Opinion
Docket No. 28503.
Filed May 29, 2003.
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Boise County. Hon. Kathryn A. Sticklen, District Judge.
Judgment of conviction for felony driving under the influence, vacated and remanded.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Charles Isaac Wadams, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Gerald R. Weber appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon his conditional plea of guilty to felony driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). For reasons set forth below, we vacate Weber's judgment of conviction and remand.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Weber was charged with felony DUI, I.C. §§ 18-8004, -8005(5), and misdemeanor possession of an open container of alcohol in a motor vehicle, I.C. § 23-505. Weber filed a motion in limine, seeking to prohibit the state from using two 1998 misdemeanor DUI convictions to enhance his current DUI charge to a felony. Weber's motion was denied after a hearing. Thereafter, Weber entered a conditional guilty plea to the felony DUI charge pursuant to I.C.R. 11(a)(2), reserving his right to appeal from the denial of his motion in limine. The district court sentenced Weber to a unified term of five years, with a minimum period of confinement of one year. Weber's sentence was suspended, and he was placed on probation for five years.
Weber now appeals, asserting that the district court erred by denying his motion in limine. Weber contends that his previous misdemeanor convictions for DUI were invalid because his guilty pleas were not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Weber additionally argues that the trial court failed to comply with I.C.R. 11(c).
II. ANALYSIS
A. Constitutional challenge
We first address Weber's constitutional challenge to the validity of his 1998 misdemeanor DUI convictions. Where a defendant raises a constitutional challenge to a prior conviction used to enhance a DUI charge from a misdemeanor to a felony, the state bears the burden of making a prima facie showing of the validity of the prior conviction used to enhance the pending crime. See State v. Beloit, 123 Idaho 36, 37, 844 P.2d 18, 19 (1992). This burden requires only that the state produce the judgment of conviction or other evidence of the existence of the prior conviction. State v. Coby, 128 Idaho 90, 92, 910 P.2d 762, 764 (1996). Once the state has made the requisite showing, the burden of going forward with proof that the prior conviction was defective because of the denial of a constitutional right shifts to the defendant. Beloit, 123 Idaho at 37, 844 P.2d at 19.
The constitutional grounds upon which a defendant can collaterally attack a prior criminal conviction in a subsequent proceeding for enhancement purposes has been limited by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994). In that case, the Court held that the United States Constitution does not entitle a defendant to assert a collateral challenge to the validity of the previous conviction on constitutional grounds other than the denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Court reasoned that prior Supreme Court decisions reflected the theme that collateral attacks upon previous criminal convictions used for enhancement purposes were permitted on constitutional grounds only where the failure to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant was shown because such failure represented a constitutional defect with jurisdictional significance. The Court noted that a judgment entered by a court without jurisdiction was a void judgment subject to collateral attack. The Court also reasoned that ease of administration and the interest in promoting the finality of judgments provided additional support for its decision. In State v. Warren, 135 Idaho 836, 25 P.3d 859 (Ct.App. 2001), this Court followed Custis and held that a defendant may not collaterally attack a prior conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel for the purpose of defending against a subsequent persistent violator sentencing enhancement.
In the instant case, we acknowledge that the state was not seeking to enhance Weber's sentence for the felony DUI charge but instead sought to enhance the substantive offense from a misdemeanor to a felony. Nevertheless, the justifications relied upon by the United States Supreme Court in Custis for limiting a defendant's ability to collaterally attack a previous conviction in order to defend against a subsequent sentencing enhancement apply equally to the situation presented here. Therefore, this Court concludes that a defendant is not entitled under the United States Constitution to collaterally attack a previous criminal conviction in a subsequent proceeding for the purpose of avoiding enhancement of the substantive offense on constitutional grounds other than the denial of the right to counsel. Because Weber's constitutional challenge to the validity of his misdemeanor DUI convictions is based on grounds other than the denial of his right to counsel, we hold that Weber is not entitled to collaterally attack the validity of those convictions in the present proceeding on this basis. B. Separate State Law Challenge
We recognize that there are cases in which the Idaho appellate courts have addressed constitutional collateral attacks on previous DUI convictions for the purpose of avoiding a felony enhancement where the attacks were on grounds other than or in addition to the denial of counsel. See generally State v. Maxey, 125 Idaho 505, 873 P.2d 150 (1994); State v. Beloit, 123 Idaho 36, 844 P.2d 18 (1992); State v. Jennings, 122 Idaho 531, 835 P.2d 1342 (Ct.App. 1992). In our view, the holdings in these cases have been called into doubt by the subsequent decision in Custis to the extent that they permit constitutional collateral attacks on the validity of prior convictions on grounds other than the denial of the right to counsel. We note that in the only Idaho Supreme Court case to address this issue after Custis, the challenge asserted was the denial of the right to counsel. See State v. Coby, 128 Idaho 90, 910 P.2d 762 (1996).
