Opinion
2010012553
08-29-2023
STATE OF DELAWARE, v. DAHMERE WHITE, Defendant.
Submitted: July 3, 2023
ORDER
Jan R. Jurden, President Judge
Upon consideration of Defendant Dahmere White's Letter Motion, Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b), statutory and decisional law, and the record in this case, IT APPEARS THAT:
D.I. 36. Because White seeks a modification of his sentence, the Court interprets the Letter Motion as a Motion for Modification of Sentence pursuant to Rule 35(b).
(1) On August 22, 2022, White pled guilty to Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited ("PFBPP") (IN21-12-0973) and Gang Participation (IN21-12-0969). The same day, the Court sentenced White to a total of five years of unsuspended Level V time, effective October 27, 2020.
D.I. 32. Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Procedural Rule 11(c)(1), the Court personally addressed White in open court and determined that he understood the nature of the charge to which the plea was offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law. By statute and as listed on the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form, which he signed, White agreed to plead guilty, knowing he could be sentenced to a range of five to eighteen years at Level V. D.I. 32. See 11 Del. C. § 4205; 11 Del. C. § 616; 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(1).
D.I. 33. White's sentence is as follows: for PFBPP, 15 years at Level V, suspended after 5 years for decreasing levels of supervision; and for Gang Participation, 3 years at Level V, suspended for 18 months at Level III. Probation for the offenses was to run concurrently with any probation White was already serving. The first five years of White's PFBPP sentence are mandatory pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(1). Id.
(2) White filed a Motion for Modification of Sentence on November 14, 2022. The Court denied the Motion, holding it cannot modify minimum mandatory sentences and the sentence remained appropriate for all the reasons stated at the time of sentencing.
D.I. 34.
D.I. 35. See 11 Del. C. § 4205(d); 11 Del C.§ 1448(e)(1).
(3) In his Letter Motion filed on July 3, 2023, White asks for leniency for a compassionate release. White specifically requests that, pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 3901(d), the sentences for the following two charges run concurrently: PFBPP (IN21-12-0973) and Violation of Probation ("VOP") (VN19-08-3047-01). In support of his request, he states he is remorseful. He also states that as a result of his mother's recent death, his son is without a caregiver.
D.I. 36. White's circumstances do not fall within the scope of the statutes addressing sentence modification due to medical needs. See 11 Del. C. § 4217 (allowing a mechanism for sentence modification upon application of the Department of Correction where good cause exists, such as serious medical illness or infirmity); see also 11 Del. C. § 4346 (eligibility for parole).
11 Del. C. § 3901(d) states in relevant part: "[t]he court shall direct whether the sentence of confinement of any criminal defendant by any court of this State shall be made to run concurrently or consecutively with any other sentence of confinement imposed on such criminal defendant."
D.I. 36. The VOP stems from a Court of Common Pleas case, Case ID No. 1908012541.
Id.
Id.
(4) Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b) governs motions for modification of sentence. Rule 35(b) contains procedural bars for timeliness and repetitiveness. Under Rule 35(b), the "[C]ourt may reduce a sentence of imprisonment on a motion made within 90 days after the sentence was imposed" and will consider untimely motions "only in extraordinary circumstances or pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4217." Furthermore, under Rule 35(b), "[t]he [C]ourt will not consider repetitive requests for reduction of sentence."
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b).
Id.
Id.
Id.
(5) According to the docket in Case ID No. 1908012541, White has already completed his VOP sentence. Moreover, White's request for modification is procedurally barred because he was sentenced more than ninety days ago. White fails to establish extraordinary circumstances warranting a modification, and an application on his behalf has not been filed pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4217. Additionally, because White previously moved for sentence modification, the instant request is repetitive. White's sentence is appropriate for all the reasons stated at the time of sentencing.
D.I. 33. White was sentenced over a year ago on August 22, 2022.
To the extent his remorse and mother's death are meant to be interpreted as an assertion of "extraordinary circumstances," they do not overcome the high bar of proving "extraordinary circumstances" that an untimely movant seeking modification faces. See State v. Redden, 111 A.3d 602, 607 (Del. Super. 2015) (explaining that extraordinary circumstances must specifically justify the delay, be beyond the movant's control, and be the reason the movant was prevented from timely filing).
D.I. 34.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that White's Letter Motion is DENIED.