Opinion
PE:22-CV-00004-DC-DF
10-11-2022
LARRY R. STEELE, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
DAVID B. FANNIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TO THE HONORABLE DAVID COUNTS, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:
BEFORE THE COURT is Defendants Brian Collier (“Collier”) and Bobby Lumpkin's (“Lumpkin”) (together, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (hereafter, “Motion to Dismiss”). (Doc. 19). This matter is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge through a standing order of referral pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Appendix C of the Local Court Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges. After due consideration, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. (Doc. 19).
I. Background
Plaintiff Larry R. Steele (“Plaintiff”) is an individual incarcerated with the Lynaugh Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) who is proceeding pro se in this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On February 2, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Prisoner's Complaint (hereafter, “Complaint”), alleging civil rights violations by the United States Postal Service, the State of Texas, and the United States of America, as well as Collier and Lumpkin. (Doc. 1). The Court ordered Plaintiff to file a more definite statement providing facts in support of ten enumerated questions. (Doc. 4). Following the Court's order, Plaintiff filed a More Definite Statement on March 3, 2022. (Doc. 5).
On April 25, 2022, the Court entered an Order Dismissing Case Against All Defendants, With Two Caveats (hereafter, “Order of Dismissal”). (Doc. 7). In this order, the Court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's claims against Defendants United States Postal Service, the State of Texas, and the United States of America. (Id. at 12). The Court also dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity Plaintiff's claims against Collier and Lumpkin, as they were brought “in their official capacities [and] for monetary relief.” (Id. at 11). Yet, the Court allowed to proceed Plaintiff's claims brought against Collier and Lumpkin “in their individual capacities” pursuant to § 1983. Id.
The specific, remaining allegations against Collier and Lumpkin, the TDCJ's Executive Director and Correctional Institutions Division Director, respectively, when reduced to their roots, are that Collier and Lumpkin established certain policies for the TDCJ which effectively deny Plaintiff access to the courts. (Doc. 5 at 4). According to Plaintiff, Defendants are “acting together” with the Postal Service in order to deny him access to the courts and prevent him from “litigat[ing] effectively.” (Docs. 1 at 13; 5 at 4). As to Collier, Plaintiff asserts that he is responsible for policies which “keep prisoners from certain information that [they] need while incarcerated in his [prison] system.” (Docs. 1, 5). Plaintiff alleges Collier, who purportedly controls the TDCJ facility housing Plaintiff, places time limits on the law library, procures limited supplies, prevents Plaintiff from accessing public information, and only allows the Postal Service as a vehicle for mail delivery. (Doc. 5 at 10). The culmination of these restrictions prevents Plaintiff “from being [h]eard in all courts,” which violates Plaintiff's Due Process Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Id.).
Plaintiff's pleadings leave muddled the precise Due Process Clause under which he is seeking recovery. (See generally Docs. 1, 5). Because Plaintiff's lawsuit as it stands is against Texas state officials, the undersigned will presume Plaintiff presents claims against Defendants pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Regardless of whether the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment applies, the forthcoming analysis would likely be substantively identical. See Tapp v. Brazill, No. 11-677, 2014 WL 2587026, at *13 (E.D. Pa. June 9, 2014) (citing Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002)).
Lumpkin, Plaintiff asserts, is responsible for the status of the Postal Service as the exclusive means by which prisoners can send out mail. (Id.). He also maintains a law library at the Lynaugh Unit, which “interprets the rules that disadvantages [sic] prisoners by doing things such as limit[ing] law library schedule times, limit[ing] legal supplies, and punish[ing] those . . . who try to go to the law[]library.” (Doc. 5 at 3). Lumpkin purportedly refuses to allow law library times on the weekend, “even though policy requires at least one law library session . . . on the weekend.” (Id. at 11). Lumpkin allegedly only grants Plaintiff “one extra law library time” when a court deadline is pending, apparently despite the existence of other available law library times. (Id.). Further, Lumpkin permits only twenty-five sheets of paper per week, even though Lumpkin's policy purportedly provides an unlimited amount. (Id.). Plaintiff also claims Lumpkin prevents him from mailing “legal mail” if he has fewer than five dollars remaining in his inmate trust fund. (Id. at 10-11).
Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on June 10, 2022, asserting the defense of qualified immunity. (Doc. 19). Plaintiff filed a Response to the Motion to Dismiss on July 5, 2022. (Doc. 22). Accordingly, this matter is now ripe for disposition.
The questions before the Court are therefore: (1) does Plaintiff allege sufficient facts to indicate Defendants violated his right to access the courts? and (2) if so, are Defendants nevertheless entitled to the defense of qualified immunity?
II. Legal Standard
When a defendant files a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the trial court must assess whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief. See Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 329-30 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Bass v. Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 501, 506 (5th Cir. 2012)). The court must accept “all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” See id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
On the other hand, if the complaint only offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” dismissal is appropriate. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Shaw v. Villanueva, 918 F.3d 414, 415 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). The court should dismiss a complaint if the court can only infer the mere possibility of misconduct, or if the plaintiff has only alleged that he is entitled to relief rather than stating a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
III. Discussion
Defendants assert in their Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiff's actions against them should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 19). Specifically, Defendants claim that Plaintiff's Complaint does not plead specific facts showing Defendants “violated a clearly constitutional right.” (Id. at 4). Defendants' attack primarily relates to the purported lack of facts indicating each Defendant's personal involvement in the supposedly unconstitutional law library and mail room policies present at the TDCJ facility. (Id. at 4-5). Defendants secondarily maintain that Plaintiff fails to allege he suffered an actual injury. (Id. at 5).
A. Due Process Violations
Before addressing Defendants' qualified immunity defense, the undersigned examines the sufficiency of Plaintiff's pleadings under Federal Rule 12(b)(6). Section 1983 prohibits any person acting under color of law from subjecting another person to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[T]o state a claim under [] § 1983, a plaintiff must first show a violation of the Constitution or of federal law, and then show that the violation was committed by someone acting under color of [] law.” Turner v. Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 685 (5th Cir. 2017).
1. Personal Involvement In order to bring such a claim against a defendant in their individual capacity, the plaintiff must allege that “the defendant was personally involved in the actions complained of or is responsible for the policy or custom giving rise to the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Wanzer v. Rayford, No. SA-20-CV-00779-XR, 2022 WL 286912, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2022). Thus, officials cannot be held vicariously liable for the conduct of those under their supervision. Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 2017). Rather, officials are accountable for “their own acts of deliberate indifference and for implementing unconstitutional policies that causally result in injury to the plaintiff.” Id.
In this case, Plaintiff has alleged Defendants are personally responsible for the policies establishing the Postal Service as the exclusive mail delivery service, as well as those policies pertaining to the law library, its usage, and the 25-page limit. (Doc. 5 at 2-4, 10-12). These allegations are adequate to plead sufficient participation in the challenged conduct. Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Supervisory liability [under § 1983] exists even without overt personal participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether Defendants were in fact responsible is not at issue at this juncture, since all Plaintiff's factual allegations are to be taken as true. Therefore, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts indicating Defendants' personal involvement in the actions complained of. See Wanzer, 2022 WL 286912, at *4.
2. Constitutional Right of Access to the Courts
Elsewhere, Plaintiff contends that his claims against Defendants are formulated upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (See generally Docs. 1, 5). This is a correct stance, since the “right of access to the courts . . . is founded in the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the First Amendment Petition Clause, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses.” Spears v. McCraw, No. 20-50406, -- Fed.Appx. --, 2021 WL 3439148, at *2 n.16 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 2021) (citing Waller v. Hanlon, 922 F.3d 590, 601 (5th Cir. 2019)) (emphasis added). Plaintiff's allegations of a lack of access to the TDCJ law library, time to utilize the library, and a subsequent inability to file court documents all coalesce with his claim for denial of access to the courts. See Smith v. Kimbhal, No. EP-08-CV-0457-FM, 2009 WL 10679542, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2009). Thus, Plaintiff asserts but a single constitutional violation premised upon a denial-of-access claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff must have alleged facts indicating this right was violated in order to survive the Motion to Dismiss.