We now consider Weber's contention that his misdemeanor convictions for DUI were invalid because the trial court failed to comply with I.C.R. 11(c) when it accepted his guilty pleas. Weber asserts that the magistrate's failure to comply with Rule 11(c) is an independent and separate state ground for Weber's collateral attack on the validity of his prior convictions. The Idaho Supreme Court, in State v. Maxey, 125 Idaho 505, 873 P.2d 150 (1994), addressed a collateral challenge to a defendant's previous DUI conviction on this basis. Although the decision in Maxey preceded the decision in Custis, inasmuch as the Idaho Supreme Court has not yet considered whether the holding in Custis applies to challenges under Rule 11(c), we are constrained to conclude that Weber is entitled to collaterally attack the validity of his misdemeanor DUI convictions on the basis that the trial court failed to comply with that rule.
When accepting misdemeanor guilty pleas, the trial court must follow the requirements of Rule 11(c). Maxey, 125 Idaho at 509, 873 P.2d at 154. Idaho Criminal Rule 11(c) provides:
Before a plea of guilty is accepted, the record of the entire proceedings, including reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, must show:
(1) The voluntariness of the plea.
(2) The defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea, including minimum and maximum punishments, and other direct consequences which may apply.
(3) The defendant was advised that by pleading guilty the defendant would waive the right againstcompulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront witnesses against the defendant.
(4) The defendant was informed of the nature of the charges against the defendant.
(5) Whether any promises have been made to the defendant, or whether the plea is a result of any plea bargaining agreement, and if so, the nature of the agreement and that the defendant was informed that the court is not bound by any promises or recommendation by either party as to punishment.
If the record demonstrates that the trial court followed the requirements of Rule 11(c), this is a prima facie showing that the plea is voluntary and knowing. State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991).
Weber contends that the trial court failed to follow the requirements of Rule 11(c) because it did not inform him that by pleading guilty he waived his right against compulsory self-incrimination and that it was not bound by the promises or recommendation from either party as to punishment. Weber additionally asserts that the trial court did not advise him that he was waiving his rights relative to both DUI offenses. In support of these claims, Weber submitted a transcript of the hearing at which he entered his misdemeanor guilty pleas as an exhibit at his motion hearing. That transcript is part of the record on appeal. Upon review of the transcript, we deem Weber's arguments to be without merit. The transcript shows that the trial court informed Weber that if he entered a plea of guilty to either of the DUI charges, he would be waiving his rights to remain silent, to have a trial by jury, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to present any defenses. In addition, the transcript reflects that there was no plea agreement in place. Therefore, it was unnecessary for the trial court to inform Weber that it was not bound by any promises or recommendation concerning his punishment.
Weber also asserts that the trial court failed to advise him of the consequences of pleading guilty. One of the requirements of Rule 11(c) is a showing that the defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea, including minimum and maximum punishments, and other direct consequences which may apply. At the very least, the record must show that a defendant understands the possible maximum penalty which would be imposed as a consequence of pleading guilty. State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 36, 557 P.2d 626, 630 (1976).
Here, the only discussion of the consequences of Weber's guilty pleas consisted of the trial court asking, "[Y]ou've reviewed this with your attorney . . . and you understand the consequences you think?" Weber's response to the trial court was, "Yes Ma'am." However, the record is devoid of any discussion concerning what Weber thought or understood those consequences to be. There was no discussion of the maximum punishment that could be imposed as a result of Weber's guilty pleas. Although Weber was represented by counsel at the time his pleas were entered, this Court cannot presume that Weber possessed such knowledge because the record also does not indicate that defense counsel informed Weber of what counsel believed the possible punishments to be. See Colyer, 98 Idaho at 36, 557 P.2d at 630. Because the record does not adequately demonstrate that the trial court complied with Rule 11(c) or that Weber fully understood the consequences of pleading guilty, the state did not meet its burden of showing that Weber's guilty pleas to the misdemeanor DUI offenses were valid. The resulting judgments of conviction therefore could not be used by the state to enhance Weber's underlying DUI offense from a misdemeanor to a felony. Under these circumstances, we hold that the district court erred by denying Weber's motion in limine to exclude his previous misdemeanor DUI convictions.
III. CONCLUSION
This Court concludes that, under Custis, Weber is not entitled to collaterally attack the validity of his previous misdemeanor DUI convictions on constitutional grounds other than the denial of the right to counsel. We further conclude, however, that Weber's challenge to the validity of his prior convictions on the basis that the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of I.C.R. 11(c) is not precluded by the decision in Custis inasmuch as our Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether Custis applies in such a situation.
Although the record demonstrates that the trial court adequately advised Weber that by pleading guilty he waived his right against compulsory self-incrimination, to have a trial by jury, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to present any defenses, we conclude that the record does not sufficiently demonstrate that Weber fully understood the consequences of pleading guilty. Therefore, the state did not meet its burden to show that Weber's guilty pleas to the misdemeanor DUI offenses were valid and the resulting judgments of conviction could not be used by the state to enhance Weber's underlying DUI offense. Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred by denying Weber's motion in limine. Weber's judgment of conviction for felony driving under the influence is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
Chief Judge LANSING and Judge GUTIERREZ, concur.