Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Ct. No. CV255031 Louis P. Etcheverry, Judge.
Dwight A. Staten, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, David S. Chaney, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Frances T. Grunder, Assistant Attorney General, Alvin Gittisriboongul and Christopher J. Becker, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and Respondents.
OPINION
DAWSON, J.
Dwight A. Staten is a prison inmate proceeding in propria persona in a lawsuit against a warden, a captain of correctional officers, and two unnamed correctional officers listed as Doe defendants. Staten claims defendants caused delays in his receiving proper dental care and, during the delays, failed to provide him with pain medication. He alleges that he was left to suffer for approximately three months.
The trial court sustained a demurrer to Staten’s second amended complaint without leave to amend. On appeal, Warden Calderon and Captain Meadors contend that the trial court properly sustained their demurrer because (1) Staten’s pleading was uncertain in that they had to guess as to his legal theory of recovery and (2) they are immune under Government Code section 820.8, which abrogates vicarious liability for public employees by stating that they are “not liable for an injury caused by the act or omission of another person.…”
Further statutory references are to the Government Code unless indicated otherwise.
This appeal concerns the question whether Staten’s allegation that Warden Calderon and Captain Meadors were negligent in their management and training of subordinates presents a theory of vicarious liability barred by the immunity provided by section 820.8. Based on case law regarding vicarious liability, we conclude that the immunity provided by section 820.8 does not extend to claims that a defendant negligently failed to supervise and train subordinates.
Accordingly, we conclude the demurrer cannot be sustained on the ground of immunity. Also, the claim of uncertainty is contrary to existing precedent. Therefore, the judgment of dismissal will be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
FACTS
The facts recited in this opinion are taken from Staten’s second amended complaint. As this action comes to us on demurrer, we assume the truth of the factual allegations contained in that pleading. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.)
Staten was an inmate at the California Correctional Institution at Tehachapi, Kern County (CCI) during the time relevant to his claim.
Staten’s second amended complaint listed four defendants and alleged they were responsible individually and in their official capacities. During the time pertinent to Staten’s claims, (1) defendant Arthur Calderon was the warden of CCI, (2) defendant T. Meadors was a captain at CCI, and (3) defendants John Doe One and Two were California Department of Corrections (CDC) employee officers or prison guards at CCI (collectively, defendants).
As initial background, we note that Staten has a parallel lawsuit pending in federal court. In Dwight A. Staten v. Edward S. Alameida, Jr. et al. (E.D.Cal., Dec. 6, 2007, No. 1:06-CV-00631-OOW-GSA-PC) [2007 WL 4287827, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 95790], the district court determined that Staten’s “amended complaint states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against [two unnamed prison guards at CCI] for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.” (2007 WL 4287827 at p. *7; 2007 U.S. LEXIS 95790 at p. *18.) The district court granted Staten leave to file a second amended complaint to cure deficiencies in the claims asserted against the other defendants, including Warden Calderon.
Staten had excruciating pain in his teeth and submitted an inmate request form asking to see a dentist. In response to this request, facility dentist James L. McCulloch summoned Staten for an exam on July 31, 2002. McCulloch took X-rays of Staten’s teeth and discovered cavities. McCulloch prescribed pain relief medication of ibuprofen and informed Staten to take two pills per day to relieve the pain until Staten could be scheduled for dental treatment to repair the cavities.
While Staten was waiting to be scheduled for treatment, an incident occurred at CCI where Black inmates and Hispanic inmates were involved in a melee causing serious harm to one another. Warden Calderon immediately declared an emergency lockdown of CCI. After a subsequent evaluation of the incident, he placed Blacks and Hispanics on lockdown until further notice.
Staten alleged that under the lockdown there would be no prison inmate movement except as authorized by Warden Calderon, the California Code of Regulations, and CDC’s Department Operations Manual section 52020.3. The policy or operating procedure authorized by Warden Calderon provided that generally, when a lockdown was in effect, no movement of prison inmates was allowed. An exception to this operating procedure existed when a medical or dental physician requested a prison guard to summon an inmate and escort the inmate to the medical or dental facility. When such a request was made, prison guards were required to summon the inmate immediately and escort him to the medical or dental facility. As a result, “the only movement for inmates would be under escort.”