Importantly, the right of access to the courts “does not guarantee any ‘particular methodology but rather the conferral of a capability-the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts.'” Barela v. Underwood, No. 3:18-CV-2353-G-BH, 2019 WL 4648262, at *6 (N.D. Tex. July 30, 2019) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356 (1996)). To state a Fourteenth Amendment claim for denial of the right to access the courts, the plaintiff must show he either lost an actionable claim or was prevented from presenting such a claim as a result of the alleged denial. Williams v. Aneli Bednars, No. 3:21-cv-00394-M-BT, 2022 WL 904268, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2022); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356 (1996). Thus, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he suffered “actual injury,” which translates to an allegation that the “actions of the defendants hindered his efforts to pursue his claim.” Cooper v. City of Plano, No. 4:10-CV-689, 2011 WL 4100721, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2011). “The constitutional right of access to courts is a facilitative right ‘designed to ensure that a citizen has the opportunity to exercise his or her legal rights to present a cognizable claim to the appropriate court, and if that claim is meritorious, to have the court make a determination to that effect and order the appropriate relief.'” Hinds v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 188 F.Supp.2d 664, 673 (N.D. Tex. 2002).
Here, Plaintiff presents several reasons why he believes Defendants violated his right to access the courts. These reasons can be organized into two general categories: exclusive use of the Postal Service for mail delivery, and inadequate access to and supplies at the law library. As to the Postal Service, Plaintiff claims that Defendants provided the Postal Service as the exclusive output for mail delivery, which infringes upon his access to the courts since the Postal Service is occasionally and “known” to be delayed in completing its deliveries. (Doc. 1 at 13). The ludicrous quality of this argument is manifest. No right to a specific mail delivery service has been upheld, even when the Postal Service experiences delays. See Corporal v. Weber, No. DKC-20-2681, 2021 WL 2949784, at *11-12 (D. Md. July 14, 2021) (implying defendants can utilize alternatives to the Postal Service); Fawley v. Johnson, No. 7:09-cv-0041, 2011 WL 3240537, at *10 (W.D. Va. July 28, 2011). The Postal Service is the preeminent form of mail delivery service; to hold that it cannot be the default provider to prisoners would be presently unwise.
Plaintiff cites to no authority supporting the proposition that prisoners are guaranteed access to any given mailing service. (See generally Doc. 1). That there are other mailing services in the United States is of no consequence to this fact. (Id. at 13). While it certainly is true that the Postal Service is not the only mailing service provider in the United States, Plaintiff fails to suggest an alternative source for mail distribution, access to which he believes he is entitled. Indeed, as noted above, no prisoner is guaranteed access to any particular form of mail delivery service. See Fawley, 2011 WL 3240537, at *10. To require all prisons to establish business relations with privately owned mailing companies lest they be subject to constitutional violations would lead to a dangerously taxing precedent in the prison system. There is not a present reason to do so.
Plaintiff relatedly maintains that the supposedly unconstitutional policies are ongoing and prevent him from litigating his existing suits, let alone defending or representing himself in prior proceedings. (Doc. 1 at 13). This contention relates conceivably only to the Postal Service argument, as Plaintiff does not explain how weekday-only or page-limit policies prevent his timely filing. As this Court previously noted in its Order of Dismissal, prisoner-friendly rules such as the mailbox rule exist to support prisoners' woes by establishing earlier filing dates than those same individuals might receive if they possessed their liberty. (See generally Doc. 7). If the mailbox rule does not save any of Plaintiff's claims or defenses in other proceedings, Plaintiff has not detailed such injury in this case. The Postal Service, as over-encumbered and worrisome a condition it may be in, is indeed a reasonable method of allowing prisoners such as Plaintiff meaningful access to the courts. The undersigned detects no reason to consider the Postal Service's reliability issues an inadequate ground for establishing that the right of access to the courts has been violated. Plaintiff's cries about the Postal Service do not warrant recovery against Defendants.
Plaintiff claims Defendants also create policies which restrict his access to the TDCJ's law library and limit such features as paper, access to public information, and weekend library sessions. (Doc. 5 at 10). This argument approximates the absurdity of the Postal Service contention. The right of access to the courts does not generate an “unlimited right to a law library or legal assistance, but rather requires meaningful access.” Kimbhal, 2009 WL 10679542, at *3. The right of access to the courts only “requires prison administrators to make law library facilities available to inmates or to otherwise provide alternative means to achieve access to [the] courts.” Norman v. Livingston, No. H-14-2488, 2016 WL 1274759, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2016). Plaintiff's pleadings admit that each of Defendants indeed provide him with access to a law library. (Doc. 5 at 10-11). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim can be construed as one complaining of inadequate time to achieve this access.
