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State v. Woodley

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE
Dec 22, 2015
No. 1 CA-CR 15-0099 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2015)

Opinion

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0099

12-22-2015

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. WILLIAM WOODLEY, II, Appellant.

COUNSEL Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By Christopher M. DeRose Counsel for Appellee Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix By Rena P. Glitsos Counsel for Appellant


NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. 2014-115881-001
The Honorable Margaret R. Mahoney, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By Christopher M. DeRose
Counsel for Appellee Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix
By Rena P. Glitsos
Counsel for Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Peter B. Swann joined. JONES, Judge:

¶1 William Woodley appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal regarding one count of possession or use of marijuana and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, both misdemeanor offenses. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the verdicts and resolve all reasonable inferences against the defendant. State v. Harm, 236 Ariz. 402, 404 n.2, ¶ 2 (App. 2015) (citing State v. Valencia, 186 Ariz. 493, 495 (App. 1996)).

¶2 In April 2014, a police officer stopped a vehicle believed to be stolen. The driver, identified as Woodley, and another man were removed from the vehicle. Three other officers arrived and, while investigating whether the vehicle was stolen, learned Woodley had been driving on a suspended license. The officers also smelled burnt marijuana on Woodley's clothing and emanating from the vehicle, and one officer saw what he believed to be a marijuana stem in the armrest of the open passenger door. A search of the vehicle revealed, in the center console, a clear plastic bag containing a green leafy substance the officers believed to be marijuana and a glass pipe.

¶3 After being advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966), Woodley admitted to using marijuana in the past but not that day and denied the marijuana recovered from the vehicle was his. Woodley told the officers the marijuana and pipe might belong to his son. Woodley also stated he was unaware his license had been suspended.

¶4 Woodley was charged with one count of possession or use of marijuana in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 13- 3405(A)(1), and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3415(A), both class one misdemeanors. At a bench trial, three police officers and a laboratory technician each testified to their training and experience in identifying marijuana. The officers testified they recognized the odor on Woodley's clothing, in the vehicle, and in the pipe as burnt marijuana and visually identified the substance found in the vehicle as marijuana. The technician testified the testing he conducted confirmed the substance found in the vehicle was marijuana, or cannabis sativa.

Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute's current version.

¶5 After the State rested, Woodley's counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal on both counts pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 20(a). The trial court denied the motion and found Woodley guilty on both counts. Woodley was placed on probation for concurrent periods of eighteen months for each count. Woodley timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶6 Woodley argues the trial court erred in denying his Rule 20 motion because the State failed to present sufficient evidence that (1) he controlled the console of the vehicle where the marijuana and pipe were found, and (2) the marijuana was a "plant of the genus cannabis" as defined by A.R.S. § 13-3401(19). We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction de novo. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011) (citing State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 595 (1993)). Where reasonable minds "could differ as to whether the properly admitted evidence, and the inferences therefrom, prove all elements of the offense, a motion for acquittal should not be granted." Bible, 175 Ariz. at 595 (citing State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 67 (1990)). Therefore, we will affirm the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal so long as there is substantial evidence to support the guilty verdict. State v. Scott, 177 Ariz. 131, 138 (1993) (citing State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293 (1989)).

I. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence of Constructive Possession to Support Woodley's Convictions.

¶7 The elements of the offenses require the State to prove, among other things, Woodley possessed marijuana and drug paraphernalia. See A.R.S. §§ 13-3405(A)(1), -3415(A). It may do so by showing Woodley "knowingly [had] physical possession or otherwise . . . exercise[d] dominion or control over the property." A.R.S. § 13-105(34); see also Carroll v. State, 90 Ariz. 411, 412 (1962) (holding crimes of possession require "physical or constructive possession with actual knowledge of the presence of the [illegal] substance"). Constructive possession can be established by showing the accused exercised dominion and control over the item or the location in which the item was found. See State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 27, ¶ 41 (App. 2007) (citing State v. Curtis, 114 Ariz. 527, 528 (App. 1977)); see also A.R.S. § 13-105(35) (describing "possession" as "a voluntary act if the defendant knowingly exercise[s] dominion or control over property").

¶8 Woodley argues the State presented insufficient evidence to establish his exercise of dominion or control over the vehicle where the marijuana and pipe were found because the State did not present direct evidence Woodley was driving the vehicle. This argument is unavailing. The State is not required to present direct evidence of the facts. See State v. Harvill, 106 Ariz. 386, 391 (1970) (concluding "the probative value of direct and circumstantial evidence are intrinsically similar," and therefore "the law makes no distinction" as to the weight each should carry); see also State v. Anaya, 165 Ariz. 535, 543 (App. 1990) ("Evidence wholly circumstantial can support differing, yet reasonable inferences sufficient to defeat a [Rule 20] motion.") (citing State v. Nelson, 129 Ariz. 582, 587 (1981)).

