Opinion
HHBCR140276060
09-22-2017
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT
Julia DiCocco Dewey, J.
By notice dated August 23, 2017, the State filed a notice of its anticipated use of uncharged misconduct evidence. Through motion dated September 5, 2017, the defendant has filed a Motion in Limine wherein he seeks to preclude evidence of that uncharged misconduct. The litigants both provided memorandum in support of their respective positions. They supplemented those memoranda during oral argument relating to the motion.
The Defendant's first argument is that the State's notice of intent to use uncharged misconduct was untimely.
Where discovery concerns inculpatory evidence, there exists no constitutional right to the disclosure of such evidence and, therefore, the rules of the court regulate any such disclosure. See Slate v. Fraenza, 9 Conn.App. 228, 236-37, 518 A.2d 649 (1986), cert. denied, 202 Conn. 803, 519 A.2d 1207 (1987). " The purpose of criminal discovery is to prevent surprise and to afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial. To achieve these goals and to assure compliance with the rules, the trial court must impose an appropriate sanction for failure to comply. In determining what sanction is appropriate, the trial court should consider the reason why disclosure was not made, the extent of prejudice, if any, to the opposing party, the feasibility of rectifying that prejudice by a continuance, and any other relevant circumstances . . . Thus, where substantial prejudice is not suffered by the defendant as a result of the admission of certain evidence, it is not an abuse of the court's discretion to refuse to exclude that evidence as a sanction for noncompliance with a discovery order." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 71 Conn.App. 217, 241, 800 A.2d 1268, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 934, 806 A.2d 1067 (2002).
In the present case, the Defendant filed his motion for disclosure of uncharged misconduct in December 2014. That motion was not acted upon by either the litigants or the court until the State's response dated August 2017. There is no reason given for the State's lack of a formal disclosure. However, all of the information, with the exception of the statements of confidential informants, was given to the Defendant well in advance of trial. It was provided in the form of arrest warrant affidavits, witness statements and police reports. There is no ascertainable prejudice.
Turning to the specific items of misconduct highlighted by the State in its request.
A. Gang Affiliations and the Relationship of the Defendant to Witnesses Including Gang Membership, Rival Gang Membership, Drug Use, and Drug Sales by the Defendant .
The State seeks to introduce evidence of gang membership and affiliation. It also seeks to establish through witnesses the fact that the decedent was a member of a rival gang.
Membership in a criminal street gang can, in some circumstances, be a relevant and essential component of a prosecution's case in chief. See State v. Johnson, 82 Conn.App. 777, 848 A.2d 526 (2004) (substantial evidence that rival gangs were feuding and intended to harm each other; retaliatory death threats showed conspiracy and motive to commit murder); State v. Douglas, 126 Conn.App. 192, 11 A.3d 699, cert. denied, 300 Conn. 926, 15 A.3d 628 (2011) (evidence of specific confrontation with rival gang member evidence of conspiracy and motive). In order for this information to be admissible, it must establish an intermediary fact from which the ultimate fact of guilt of a charged crime may be inferred. In this case, the evidence must relate to either murder or to carrying a pistol without a permit.
The State suggests that gang affiliation is probative of motive, intent, opportunity and means to commit a crime. It further suggests that this evidence would place crucial State evidence in context. The difficulty with the state's argument is that gang affiliation, without more, is not probative of any of those initial factors. Furthermore, it is difficult for this court to assess how that gang affiliation alone would put other state's evidence in context without the court's knowledge of what evidence the State intends to bolster.
The same reservations exist for the information sought concerning the proffered statements concerning Tyrell Johnson smoking marijuana with the defendant and purchasing marijuana from the decedent on the night of the homicide as well as the conversations the defendant had with Josslyn Kinsley concerning her infidelity. Finally, as presented to this court there is little probative value concerning the defendants' demeanor when he heard the decedent's name prior to the homicide.
The court must balance the probative value of the aforementioned evidence against its prejudicial impact. As presented, gang affiliation testimony would have little probative value but does risk an unduly prejudicial impact.
