Opinion
Case No. 5D20-1807
08-20-2021
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Eric Bernard WRIGHT, Appellee.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellant. Eddie J. Bell, of Law Office of Eddie J. Bell, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Eddie J. Bell, of Law Office of Eddie J. Bell, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
NARDELLA, J.
The State appeals a portion of the trial court's order granting Defendant's request to suppress evidence obtained through an authorized wiretap. We reverse.
The following facts are undisputed. Law enforcement was investigating Defendant in connection with a series of shootings. The investigation involved several wiretaps of Defendant's telephones. During the investigation, Phil Archer, the elected state attorney for the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, took a leave of absence. In his stead, assistant state attorney P. Kent LeBlanc was appointed by the circuit court as acting state attorney for the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida. While serving as acting state attorney, Mr. LeBlanc authorized two applications to tap Defendant's telephones, both of which were approved by the trial court. The evidence obtained through the wiretap applications authorized by Mr. LeBlanc led to Defendant being charged with various offenses, including attempted first-degree premeditated murder.
The Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained through the wiretap applications authorized by Mr. LeBlanc, arguing that he was not one of the officials who, pursuant to Florida's wiretap statute, could authorize a wiretap application. The trial court agreed, relying on the Florida Supreme Court's decision in State v. Daniels , 389 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1980).
The State argues that as acting state attorney, Mr. LeBlanc had all the powers appurtenant to that position and, thus, had authority to authorize the wiretap applications. We agree.
The sole issue on appeal is a pure question of law subject to de novo review. State v. Otte , 887 So. 2d 1186, 1188 (Fla. 2004).
The law governing the application for and use of wiretaps is framed by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which provides, in relevant part, as follows:
The principal prosecuting attorney of any State, or the principal prosecuting attorney of any political subdivision thereof, if such attorney is authorized by a statute of that State to make application to a State court judge of competent jurisdiction for an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications, may apply to such judge for, and such judge may grant in conformity with section 2518 of this chapter and with the applicable State statute an order authorizing, or approving the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications by investigative or law enforcement officers having responsibility for the investigation of the offense as to which the application is made, when such interception may provide or has provided evidence of the commission of the offense of murder, kidnapping, human trafficking, child sexual exploitation, child pornography production, prostitution, gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic drugs, marihuana or other dangerous drugs, or other crime dangerous to life, limb, or property, and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, designated in any applicable State statute authorizing such interception, or any conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses.
18 U.S.C. § 2516(2). This provision represents the minimum requirements for obtaining a wiretap, leaving states with the option to pass more restrictive measures. State v. Rivers , 660 So. 2d 1360, 1362 (Fla. 1995) (discussing the interplay between federal and state law governing wiretaps). This led to the passage of Florida's wiretap statute, which provides, in relevant part, as follows:
The Governor, the Attorney General, the statewide prosecutor, or any state attorney may authorize an application to a judge of competent jurisdiction for, and such judge may grant in conformity with ss. 934.03-934.09 an order authorizing or approving the interception of, wire, oral, or electronic communications[.]
§ 934.07(1), Fla. Stat. (2016). This statute "must be strictly construed and narrowly limited in its application by the specific provisions set out by the legislature." Rivers , 660 So. 2d at 1362.
The trial court's interpretation of who may authorize a wiretap application reads out acting state attorneys and writes in elected state attorneys. A plain reading of Florida's wiretap statute, however, does not support this interpretation. State v. Maisonet-Maldonado , 308 So. 3d 63, 68 (Fla. 2020) ("If the language of the statute is clear, the statute is given its plain meaning, and the court does not look behind the statute's plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, the statute clearly and unambiguously provides that "any state attorney," as opposed to just an elected state attorney, may authorize a wiretap application. § 934.07(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) (emphasis added); see also Buechel v. Shim , ––– So. 3d ––––, 46 Fla. L. Weekly D265, 2021 WL 298161 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021) (explaining that this court is without constitutional authority to add words to a statute). Given this clear language, the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning. See Holly v. Auld , 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984).
Mr. LeBlanc was the acting state attorney when he authorized the wiretap applications. The actions of an acting state attorney "shall be in all respects as valid as a regularly appointed state attorney." § 27.16, Fla. Stat. (2016). Thus, Mr. LeBlanc was the state attorney for the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida when he authorized the wiretap applications and, therefore, was empowered under section 934.07(1), Florida Statutes (2016), to authorize the subject wiretaps. Further, nothing about his position as acting state attorney and authorization of the wiretap applications ran afoul of the broader federal wiretapping statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 2156(2) (permitting "principal prosecuting attorney of any political subdivision" who is authorized by state statute to apply for wiretaps).
This case is distinguishable from the situation in Daniels . In that case, an assistant state attorney authorized a wiretap application. Daniels , 389 So. 2d at 633. The State argued that since assistant state attorneys have all the powers of state attorneys except with regard to signing informations, pursuant to section 27.181(3), Florida Statutes (1975), they also have the power to authorize wiretaps under section 934.07, Florida Statutes (1975). Id . The Florida Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that the broad delegation of powers to assistant state attorneys under section 27.181(3), Florida Statutes (1975), did not empower assistant state attorneys to authorize wiretap applications because they were not enumerated as one of the individuals who could do so under section 934.07, Florida Statutes (1975). Id . at 636. Here, Mr. LeBlanc was not serving in his capacity as an assistant state attorney when he authorized the wiretap applications. Instead, as discussed above, he was serving as acting state attorney pursuant section 27.16, Florida Statutes (2016), and, therefore, could, unlike the assistant state attorney in Daniels , authorize the wiretap applications at issue in this case.
Paragraph (3) of 27.181, Florida Statute (1975), was later moved to paragraph (2) of that statute, where it remains.
In light of the foregoing, the portion of the trial court's order suppressing the evidence obtained through the wiretap applications authorized by Mr. LeBlanc is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
EISNAUGLE and WOZNIAK, JJ., concur.