Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3420-10T2
02-24-2012
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. BRENDA WILEY, Defendant-Appellant.
Brenda Wiley, appellant pro se. Anthony P. Kearns, III, Hunterdon County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Jeffrey L. Weinstein, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Fisher and Nugent.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hunterdon County, Indictment No. 91-6-76.
Brenda Wiley, appellant pro se.
Anthony P. Kearns, III, Hunterdon County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Jeffrey L. Weinstein, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant was fifteen years old when she killed her mother and younger brother in 1990. After a contested hearing, the Family Part judge waived jurisdiction, and defendant was tried in 1992 in the Law Division, where she was convicted of the purposeful and knowing murders of her mother and brother. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent life sentences with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility.
Defendant appealed the judgment of conviction. We affirmed, State v. Wiley, No. A-3514-91 (App. Div. April 26, 1994), and the Supreme Court denied certification, 144 N.J. 174 (1996). Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief in 1997, claiming the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirmed the denial of that PCR petition, State v. Wiley, No. A-1061-97 (App. Div. Oct. 2, 1998), and the Supreme Court denied certification, 157 N.J. 647 (1999). Defendant filed a second PCR petition in 2005. We affirmed the denial of that second PCR petition, State v. Wiley, No. A-4543-05 (App. Div. Dec. 29, 2006), and the Supreme Court denied certification, 190 N.J. 393 (2007). In 2006, defendant also petitioned the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus that was denied in 2008.
Defendant argued that her counsel was ineffective in failing: to call an expert witness at the waiver hearing; to move to change venue; and to advise defendant of the consequences of her testifying at the waiver hearing.
In her second PCR petition, defendant argued that: new evidence regarding her mental condition at the time of the murders warranted a new waiver hearing or a new trial; the sentence imposed constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment; the burden of proof was unconstitutionally shifted to her at the waiver hearing; and an evidentiary hearing was required to explore her ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.
In January 2011, defendant moved in the trial court for reconsideration of her sentence. That motion was denied by order entered on February 17, 2011. Defendant appealed, presenting for our consideration the following arguments:
I. [THE TRIAL JUDGE] INCORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF SENTENCE.
II. THE PROSECUTOR INCORRECTLY DECLINED TO JOIN IN THE MOTION.
III. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADMISSIBLE UNDER [VARIOUS RULES].
In this point heading, defendant cited Rules 3:21-10(b)(4), 1:12, and 3:22-4, in support of her argument that her sentence should have been reconsidered. She also cited Rule 3:7-15, which does not exist; the text of her brief in this regard is not sufficiently clear to permit an understanding of the precise rule defendant meant to cite when she referred to the nonexistent Rule 3:7-15.
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We find insufficient merit in these arguments to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing
is a true copy of the original on
file in my office
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CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION