Opinion
(2100)
The defendant was found guilty of crossing a median divider in his vehicle in violation of statute ( 14-237) and fined $55. On appeal from that judgment held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for discovery of certain items, none of which was discoverable as of right. 2. Since the defendant was not arrested when he was issued a complaint for the motor vehicle infraction here, he could not prevail on his claim that his arrest was invalid. 3. The trial court correctly concluded that the testimony of the police officer as to his occupation was not hearsay.
Argued January 17, 1984
Decision released April 10, 1984
Complaint charging the defendant with a motor vehicle infraction, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New London and tried to the court, Goldstein, J.; judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed. No error.
Eddi Z. Zyko, pro se, the appellant (defendant).
Morris H. Globerman, deputy assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
After a trial by the court the defendant was found guilty of crossing a median divider on Route 52 in violation of General Statutes 14-237 and fined $55. On appeal the defendant claims that the trial court erred (1) in denying parts of his motion for discovery; (2) in denying his motion to dismiss; and (3) in ruling that certain evidence was not hearsay.
General Statutes 14-237 states: "When any highway has been divided into two roadways by leaving an intervening space or by a physical barrier or clearly indicated dividing section, each vehicle shall be driven only upon the right-hand roadway and no vehicle shall be driven over or across any such dividing space, barrier or section, except through an opening or at a crossover or intersection established by public authority. Violation of any provision of this section shall be an infraction." (Emphasis added.)
This appeal was originally filed in the Appellate Session of the Superior Court. Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June, 1983, No. 83-29, 3(c).
None of the items requested in the motion for discovery and denied by the court is discoverable as of right. See Practice Book 741. Section 745 of the Practice Book permits additional disclosure in the court's discretion, but only upon a showing of good cause. The defendant did not make this showing. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
The court did order certain interrogatories answered.
The second issue raised by the defendant concerns the denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Practice Book 815(4). The defendant argues that his "arrest" was invalid because the state trooper was not in uniform and displayed no badge identifying himself as a trooper. Even if this were so, it would not bar prosecution of the defendant or be a defense to a valid conviction. State v. Gallagher, 191 Conn. 433, 438, 465 A.2d 323 (1983). Furthermore, General Statutes 14-237 defines the crossing of a median divider on a highway as an infraction. Section 51-164n(a) in relevant part states: "A summons for the commission of an infraction shall not be deemed to be an arrest. . . ." In addition, General Statutes 14-1(31) requires an officer to be in uniform or display a badge when the officer is making an arrest. In the present case, the state trooper's siren and flashing headlights were on when he stopped the defendant. Even though the officer was not in uniform, he displayed to the defendant his state police identification card. We conclude that the defendant was not arrested but was merely given an infraction complaint for crossing the median divider.
See footnote 1, supra.
The defendant next challenges the court's ruling that testimony by the officer as to his occupation is not hearsay. That testimony was not an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein. See State v. Gunther, 39 Conn. Sup. 504, 506, 466 A.2d 804 (1983); Holden Daly, Connecticut Evidence 93a. The trial court was correct in overruling the defendant's objection.