The State also sought to elicit statements made by the defendant to the effect " I like to play with guns, my boys have guns, a 44 magnum." These comments are not uncharged misconduct but admissible as an admission of a party opponent. Connecticut Code of Evidence Section 8-3(1)(A). The evidence is highly relevant and should be admitted to prove the defendant's specific intent to commit murder and the identity of the person who shot the decedent. It also is relevant as indicative of the means and opportunity to commit the offense charged. See, generally, State v. Collins, 299 Conn. 567, 10 A.3d 1005, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 908, 132 S.Ct. 314, 181 L.Ed.2d 193 (2011). It is also relevant to the element of possession required for the second offense charged. There will be a limiting instruction.
In determining prejudice, this court is considering whether the evidence tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant. There is always some prejudice from highly probative evidence.
B. Statements Made by the Defendant regarding Acquisition of the Firearm Used in the Homicide and the Shooting Incident that Occurred on August 21, 2014 on Maple Street Where the Defendant Discharged a Loaded 44 Magnum Handgun at an Occupied Car in a Residential Neighborhood Containing Multiple Occupied Residences .
The defendant made several statements to witnesses concerning a shooting on Maple Street three days after the homicide in question. These are also admissions of a party opponent. The evidence should be admitted to prove the defendant's specific intent to commit murder and the identity of the person who shot the decedent. See, generally, State v. Collins, 299 Conn. 567, 10 A.3d 1005 (2011). It is also relevant evidence of a critical element of the second offense charged. It also is relevant as indicative of the means and opportunity to commit the offense charged. The highly probative evidence is prejudicial, but the prejudicial impact does not outweigh its probative value. There will be a limiting instruction.
C. Burning the Ex-Girlfriend's House .
There is evidence that the defendant told several individuals that he and the decedent were engaged in a series of retaliatory arsons near the time of the homicide. The alleged impetus for the arson was the fact that a young lady shared her affections with the defendant and the decedent. These admissions of a party opponent are admissible to establish the defendant's specific intent as well as vengeful motive. See State v. Beavers, 290 Conn. 386, 403, 963 A.2d 956 (2009). This court has weighed the prejudicial impact of these comments against their probative value and concludes that they are not unduly prejudicial in light of all evidence in this case.
There will be a limiting instruction.
D. Statements Made by the Defendant in the Presence of Officer Tvardzk .
See Section A.
E. The Shooting Incident at 66 Prospect Street and the Defendant's Admission Regarding Each Shooting. The Defendant's Statements Regarding Possession of the 44 Magnum Recovered by the Police .
See Section B.
Under this category, the State also wishes to introduce evidence relating to the Maple Street and Prospect Street shootings. That evidence consists of the defendant's pleas of guilty to those crimes. Those admissions are admissible. See State v. Greene, 274 Conn. 134, 874 A.2d 750 (2005). The evidence should be admitted to prove the defendant's specific intent to commit murder and the identity of the person who shot the decedent. It also is relevant as indicative of the means and opportunity to commit the offense charged. Finally it is relevant evidence of a critical element of the second offense charged. The highly probative evidence is prejudicial, but the prejudicial impact does not outweigh its probative value. There will be a limiting instruction.
F. The Defendant's Statements that the Gun Recovered by the Police was the Same Gun Used in this Homicide. The Defendant's Statements Relating to his Possession of the 44 Magnum Recovered by the Police .
The defendant made several statements to civilian witnesses and police officers regarding his connection to a weapon recovered by the officers, a gun linked to the present homicide. These are also admissions of a party opponent. The evidence should be admitted to prove the defendant's specific intent to commit murder and the identity of the person who shot the decedent. It also is relevant as indicative of the means and opportunity to commit the offense charged. Finally it is relevant evidence of a critical element of the second offense charged. The highly probative evidence is prejudicial, but the prejudicial impact does not outweigh its probative value. There will be a limiting instruction.
G. The Fact that the Defendant is Currently Incarcerated .
The State seeks to elicit evidence that at the time the defendant made several statements, he was incarcerated. These statements were made to jailhouse informants.
Absent a challenge by the defense of the jailhouse informants' means and opportunity to receive information from the defendant, the fact of the defendant's incarceration is irrelevant.
All of the above rulings are premised on the information currently available to the court. If circumstances warrant during trial, the litigants can certainly renew their requests and their objections.
So Ordered.