Summary
In Wiley, the supervisor at a residential facility restricted the defendant to his room overnight after he illegally consumed alcohol; a few minutes later an alarm sounded indicating a security door had been opened.
Summary of this case from State v. Oponski-SimsOpinion
No. 2-660 / 01-1458
Filed October 16, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, Cynthia Danielson and R. David Fahey, Judges.
Defendant appeals, following bench trial, from his conviction for escape in violation of Iowa Code section 719.4(1) (2001). AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Tricia Johnston, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Cristen Odell, Assistant Attorney General, Patrick Jackson, County Attorney, and Mona Clarkson, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Zimmer and Miller, JJ.
Isaac Benjamin Wiley appeals, following bench trial, from his conviction for escape in violation of Iowa Code section 719.4(1) (2001). He claims there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
On January 14, 2000 Wiley received a deferred judgment following his conviction for burglary in the third degree. On September 29, 2000 the State filed a probation violation complaint alleging Wiley had violated the terms and conditions of his deferred judgment, and on November 3, 2000 the district court revoked Wiley's deferred judgment and imposed a five-year prison sentence. The district court then suspended the five-year sentence and ordered probation for a period of five years under the direction and supervision of the Eighth Judicial District Department of Correctional Services. The court ordered Wiley "shall also be committed to and shall reside in the Men's Residential Facility located in Burlington, Iowa for a period of 365 days or until maximum benefit, whichever first occurs."
Wiley began his confinement at the residential facility on December 28, 2000, and lived in Room 17. On February 18, 2001 another resident of the facility impermissibly brought alcohol into the facility and Wiley, along with several other residents, consumed the alcohol. A residential officer received a report that some of the residents had alcohol. Upon investigation the officer discovered several cups and a bottle of whiskey hidden in the ceiling tile over Wiley's room. After supervising a breath test and confirming Wiley had consumed alcohol, the supervisor restricted Wiley and the others to their rooms until morning.
A few minutes later the officer heard the alarm buzzer sound from the security door by rooms 16 and 17, indicating the door had been opened. The monitors revealed several residents, including Wiley, leaving the facility through the back door. The residential supervisor gave chase and saw Wiley about two blocks away. The supervisor then kept Wiley in sight until a Burlington police officer arrived and arrested Wiley. He had been gone from the facility for approximately four minutes before he was apprehended.
Wiley was charged with escape in violation of Iowa Code section 719.4(1). Wiley filed a motion to adjudicate law points contesting the charge and arguing that because his confinement in the facility was a condition of probation he was not in "actual custody" or "physically restrained" as is required under section 719.4(1). Wiley alleged he would be more properly charged under section 719.4(3). The district court denied the motion finding, in part, the fact the facility "had an alarm to detect persons leaving it without authorization is a physical restraint" and the mere fact Wiley could have been prosecuted under 719.4(3) did not prohibit the State from proceeding in its prosecution of him under this section 719.4(1).
Following a bench trial Wiley was convicted under section 719.4(1) and sentenced to an indeterminate five-year term of incarceration which was ordered to run consecutive to the term under the burglary conviction. Wiley appeals from this conviction, arguing there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction under section 719.4(1) because his actions do not constitute escape under this Code provision. He asserts that instead he may have been guilty of being absent from custody in violation of section 719.4(3). Specifically, Wiley argues subsection one requires "actual custody," which means "physical restraint," and he argues he was not "physically confined" in the facility, as shown by the nature of the facility and his presence there only as a term of his probation. He contends his "walk away from the facility was at most a temporary, four-minute absence from custody," and thus he should have been charged under section 719.4(3).
II. SCOPE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Our scope of review is on assigned error. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4; State v. Dible, 538 N.W.2d 267, 270 (Iowa 1995). It is the same on a defendant's appeal from a criminal conviction whether the court or a jury is the fact finder. State v. LaPointe, 418 N.W.2d 49, 51 (Iowa 1988).
The standard of review in a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is well established. Dible, 538 N.W.2d at 270. We will uphold a verdict where substantial evidence in the record tends to support the charge. Id. A trial court's finding of guilt is binding on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. Iowa R.App.P. 6.14(6)( a); State v. Thomas, 561 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Iowa 1997).
In a criminal case tried to the court, as in a civil case tried to the court at law, the court's verdict is like a jury verdict. Upon review of the sufficiency of evidence to support the verdict, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and we accept as established all reasonable inferences tending to support it. Findings of the trial court are to be broadly and liberally construed, rather than narrowly or technically, and, in case of ambiguity, we will construe findings to uphold, rather than defeat, the judgment. Direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative so long as the evidence raises a fair inference of guilt and [does] more than create speculation, suspicion, or conjecture. It is necessary to consider all the evidence in the record and not just the evidence supporting the verdict to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the charge. Substantial evidence means evidence which would convince a rational factfinder that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Dible, 538 N.W.2d at 270 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Although the issue before us is cast as whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction under section 719.4(1), we believe the issue can at least as readily be viewed as a challenge to the trial court's interpretation and application of section 719.4(1). This view is supported by the fact the issue now before us was presented to the trial court by way of a motion to adjudicate law points and there was essentially no dispute over the underlying facts. Assuming the issue before us should be viewed as one of statutory interpretation and application, our review nevertheless remains a review for errors at law. State v. McCoy, 618 N.W.2d 324, 325 (Iowa 2000).
III. MERITS
Wiley does not challenge the facts that he was convicted of a felony, he was committed to a community-based correctional facility, and he left the facility without staff permission. He argues however that one "committed" to a residential facility as a condition of probation, such as he was, is not "physically restrained" or "physically confined" and therefore he was in "constructive custody" or mere "legal restraint" and was not in "actual custody" at the time of the incident in question. Wiley contends "actual custody," consisting of "physical restraint," is required under section 719.4(1). Accordingly, while he asserts there may be sufficient evidence to convict him under section 719.4(3), being absent from custody, there is not sufficient evidence to support his conviction under 719.4(1). The State maintains the charge under subsection one was accurate.
Subsection one applies to any person who has been convicted of a felony "who intentionally escapes, or attempts to escape, from a detention facility, community-based correctional facility, or institution to which the person has been committed by reason of the conviction. . . ." Iowa Code § 719.4(1) (2001); see also State v. Burtlow, 299 N.W.2d 665, 668 (Iowa 1980) (interpreting an earlier version of section 719.4(1)). Subsection three applies to any person "who has been committed to any institution under the control of the Iowa department of corrections, to a community-based correctional facility, or to a jail or correctional institution, who knowingly and voluntarily is absent from a place where the person is required to be. . . ." Iowa Code § 719.4(3).
Custody begins when an arrest is made and continues until the defendant is lawfully discharged. State v. Eads, 234 N.W.2d 108, 111 (Iowa 1975). Custody can be actual or constructive. State v. Schmitt, 290 N.W.2d 24, 28 (Iowa 1980). Actual custody refers to physical restraint, meaning detention, confinement, or imprisonment. Id.
The Iowa Supreme Court has compared sections 719.4(1) and 719.4(3) and considered which subsection more appropriately applies under differing facts. In Burtlowthe defendant failed to return to a state work release center after a furlough and the State charged him with escape under section 719.4(1). Burtlow, 299 N.W.2d at 667. The supreme court found that there was no factual basis to support a conviction under subsection one because Burtlow's conduct fit more readily under subsection three concerning failures to return from an authorized release center. Id. at 669. The court went on to hold:
We believe subsection one is intended to apply [to] unauthorized departures from physical restraint. In those cases a danger of injury to persons or property exists. When the offense is a mere failure to return from an authorized release, no such danger exists. It is reasonable to conclude the legislature intended to punish breaches of physical restraint more severely.Id. Accordingly, we agree with Wiley that, under Burtlow, subsection one can only apply to persons under "physical restraint" at the time of escape.
However, in State v. Breitbach, 488 N.W.2d 444, 445 (Iowa 1992), the supreme court clarified its holding in Burtlow and the definition of "physical restraint." In Breitbach police arrived at Breitbach's girlfriend's home with an arrest warrant and informed the defendant he would have to go with them. Breitbach, 488 N.W.2d at 445. As they stood on the porch of the residence, the defendant asked the police if he could go inside and speak to his girlfriend, they agreed, and as the police turned to reenter the apartment Breitbach jumped off the porch and ran. Id. He was later apprehended and charged with escape pursuant to section 719.4(1). Id. In affirming Breitbach's conviction the supreme court clarified the definition of "physical restraint" for purposes of the escape statute:
However, we did not mean in Burtlow that custody for purposes of subsection 1 must involve actual physical contact with the arrestee. Instead, "physical restraint," as that term is used in Burtlow, is necessarily involved whenever an individual either is or would be subjected to immediate physical restraint if an attempt to flee from the authorities was made.Id. at 449. The court further held that although anytime a felon escapes from physical restraint it necessarily poses a danger of injury to persons or property, the language in Burtlow does not create a requirement that the State demonstrate an arrestee's unauthorized departure will give rise to danger of injury to persons or property when seeking a conviction under section 719.4(1). Id.
Based on the cases set forth above and the facts in the record, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to show Wiley was physically confined or restrained and therefore in actual custody at the time of the incident. First, community-based correctional facilities are part of the intermediate criminal sanctions program created under Iowa Code chapter 901B. On the continuum of sanctions "residential facility placement" is part of Level Three, "quasi-incarceration," which is clearly a form of physical restraint. See Iowa Code § 901B.1(c). Second, the residents of the residential correctional facility do not have permission to leave on their own free will without permission from the staff. Wiley acknowledged at trial that he knew it was wrong and against the rules to leave the facility. Third, the facility has an alarm system on the doors and windows to detect people leaving without authorization. We agree with the district court that this too is a form of restraint or confinement.
Finally, based on the definition in Breitbach, Wiley was clearly under "physical restraint" because he knew or should have known he "would be subjected to immediate physical restraint if an attempt to flee from the authorities" at the facility was made. Breitbach, 488 N.W.2d at 449. (Wiley was in fact physically restrained when arrested by the Burlington police several minutes after he left the facility.) Therefore, Wiley was under "physical restraint" at the time he left the facility, as required under section 719.4(1).
For all of the reasons set forth above, we find there was sufficient evidence to show Wiley was under "physical restraint" and "actual custody" at the time of the incident, and thus sufficient evidence to support his conviction under 719.4(1). The district court did not err in its interpretation and application of section 719.4(1). Having found no merit to any of Wiley's arguments we affirm his conviction under section 719.4(1) for escape after being convicted of a felony.