Opinion
NO. 20-KA-23
09-22-2020
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. MATTHEW RICHARD WIGGINS
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, STATE OF LOUISIANA Ricky L. Babin Adam J. Koenig COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, MATTHEW RICHARD WIGGINS Wilbur W. Reynaud
**THIS OPINION HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS NOT FOR PUBLICATION**
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF ST. JAMES, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 78,64, DIVISION "C"
HONORABLE KATHERINE TESS STROMBERG, JUDGE PRESIDING ROBERT A. CHAISSON JUDGE Panel composed of Judges Marc E. Johnson, Robert A. Chaisson, and John J. Molaison, Jr. VACATED AND REMANDED
RAC
MEJ
JJM COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
STATE OF LOUISIANA
Ricky L. Babin
Adam J. Koenig COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
MATTHEW RICHARD WIGGINS
Wilbur W. Reynaud CHAISSON, J.
In this appeal, the State of Louisiana seeks review of the trial court's ruling that granted the "Motion to Enforce Agreement in a Confidential Hearing" filed by defendant, Matthew R. Wiggins. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the ruling of the trial court that effectively quashed the prosecution of defendant and remand the matter for further proceedings.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 6, 2017, the District Attorney for the 23rd Judicial District filed a bill of information charging defendant, in count one, with possession of cocaine, in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(C), and in count two, with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1. At the arraignment held on January 22, 2018, defendant pled not guilty.
Both the State and defendant, in their appellate briefs, suggest that defendant was charged with a third offense - possession of marijuana, in violation of La. R.S. 40:966(E). However, the bill of information contained in the appellate court record does not list a third offense.
On June 5, 2019, defendant filed a "Motion to Enforce Agreement in a Confidential Hearing." In the motion, defendant alleged that he had entered into a "plea type agreement" with the St. James Parish Sheriff's Office that was sanctioned by the District Attorney's Office, which provided that he would serve no jail time in connection with the current charges. Defendant claimed that he had fully complied with his portion of the agreement but that the St. James Parish Sheriff's Office and/or the District Attorney's Office were attempting to violate the agreement by now threatening to amend the original bill and charge him as a multiple offender. In the motion, defendant requested that the St. James Parish Sheriff's Office and the District Attorney's Office be required to comply with the plea agreement.
On June 24, 2019, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant's motion to enforce. At the hearing, Juliette Scioneaux, employed as Chief of Detectives by the St. James Parish Sheriff's Office Narcotics Division, testified regarding defendant's involvement as a confidential informant. According to Detective Scioneaux, on November 8, 2017, after defendant's arrest on the current charges, he met with two narcotics officers and signed a confidential informant agreement. Thereafter, in April of 2018, she, along with the two narcotics detectives who handled the initial confidential informant agreement, met with defendant and his attorney at defense counsel's office. With regard to that meeting, Detective Scioneaux testified that the arrangement was that defendant would have to make cases if he wanted any assistance and/or consideration regarding his charges. She specifically testified, "we worked out where he would have to make cases for us, what type of cases we were looking to be made, and who potential targets would be with him." Further, Detective Scioneaux stated that in exchange for defendant's assistance, "the D.A.'s Office would deem fit what they thought they would do with his charges."
Detective Scioneaux acknowledged that defendant completed one case that resulted in a guilty plea and had made "two buys" in a second case when some issues arose that resulted in the St. James Parish Sheriff's Office no longer using him as a confidential informant. During her testimony, Detective Scioneaux maintained that no specific offer was made that defendant would stay out of jail if he made cases but only that he would be given consideration regarding the charges. When asked about the involvement of the District Attorney's Office in these confidential informant agreements, Detective Scioneaux explained that the sheriff's office does notify the District Attorney's Office when a person signs up to be a confidential informant and advises it of the informant's progress.
Detective Scioneaux explained that after defendant made one or two buys, his name started coming up in a homicide investigation. She suggested that defendant submit to a polygraph test, which he failed. As a result, the sheriff's office started having "trust issues" with defendant and quit using him as a confidential informant.
Defendant also testified at the hearing. According to defendant, he was promised he would receive no jail time on the current drug and gun charges if he cooperated as a confidential informant and provided the sheriff's office with information regarding drug deals. Defendant maintained that he complied with his part of the agreement insofar as he completed two controlled buys and worked on a case that resulted in the conviction of a drug dealer. He testified that he was in the process of working on "a bigger case" with the sheriff's office when "it just stopped." Defendant further asserted that he was asked to help with a murder investigation but was unsuccessful in getting any information because his cover was blown on the street through no fault of his own. According to defendant, at that point, "they" changed the deal and threatened to charge him as a multiple offender if he did not plead guilty to the current charges.
During cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that he signed a confidential informant agreement in November of 2017, which provided that no promises were made in connection with his work. Further, he admitted that there was no written agreement that he would not receive jail time in exchange for his cooperation, nor was there any signed agreement setting forth the specifics of the leniency he would be given.
After considering the evidence presented, as well as the arguments of counsel, the trial court granted defendant's motion and ruled that the State could not prosecute defendant. The State thereafter filed a writ application with this Court seeking review of the trial court's granting of defendant's motion to enforce agreement. On September 11, 2019, this Court denied the State's writ application on the basis that the proper vehicle for seeking review of the adverse ruling, which quashed the entire prosecution, is by this Court's appellate jurisdiction, rather than its supervisory jurisdiction. This Court remanded the matter with instructions for the 23rd Judicial District Court to treat the State's notice of intent as a motion for appeal and to proceed accordingly. See State v. Wiggins 19-396 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/11/19) (unpublished writ disposition).
