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recognizing that under "current practice" grand jury proceedings are not transcribed
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I.D. No. 1402016703
11-20-2015
STATE OF DELAWARE, v. THOMAS WEBSTER, Defendant.
Stuart B. Drowos, Esquire, Mark Denney, Esquire, Danielle J. Brennan, Esquire, Deputy Attorneys General, Department of Justice, 820 North French Street, Wilmington, DE 19899, Attorneys for the State of Delaware. James E. Liguori, Esquire, 46 The Green, Dover, DE 19901, Attorney for Defendant Thomas Webster.
Upon the State's Motion to Quash Defendant's Subpoenas Duces Tecum - GRANTED.
Upon Defendant's Motion to Interview Grand Jurors; Dismiss Indictment for Prosecutorial Misconduct and/or Selective Prosecution - DENIED.
Upon Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment - DEFERRED.
Upon Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Attorney General's Office - DENIED. OPINION AND ORDER Stuart B. Drowos, Esquire, Mark Denney, Esquire, Danielle J. Brennan, Esquire, Deputy Attorneys General, Department of Justice, 820 North French Street, Wilmington, DE 19899, Attorneys for the State of Delaware. James E. Liguori, Esquire, 46 The Green, Dover, DE 19901, Attorney for Defendant Thomas Webster. WHARTON, J.
1. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court are several motions filed by Defendant Thomas Webster and one motion by the State of Delaware in this matter. Specifically, before the Court are the State's Motion to Quash Defendant's Subpoenas Duces Tecum and Defendant Thomas Webster's Motion to Interview Grand Jurors; Dismiss Indictment for Prosecutorial Misconduct and/or Selective Prosecution; Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment; and Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Attorney General's Office. For the following reasons, the State's Motion to Quash Defendant's Subpoenas Duces Tecum is GRANTED; Defendant's Motion to Interview Grand Jurors; Dismiss Indictment for Prosecutorial Misconduct and/or Selective Prosecution is DENIED; Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment is DEFERRED; and Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Attorney General's Office is DENIED .
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 10, 2014, a Kent County grand jury was convened to hear testimony related to an incident involving Defendant that occurred on August 24, 2013 ("First Grand Jury"). The First Grand Jury ignored the indictment. On May 4, 2015, a second Kent County grand jury considered the same incident involving Defendant on August 24, 2013 ("Second Grand Jury"). The Second Grand Jury returned a True Bill against Defendant on a single count of Assault Second Degree. After the Second Grand Jury returned a True Bill, one of the grand jurors contacted the Court. On May 18, 2015, the presiding Superior Court judge held a conference with attorneys for Defendant and the State and advised them that the Court had received a phone call from a grand juror. The Court said the grand juror, "informed that she was very nervous and upset and felt that she was pressured and manipulated by the Attorney General in the presentation of the evidence, or the matters, I should say, that went to the Grand Jury." The Judge ordered that the transcript of the conference be sealed. All further filings dealing with the grand jury have been ordered sealed as well. In light of the Court's decision on the pending motions, by separate Order entered today, the Court has ordered all previously sealed docket entries unsealed.
Transcript of Conference (May 18, 2015).
On August 14, 2015, Defendant filed three motions: (1) a Motion to Interview Grand Jurors; Dismiss the Indictment for Prosecutorial Misconduct and/or Selective Prosecution; (2) a Motion to Dismiss the Indictment; and (3) a Motion to Disqualify the Attorney General's Office. All responses and replies were timely submitted for these three motions.
Along with these three motions, Defendant served subpoenas duces tecum on the Attorney General and two Deputy Attorneys General ("DAGs"). Defendant requested documents including any emails, texts, or other written communications between the Attorney General, the two DAGs, and any third party regarding presentment of the indictment to the Second Grand Jury. Defendant asserts that the information contained in these documents is needed to support his motions to dismiss for selective prosecution and prosecutorial misconduct.
Subpoena (Aug. 14, 2015).
