Opinion
22-CV-7584 (LTS)
10-24-2022
BEATRICE SHIRLEY WILLIAMS STEELE, Plaintiff, v. NYC BUSINESS CENTERS, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, Defendant.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge.
Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action invoking the Court's federal question jurisdiction, alleging that Defendant violated her constitutional rights. By order dated September 8, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the following reasons, the Court dismisses this action for failure to state a claim, with 30 days' leave to replead.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits - to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
In this complaint, Plaintiff is challenging fees imposed as a result of traffic violations. According to Plaintiff, “[d]ebt of violation of ticket were paid twice even after a hearing issued dismissal.” (ECF 2 ¶ IA.) Plaintiff seeks to be “refunded” $1,000, and $8 million in damages. (Id. ¶ III.) The named defendant is New York City Business Centers, which appears to be part of the New York City Department of Finance.
Plaintiff has filed a number of prior pro se actions in this court. See Steele v. Equifax, ECF 1:19-CV-4106 (MKV) (S.D.N.Y. filed May 7, 2019) (motion to dismiss pending; Plaintiff submitted a letter on June 25, 2021 requesting a stay because of “tumors in [her] brain.” (Doc. 47); Steele v. Combined Life Ins. Co. of New York Chubb, ECF 1:20-CV-10252, 4 (LLS) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2021) (dismissing complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Steele v. Equifax, ECF 1:21-CV-5997, 59 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2022) (dismissing complaint with prejudice under stipulation); Steele v. Saks Fifth Ave., ECF 1:12-CV-4691, 5 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2012) (dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted); Steele v. TransUnion, ECF 1:12-CV-310, (GBD) (JCF) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2015) (adopting report and recommendation, granting motion for judgment on the pleadings, and dismissing complaint with prejudice), aff'd, 15-0569-cv (2d Cir. May 6, 2016); Williams-Steele v. Veteran's Admin. Benefits (Claims), ECF 1:12-CV-47, 4 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2012) (dismissing complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Williams Steele v. Transunion, ECF 1:10-CV-6749, 29 (PGG) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2011) (dismissing complaint under stipulation), denying Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2012).
DISCUSSION
The Court construes Plaintiff's complaint as asserting a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).
A. New York City Business Centers, Department of Finance
Plaintiff's claims against the New York City Business Centers, Department of Finance must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F.Supp.2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's claims against the New York City Department of Finance. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). As explained in the next section, the claims are insufficient even if treated as brought against the City of New York.
B. City of New York
It may be Plaintiff's intention to sue the City of New York. When a plaintiff sues a municipality under Section 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality's employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff's rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects' a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes' a person ‘to be subjected' to such deprivation.”) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). In other words, to state a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
There are no facts in the complaint suggesting that a municipal policy, custom, or practice led to the violation of Plaintiff's federally protected rights. The complaint therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against the City of New York.
C. Due process
The Court liberally construes the complaint as alleging, under Section 1983, a violation of her right under the Fourteenth Amendment to procedural due process. To state a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that [she] possessed a protected liberty or property interest, and that [she] was deprived of that interest without due process of law.” Hynes v. Squillance, 143 F.3d 653, 658 (2d Cir. 1998); see Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2011). “The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard . . . at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (citations omitted). Generally, when the deprivation at issue is pursuant to established state procedures, due process only requires some kind of hearing prior to a final deprivation of an individual's liberty or property interest. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 299 (1981); Rivera-Powell v. New York City Board of Elections, 470 F.3d 458, 465 (2d Cir. 2006); DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292, 302 (2d Cir. 2003).
Numerous district courts in this Circuit have concluded that “the City's administrative parking violations system, together with the judicial system of the State of New York, provide[ ] adequate pre-deprivation remedies, adequate post-deprivation remedies, and sufficient notice that such remedies were available.” Rackeley v. City of New York,186 F.Supp.2d 466, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Yu Juan Sheng v. City of New York, No 05-CV-1118 (RRM), 2009 WL 6871132, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that New York City's procedures for serving and filing summonses, and entering and enforcing judgments afford “adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard before [a] car [i]s seized.”); Jaouad et al., v. City of New York, 4 F.Supp.2d 311, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (an action under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules provides constitutionally sufficient opportunity for recipients of defective summons for parking violation to be heard if administrative law judge did not vacate invalid ticket). Moreover, case law demonstrates that individuals have successfully challenged parking tickets issued in New York City through actions filed in state court under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules Article 78. See Iwachiw v. New York State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 299 F.Supp.2d 117, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (listing cases).
Plaintiff does not assert any facts suggesting that the process available to is not sufficient to comport with her constitutional right to due process.. Thus, even if Plaintiff asserted that a municipal policy, custom, or practice resulting in a violation of her constitutional rights, she has failed to provide facts suggesting that her right to due process was violated. In an abundance of caution, and in light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to replead her claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this order, Plaintiff's complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to submit an amended complaint. An Amended Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and she cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.