Opinion
Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-CR-1037
11-05-2021
Meliek L. STEADMON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
Attorneys for Appellant: Valerie Kent Boots, Indianapolis, Indiana, Timothy J. Burns, Indianapolis, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Samuel J. Dayton, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellant: Valerie Kent Boots, Indianapolis, Indiana, Timothy J. Burns, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Samuel J. Dayton, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Riley, Judge.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Meliek Steadmon (Steadmon), appeals his conviction for battery, a Class B misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Steadmon presents this court with one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] On December 4, 2020, A.S. called 911 and reported that her boyfriend had "just attacked [her]" and had punched her in her eye. (Appellant's Vol. II, p. 14). Approximately six minutes later, Michael Best of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (Officer Best) arrived at the scene, and he saw a man, later identified as Steadmon, and A.S. standing outside. A.S. was visibly upset and crying hysterically. A.S. informed Officer Best that Steadmon had hit her in the eye with his fist, and Officer Best noticed that A.S. had some swelling on her face. While A.S. was speaking with Officer Best, Steadmon ran into his house, locked the door, and turned off all the lights.
[5] On December 5, 2020, the State filed an Information, charging Steadmon with Count I, Class A misdemeanor domestic battery, and Count II, Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury. On May 6, 2021, the trial court conducted Steadmon's bench trial. Over Steadmon's hearsay objection, the trial court admitted into evidence, A.S.’s 911 call. Steadmon also objected to the admission of Officer Best's testimony about A.S.’s statements describing Steadmon's attack. The trial court overruled the objection. At the close of the evidence, the trial court found Steadmon not guilty of Class A misdemeanor domestic battery; however, the trial court found him guilty of Class B misdemeanor battery, as a lesser included offense of Count II.
[6] Steadmon now appeals. Additional information will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[7] When ruling on the admissibility of evidence, the trial court is afforded broad discretion, and we will only reverse the ruling upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Gibson v. State , 733 N.E.2d 945, 951 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). An abuse of discretion involves a decision that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. We consider the evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling and any uncontradicted evidence to the contrary to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the ruling. Id.
[8] Steadmon argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting A.S.’s statements made in the 911 call and statements she made to Officer Best. The State argues that both pieces of evidence were admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.
[9] A trial court may admit hearsay that qualifies under the excited utterance exception. See Ind. Evidence Rule 803(2). An excited utterance is a statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused and is not excluded by the hearsay rule. Id.
[10] To meet the excited utterance exception, three elements must be present: (1) a "startling event or condition" has occurred; (2) the declarant made a statement while "under the stress or excitement caused by the event or condition;" and (3) the statement was "related to the event or condition." Lawrence v. State , 959 N.E.2d 385, 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
[11] This test is not "mechanical", and admissibility turns "on whether the statement was inherently reliable because the witness was under the stress of the event and unlikely to make deliberate falsifications." Sandefur v. State, 945 N.E.2d 785, 788 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). The lapse of time is not dispositive, but if a statement is made long after a startling event, it is usually "less likely to be an excited utterance." Teague v. State , 978 N.E.2d 1183, 1187 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) ; see Chambless v. State , 119 N.E.3d 182, 189 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) ("The longer the time between an event and an utterance, the greater the likelihood that the statement is a narrative of past events instead of an excited utterance.").
[12] "The heart of the [excited utterance] inquiry is whether the declarant was incapable of thoughtful reflection." Teague , 978 N.E.2d at 1187 (quoting Jones v. State , 800 N.E.2d 624, 627 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) ). The rationale behind admitting excited utterances is that startling events and an absence of opportunity for reflection vest the statements with reliability and reduce the likelihood of falsification. See Robert Lowell Miller Jr., Indiana Practice: Indiana Evidence § 803.102 at 307-09 (4th ed. 2018).
[13] When A.S. called 911, and during the first thirty seconds of the call, she informed the operator that her boyfriend had "just attacked" her. (State's Exh. 1 at 0:29). A.S. can be heard sniffling, taking deep breaths, and trying not to cry during the call. See McMillen v. State , 169 N.E.3d 437, 442 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (holding that being attacked by another person is a startling event). We find that A.S. was under the stress of a startling event when she told the operator that Steadmon had attacked her; therefore, A.S.’s statement in that regard was admissible under the excited utterance exception, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted A.S.’s statements into evidence.
[14] As for A.S.’s statements to Officer Best, the evidence at trial established that six minutes after the 911 call, Officer Best arrived, and he saw Steadmon and A.S. standing outside Steadmon's residence. A.S. was visibly upset and was crying hysterically. A.S. informed Officer Best that Steadmon had hit her in the eye with his fist. See McMillen , 169 N.E.3d at 442 (finding that the victim was still under stress of an attack on her when, minutes after her attack, she was crying when she spoke with a police officer). Here, we also find that A.S.’s statements to Officer Best were made while she was still under the stress of Steadmon's attack. Thus, we hold that A.S.’s statements to Officer Best were admissible under the excited utterance exception, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted those statements into evidence.
CONCLUSION
[15] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that A.S.’s statements in the 911 call describing Steadmon's attack and her statements to Officer Best reiterating the attack were made under the stress of a startling event, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting those statements under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.
[16] Affirmed.
[17] Najam, J. and Brown, J. concur