Opinion
ID No: 9511017952
October 25, 2001
ORDER
Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, Defendant has filed a motion for postconviction relief. Following a three day jury trial, Williams was convicted of stalking and noncompliance with conditions of bond. He was sentenced to nine years in prison, followed by Level IV and Level III probation totaling one year. Williams' conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.
Williams v. State, Del. Supr., No. 113, 1999, Holland, J. (May 18, 1999) (ORDER).
I.
Williams alleges that in several ways, he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After the original motion was presented, the trial judge promptly examined the motion and contents of the files relating to the judgment under attack. Based upon that preliminary consideration, it plainly appears from the motion and the record of prior proceedings that movant is not entitled to relief and for the reasons discussed below, the court is ordering its summary dismissal.Williams' motion is in the proper form and it is timely. Moreover, Williams' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not procedurally barred. Nevertheless, Williams fails to satisfy either of Strickland v. Washington's tests for ineffective assistance of counsel. A defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Further, "review of counsel's representation is subject to a strong presumption that counsel's conduct was professionally reasonable." An ineffective assistance claim is not a question of hindsight or speculation about what trial counsel could have done better. Rather, the question is whether trial counsel's actions were adequate.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(b)(1),(4).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984).
Albury v. State, Del. Supr., 551 A.2d 53, 58 (1988). See also Wright v. State, Del. Supr., 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (1996); Skinner v. State, Del. Supr., 607 A.2d 1170, 1172 (1992).
Flamer v. State, Del. Supr., 585 A.2d 736, 753 (1990). See also Dawson v. State, Del. Supr., 673 A.2d 1186, 1190, cert. denied, Dawson v. Delaware, 519 U.S. 844 (1996) (Counsel's efforts . . . enjoy a strong presumption of reasonableness." (citing Flamer); Wright, 671 A.2d at 1356.
See Gattis v. State, Del. Supr., 697 A.2d 1174, 1178 (1997); Wright, 671 A.2d at 1356-1357.
II.
Williams' first claim is that his trial counsel was not prepared for trial. Allegedly, he never interviewed unspecified witnesses, including unnamed alibi witnesses. Defendant also complains that trial counsel failed to object to the introduction of an uncharged burglary involving the victim's place of business, and prior acts involving an earlier stalking of another victim.
As mentioned, Williams' claims do not satisfy either of Strickland v. Washington's tests for ineffective assistance of counsel. Williams has not demonstrated that trial counsel's efforts failed to meet an objectively reasonable standard. Nor has Williams demonstrated that he suffered prejudice due to any ineffectiveness on trial counsel's part. At the most, Williams argues that the court erred by admitting the evidence of the uncharged burglary and Defendant's prior bad acts, which does not involve ineffective assistance of counsel. That sort of claim, is procedurally barred and Williams has not established grounds to excuse his default.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
III.
Substantively, Williams' claims concerning his counsel's alleged unpreparedness and supposed failure to investigate remain vague and unsubstantiated. In fact, during trial Williams attempted to raise his concerns and, in the process, a helpful record was developed. Trial counsel explained that during the long time between Defendant's indictment and trial:
There's been a lot of investigation done, there's been a lot of records that we requested. We have followed up on an awful lot of leads investigatively that have been given to us; and some of them, frankly, just didn't pan out.
Trial counsel further explained that his decision not to pursue Defendant's partial alibi was "strategic." Having heard the trial attorney's thinking and having observed the trial, the court is unwilling to second-guess the trial attorney's belief that, at best, he might have poked a hole or two in the State's case, but he never could have established a complete alibi for Defendant. And a partial alibi would have made the State's case.
The court further observes that this was not a close case. The victim was the executive director for Pacem in Terrace, a volunteer organization promoting peace with justice. She knew Defendant well, having worked with him closely over time. Her testimony was highly credible and it left room for no reasonable doubt that Defendant was mentally disturbed and furious with the victim. She testified that before he began stalking her, Defendant had smashed her face with his fists. She was hospitalized with her injuries and she required major facial surgery. Defendant had been arrested for the brutal assault and he had been ordered to have no contact with her. Nevertheless, he initiated direct and indirect contact with her, which precipitated this prosecution.
The assault case was a separate prosecution. Williams v. State, Del. Supr., No. 84, 1997 Veasey, C.J. (Dec. 30, 1997) (ORDER).
After the assault charges were filed against Defendant, the police and the State's child protection agency began responding to false complaints about crimes allegedly taking place at the victim's home. Circumstantial evidence clearly pointed to Defendant as the source of those false and annoying complaints. On top of everything else, this behavior was consistent with the way Defendant had acted toward another woman who had crossed his path several years earlier. In that case, Defendant admittedly threatened the President, using the earlier victim's name. Defendant also made allegations about the former victim that precipitated harassing visits from other law enforcement agencies, besides the United States Secret Service. Defendant also telephoned the earlier victim and blew into the mouthpiece, which happened to the victim in this case. Based on the evidence presented at Defendant's trial, it is almost inconceivable that a jury could doubt that Defendant was behind the harassing telephone calls and the false criminal complaints.
As for Williams' claim about improper evidence of an uncharged crime and prior bad acts, the court made an extensive record about that during trial. The court undertook a formal D.R.E. 404(b) analysis, as called for by Getz v. State and D.R.E. 403. When the first 404(b) evidence was introduced, the court gave a Getz instruction, sua sponte. The court also included a formal Getz charge in its jury instructions at the end of trial.
Getz v. State, Del. Supr., 538 A.2d 726, 734 (1988).
IV.
In summary, trial counsel is presumptively effective. The court has no basis to conclude that trial counsel's efforts fell below a reasonably objective standard and even if it did, the court sees no prejudice. The court is satisfied that representing Defendant was a challenge at several levels. Nevertheless, trial counsel exercised sound, professional judgment and reasonable effort to obtain the best result possible for Defendant under the circumstances.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's October 1, 2001 Motion for Postconviction Relief is summarily DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.