The State thereafter filed a motion for appeal that was granted by the trial court.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to enforce agreement and in thereafter quashing the bill of information charging defendant with possession of cocaine and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Specifically, the State asserts that defendant failed to satisfy his burden of proving the existence of a valid contract. The State points out that no specific promises were made to defendant regarding the status of his current charges, but rather defendant was only told that if he cooperated with the St. James Parish Sheriff's Office Narcotics Division, he may be afforded some consideration in connection with the current charges.
In response, defendant claims that he entered into a valid agreement with the State whereby he would receive no jail time on the current charges if he served as a confidential informant and assisted in obtaining two or three felony convictions. Defendant maintains that he successfully assisted in obtaining one felony conviction and was in the process of obtaining evidence for a second case when the State terminated its agreement with him and threatened to multiple bill him on the current charges if he did not plead guilty in another matter. Defendant contends that based on the fact that he complied with his obligation, he is entitled to enforcement of the agreement regarding no jail time, and therefore, the trial court correctly granted his motion and quashed the prosecution.
Having reviewed the record of these proceedings, including the June 24, 2019 transcript from the hearing on defendant's motion to enforce agreement, and the applicable jurisprudence, we find that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion and quashing the prosecution.
First, defendant did not file a motion to quash seeking a dismissal of the prosecution. Rather, throughout these proceedings, defendant only requested that the trial court enforce an alleged agreement that he would not serve jail time on the current charges. A request for the enforcement of an agreement that provided for no jail time does not necessarily require a dismissal of the charges. Therefore, the trial court clearly exceeded its authority in quashing the prosecution.
Second, defendant failed to prove the existence of any agreement with the State that provided for no jail time in exchange for his assistance. In determining the validity of agreements not to prosecute or of plea agreements, Louisiana courts generally refer to rules of contract law, while recognizing at the same time that a criminal defendant's constitutional right to fairness may be broader than his or her right under contract law. State v. Mitchell, 08-629 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/13/09), 7 So.3d 744, 751, writ denied, 09-254 (La. 10/30/09), 21 So.3d 270.
The first step under contract law is to determine whether a contract was formed in the first place through offer and acceptance. Id. A contract is formed by the consent of the parties established through offer and acceptance; thus, an enforceable contract requires a meeting of the minds. Unless the law requires a certain formality, offer and acceptance can be made orally. Ocampo v. Maronge, 17-403 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/17), 237 So.3d 627, 634, writ denied, 18-314 (La. 4/16/18), 240 So.3d 920. See also State v. Birgans, 45,982 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/26/11), 57 So.3d 478, 487, n.14, writ denied, 10-2561 (La. 11/4/11), 75 So.3d 917.
The party demanding performance of a contract has the burden of proving its existence. In the context of plea bargains, a defendant may demand specific performance of the State's promise if he can show that the parties reached an agreement, that he performed his part of the agreement, and that in doing so, he relinquished a fundamental right. State v. Robinson, 01-946 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/29/02), 807 So.2d 1085, 1089, writ denied, 02-638 (La. 11/1/02), 828 So.2d 563.
In the present case, as previously noted, defendant did not meet his burden of proving the existence of a contract. At the hearing on defendant's motion to enforce, Detective Scioneaux testified that the arrangement was that defendant would have to make cases for them if he wanted any assistance and/or consideration regarding his charges. She explained that in exchange for defendant's assistance, "the D.A.'s Office would deem fit what they thought they would do with his charges." During her testimony, Detective Scioneaux maintained that no specific offer was made that defendant would stay out of jail if he made cases but only that he would be given consideration regarding the charges.
At one point in her testimony, Detective Scioneaux agreed that the initial arrangement with defendant was that he had to make some cases in order to stay out of jail. She then clarified that if defendant wanted "any attempt" to stay out of jail, he needed to make cases.
In addition, defendant's own testimony supports our conclusion that no valid contract was formed. During cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that he signed a confidential informant agreement in November of 2017, which provided that no promises were made in connection with his work. Further, he admitted that there was no written agreement that he would not receive jail time in exchange for his cooperation, nor was there any signed agreement setting forth the specifics of the leniency he would be afforded.
Given this evidence, we find that defendant failed to prove the existence of a contract. Moreover, even if defendant had proved the existence of an agreement with the sheriff's office that he would serve no jail time, the law is clear that the district attorney is the only official with the authority to engage in a plea agreement on behalf of the State. State v. Runnels, 15-172 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/15), 182 So.3d 1245, 1250. Defendant clearly did not prove that he entered into any type of agreement with the State in connection with his current charges.
In fact, even the trial judge, in her reasons for judgment at the conclusion of the hearing, noted that there "obviously" was not a meeting of the minds. Even though the trial judge found there was no meeting of the minds, she nonetheless granted defendant's motion and quashed the prosecution. Her decision was based on the fact that defendant's attorney had not reviewed the confidential informant agreement signed by defendant on November 8, 2017. We note that this agreement was apparently signed prior to Mr. Wilbur Reynaud's representation of defendant as Mr. Reynaud's name does not appear in the record until the minute entry of February 26, 2018.
The testimony of both defendant and Detective Scioneaux at the June 24, 2019 hearing indicate that Assistant District Attorney Adam Koenig was present at one of the meetings that defendant and his attorney had with the sheriff's office. Detective Scioneaux, who was not present at the meeting, testified that it occurred "about a month or two ago" and pertained to defendant helping with a murder case. Defendant likewise referenced a meeting with "Mr. Adam," in which "Mr. Adam" allegedly threatened to multiple bill defendant on the current charges if he did not help with the murder investigation. Even though Mr. Koenig was present at one of the meetings with defendant, there was no evidence produced to suggest that any type of agreement was entered into between defendant and the State. --------
For the reasons set forth herein, we find that the trial court improperly granted defendant's motion and quashed the bill of information. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is vacated and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.
VACATED AND REMANDED