The first two paragraphs of this section provide: “The Correctional Captain/Facility Captain is responsible for ensuring that a detailed institution/facility count is accurately conducted at the designated times. [¶] The Correctional Captain/Facility Captain shall establish a system that regulates staff/inmate movement throughout the institution/facility.”
Staten alleges that the lockdown continued for “an incessant period of time,” which appears to mean the lockdown lasted the entire period that his dental treatment was delayed.
Staten’s pain medication ran out before he received dental treatment. When Staten informed prison guards that he was out of medication, they responded: “‘Blacks are on lockdown and no movement is allowed.’” The prison guards told Staten to submit a CDC 7362 form to be seen by the doctor. Staten told the prison guards that he needed the form and a prison guard responded that he was unable to provide one because the office contained none. The prison guard then advised Staten to submit an inmate request form.
Staten submitted an inmate request form. No answer was rendered. Consequently, on September 10, 2002, Staten submitted an emergency grievance to Warden Calderon requesting a refill of his pain medication. Staten received no response to this grievance. Staten appears to allege that this notice provided Warden Calderon with knowledge of his excruciating pain and immediate need for treatment of his cavities.
On November 13, 2002, Staten submitted another grievance using Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form 602. In that form, Staten referenced his earlier grievance and asserted that as a result of the delays in his dental treatment he lost part of a tooth. He also sought compensatory damages in the amount of $250,000.
Dr. McCulloch made many unsuccessful attempts to have prison guards escort Staten to the dental facility for treatment. Eventually, McCulloch succeeded in having Staten escorted to the dental facility at CCI on December 4, 2002. When Staten arrived at the dental facility, he asked McCulloch why it had taken so long for him to receive dental treatment. McCulloch told him that he had called prison guards many times during the three-month period requesting that Staten be escorted to the dental facility for treatment, but they failed to escort Staten to the dental facility in a timely fashion. McCulloch also took the position that Staten’s “complaint is with custody not with dental.”
Staten alleged that various acts and omissions of Warden Calderon were wrongful. For example, Staten alleged there was a long waiting list of inmates needing dental care and Warden Calderon breached his duty to provide more dental physicians to treat prison inmates with emergency dental needs. Staten also claimed that Warden Calderon created a deficient policy or operating procedure regarding inmate movement during lockdown that violated his constitutional rights. Among other things, the operating procedure prevented inmates on lockdown status who needed refills of medication from obtaining timely refills.
Staten also alleged that Warden Calderon, with knowledge of the risk to inmate health, “failed to properly manage and train his subordinates to adhere to summoning prison inmates when requested by medical and dental physicians during ‘lockdown’ programs.” More particularly, Staten alleged that Warden Calderon had “knowledge of this insubordination”—that is, the fact that his subordinates were not complying with the operating procedure of summoning and escorting prison inmates when requested by a physician. Staten further alleged that Warden Calderon gave tacit authorization to his subordinate’s misconduct.
Staten alleged that Captain Meadors was responsible for supervising and training correctional officers to respond effectively when directed by a medical physician to summon a prison inmate for immediate medical attention. Captain “Meadors failed to properly manage and train his subordinates to adhere to the procedure for dental summons by a physician requesting for a prison guard to summon and escort a prison inmate for dental treatment. [Citation.] On lockdown conditions, it’s the Captain’s responsibility to ensure that all prison guards cooperate with all dental and medical physicians when they request for an inmate to be escorted to the medical or dental facility for immediate treatment.” (Underscoring omitted.) Staten further asserted that Captain Meadors had knowledge that Dr. McCulloch had requested prison guards to summon Staten for immediate dental treatment and that the prison guards had failed to summon and escort Staten in accordance with proper procedures. Despite this knowledge, Captain Meadors failed to correct the problem and thereby breached his duty.
With respect to John Doe One and Two, Staten alleged that they both failed to comply with McCulloch’s orders to summon and escort Staten to the dental facility and their delays caused him injury.
Staten alleged that the negligence of the defendants resulted in his suffering three months of pain and permanent damage to his teeth, including the loss of one tooth. In item 14 of his seconded amended complaint on Judicial Council form 982.1 (rev. Jul. 1, 2002), Staten prayed for compensatory damages in the amount of $125,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $125,000.
PROCEEDINGS
Staten filed his original complaint in Kern Superior Court on March 14, 2005.
Subsequent proceedings caused Staten to file a second amended complaint on May 24, 2006. The second amended complaint consists of (1) the three-page Judicial Council form 982.1 used for personal injury complaints; (2) the one-page Judicial Council form titled “CAUSE OF ACTION—General Negligence”; (3) a 25-page handwritten attachment with a caption that included the label “Civil Complaint for Negligence and Personal Injury to Plaintiff’s 8th and 14th Constitutional Rights and Demand for Jury Trial”; and (4) exhibits A through F, which included a 15-page declaration by Staten that repeated, rephrased or expanded many of the factual allegations in the 25-page attachment.
Item 2 of Judicial Council form 982.1 states: “This pleading, including attachments and exhibits, consists of the following number of pages: ….” Staten completed this item by writing “67 pages [¶] 6 exhibits 22 pages.” (Underscoring omitted.) Thus, it appears that Staten intends his pleading—the second amended complaint—to contain 67 pages, which includes 22 pages of exhibits. Accordingly, we construe the second amended complaint as containing the 25-page handwritten attachment and the six exhibits.
On June 16, 2006, Warden Calderon and Captain Meadors demurred on the grounds that (1) they were immune from liability, (2) the first cause of action failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and (3) the pleading was uncertain. The points and authorities supporting the demurrer argued sections 820.8 and 845.6 provided immunity to Warden Calderon and Captain Meadors.
On October 26, 2006, the superior court held a hearing on the demurrer of Warden Calderon and Captain Meadors and a motion for a stay by Staten. The superior court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and denied the motion for a stay. These rulings were reflected in a minute order dated October 26, 2006. In addition, the superior court’s decision was set forth in a written order prepared by counsel for Warden Calderon and Captain Meadors. The superior court signed and filed that order on November 9, 2006. The order stated:
“The Court sustains the defendants’ demurrer to plaintiff’s second amended complaint on the grounds of uncertainty and immunity as stated in defendants’ demurrer. The Court finds that plaintiff has been given ample time and opportunity to amend his complaint and has been unable to do so against these defendants. Thus, the Court sustains defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend.”
On November 29, 2006, the superior court filed a judgment of dismissal for Warden Calderon and Captain Meadors against Staten based on its October 26, 2006, minute order sustaining their demurrer to Staten’s second amended complaint without leave to amend. The judgment made no reference to defendants John Doe One and Two.
On January 8, 2007, Staten filed a notice of appeal from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
The review of a demurrer and the interpretation and application of a statutory provision to facts assumed to be true present questions of law subject to independent review on appeal. (Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1231 [demurrer tests only the sufficiency of the pleadings, which is a question of law]; Twedt v. Franklin (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 413, 417 [statutory interpretation and application are questions of law subject to independent review by this court].)
A. General Demurrers
Appellate courts review an order sustaining a general demurrer without leave to amend under the following standard:
“The reviewing court gives the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. [Citations.] The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.] The judgment must be affirmed ‘if any one of the several grounds of demurrer is well taken. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] However, it is error for a trial court to sustain a demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory. [Citation.] And it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the plaintiff shows there is a reasonable possibility any defect identified by the defendant can be cured by amendment. [Citation.]” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.)
