Opinion
No. COA12–1233.
2013-07-2
STATE of North Carolina v. Earl Lee WILSON.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Katherine A. Murphy, for the State. Brock, Payne & Meece, P.A., by C. Scott Holmes, for Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 29 March 2012 by Judge Paul C. Ridgeway in Person County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 June 2013. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Katherine A. Murphy, for the State. Brock, Payne & Meece, P.A., by C. Scott Holmes, for Defendant.
STEPHENS, Judge.
Defendant Earl Lee Wilson appeals from the judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver, sale or delivery of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia, as well as having attained habitual felon status. The trial court consolidated the convictions for judgment and sentenced Defendant to 165 to 207 months imprisonment. Defendant appeals, contending the trial court abused its discretion by limiting his cross-examination of one of the State's witnesses. We find no error.
On 21 June 2011, while working as a paid police informant, Willy Smith bought $20 worth of crack cocaine from Defendant. Smith bought another $20 worth of crack cocaine from Defendant on 5 July 2011. At trial, Smith described the transactions on direct examination. Thereafter, the State moved to prohibit cross-examination of Smith about unrelated sex offense charges then pending against him. The charges were filed after the drug transactions but prior to Defendant's trial. The State argued that the pending charges were not relevant and noted that Smith had not been promised any benefit in exchange for his testimony. Defendant opposed any limits on cross-examination, arguing that the pending charges were grounds for impeachment and provided a possible source of bias. Defendant also noted that Smith's bond for the pending charges had been reduced from one million dollars to $50,000.
The trial court allowed the State's motion in part, prohibiting Defendant from questioning Smith about the specific nature of the pending charges. However, the court permitted Defendant to cross-examine Smith about the fact that he faced pending charges, as well as about the possible punishment for those charges and Smith's bond reduction. Defendant noted his exception to the court's ruling. On cross-examination, Defendant elicited testimony from Smith about the charges as permitted by the court's ruling. Smith testified that he did not expect to receive any benefit as a result of his testimony against Defendant.
Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting the scope of his cross-examination of Smith. We disagree.
It is well-established that “the right of cross-examination is included in the right of an accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him.” Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404, 13 L.Ed.2d 923, 926 (1965). Generally, “[a] witness “may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 611(b) (2011). “Cross-examination of an opposing witness for the purpose of showing his bias or interest is a substantial legal right, which the trial judge can neither abrogate nor abridge to the prejudice of the cross-examining party.” State v. Hart, 239 N.C. 709, 711, 80 S .E.2d 901, 903 (1954).
Nevertheless, cross-examination may be properly limited pursuant to Rule of Evidence 403 if the trial court determines the probative value of the evidence to be elicited would be “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” State v. Whaley, 362 N.C. 156, 159–60, 655 S.E.2d 388, 390 (2008) (citations omitted). Decisions about the scope and duration of cross-examination are left to the discretion of the trial court. State v. Harris, 290 N.C. 681, 697, 228 S.E.2d 437, 446 (1976) (citations omitted). “The discretionary power of the trial judge is to confine the cross-examination within reasonable limits.” State v. Roberson, 215 N.C. 784, 787, 3 S.E.2d 277, 279–80 (1939). In discretionary matters, “[w]e reverse the trial court only when the court's ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Locklear, 363 N.C. 438, 448–49, 681 S.E.2d 293, 302 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Here, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in limiting the scope of cross-examination. The court did not entirely prohibit Defendant from cross-examining Smith about the pending charges and other possible sources of bias. Instead, the court permitted the jury to hear testimony about Smith's history as a paid informant, the fact that he faced pending criminal charges, the possible life sentence Smith faced if convicted of those charges, and the substantial reduction of Smith's bond. Defendant was also permitted to question Smith about whether he expected to receive any benefit for his testimony. See State v. Alston, 17 N.C.App. 712, 714, 195 S.E.2d 314, 315 (1973) (finding error where the defendant was prohibited from cross-examining State's witnesses about their expectation of leniency). These areas of cross-examination were highly relevant to Smith's credibility. The trial court then instructed the jury to consider any sources of bias in evaluating the credibility of witnesses.
The trial court only prohibited Defendant from cross-examining Smith about the specific nature of the pending charges. We agree with the trial court that the specific nature of the sex offense charges had significant potential to cause unfair prejudice and was of limited, if any, relevance to any fact at issue, including Smith's credibility. See State v. Lynch, 334 N.C. 402, 411, 432 S.E.2d 349, 353 (1993) (“Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the scope of Defendant's cross-examination of Smith.
NO ERROR.
Report per Rule 30(e).