Summary
dismissing claim that state judge failed adequately to train and/or supervise his staff with regard to the appointment of counsel on appeal for indigent criminal defendants on judicial immunity grounds
Summary of this case from Robinson v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.Opinion
Case Number 02-10216-BC.
June 5, 2003.
Before the Court is the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The motion was referred to Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and E.D. Mich. LR 72.1. The magistrate judge issued a report recommending that the defendants' motion be granted and the case be dismissed with prejudice. On April 28, 2003, after not receiving any objections to the report, which were due on April 24, 2003, the Court entered an order adopting the recommendation and dismissing the case.
On May 12, 2003, the plaintiff filed a motion to show cause. In the motion, the plaintiff argues that the Court should reconsider its April 28, 2003 order because the plaintiff, a prisoner presently confined at the Chippewa Correctional Facility in Kincheloe, Michigan, gave prison officials his objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation for mailing on April 24, 2003 and, therefore, his objections should be deemed timely filed. The objections were received and filed by the Clerk's Office on April 30, 2003. As the plaintiff is seeking review of a Court order, the Court will construe the motion to show cause as a motion for reconsideration.
The Court will grant a motion for reconsideration if the moving party shows: (1) a "palpable defect," (2) that mislead the Court and the parties, and (3) that correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case. E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(g)(3). A "palpable defect" is a defect which is obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest, or plain. Fleck v. Titan Tire Corp., 177 F. Supp.2d 605, 624 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Furthermore, the Local Rules provide that any "motion for rehearing or reconsideration which merely present the same issues ruled upon by the Court, either expressly or by reasonable implication, shall not be granted." E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(g)(3).
In this case, the plaintiff has shown that the Court was misled by a "palpable defect." Under the prison mailbox rule, prisoner submissions are deemed filed on the date they are signed, absent evidence to the contrary. Towns v. United States, 190 F.3d 468, 468 (6th Cir. 1999); Hudson v. Martin, 68 F. Supp.2d 798, 799 n. 2 (E.D. Mich. 1999). Because the plaintiff signed his objections on April 23, 2003, and there is no evidence in the record to the contrary, this Court will assume that this was the date that the plaintiff actually filed his objections with the Court. The plaintiff's objections, therefore, will be deemed timely filed. As a result, the Court will vacate its April 28, 2003 order and conduct a de novo review of the matter in light of the magistrate's report and the objections filed as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). In conducting this review, the Court is mindful that a pro se litigant's complaint is to be construed liberally, Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 100 (6th Cir. 1991), and is held to "less stringent standards" than a complaint drafted by counsel. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Nonetheless, such complaints still must plead facts sufficient to show a redressable legal wrong has been committed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b); Dekoven v. Bell, 140 F. Supp.2d 748, 755 (E.D. Mich. 2001). For reasons explained in detail below, the Court will adopt the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and dismiss the case.
I.
On September 16, 1999, following a jury trial, the plaintiff was found guilty of aggravated stalking, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.411i, and sentenced to three to seven and one-half years' imprisonment. The sentencing judge was defendant Daniel Burress, a Circuit Court Judge in Livingston County, Michigan. At the end of the sentencing hearing, the plaintiff was given a form entitled "Notice of Right to Timely Appeal By Right and Request for Appointment of Attorney." Underneath the "Request for Appointment of Attorney" section of the form the following statement is printed: "I request the appointment of an attorney to appeal my conviction. The financial schedule on the back of this form is submitted to show my financial condition." The plaintiff alleges that he signed the form indicating that he was requesting an attorney on appeal, completed the financial schedule, and then gave the form to Judge Burress for processing.
On November 30, 1999, the plaintiff wrote a letter to Judge Burress inquiring why appellate counsel had not been appointed in his case. The plaintiff claims that a deputy clerk with the initials "DB" replied to his letter and stated, "You should be hearing shortly. I spoke w/ court administrators [sic] office it is in the works." After not hearing back from the court, the plaintiff wrote a letter to the Michigan Attorney General's Office requesting assistance in securing appellate counsel. Robert Ianni from the attorney general's office replied in a letter dated July 18, 2000 and told the plaintiff to contact the Circuit Court which sentenced him or the Michigan State Appellate Defender's Office. The plaintiff wrote to the appellate defender's office and, in a letter dated August 14, 2000, James Neuhard from that office informed the plaintiff that the trial judge was responsible for appointing counsel on appeal. Mr. Neuhard, however, forwarded the plaintiff's letter to the Michigan Appellate Assigned Counsel System (MAACS). On September 7, 2000, a paralegal from MAACS wrote to the plaintiff and informed him that she had contacted the Livingston County Circuit Court and had been informed that the plaintiff had not signed the form requesting an attorney on appeal and had not completed the financial information associated with the form. As a result, the paralegal explained to the plaintiff that an attorney was not appointed to represent him and he did not have an appeal pending in the court of appeals. The paralegal also told the plaintiff that leave to appeal expires one year from the date of his conviction.
On December 12, 2002, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Defendant Burress argues that he is entitled to judicial immunity and defendant Carroll argues that she is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. The plaintiff answered the motion on January 16, 2003.
