Opinion
No. COA12–355.
2013-01-15
STATE of North Carolina v. Sammy Dean WOOD.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Carrie D. Randa, for the State. Wait Law, P.L.L.C., by John L. Wait, for defendant-appellant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 28 October 2011 by Judge James M. Webb in Surry County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 31 December 2012. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Carrie D. Randa, for the State. Wait Law, P.L.L.C., by John L. Wait, for defendant-appellant.
ERVIN, Judge.
Defendant Sammy Dean Wood appeals from a judgment entered by the trial court based upon a jury verdict convicting him of driving while impaired and sentencing Defendant to an active term of 180 days imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by admitting certain medical records into evidence and allowing them to be read to the jury and by denying his motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence. After careful consideration of Defendant's challenges to the trial court's judgment in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that Defendant is not entitled to any relief from the trial court's judgment.
I. Factual Background
A. Substantive Facts
At trial, the State's evidence tended to show that, during the early morning hours of 16 April 2009, Defendant ran off the road and struck a tree while driving his truck on a public street. After hearing the collision, Henry Rodriguez ran to Defendant's truck. As he helped Defendant out of the truck, he observed that Defendant was badly injured and that Defendant smelled of alcohol.
After responding to the scene of the accident and observing that Defendant was injured, Officer Channing Murphy of the Elkin Police Department noted that Defendant was “very, very slow and disoriented” when questioned. Defendant told Officer Murphy that he had consumed three beers approximately one hour prior to the accident.
Although Officer Murphy did not notice an odor of alcohol on defendant at the scene of the accident, he did notice a strong odor of alcohol emanating from Defendant's person while questioning him at the hospital. In addition, Officer Murphy noticed that Defendant's speech was slow and slurred and that his eyes were red. However, Officer Murphy could not determine if these observations stemmed from Defendant's alcohol consumption or from the accident in which Defendant had been involved. Even so, Officer Murphy testified that Defendant had consumed “a sufficient amount of some impair[ing] substance to appreciably impair his mental and physical faculties to operate a motor vehicle.”
B. Procedural History
On 16 April 2009, a citation was issued charging Defendant with driving while subject to an impairing substance. After being convicted of impaired driving by Judge William F. Southern, III, in the Surry County District Court on 26 August 2009 and being sentenced to a term of six months imprisonment, Defendant noted an appeal to the Surry County Superior Court for a trial de novo.
The charge against Defendant came on for trial before the trial court and a jury at the 27 October 2011 criminal session of the Surry County Superior Court. On 28 October 2011, the jury returned a verdict convicting Defendant of driving while impaired. Based upon the jury's verdict, the trial court sentenced Defendant to 180 days imprisonment. Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court's judgment.
II. Legal Analysis
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
As an initial matter, we address Defendant's argument that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence. According to Defendant, the State failed to present sufficient evidence tending to show that he was appreciably impaired at any relevant time after driving. We disagree.
“This Court reviews the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.” State v. Smith, 186 N.C.App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). “ ‘Upon defendant's motion for dismissal, the question for the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant's being the perpetrator of such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied.’ “ State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (quoting State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75, 430 S.E.2d 914, 918 (1993)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 890, 121 S.Ct. 213, 148 L.Ed.2d 150 (2000). “In making its determination, the trial court must consider all evidence admitted, whether competent or incompetent, in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving any contradictions in its favor.” State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d 211, 223 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135, 115 S.Ct. 2565, 132 L.Ed.2d 818 (1995). In order to adequately support an impaired driving conviction, the State must elicit evidence tending to show that the defendant was driving any vehicle on a highway, street, or public vehicular area while under the influence of an impairing substance. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 20–138.1.
