Opinion
ID No. 0406002066.
Submitted: May 18, 2007.
Decided: July 5, 2007.
Upon Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief.
SUMMARILY DISMISSED.Renee L. Hrivnak, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.
Deon Wright, Smyrna, Delaware, pro se.
ORDER
This 5th day of July 2007, upon consideration of Defendant's motion for postconviction relief, it appears to the Court that:
1. On February 14, 2006 Defendant pled guilty before the undersigned judge to Use of a Vehicle for Keeping Controlled Substances, Possession of Cocaine, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. He was subsequently sentenced as a habitual offender on May 26, 2006 by another judge.
2. Defendant filed this motion for postconviction relief on May 18, 2007 alleging in toto:
Ground one: Suppression of favorable evidence
Supporting facts: This defendants [sic] trial attorney . . . was asked numerous times to file pre-trial motions, namely a motion to supress [sic] evidence in his case, and this direction was never followed by [defense counsel]. These actions effectively denied this defendant to [sic] his right to effective counsel at every stage of any proceeding against him, as guaranteed by the 6th Amendment of the United States Constitution. Also [defense counsel] withdrew from this defendants [sic] case having never filed the pre-trial motion requested by this defendant. At which time this defendant was appointed [a new defense counsel] as his attorney. This defendant made the same request (pre-trial motion to supress [sic]) to the new attorney, who in turn informed him that the time allowed had passed to file said motion. With this time passing, and the untimely withdrawl [sic] from my case by [original defense counsel], this defendant was forced to enter into a plea agreement with the State of Delaware.
Ground two: Ineffective assistance of counsel
Supporting facts: After being forced to enter into the plea agreement with the State of Delaware by the actions of [original defense counsel] as stated above in ground one This [sic] defendants [sic] new attorney . . . who was instrumental in facilitating the plea agreement, failed to provide any mitigating factors to the sentencing court at the time of sentencing, (note: check counsel of records [sic] under said case number). These actions, or lack thereof effectively denied the defendant his right to effective assistance of counsel at every stage of any proceeding against him, as guaranteed by the 6th Ammendment [sic] of the United States Constitution.
2. Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(d)(4) provides that if it "plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief, the judge may enter an order for its summary dismissal and cause the movant to be notified."
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(4).
3. Defendant's first ground is essentially an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel (although captioned "Suppression of favorable evidence"). However, Defendant provides no legal or factual support for the claim in ground one; rather, his allegation is vague and conclusory. Therefore, Defendant's motion is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
See Jordan v. State, 1994 WL 466142, at *1 (Del.Supr.) (holding conclusory allegations are legally insufficient to prove ineffective assistance of counsel); Zimmerman v. State, 1991 WL 190298 (Del.Super.) (stating that the Court "will not address Rule 61 claims that are conclusory and unsubstantiated").
In light of this Court's denial of ground one, Defendant's motion will now be referred to the sentencing judge for any appropriate action on this claim relating to his sentencing.
IT IS SO ORDERED.