No. 09-09-00491-CR
Submitted on August 13, 2010.
Opinion Delivered December 15, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. 08-04173.
Before McKEITHEN, C.J., KREGER and HORTON, JJ.
HOLLIS HORTON, Justice.
Jamaal Clarence Staten appeals his aggravated assault conviction and his seven year sentence. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02 (West Supp. 2010). In two issues, Staten alleges charge error. Specifically, Staten argues the trial court (1) failed to limit the definitions of culpable mental states to include only result-oriented language, and (2) refused to charge the jury on a lesser-included offense of deadly conduct. We overrule Staten's issues and affirm the trial court's judgment.
The jury gave Staten a seven year sentence after finding him guilty of aggravated assault. The trial court initially pronounced Staten's sentence in absentia: we abated Staten's appeal and remanded it to the trial court so that the trial court could pronounce Staten's sentence in his presence. See Staten v. State, No. 09-09-00491-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 5353, at *2 (Tex. App.-Beaumont July 7, 2010). The trial court did so, and we reinstated Staten's appeal. We provided the parties with additional time for briefing, but neither party submitted additional briefs. Thus, we address only those issues raised in Staten's original brief.
Factual Background
On July 9, 2008, Staten shot his mother, Joyce Richards, in the head. G.S., Staten's adolescent cousin and Joyce's niece, was staying with Joyce that day. G.S. testified that when she came into the living room, she "saw a gun to [Joyce's] head." After Staten shot Joyce, Joyce asked that G.S. call the police. G.S., while speaking with the 911 operator, could see Joyce on the floor, and she could still talk to her. Staten told G.S. to give him the phone, and then Staten called the police. According to G.S., after Staten called the police, he left and did not return. Also, according to G.S., before Joyce was shot, Staten acted like he was "mad at something[,]" and he "was just talking to [himself]." Joyce testified that she recalls little about the shooting, but she remembered that she told G.S. to call 911 because she had been shot. Joyce explained that she and Staten "never argue[,]" and that they had not been fighting in the immediate period before Staten shot her. Joyce also testified about Staten's medical care. According to Joyce, Staten had been suffering from a mental illness for three years prior to trial, and he had been receiving psychiatric care at MHMR for about a year prior to Joyce's injury. Joyce testified that Staten had seen a doctor on the morning of the shooting. But, according to Joyce, Staten had not taken his medications on July 9, and she told the jury that in her opinion, Staten was not acting right on the day that he shot her. Joyce felt that Staten had exhibited bizarre behavior on July 9, and she testified that she did not believe that Staten had intended to harm her. According to Joyce, Staten needed help. The Beaumont Police Department investigated the shooting. Sergeant Waggoner testified that on July 9, he encountered Staten at a gas station where he asked Staten to tell him the location of the gun used in the shooting. Staten told Waggoner that the gun was in Staten's bedroom. According to Waggoner, Staten appeared "[f]airly calm" considering the circumstances, and Staten appeared to understand everything he was told. Officer Riley also participated in the Beaumont Police Department's investigation. Riley was sent to Joyce's house in response to the calls received by the police. Riley testified that he saw Joyce lying on the floor along with both live rounds and spent shells. Riley asked Joyce who shot her; she responded, "`Jamaal [Staten], my son.'" After being informed that the gun could be found in Staten's bedroom under his bed, Riley retrieved the gun along with a box of bullets, which he found between Staten's mattress and box-springs. During the trial, two physicians responded to questions about Staten's competency and mental illness. Dr. Edward Gripon, a psychiatrist, evaluated Staten to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. Dr. Gripon explained that he thought Staten was mentally ill, and he agreed that Staten had "schizophrenia of the paranoid type;" nevertheless, Dr. Gripon "found [Staten] to be ill but competent" to stand trial. According to Dr. Gripon, persons diagnosed with schizophrenia may still know the difference between right and wrong. With respect to Staten's conduct after the shooting, Dr. Gripon indicated that Staten's calling 911, leaving the scene of the shooting, directing officers to the gun's location, and requesting an attorney are indications that Staten knew what he did was wrong. Dr. George Groves, a psychiatrist, performed a competency evaluation of Staten in June 2009. Dr. Groves concluded that Staten suffers from a "chronic mental illness[,]" most likely schizophrenia of the paranoid type, but still "met the minimal standards for competency to be able to stand trial." According to Dr. Groves, Staten told him that "he remembered that he had had an argument and stated at one point that it was an argument with his mother." Dr. Groves explained that having paranoid schizophrenia does not automatically mean that the individual does not understand right and wrong. According to Dr. Groves, Staten's actions following the shooting were not consistent with the acts of someone who was "completely psychotic, out of touch with reality, [or] not having a sense of right or wrong." Intentionally, Knowingly, or Recklessly