¶9 The testimony of the officers who later arrived at the scene presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a reasonable inference Woodley exercised dominion or control over the vehicle in which the marijuana was found. The officers testified Woodley was lying prone nearby the stopped vehicle when they arrived, his suspended license was located beneath the glass pipe discovered in the vehicle's center console, and he admitted he owned the vehicle. Based on this evidence, the court as the factfinder could reasonably conclude Woodley exercised dominion or control over the vehicle in which the marijuana and pipe were found and, thus, was in constructive possession of both. See State v. Moroyoqui, 125 Ariz. 562, 564 (App. 1980) (finding sufficient evidence of marijuana possession where defendant exercised dominion and control over the vehicle in which the marijuana was found).

¶10 Woodley also argues insufficient evidence supports his conviction because the vehicle was not under his sole dominion or control. Exclusive use or control of the vehicle is not needed to prove constructive possession. See State v. Gonsalves, 231 Ariz. 521, 523, ¶ 9 (App. 2013) ("[U]nder a theory of constructive possession, two or more persons may jointly possess a prohibited object.") (quoting State v. Carroll, 111 Ariz. 216, 218 (1974)). We therefore find no error.

Although not raised by either party, we also find sufficient evidence supporting a reasonable inference Woodley knowingly possessed or used marijuana — a separate element of the marijuana possession offense. See A.R.S. § 13-3405(A)(1) ("A person shall not knowingly . . . [p]ossess or use marijuana.") (emphasis added); see also State v. Hunt, 91 Ariz. 149 (1962) (noting the mere presence of the defendant where an illegal substance is found "is insufficient to show knowledge of its presence"). The officers repeatedly referenced the smell of burnt marijuana on Woodley's clothing, in the vehicle, and in the pipe found in the vehicle. From that, one could reasonably infer Woodley had actual knowledge of the marijuana's presence. --------

II. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence the Marijuana Found was "of the Genus Cannabis" as Defined by Statute.

¶11 Marijuana is defined by statute as "all parts of any plant of the genus cannabis, from which the resin has not been extracted, whether growing or not, and the seeds of such plant." A.R.S. § 13-3401(19). Woodley argues the State failed to present evidence the substance found in the vehicle was "of the genus cannabis." The record reflects otherwise.

¶12 The laboratory technician specifically testified the substance recovered from Woodley's vehicle was cannabis sativa, cannabis being the genus and sativa being the species of what is colloquially referred to as "marijuana." The technician was not trained as a botanist or plant taxonomist and was apparently unfamiliar with the specific terms Woodley's counsel used during cross-examination. But a laboratory technician need not pass a vocabulary test of botany terms before the court accepts his testimony regarding laboratory testing results. Indeed, Woodley identified no concern on appeal with respect to the integrity of the actual laboratory tests. Thus, the technician's testimony that the substance tested was cannabis sativa was uncontroverted and provided sufficient evidence to establish that the substance tested fit the statutory definition.

¶13 Additionally, despite Woodley's protest that there need be "explicit evidence" the plant substance was "of the genus cannabis," "[t]he [illegal] character of the substance may be proved by circumstantial evidence." State v. Cunningham, 17 Ariz. App. 314, 316 (1972) (citations omitted). Evidence presented established Woodley smelled like burnt marijuana at the scene and was travelling in a vehicle that smelled like burnt marijuana. The officers discovered what appeared to be a stem of marijuana in the armrest of the passenger door of the vehicle. And, the pipe found in the center console of the vehicle Woodley owned and was driving was of the type used for smoking marijuana, smelled of marijuana, and appeared to contain marijuana residue. Ultimately, upon testing, the substance found within the vehicle that smelled like marijuana and looked like marijuana and had been smoked in the pipe was found to be marijuana.

¶14 The testimony of the police officers and laboratory technician constituted substantial evidence upon which a reasonable inference can be drawn that what was taken from Woodley's vehicle was marijuana "of the genus cannabis" as required by statute. And, contrary to Woodley's assertion, no judicial notice of the substance's genus or species was needed to defeat the Rule 20 motion. We therefore find no error.

CONCLUSION

¶15 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.


Summaries of

State v. Woodley

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE
Dec 22, 2015
No. 1 CA-CR 15-0099 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2015)
Case details for

State v. Woodley

Case Details

Full title:STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. WILLIAM WOODLEY, II, Appellant.

Court:ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE

Date published: Dec 22, 2015

Citations

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0099 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2015)