“[O]ur [review of a general demurrer] ends and reversal is required once we determine a complaint has stated a cause of action under any legal theory.” (Genesis Environmental Services v. San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control Dist. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 597, 603.) The “any possible legal theory” threshold was explained by our Supreme Court as follows:
“If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer. ‘[Courts] are not limited to plaintiffs’ theory of recovery in testing the sufficiency of their complaint against a demurrer, but instead must determine if the factual allegations of the complaint are adequate to state a cause of action under any legal theory. The courts of this state have … long since departed from holding a plaintiff strictly to the “form of action” he has pleaded and instead have adopted the more flexible approach of examining the facts alleged to determine if a demurrer should be sustained.’ [Citations.]” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38-39 (Quelimane).)
Under this principle, courts must look at the substance of a complaint and ignore erroneous and confusing labels used by an inept pleader. (Saunders v. Cariss (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 905, 908.)
B. Demurrer Based on Uncertainty
Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f) provides that a demurrer may be based on the ground that “[t]he pleading is uncertain” and defines uncertain to include ambiguous and unintelligible.
In this case, the Attorney General contends Staten’s second amended complaint contains defects that render it uncertain. With respect to the 25-page handwritten attachment to the Judicial Council forms, the Attorney General asserts it was “improperly referenced” and “contains several competing theories of liability under the a [sic] single general negligence cause of action. Included among these theories are alleged violations of his constitutional and civil rights, which are clearly not negligence based doctrines.” The Attorney General also asserts that “[i]t is unclear on the face of the complaint what, if any, intended purpose [Staten’s] exhibits are intended for.”
The defendants’ brief does not explain why the reference is improper or cite any authority supporting that position. (See Akins v. State of California (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1, 50 [waiver of contention by failure to cite any legal authority].) Therefore, we conclude that the 25-page attachment is a part of Staten’s second amended complaint. (See fn. 3, ante.) Furthermore, the attachment’s many parenthetical references to the exhibits identify the allegations which Staten believes are supported by the information contained in the exhibits.
Based on the foregoing, the Attorney General argues that Staten’s second amended complaint is “uncertain” for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f) because “[d]efendants can not [sic] and should not be forced to guess as to [Staten’s] theory of liability.”
Based on the principles set forth by the California Supreme Court in Quelimane, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pages 38 through 39, we reject the argument that Staten’s second amended complaint is fatally uncertain because Warden Calderon and Captain Meadors are required to guess as to Staten’s theory of liability. The relevant test is whether the pleading’s factual allegations “are adequate to state a cause of action under any legal theory” regardless of the title under which those factual allegations are stated. (Quelimane, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 38; Saunders v. Cariss, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 908.) It follows that Staten’s failure to organize the factual allegations for his state law negligence claims and his federal civil rights claims under separate headings is not a ground for concluding his pleading is uncertain for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f). Moreover, Staten has identified negligence as one of his theories of recovery—there is no guessing about that.
Accordingly, the order sustaining the demurrer cannot be upheld on the ground the second amended complaint was uncertain.
C. Standards for Self-representing Parties
As a general rule, the pleadings and motions filed by a self-representing litigant are subject to the standards applied by California courts in civil litigation. (Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284-1285 [self-representing litigants are not exempt from statutes or court rules governing procedure].) The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the federal due process clause to reach the same result: “[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.” (McNeil v. United States (1993) 508 U.S. 106, 113 [in ordinary civil litigation, federal procedural rules are not interpreted more leniently for parties who proceed without counsel].)
The exception to the general rule concerns a civil rights action brought under title 42 United States Code section 1983 by an inmate who does not have access to counsel. In that situation, the inmate’s pleadings are scrutinized under a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. (Haines v. Kerner (1972) 404 U.S. 519, 520; Hughes v. Rowe (1980) 449 U.S. 5, 10, fn. 7.)
In this appeal, our discussion will focus on Staten’s state law negligence claims and will apply the principles of law ordinarily applied by California appellate courts when reviewing a demurrer. As a result, we do not reach the federal question whether Staten adequately stated a 42 United States Code section 1983 claim under the pleading standard adopted in Haines v. Kerner, supra, 404 U.S. 519.
