Opinion
Opinion filed June 6, 1960.
1. COURTS.
Where case in which a chancery court struck out certain parts of an answer to a bill was a civil case in which the pleadings presented issues of fact to be determined upon proof to be heard by the chancery court, appellate jurisdiction was in the Court of Appeals, and not the Supreme Court. T.C.A. secs. 16-408, 27-819.
2. APPEAL AND ERROR.
The Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review action of the Court of Appeals is limited to final judgments and the decrees, and the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders of the Court of Appeals. T.C.A. secs. 16-408, 27-819.
FROM DAVIDSONGEORGE W. OMACHT, Assoc. Inv. Co., South Bend, Ind., RICHARD DANCE, Nashville, for petitioner.
JACK WILSON, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
The Chancery Court, Davidson County, Ned Lentz, Chancellor, entered an order striking certain parts of respondents' answer to petitioner's bill, and thereafter the Court of Appeals entered an order vacating the order of the Chancery Court, and a petition was filed for writs of certiorari and supersedeas to review order of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court, Felts, Justice, held that in view of fact action was a civil case in which the pleadings presented issues of fact to be determined upon proof to be heard by the Chancery Court, appellate jurisdiction was in the Court of Appeals, and not the Supreme Court.
Petition for writs of certiorari and supersedeas denied.
This is a petition for the writs of certiorari and supersedeas to review an interlocutory order of the Court of Appeals, entered by Presiding Judge Hickerson, of the Middle Section, vacating an interlocutory order of the Chancery Court of Davidson County which struck out certain parts of respondents' answer to petitioner's bill.
Since this was a "civil case" in which the pleadings presented "issues of fact to be determined upon proof" to be heard by the Chancery Court, appellate jurisdiction of it is in the Court of Appeals, not this Court. T.C.A. sec. 16-408; State of Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 153 Tenn. 349, 284 S.W. 359; Cox v. Smith, 154 Tenn. 369, 289 S.W. 524; Goins v. Yowell, 199 Tenn. 167, 285 S.W.2d 135.
This Court has jurisdiction to grant the writs of certiorari and supersedeas to review only final decrees and judgments of the Court of Appeals. The statute (sec. 14, chap. 100, Acts 1925, now T.C.A. sec. 27-819), creating the Court of Appeals, provides:
"The Supreme Court, or any Judge thereof, shall have the right to require, by certiorari, the removal to that court for review of any case that has been finally determined in the Court of Appeals, upon a sworn petition for this purpose filed in the Supreme Court * * *; and there shall be no other method of review" (italics ours).
Thus, by the statute, this Court's jurisdiction to review the action of the Court of Appeals is limited to final judgments and decrees — cases that have been "finally determined" — in that Court; and this Court has no jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders of that Court. First Nat. Bank of Greenwood, Miss. v. Planters' Nat. Bank of Clarksdale, Miss., 158 Tenn. 50, 12 S.W.2d 528.
In that case, Chief Justice Green distinguished Cockrill v. People's Savings Bank, 155 Tenn. 342, 293 S.W. 996, on the ground that "immediate appellate jurisdiction" of it was in this Court, and not the Court of Appeals; and, therefore, this Court properly granted the writs of certiorari and supersedeas "issued directly to the Chancery Court."
Likewise, City of Nashville v. Dad's Auto Accessories, 154 Tenn. 194, 285 S.W. 52, was a case within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of this Court and the writs of certiorari and supersedeas granted by this Court were issued directly to the Circuit Court.
For these reasons the petition for the writs of certiorari and supersedeas must be denied.