On August 21, 2015, the State filed a Motion to Quash the three subpoenas duces tecum asserting that the documents are protected under the governmental privilege. On September 8, 2015, Defendant responded opposing the State's Motion to Quash. On September 11, 2015, the State replied, arguing for the first time that the subpoenas duces tecum should be quashed under Superior Court Criminal Rule 16. Because the State's Rule 16 argument was raised for the first time in its reply, the Court permitted Defendant to file a sur-reply, which was filed on September 17, 2015.
III. DISCUSSION
A. State's Motion to Quash Defendant's Subpoenas Duces Tecum.
Defendant's subpoenas duces tecum request "any and all e-mails, texts or written communications with regard to the presentment of the indictment of Thomas Webster to the Grand Jury on May 4, 2015, between/among you and any individual or entity." Defendant served the subpoenas duces tecum on the Attorney General and two Deputy Attorneys General ("DAG"). Defendant intends to use the requested documents in support of his motions to dismiss for selective prosecution and prosecutorial misconduct.
Id.
Id.
Thomas Webster's Sur-Reply to State's Reply in Support of its Motion to Quash Defendant's Subpoenas (Sept. 7, 2015).
The State contends that Superior Court Criminal Rule 16 prohibits the discovery of any information or documents identified in Defendant's subpoenas duces tecum. Rule 16(a)(2) provides which evidence or information is not subject to disclosure by the State:
State's Reply in Support of Its Motion to Quash Defendant's Subpoenas at 1-3 (Sept. 11, 2015).
Except as provided in paragraphs (A), (B), (D), and (E) of subdivision (a)(1), this rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal state documents made by the attorney general or other state agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case, or of statements by state witnesses or prospective state witnesses.Notwithstanding Rule 16(a)(2), Rule 16(a)(1)(C) provides which evidence or information is subject to disclosure by the State:
Upon request of the defendant the state shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph . . . documents . . . which are within the possession, custody or control of the state, and which are material to the preparation of the defendant's defense . . . ."This rule incorporates the work product doctrine. The work product doctrine prevents the disclosure of an attorney's or his agents['] thought processes." An essential purpose of the work product doctrine is "that a lawyer [is able to] work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel." However, this rule is broader than the work product doctrine because it protects disclosure of statements made by state witnesses or prospective state witnesses.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 16(a)(2).
State v. Capano, 1998 WL 729791, at *6 (Del. Super. Sept. 25, 1998).
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 16(a)(2); Capano, 1998 WL 729791, at *6.
Here, any emails, texts, or written communications made by the Attorney General or the two DAGs regarding presentment of the indictment to the Second Grand Jury are protected as "other internal state documents." Generally, Delaware courts have found that, inter alia, "other internal state documents" encompasses notes made by a prosecutor when interviewing a witness. There is no question that the two DAGs are "state agents" as contemplated by Rule 16. If the Court were to permit Defendant to discover and inspect the emails and text messages made by the Attorney General and the two DAGs, it would frustrate the purpose of Rule 16 because it would allow Defendant a window into the mental thought processes of the state agents in presenting the indictment to the Second Grand Jury. Such an inquiry into the State's strategy when preparing for presentment of an indictment to a grand jury is prohibited by Rule 16.
Williams v. State, 2014 WL 4179121, at *3 (Del. Aug. 21, 2014) (holding that a prosecutor's notes made during a victim's interview are not discoverable under Rule 16(a)(2)); State v. Rivera, 2014 WL 2538678, at *2 (Del. Super. June 4, 2014) (holding that a prosecutor's notes made during a victim's interview to police are not discoverable under Rule 16(a)(2)).
See Jackson v. State, 643 A.2d 1360, 1374-75 (Del. 1994).
Additionally, any statements made by state witnesses or prospective state witnesses are protected under Rule 16(a)(2). "A subpoena duces tecum may not be used either to ascertain the existence of documentary evidence or as a 'fishing expedition' to obtain statements of prospective witnesses that would not otherwise be discoverable." Defendant has failed to identify any specific witnesses' emails, text messages, or other written communications other than the Attorney General and the two DAGs. Permitting Defendant to obtain by subpoena all the emails, text messages, and written communications between the Attorney General, the two DAGs, and all other third parties with regard to presentment of the indictment would give him an unfettered view into the deliberative processes of the Department of Justice. The Court declines to afford him that view.