On September 24, 2001, the plaintiff wrote Judge Burress another letter requesting an attorney on appeal. Defendant Bucilla Carroll, a court administrator, replied to the plaintiff's letter and informed him that he had never filed the required financial information and, therefore, his request for an attorney was never processed. Defendant Carroll enclosed the proper forms with her letter and told the plaintiff that he could still submit them to Judge Burress and the judge would determine whether a late appointment could be made. The plaintiff completed the forms and, on August 8, 2002, Judge Burress appointed counsel for the plaintiff by signing a form entitled "Claim of Appeal and Order Appointing Counsel." On August 7, 2002, the plaintiff filed a pro se civil rights complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that the defendants violated his Sixth Amendment right to have assistance of counsel on appeal, acted "maliciously and/or corruptly in clear absence of all jurisdiction," and acted "knowingly, intentionally and with reckless disregard and deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's Constitutional and Statutory rights." See Compl. at ¶¶ 19-23. The plaintiff also alleges that defendant Burress "failed to adequately train and/or supervise his staff in policies and regulations." Id at ¶ 18. The plaintiff seeks two million dollars in compensatory damages, as well as punitive damages, attorney fees, and costs.
In his Report and Recommendation, the magistrate judge suggested that defendant Burress is immune from suit because he was acting in his judicial capacity when he committed the alleged errors in processing the plaintiff's paperwork for an appointed attorney on appeal and that he clearly had jurisdiction over the plaintiff's case. Similarly, the magistrate judge suggested that defendant Carroll is immune from suit because her alleged failure to notify the plaintiff that his paperwork for an attorney on appeal was not being processed was an integral task of the judicial process. Therefore, the magistrate judge recommended that the Court grant the defendants' summary judgment motion and dismiss the case.
In his objections to the report, the plaintiff argues that he properly completed the form to request an attorney on appeal and the associated financial information. The defendants, however, failed to act in an expedient manner to provide him with appellate counsel and, as a result, the plaintiff's Constitutional rights were violated. The plaintiff also argues that defendant Burress was not acting in his judicial capacity because he was not entering orders that affected the "rights and liabilities" of any party, but instead was acting in a personal capacity as he was giving instructions to court personnel on how to process the plaintiff's paperwork. Moreover, the plaintiff argues that defendant Burress was acting without jurisdiction because he made the decision to appoint counsel for the plaintiff after the plaintiff's rights were "exhausted."
II.
A motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 56 presumes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. The Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). When the "record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party," there is no genuine issue of material fact. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 951 (6th Cir. 2000).The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts. Mt. Lebanon Pers. Care Home, Inc. v. Hoover Univeral, Inc., 276 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir. 2002). The party opposing the motion then may not "rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact" but must make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion. Street v. J.C. Bradford Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, or other factual material showing "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. If the non-moving party is unable to meet his or her burden of proof, summary judgment is clearly proper. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
The party who bears the burden of proof must present a jury question as to each element of the claim. Davis v. McCourt, 226 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2000). Failure to prove an essential element of a claim renders all other facts immaterial for summary judgment purposes. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Elvisly Yours, Inc., 936 F.2d 889, 895 (6th Cir. 1991).
"[G]enerally, a judge is immune from a suit for money damages." Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991); Mann v. Conlin, 22 F.3d 100, 103 (6th Cir. 1994). "[J]udicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11; see also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) ("[I]mmunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly."). Rather, "[a] judge is liable for money damages in only two circumstances: (1) where the judge acts in a non-judicial capacity; and (2) where the judge acts `in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.'" Mann, 22 F.3d at 103 (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12); see also Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, a judge is entitled to immunity from actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivation of civil rights. Stern v. Mascio, 262 F.3d 600, 606 (6th Cir. 2001).
Whether an action is judicial depends on the "`nature' and `function' of the act, not the `act itself.'" Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13, ( quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)). This functional analysis generally turns on two factors set forth by the Supreme Court in Stump. First, rather than looking at a particular act in isolation, courts should "look to the particular act's relation to a general function normally performed by a judge." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13. Second, courts must assess whether the parties dealt with the judge in his or her judicial capacity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362.
"Quasi-judicial immunity extends to those persons performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune." Cooper v. Parrish, 203 F.3d 937, 950 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Bush, 38 F.3d at 847). See Tidik v. Ritsema, 938 F. Supp. 416, 423 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (finding that a court administrator was immune from suit because the administrator's duties were intertwined with the judicial process).
In this case, the Court agrees with the magistrate judge that the defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The plaintiff's complaint is directed at the defendants' alleged improper handling of his application to have an attorney appointed for him on appeal. Approving and appointing an attorney for a criminal defendant is a "function normally preformed by a judge." Furthermore, the plaintiff dealt with Judge Burress solely in his judicial capacity. Under Michigan law, a judicial officer is called upon to pass on the merits of a request for counsel. See Mich. Ct. R. 6.005. Moreover, the plaintiff wrote letters to the judge and to defendant Carroll at the address of the court. Thus, even if the Court accepts all of the plaintiff's allegations as true, it is clear that defendant Burress was acting in his judicial capacity and within his jurisdiction as a sentencing judge. Consequently, defendant Burress is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because he is immune from suit.
Similarly, defendant Carroll is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity from suit because the act of processing the paperwork to appoint an attorney for an indigent criminal defendant like the plaintiff is a task integral to the judicial process. The plaintiff has failed to present evidence on which a jury could conclude otherwise. Therefore, summary judgment in this case is clearly proper. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
III.
The plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrines of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity. The defendant's are entitled to judgment as a matter of law and the above-entitled case must be dismissed.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion to show cause [dkt #17], construed as a motion for reconsideration, is GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that this Court's April 28, 2003 Order Adopting Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation and Dismissing Complaint [dkt #13] is hereby VACATED.
The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge has correctly characterized the plaintiff's claims and has applied the correct law to the facts as stated in the pleadings, construed most favorably to the pro se plaintiff. Therefore, it is ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [dkt #32] is ADOPTED.
It is further ORDERED that the defendants' motion for summary judgment [dkt #10-1] is GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that the complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.
It is further ORDERED that the defendants' motion for a protective order [dkt #10-2] is DENIED as moot.