II. Immunity under Section 820.8
A. Statutory Text
The immunity provision in section 820.8 states that “a public employee is not liable for an injury caused by the act or omission of another person,” unless otherwise provided by statute. Section 820.8 restates this principle from the opposite perspective: “Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by his own negligent or wrongful act or omission.”
The Senate legislative committee comment to section 820.8 states: “The section nullifies the holdings of a few old cases that some public officers are vicariously liable for the torts of their subordinates.” (Sen. Com. com., reprinted at 32 West’s Ann. Gov. Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 820.8, p. 264.) In other words, section 820.8 sets forth the principle that the liability of a public officer must be based on his or her personal fault. (See Martinez v. Cahill (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 823, 824 [cause of action against mayor or deputy chief must be found in personal fault, not negligence of city employees serving under public officer].)
For purposes of this opinion, we consider liability imposed under the doctrine of respondeat superior as a particular type of vicarious liability. (See 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, § 1220, pp. 597-598 [circumstances justifying vicarious liability].)
Because of the reference to vicarious liability in the Senate legislative committee comment, we include an overview of vicarious liability taken from a recent journal article:
“Vicarious liability is when A, regardless of any culpable behavior on her part, is held responsible for the actions of B solely because they have a certain relationship, such as principal/agent or employer/employee.… Vicarious liability is usually imposed on a principal who has not engaged in any culpable behavior because of the fault of her agent. This is not strict liability because there is fault, the agent’s.… Vicarious liability is nevertheless similar to strict liability because it imposes liability on the principal regardless of any personal fault. Vicarious liability must also be distinguished from liability for misconduct or harm done by another that is imposed on a person because she has contributed to the misconduct or harm. For example, a principal can be held liable for negligence of, or harm done, by an agent that was made possible because the principal negligently chose or failed to supervise the agent.” (Spece & Bernstein, Scientific Misconduct and Liability for the Acts of Others (2007) 26 Med. & L. 477, 480.)
B. Issue Presented
The Attorney General’s interpretation and application of section 820.8 to the facts of this case are set forth clearly in its brief:
“[Staten] failed to allege any specific facts tying defendants Calderon and Meadors to his alleged injury aside from noting that these defendants failed to manage their subordinates and ensure that they followed policy. Because [Staten] attempted to hold defendants liable for the actions of their subordinates, defendants Calderon and Meadors fell squarely within the immunity provided by … section 820.8 and long established case law. For this reason, the court properly sustained the demurrer.”
The foregoing argument ignores the obvious question whether the immunity contained in section 820.8 extends to claims that a public official negligently failed to train and supervise his or her subordinates.
C. Analysis
1. Case law involving section 820.8 and the failure to train
The application of section 820.8 to claims of negligent training and supervision has not been decided in a published decision by a California appellate court. Only one published case has mentioned negligent supervision and training in the context of the immunity provided by section 820.8.
In Weaver v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 188, a minor sued the commissioner of the California Highway Patrol (CHP) for serious injuries sustained as a passenger in a car pursued by CHP officers. The trial court granted the commissioner’s motion for summary judgment and the appellate court affirmed. The appellate court concluded that the commissioner’s “declaration offered in support of the motion negated the allegations of the complaint pertaining to his own allegedly wrongful actions, and … section 820.8 affords him immunity from liability based on the acts of his subordinates .…” (Id. at p. 202.) The court stated that the commissioner’s declaration also negated issues of negligent supervision and training, which were not alleged against him in the complaint. (Id. at p. 203.) Furthermore, the court stated that, to the extent that the minor’s state law theories of liability were premised on vicarious liability for the acts of subordinates, the commissioner was immune under section 820.8. (Weaver, at p. 203.)
It appears that the court in Weaver considered claims of negligent supervision and training to be based on the commissioner’s own wrongful actions, rather than a theory of vicarious liability.
2. Vicarious liability and the failure to train subordinates
Authorities found outside the context of section 820.8 also support the proposition that the immunity provided by section 820.8 does not extend to claims of negligent training and supervision.