State v. Wood, 2007 WL 441953, at *2 (Del. Super. Feb. 1, 2007).
Additionally, and contrary to Defendant's contention, Rule 16(a)(1)(C) does not permit him to discover the requested documents. Defendant mistakenly argues that Rule 16(a)(1)(C) is listed as an exception to the prohibition against discovery of internal State documents under Rule 16(a)(2). However, the plain language of Rule 16(a)(2) clearly does not include subsection (a)(1)(C) as an exception to the general rule precluding discovery. "The goal of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to legislative intent." "Statutes must be read as a whole and all the words must be given effect." The omission of subsection (a)(1)(C) provides clear guidance to the Court that it was not intended to be an exception to Rule 16(a)(2). Accordingly, the State's motion to quash the subpoenas duces tecum is GRANTED.
Thomas Webster's Sur-Reply at ¶¶ 4-5.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 16(a)(2).
Eliason v. Englehart, 733 A.2d 944, 946 (Del. 1998).
Indus. Rentals, Inc. v. New Castle Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 776 A.2d 528, 530 (Del. 2001).
B. Defendant's Motion to Interview Grand Jurors; Dismiss the Indictment for Prosecutorial Misconduct and/or Selective Prosecution.
After the Second Grand Jury returned a True Bill, one of the grand jurors contacted the presiding Superior Court Judge and, according to the Court, "she was very nervous and upset and felt that she was pressured and manipulated by the Attorney General in the presentation of the evidence, or matters, I should say, that went to the Grand Jury." Based on this statement, Defendant asserts that "the Grand Jury was substantially manipulated and influenced by the behavior of the Deputy Attorney General" and that the DAG "engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in presenting the case to the Grand Jury." Defendant requests that the Court interview the grand jurors, with Counsel present, to determine whether other grand jurors felt pressured or manipulated.
Transcript of Conference (May 18, 2015).
Defendant's Motion to Interview Grand Jurors; Dismiss Indictment for Prosecutorial Misconduct and/or Selective Prosecution at ¶ 7 (Aug. 14, 2015).
Id. at ¶ 8.
Generally, grand jury proceedings are protected by a "veil of secrecy." Although compelling the disclosure of grand jury proceedings through examination of grand jurors is within the Superior Court's discretion, it "has seldom, if ever, been exercised." With the general rule in mind, "[t]he Superior Court may order disclosure of grand jury proceedings when: (1) 'the public interest in disclosure of the proceeding overrides the public interest in maintaining the secrecy of the Grand Jury proceeding;' or (2) 'the primary and traditional reasons for maintaining the veil of secrecy around the Grand Jury proceedings are no longer operative.'"
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 6(e)(2). See also State v. Wright, 2008 WL 4147575, at *1 (Del. Super. Aug. 27, 2008).
Wright, 2008 WL 4147575, at *1 (quoting In re Jessup's Petition, 136 A.2d 207, 215 (Del. 1957)) (internal quotations omitted) (denying the defendant's motion to compel disclosure of grand jury proceedings when the defendant claimed a need to review the proceedings to ensure that there was sufficient evidence to indict him on a charge that was dropped by the State before trial); Mell v. New Castle Cnty., 2004 WL 1790140, at *5 (Del. Super. Aug. 4, 2004) (finding that the identity of witnesses who testify before a grand jury are not subject to disclosure).
Wright, 2008 WL 4147575, at *1 (quoting Jessup, 136 A.2d at 218).
Defendant's motion to interview the Second Grand Jurors must be denied because he fails to show that "the public interest in disclosure of the proceedings overrides the public interest in maintaining the secrecy of the Grand Jury proceeding." Delaware courts have found that inquiry into post-verdict jury deliberations is prohibited even when one juror asserts she was harassed or intimidated by another juror. Here, Defendant relies solely on the grand juror's statement that she felt "pressured and manipulated" by the DAG in support of his motion. There is no evidence to suggest that the grand juror was threatened with physical harm or felt intimidated by the DAG. Defendant advances no other persuasive explanation or evidence why the Court should pierce the veil of secrecy given to grand jury proceedings.