According to well-established North Carolina law, the “fact that a motorist has been drinking, when considered in connection with faulty driving ... or other conduct indicating an impairment of physical or mental faculties, is sufficient prima facie to show [impaired driving].” State v. Hewitt, 263 N.C. 759, 764, 140 S.E.2d 241, 244 (1965). According to Officer Murphy, Defendant admitted that he had consumed three beers shortly before the accident. Both Mr. Rodriguez and Officer Murphy testified that Defendant smelled of alcohol. In addition, Officer Murphy noted that Defendant's speech was slow and slurred and that his eyes were red. The record clearly reflects that the accident in which Defendant was involved occurred when Defendant ran off the road. As a result, we hold that Officer Murphy's opinion to the effect that Defendant was appreciably impaired was supported by more than just Defendant's alcohol consumption. In light of that fact, the issue of whether Defendant's disorientation, slow and slurred speech, and bloodshot eyes stemmed from the accident or the consumption of alcohol was properly submitted for the jury's consideration. Thus, the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's dismissal motion.
B. Admission of Defendant's Medical Records
Secondly, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the admission of medical records documenting the treatment that he received at the hospital emergency room. According to Defendant, the challenged medical records constituted testimonial evidence, so that the trial court's decision to allow their admission into evidence violated his right to confront the witnesses against him as enunciated in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Alternatively, Defendant argues that the trial court's ruling contravened the rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay evidence. We review Defendant's contentions de novo. State v. Johnson, 209 N.C.App. 682, ––––, 706 S.E.2d 790, 797 (2011) (stating that, “[w]hen preserved by an objection, a trial court's decision with regard to the admission of evidence alleged to be hearsay is reviewed de novo ”); State v. Graham, 200 N.C.App. 204, 214, 683 S.E.2d 437, 444 (2009) (stating that “[t] he standard of review for alleged violations of constitutional rights is de novo ”), disc. review denied,363 N.C. 857, 694 S.E.2d 766 (2010).
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the admission of “testimonial” statements by a witness who did not appear at trial unless: (1) the party is unavailable to testify and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 158 L.Ed.2d at 203. However, medical reports created for treatment-related purposes are not testimonial statements for Confrontation Clause purposes. Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 312 n. 2, 174 L.Ed.2d 314, 322 (2009). Simply put, even though hospital personnel may have been aware that Defendant was under investigation for impaired driving and although they may have observed Defendant speaking with Officer Murphy, neither of those facts transforms records created for the purpose of providing Defendant with medical care into documents created for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial.
Similarly, the records of regularly conducted business activities are admissible pursuant to a recognized exception to the prohibition against the admission of hearsay evidence even if the declarant is available as a witness. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 803(6). According to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 803(6), a business record is:
[a] memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation....
Id. “Business records are defined to include the records of hospitals.” State v. Miller, 80 N.C.App. 425, 428, 342 S.E.2d 553, 555 (citing Rule 803(6) Commentary, N.C. Rules of Evidence), disc. review denied, 317 N.C. 711, 347 S.E.2d 448 (1986).
Although Defendant argues that the only business of a hospital is to provide medical treatment and that “the State produced insufficient evidence at trial showing how the statements recorded in [the medical records] reasonably related to the medical treatment [he] received,” we do not find this argument persuasive. The records at issue here consist of the emergency room treatment notes made by doctors and nurses responsible for examining and treating Defendant after he was brought to the hospital following the accident. Among other things, the challenged records document Defendant's medical history, the observations made by various medical personnel concerning Defendant's condition, the diagnosis of Defendant's medical condition made by the team responsible for examining and treating him, and the nature and extent of the medical treatment that Defendant received. After carefully reviewing the records in question, we conclude that Defendant's contention that the statements recorded in the records at issue are not “reasonably related” to his medical treatment is devoid of merit. Thus, Defendant has failed to establish that the trial court erred by admitting the challenged medical records under either theory enunciated in his brief.
III. Conclusion
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that none of Defendant's challenges to the trial court's judgment have merit. As a result, the trial court's judgment should, and hereby does, remain undisturbed.
NO ERROR. Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge STEPHENS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).