For example, in Roberts v. Williams (5th Cir. 1971) 456 F.2d 819, a juvenile incarcerated at a county farm sued the superintendent and others after a shotgun held by a trusty guard discharged into the juvenile’s face causing injury. The district court found the superintendent liable for violating 42 United States Code section 1983 and for state law negligence based on the failure to properly train and supervise the trusty in the handling of the shotgun. (Roberts v. Williams, at pp. 822-823.) The appellate court affirmed the judgment against the superintendent on both the federal and state law claims. (Id. at p. 834.) The appellate court indicated that it was not called upon to decide the question whether the superintendent could be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior because “we agree that [the superintendent’s] liability is based on his own negligence.” (Id. at p. 822.)
Similarly, a prison superintendent was held liable for violating a prisoner’s constitutional rights based on the district court’s finding that the superintendent failed to train and supervise correctional officers in the proper use of an isolation cell. (O’Connor v. Keller (D.Md. 1981) 510 F.Supp. 1359 [48-hour confinement in isolation cell without mattress, blanket or toilet paper violated prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights].) In reaching this conclusion, the district court stated that the superintendent could not be held liable under a respondeat superior theory, but that he was accountable for his own conduct, which included the failure to train and supervise officers properly. (Id. at p. 1374.)
More recently, the United States District Court for the Central District of California stated that “[v]icarious liability does not apply to supervisorial personnel in a civil rights action. [Citations.]” (Hollis v. Director of Corrections (2008) 560 F.Supp.2d 920, 927.) Despite this limitation, “a supervisor may be liable if the alleged deprivation resulted from a failure to properly train or supervise personnel .…” (Ibid.)
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Staten’s allegations that Warden Calderon and Captain Meadors failed to manage, supervise and train the prison guards do not involve a theory of vicarious liability. Rather, Staten’s theory of liability is based on the official’s “own negligent or wrongful act or omission” for purposes of section 820.8. Accordingly, it was error to sustain the demurrer based on the immunity set forth in section 820.8.
III. Section 845.6
Warden Calderon and Captain Meadors did not cite or discuss section 845.6 in their appellate brief. They did mention section 845.6 in their memorandum of points and authorities in support of their demurrer to Staten’s second amended complaint. To forestall all unnecessary further proceedings, we will consider whether the order sustaining their demurrer can be upheld based on section 845.6.
Section 845.6 provides in part: “[A] public employee is [not] liable for injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody; but, except as otherwise provided by Sections 855.8 and 856, a public employee … is liable if the employee knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care.”
For purposes of this appeal we will assume that for Staten’s second amended complaint to “state facts sufficient to constitute of cause of action” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e)) for negligence, it must include an allegation that the supervisory official knew or had reason to know that Staten was in need of immediate medical care. (See Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1390 [“complaint must allege the ultimate facts necessary to the statement of an actionable claim”].)
Staten’s second amended complaint included allegations that Warden Calderon (1) knew of Staten’s pain and suffering and need for a refill of his pain medication because of the grievance that Staten submitted on September 10, 2002, (2) knew that prison guards were not summoning and escorting prison inmates in accordance with the operating procedure concerning physicians’ requests that an inmate be brought in for treatment, and (3) knew of the delays that many inmates were experiencing in receiving emergency dental care.
Exhibit F to Staten’s second amended complaint included the assertion that Captain Meadors had knowledge that Dr. McCulloch had requested prison guards to summon Staten for immediate dental treatment and that the prison guards had failed to summon and escort Staten in accordance with the operating procedure.
Based on these allegations, we conclude that Staten sufficiently alleged that Warden Calderon and Captain Meadors knew or should have known that he needed immediate dental care. California’s pleading requirements do not require Staten to set forth evidentiary facts from which this knowledge can be inferred. (Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc., supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1390.) Therefore, we conclude that section 845.6 does not provide a basis for concluding that Staten’s second amended complaint “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action” for negligence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)
DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is reversed and the superior court is directed to vacate its order sustaining the demurrer to the second amended complaint and enter a new order overruling the demurrer. Staten shall recover his costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: VARTABEDIAN, Acting P.J., HILL, J.