Jessup, 136 A.2d at 218.
See, e.g., McClain v. Gen. Motors Corp., 586 A.2d 647, 652-53 (Del. Super. 1988).
Id. (stating that because the juror was not threatened with physical harm or complain of undue intimidation, the Court declined to further consider the juror's allegation).
Moreover, Defendant fails to show that "the primary and traditional reasons for maintaining the veil of secrecy around the Grand Jury proceedings are no longer operative." The primary and traditional reasons behind requiring secrecy of the grand jury proceedings may be summarized as follows:
Id.
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated;
(2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictments or their friends from importuning the grand jurors;
(3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before the grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it;
(4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information with respect to the commission of crimes;
(5) to protect (the) innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.
Jessup, 136 A.2d at 214-15 (quoting United States v. Amazon Indus. Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 261 (D. Md. 1931)) (internal quotations omitted).
Reasons (2) and (4) remain operative here. If the Court were to interview every grand juror that complained post-indictment of being "pressured or manipulated," the door would be opened for persons subject to indictments, or their friends, to pressure grand jurors post-indictment to make such a complaint and call the indictment into question. This risk frustrates the purpose of preventing harassment of grand jurors. Additionally, witnesses who provide information with respect to the commission of crimes may be reluctant to disclose such information if the veil of secrecy can be pierced merely by a juror who complains of pressure or manipulation. Defendant advances no argument as to why these reasons are no longer operative.
Even if the Court lifted the veil of secrecy, the grand jurors would be incompetent to testify at a hearing as to whether they felt pressured or manipulated by the DAG in their deliberations. "The courts have long condemned post-verdict [or post-indictment] questioning of jurors because of the potential for harassment and intimidation." Delaware Rule of Evidence ("DRE") 606(b) prohibits jurors from testifying "to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions" which influences the juror's assent to an indictment except where a juror is exposed to "extraneous prejudicial information" or any improper "outside influence."
Burke v. State, 484 A.2d 490, 500 (Del. 1984).
DRE 606(b) provides in full:
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect to of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror or whether a clerical mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
DRE 606(b) prohibits inquiry into a juror's mental processes. In Burke v. State, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a juror's interpretation of the demeanor of the defendant and how that interpretation influenced the juror's decision is the type of evidence contemplated in DRE 606(b). Similarly here, whether the juror felt pressured or manipulated by the DAG during the proceedings goes directly to the mental processes of the juror. Whether this interpretation of the DAG's actions influenced the grand juror's thought processes in returning a True Bill against Defendant is prohibited from inquiry by the Court under DRE 606(b). Additionally, inquiry into whether the other grand juror's felt pressured or manipulated is prohibited.
Burke, 484 A.2d at 501.
DRE 606(b) only permits inquiry into extraneous or extrinsic influences. "Extraneous or extrinsic influences have been construed to cover 1) exposure of jurors to news items about the matter pending before the jury, 2) consideration by the jury of extra record facts about the case, 3) communications between third parties and jurors relevant to the case to be decided and 4) pressures or partiality on the part of the court." "Intrinsic influences have been construed to include 'discussions among jurors, intimidation or harassment of one juror by another, and other intra-jury influences on the verdict.'" Here, any statements made by the DAG that caused the grand juror to feel pressured or manipulated were not an improper extrinsic influence. There is also no evidence that the DAG threatened or harassed the grand jury. Moreover, since the DAG was prohibited from participating in the Grand Jury's deliberations, any influence he may have exerted on the grand jurors was necessarily intrinsic to their thought processes, and, therefore, off limits to inquiry.