In issue one, Staten contends the trial court erred in defining the culpable mental states connected with the crime of aggravated assault by using language that allowed the jury to consider the nature of the defendant's conduct. Staten argues that the definitions of the culpable mental states should have been limited to language that allowed the jury to consider only the result of the defendant's conduct, thus restricting the jury's discretion in evaluating whether the State had proved that Staten acted with the requisite intent to commit aggravated assault. The court's charge contains definitions of the terms "intentionally," "knowingly," and "reckless" that mirror the definitions for those terms in the Texas Penal Code. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(a), (b), (c) (West 2003). During the charge conference, conducted after both parties rested, Staten objected to the trial court's definitions of the terms "intentionally," "knowingly," and "reckless[ly]," stating that aggravated assault was a result-oriented offense. Staten also proposed definitions for these terms that used only result of conduct language. The trial court denied Staten's objection to the charge and to his requested instructions. In reviewing a claim of jury charge error, we must first determine whether error actually exists in the charge. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (en banc) (citing Middleton v. State, 125 S.W.3d 450, 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). If error exists, we then determine whether it caused sufficient harm to require reversal. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc). In the absence of a timely and proper objection, we reverse only if the record shows the trial court's error caused the defendant to suffer "egregious harm." Id. If the defendant lodged a proper and timely objection to an improper jury charge, the defendant is entitled to obtain a reversal if he suffered " some harm." Id. Some harm means any harm, regardless of degree. Arline v. State, 721 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc). "For both preserved and unpreserved charging error, `the actual degree of harm must be assayed in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including contested issues and weight of probative evidence, the argument of counsel[,] and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole.'" Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc) (quoting Arline, 721 S.W.2d at 351-52). "In assessing harm resulting from the inclusion of improper conduct elements in the definitions of culpable mental states, we `may consider the degree, if any, to which the culpable mental states were limited by the application portions of the jury charge.'" Patrick, 906 S.W.2d at 492 (quoting Cook v. State, 884 S.W.2d 485, 492 n. 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)). A person commits the offense of aggravated assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.01(a)(1) (West Supp. 2010), 22.02(a)(2). Aggravated assault is a result-oriented offense. Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532, 533, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The Court of Criminal Appeals states that statutory definitions of culpable mental states included in a jury charge for result-oriented offenses should be limited to the result of the conduct. Cook, 884 S.W.2d at 490-91. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals has also held that no harm results when the application paragraph of the charge points the jury to the appropriate portion of the pertinent definitions, which in this case consists of the result of conduct language found within the charge defining the terms "intentionally," "knowingly," and "reckless[ly]." Patrick, 906 S.W.2d at 493; Hughes v. State, 897 S.W.2d 285, 296-97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). In other words, "[t]he application paragraph of a jury charge is that which authorizes conviction, and an abstract charge on a theory of law which is not applied to the facts is insufficient to bring that theory before the jury." McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 264 n. 18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (citing Jones v. State, 815 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). The Texarkana Court of Appeals has explained that in evaluating the effect of the entire charge, "[a]n erroneous definitional section of a jury charge can be `saved' by a proper application section." Martin v. State, 252 S.W.3d 809, 815 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008), pet. dism'd, improvidently granted, No. PD-0807-08, 2009 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). In Staten's case, in the abstract portion of the charge, the court provided the complete statutory definitions of the terms "intentionally," "knowingly," and "reckless[ly]." Consequently, the definitions included both nature of conduct and result of conduct language. