no Nevada case law that addresses this precise situation, it is the law generally in the states that there should be no res judicata effect when it is unclear whether the decision in question is on the merits. See State ex rel. J.E. Dunn Construction Co. v. Fairness in Construction Board, 960 S.W.2d 507, 513 (Mo.Ct.App. 1997); 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 728, p. 269 (1997). Based on this case law, the court concludes that the Nevada decision is not entitled to res judicata effect and that the probate court erred in ruling to the contrary. Accordingly, the court grants the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denies the defendant's cross motion.
The plaintiff's "motion for appeal from probate" and "reasons for appeal," which constitute the equivalent of a complaint, see Practice Book § 10-76(a), allege that the 2001 release was the product of fraud by the defendant and that a determination of the enforceability of the release is necessary before an accounting of the defendant's activities can be ordered. Because these matters arise under the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, because that Act gives jurisdiction in the first instance to the probate court over such matters, see General Statutes § 45a-557b(a), and because of the probate court's familiarity with the circumstances of this case, the court remands the case to the probate court for the district of Danbury for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See State v. Gordon, 45 Conn.App. 490, 496-97, 696 A.2d 1034, cert. granted, 243 Conn. 911, 701 A.2d 336 (1997).
The Supreme Court apparently dismissed the appeal in Gordon on October 27, 1998. See In re Cameron S., Superior Court, judicial district of Windham at Willimantic (December 13, 1999) (Mack, J.).
It is so ordered.
Carl J. Schuman
Judge, Superior Court