Plaintiff states that, “even though policy requires at least one” weekend law library session, Lumpkin refuses to permit sessions on the weekend. (Doc. 5 at 11). Putting aside the questionable logic of Defendants being able to control the Lynaugh Unit policies but unable to circumvent them in their application, Plaintiff finds himself upon yet another dead-end, as Defendants are not per se liable for refusing to follow their own policies. See Hernandez v. Estelle, 788 F.2d 1554, 1558 (5th Cir. 1986) (observing “no [] controlling constitutional principle” in the claim that “the mere failure of [] TDC[J] officials to follow their regulations was a constitutional violation”). That this access is limited to weekdays only is not enough to tip the balance of Defendants' conduct over the constitutional edge into impropriety.
Plaintiff characterizes the weekdays during which he is able to utilize the law library as being insufficient because Lumpkin only provides him “one extra law library time.” (Doc. 5 at 3). Clearly, Plaintiff's use of the term “extra” implies that these sessions are beyond the regularly allocated amount for inmates. Even assuming the law library would have open additional sessions as Plaintiff insists, Plaintiff has not demonstrated or even claimed an entitlement to additional law library times beyond the allotted amount, whether or not a court deadline is pending. The undersigned cannot recognize, absent any case law or statutory support, a constitutional right to a specific number of library sessions, let alone a given number of hours within them. See Whitlock v. Stephens, No. 5:14cv-94, 2016 WL 11474208, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2016) (“There is no constitutional right guaranteeing prisoners ten hours per week of access to the law library.”).
Plaintiff's complaints about the page limits bode no better. An inmate cannot demonstrate actual injury “simply by establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. Defendants cannot be found to have committed a constitutional violation simply because they capped Plaintiff's weekly paper consumption to a measly 25 pages. See Meyer-Clemmons v. Karr, No. C11-5603-RBL-JRC, 2012 WL 709596, at *9-11 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2012) (finding no violation where officials set a 650-page “free” limit); see also Munt v. Roy, No. 17-cv-5215, 2019 WL 157289, at *7 (D. Minn. Jan. 10, 2019) (holding a “50-page printing limit” to have not stated a constitutional violation). Defendants, as prison officials, are only obligated to provide “reasonable amounts” of certain state-funded library supplies, including paper, pens, and stamps. Dunham v. Britt, No. 6:15cv869, 2016 WL 1458248, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2016) (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977)). Much like with Plaintiff's other arguments, at no point in his briefings does he indicate how much paper he thinks should or would be necessary for his right of access to the courts to be guaranteed by Defendants. It is incredulous to consider Defendants' policies to only be within the realm of constitutionality if they allotted prisoners an unlimited paper supply. This argument must be rejected.
Plaintiff contends that Lumpkin prevents him from mailing any documents when his inmate trust fund account contains fewer than five dollars. (Doc. 5 at 10-11). While it indeed is true that reasonable paper supplies, stamps, and other mailing-related items must be provided at the Government's expense, Plaintiff notates no authority supporting the implied proposition that Plaintiff need not maintain a sufficient trust fund account to send out said mail. On the contrary, courts around the country have held that a defendant's refusal to deliver “legal mail” based upon insufficient funds does not constitute a violation of his right to access the courts. See, e.g., Foster v. Cooper, No. 92 C 6159, 1994 WL 110180, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 1994) (citing Hadley v. Peters, 12 F.3d 1100 (7th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision)); Chandler v. Coughlin, 763 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1985). The instant situation about which Plaintiff complains can be analogized to a hypothetical policy of providing some, but not an unlimited amount, of stamps for mailing. In this alternative scenario, the right to access the courts does not translate to endless free postage, but rather to the Government provision of “a reasonably adequate amount of postage,” so long as the regulations are reasonable “in light of, for example, prison budgetary considerations.” Chandler, 763 F.2d at 114 (quotation marks omitted). A standing sum of five dollars likely does not produce an undue hardship upon prisoners seeking to file legal mail, and Plaintiff has provided no assertions indicating otherwise. Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a constitutional violation merely because it is Defendants' policy to require sufficient funds for mailing. See Williams v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 566 Fed.Appx. 113, 116 (3d Cir. May 7, 2014) (unpublished). The policy is therefore reasonable.