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(a), (b), (c). However, the application paragraph of the charge instructed the jury to find Staten guilty if he "intentionally, knowingly[,] or recklessly caused bodily injury to Joyce Richards by the use of a deadly weapon, namely: a firearm, by shooting her with a firearm[.]" Thus, the application paragraph limited the jury's consideration to the result of the defendant's conduct-that he caused injury to his mother-and restricted the jury from convicting Staten based on the nature of his conduct. We conclude that the application paragraph in Staten's charge pointed the jury to the appropriate mens rea of the offense for which Staten was indicted. By pointing the jury to the proper definitions, the application portion of the charge allowed the jury to convict solely based upon the result of his conduct. We conclude the court erred in including the complete statutory definitions of the terms "intentionally," "knowingly," and "reckless[ly]," but further conclude that the trial court's error was not harmful. Patrick, 906 S.W.2d at 492-93; Hughes, 897 S.W.2d at 296-97; Coleman v. State, 279 S.W.3d 681, 686-87 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2006), aff'd, 246 S.W.3d 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Martin, 252 S.W.3d at 815. We overrule Staten's first issue. Lesser-Included Offense
In his second issue, Staten complains the trial court erred by refusing to allow the jury to determine if he had engaged in deadly conduct. Determining whether an offense has lesser-included offenses is a two-step process. See Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 535-36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Step one generally requires that the pleadings be analyzed to compare the elements of the offense alleged in the indictment with the elements of the proposed lesser-included offense. See id.; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.09(1) (West 2006). Citing Guzman v. State, 188 S.W.3d 185 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), Staten argues that deadly conduct is a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault. The State concedes that in some situations, deadly conduct can be a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault, but argues that whether it is a lesser-included offense depends on the specific factual circumstances involved in each case. Additionally, the State acknowledges that deadly conduct may be a lesser-included offense to a charge of aggravated assault in some circumstances, even when the victim suffers an actual injury. See Ford v. State, 38 S.W.3d 836, 845 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd). For the reasons outlined by the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Ford, we conclude that under the circumstances of Staten's case, deadly conduct is a lesser-included offense to the crime charged by the indictment, aggravated assault. See id. Staten has satisfied the first step. See Hall, 225 S.W.3d at 535-36. Hall's second step requires that we determine whether the evidence establishes that the lesser-included offense is "`a valid, rational alternative to the charged offense.'" 225 S.W.3d at 536 (quoting Forest v. State, 989 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). In other words, some evidence must permit a rational jury to acquit Staten on the greater offense while convicting him of the lesser-included offense. See Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). In making this determination, we review all the evidence presented at trial. Bignall v. State, 887 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). "[I]t is not enough that the jury may disbelieve crucial evidence pertaining to the greater offense; there must be some evidence directly germane to a lesser included offense for the factfinder to consider before an instruction on a lesser included offense is warranted." Id. at 24. Staten argues that the evidence was undisputed that he "was not trying to hurt the complainant." Staten also claims that the evidence concerning his mental illness demonstrates that "he recklessly engaged in conduct that placed [his mother] in imminent danger of serious bodily injury" and thus, if guilty, he would be guilty only of deadly conduct. However, the evidence at trial about Staten's conduct is not limited to Joyce's testimony that she did not believe that Staten intended to cause her injury. G.S. testified that she "saw a gun to [Joyce's] head." G.S. also recalled that Staten appeared to be "mad at something" before he came into the room on July 9. Additionally, although Joyce denied that she recalled anything about the shooting or that she and Staten ever argued, medical records admitted into evidence during trial reflect that Joyce explained to the emergency responders, when telling them that Staten had not taken his medications that day, that he got mad and afterwards shot her. In light of this evidence, the jury was entitled to discount Joyce's testimony that he did not intend to cause Joyce's injury. Staten also told Dr. Groves that he had argued with his mother on the day of the shooting. Following the shooting, Staten hid the gun and left the house. Given the totality of the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the evidence would permit the jury to find Staten guilty of only the lesser-included offense of deadly conduct. See Hall, 225 S.W.3d at 536. We conclude that on this record the second prong of the Hall test is not met. We hold that Staten was not entitled to have the jury charged on deadly conduct. See id. at 535-36. We overrule Staten's second issue and affirm the trial court's judgment. AFFIRMED.