As noted in McClain, the House Judiciary Committee and its Special Subcommittee on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws explains the difference between "extraneous" and "extrinsic" in a Report of the Committee of the Judiciary:
[Under Rule 606(b), a juror] could testify as to the influence of extraneous prejudicial information brought to the jury's attention (e.g. a radio newscast or a newspaper account) or an outside influence which improperly had been brought to bear upon a juror (e.g. a threat to the safety of a member of his family), but he could not testify as to other irregularities which occurred in the jury room.
McClain, 586 A.2d at 651.
Id. at 652.
Defendant asserts that, "[t]he extent to which other Grand Jurors may have felt pressured or manipulated by the Deputy Attorney General is a factor the Court must consider in ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss." Because Defendant has failed to show that "the public interest in disclosure of the proceedings overrides the public interest in maintaining the secrecy of the Grand Jury" and because the inquiry requested by Defendant necessarily would intrude improperly into a grand juror's "mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the...indictment," the Court will not dismiss the Indictment.
Defendant's Motion to Interview the Grand Jurors; Dismiss the Indictment for Prosecutorial Misconduct and/or Selective Prosecution at ¶ 10 (Aug. 14, 2015).
Jessup, 136 A.2d at 218.
In the alternative, Defendant seeks dismissal of the Indictment based on a claim of selective prosecution. Specifically, he alleges that Defendant was singled out for prosecution for political reasons due to his race and position as a police officer. In order to support a defense of selective prosecution, a defendant "bears the heavy burden" of establishing: (1) that the defendant has been singled out for prosecution while others similarly situated have generally not been prosecuted for the same type of conduct, and (2) the State's discriminatory prosecution of him has been invidious or in bad faith, that is, based upon impermissible considerations such as race, or religion or the desire to prevent the exercise of constitutional rights. A defendant must, by producing some credible evidence, make a threshold showing of a "colorable basis" or "colorable entitlement" to his defense of selective prosecution before an evidentiary hearing will be afforded on the issue. In particular, some credible evidence must be adduced indicating that the prosecution intentionally and purposefully discriminated against the defendant by failing to prosecute other similarly situated persons. Applying the above standards, the Court finds that Defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issue of selective prosecution, nor has he met his "heavy burden" of establishing selective prosecution so as to warrant dismissal of the Indictment.
Defendant's Motion to Interview Grand Jurors; Dismiss Indictment for Prosecutorial Misconduct and/or Selective Prosecution at ¶¶ 14-18 (Aug. 14, 2015).
State v. Holloway, 460 A.2d 976, 979 (Del. Super. 1983) (citing United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d. Cir. 1973).
State v. Wharton, 1991 WL 138417 at *7 (citing United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d. 171, 181 (3d. Cir. 1973); United States v. Torquado, 602 F.2d 564, 569-70 (3d. Cir. 1979).
Id.
Defendant has failed to allege that other similarly situated police officers were not prosecuted for the same or similar conduct. Such an allegation, supported by some credible evidence, is the first step in establishing a claim of selective prosecution. The failure to meet that first step is fatal to Defendant's motion to dismiss on selective prosecution grounds. Moreover, the allegation that Defendant was selected for prosecution because of his race and position as a police officer in order to satisfy the political goals of the Attorney General overlooks the fact that it is entirely appropriate for a newly elected Attorney General to establish as a policy goal of his administration the elimination of the unlawful use of excessive force by law enforcement officers, especially against minorities.
The Court finds that Defendant has not made the threshold showing of a "colorable basis" or "colorable entitlement" to the defense of selective prosecution and, therefore, is not entitled to a hearing. The Court further finds that Defendant has not met his heavy burden of establishing the defense of selective prosecution. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Interview the Grand Jurors; Dismiss Indictment for Prosecutorial Misconduct and/or Selective Prosecution is DENIED.
C. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment.