Plaintiff makes another argument, claiming that Defendants impinge on his right to public information. (Doc. 5 at 10). Plaintiff however does not indicate which “public information” documents he seeks and has been denied access to. The only constitutional provision Plaintiff cites is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Constitution, however, “is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act.” Am. Civ. Liberties Union v. Mississippi, 911 F.2d 1066, 1072 (5th Cir. 1990) (internal citation omitted). In any event, there is no right under federal law to have access to public records. Norwood v. City of Hammond, No. Civ.A.02-0200, 2003 WL 1090253, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 11, 2003). Therefore, Plaintiff has not alleged a right guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment, and subsequently has no § 1983 claim under this provision. See Norwood, 2003 WL 1090253, at *6.
With the failure to state a claim for a violation of Plaintiff's right to access the courts, the Complaint is left devoid of cognizable causes of action. Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED for Plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 19).
B. Qualified Immunity
The undersigned has concluded that Plaintiff's Complaint does not allege sufficient facts to support his Fourteenth Amendment violation claim. Nevertheless, the undersigned finds it comprehensive to consider the remaining argument in the Motion to Dismiss.
Defendants, as Texas state government officials, raise in their Motion to Dismiss the defense of qualified immunity. (Doc. 19). When a defendant raises the qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff “has the burden of demonstrating the inapplicability of that defense.” Turner v. Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 685 (5th Cir. 2017). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit follows a two-part analysis for determining whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity, examining “(1) whether [p]laintiffs have stated a violation of their [constitutional] rights; and if so, (2) whether [defendant's] conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.” Powers v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 951 F.3d 298, 305-06 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 305 (5th Cir. 1992)). The second prong is “better understood as two separate inquiries: whether the allegedly violated constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the incident; and, if so, whether the conduct of the defendant[] was objectively unreasonable in the light of that then clearly established law.” Id. at 306 (quoting Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 135 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 1998)) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
District courts are allocated discretion to decide which prong of the two-part qualified immunity framework is to be addressed first. Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011). The undersigned begins with the question of whether a constitutional right violation has been alleged.
1. Constitutional Right Violation
The first prong, whether a constitutional right was violated on the facts alleged, is the threshold question in a qualified immunity analysis. Blackmon v. Kukua, 758 F.Supp. 398, 413 (S.D. Tex. 2010). The undersigned has already concluded above that Plaintiff has not alleged a violation of his constitutional right of access to the courts. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of rebutting Defendants' entitlement to the qualified immunity defense on the first prong of the analysis.
2. Objectively Reasonable in Light of Clearly Established Law
In the event that the Court concludes that Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a claim for denial of access to the courts, the undersigned considers the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis. A government official's conduct “violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, ‘the contours of a right are sufficiently clear' that every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.'” Hinojosa v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657, 669 (5th Cir. 2015) (alterations included) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).
In this instance, the undersigned concludes that Defendants' alleged conduct did not violate clearly established law. As explained above, none of Plaintiff's arguments in support of his claim are convincing. There is no other reason to believe Defendants, assuming they did act as alleged, were unreasonable in placing limitations upon paper and library usage, or failing to provide alternative means of mail delivery. To the extent there is support indicating that page limits and weekdays-only policies, or the exclusive use of the Postal Service, are unconstitutional, the plethora of case law signifying the contrary would cast upon “established law” a cloud of ambiguity. Therefore, Defendants would have been reasonable in implementing the allegedly unconstitutional policies. Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden on the second prong.
The undersigned has found that, even if Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), Defendants would be entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. (Doc. 19).
IV. Recommendation
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. (Doc. 19).
Finally, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that all other pending motions be DISMISSED AS MOOT, and that this case be CLOSED.
Instructions for Service and Right to Appeal/Object
In the event that a party has not been served by the Clerk with this Amended Report and Recommendation electronically, pursuant to the CM/ECF procedures of this District, the Clerk is ORDERED to mail such party a copy of this Amended Report and Recommendation by certified mail, return receipt requested. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party who desires to object to this report must serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy unless the time period is modified by the District Judge. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions, or recommendations to which objections are being made; the District Judge need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. Such party shall file the objections with the Clerk of the Court and serve the objections on the U.S. Magistrate Judge and on all other parties. A party's failure to file such objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Judge. Additionally, a party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Judge. Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass 'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996).