Defendant moves to dismiss the indictment for what he terms "the State's purposeful harassment and violation of common law principles associated with the authority of the Grand Jury and post accusation delay" and Superior Court Criminal Rule 48(b). He alleges that "allowing a prosecutor to submit the same evidence to a second grand jury after a first grand jury returned a 'no true bill' would denigrate the authority of the Grand Jury institution, disrespect the work of the first grand jury, insult the public service rendered by our citizens who sat as grand jurors on the first grand jury and additionally rises to the level of post accusation delay." The State responds that Defendant's reliance on Superior Court Criminal Rule 48(b) is misplaced since Defendant had not been charged prior to an indictment being returned by the second grand jury. The State also argues that there is no prohibition on presenting a case to the grand jury a second time. There are flaws in both positions.
Motion to Dismiss the Indictment (Aug. 14, 2015).
Id. at ¶ 9.
State's Response to Motion to Dismiss at ¶ 2 (Sept. 14, 2015).
Id. at ¶¶ 2-5.
Defendant alleges that identical evidence was presented to both grand juries. The State neither agrees, nor disagrees with that assertion. In fact, under current practice where grand jury proceedings are not transcribed, there is no record of the grand jury proceedings for the Court to review to determine if both grand juries heard the identical evidence. The State argues that Rule 48(b) is inapplicable because Defendant was never arrested. The State is clearly wrong on this point since it has long been the law that an indictment may be dismissed for unnecessary pre-arrest delay.
State's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 2 (September 14, 2015).
See, Preston v. State, 388 A. 2d 562 (Del. 1975).
Defendant's claim that the Indictment should be dismissed because the State presented identical evidence to a second grand jury after the first grand jury failed to indict is without merit. As mentioned above, it has not been established that identical evidence was presented to both grand juries. Even if identical evidence had been presented to both grand juries, the State is not barred from seeking an indictment from a second grand jury on the same evidence since jeopardy has not attached and collateral estoppel is inapplicable. Moreover, while repetitive attempts to secure an indictment could constitute impermissible harassment, the Court finds that a single subsequent attempt to obtain an indictment does not rise to that level.
State v. McLaughlin, 1998 WL 110002 (Del. Super.).
Rule 48(b) provides, "[i]f there is unnecessary delay in presenting a charge to a grand jury or in filing an information or in bringing a defendant to trial, the Court may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint." With regard to pre-arrest delay, the Supreme Court of Delaware, in Preston v. State, held that in order to prevail on the issue of pre-arrest delay, a defendant must show that he was actually and substantially prejudiced by the delay. Here defendant has made no claim of actual prejudice, nor has he asked for a hearing under Preston. Nevertheless, Defendant is entitled to a hearing, at which he has the burden of proof, in order for the Court to consider (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the prejudicial effect of the delay; (4) whether defense witnesses have become unavailable by reason of the delay; (5) whether the delay was intended to prejudice the defendant; and (6) the kind of evidence and the quantum which is available to prove the State's case.
State v. Preston at 566-67.
Id. at 567.
Accordingly, a ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment is DEFERRED pending a Preston hearing.
D. Defendant's to Disqualify Attorney General's Office.
Defendant moves to disqualify the Attorney General's Office from prosecuting him because, as a result of information he hopes to develop through the subpoenas duces tecum he has issued, he intends to call as witnesses certain staff of the Attorney General's Office. The State opposes the motion. Since the Court has granted the State's Motion to Quash Defendant's Subpoenas Duces Tecum, it is unclear whether Defendant will call members of the Attorney General's staff to testify at trial. In any event, none of the subpoenas were directed to the trial prosecutors in this case. The Court finds no reason to disqualify the entire Attorney General's Office.
Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Attorney General's Office ¶¶ 11-13 (Aug. 14, 2015).
State's response to Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Attorney General's Office (Sept. 14, 2014). --------
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Attorney General's Office is DENIED.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State's Motion to Quash Defendant's Subpoenas Duces Tecum is GRANTED; Defendant's Motion to Interview Grand Jurors; Dismiss Indictment for Prosecutorial Misconduct and/or Selective Prosecution is DENIED; Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment is DEFERRED; Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Attorney General's Office is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________
/s/ Ferris W. Wharton, Judge
McClain, 586 A.2d at 651 n.10 (quoting Report of the Committee of the Judiciary, H.R., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1973)).