Opinion
NO. 2012 KA 1599
04-26-2013
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. TREVEL WATTS
Walter P. Reed District Attorney Covington, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee State of Louisiana By: Kathryn W. Landry Special Appeals Counsel Baton Rouge, Louisiana Bruce G. Whittaker New Orleans, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Trevel Watts Trevel Watts Cottonport, Louisiana Defendant/Appellant Pro Se
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from the
22nd Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of St. Tammany
State of Louisiana
Case No. 512692
The Honorable Martin E. Coady, Judge Presiding
Walter P. Reed
District Attorney
Covington, Louisiana
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
State of Louisiana
By: Kathryn W. Landry
Special Appeals Counsel
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Bruce G. Whittaker
New Orleans, Louisiana
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
Trevel Watts
Trevel Watts
Cottonport, Louisiana
Defendant/Appellant
Pro Se
BEFORE: GUIDRY, CRAIN, AND THERIOT, JJ.
THERIOT , J.
The defendant, Trevel Watts, was charged by bill of information with aggravated incest, a violation of La. R.S. 14:78.1, and entered a plea of not guilty. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress statements. After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty as charged. The defendant admitted to the allegations in the habitual offender bill of information, and the trial court adjudicated him a second-felony habitual offender, vacated the originally-imposed sentence of twenty years imprisonment at hard labor, and sentenced the defendant to thirty-five years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The trial court denied the defendant's motions to reconsider sentence. The defendant now appeals, assigning error to the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress and exclusion of proffered testimony to impeach the victim's credibility. The defendant further requests a review for error pursuant to La. Code Crim. P. art. 920(2). For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction, habitual offender adjudication, and sentence.
The bill of information originally charged the defendant with forcible rape (count one). The State amended the bill of information to add count two, aggravated incest. The counts were severed and the defendant proceeded to trial on count two.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
According to statements by the thirteen-year-old victim (C.C.) and the defendant (the victim's uncle), on June 27, 201l, the defendant vaginally penetrated the victim while she was visiting the defendant and her aunt at their home. The incident occurred after the victim's aunt left the home. In a recorded interview with Detective Vincent Cyprian of the St. Tammany Parish Sheriffs Office, the defendant stated that while he and the victim were alone in the home, she approached him while he was watching television in the living room, pulled down her pants, and asked him to touch her vaginal area before lying on the sofa with her legs open. After initially claiming that he only touched the victim with his hand or finger, the defendant ultimately admitted to putting his penis partially into the victim's vagina and immediately taking it out because the victim got teary-eyed.
The defendant was married to the victim's maternal aunt. The victim was thirteen years old at the time of the offense and fourteen years old at the time of the trial. Herein, only initials will be used to identify the victim. See La. R.S. 46:1844(W).
The victim, however, indicated that her four-month-old cousin and another child were present at the home at the time of the incident. Further, according to the victim, after her aunt left, the defendant began asking her questions of a sexual nature and told her to come into a bedroom with him. She complied, bringing the four-month-old baby with her. As the other child who was present in the home attempted to follow them, the defendant instructed him to stay in the living room. The victim further indicated that after she entered the bedroom the defendant told her to remove her pants, unbuttoned and unzipped his pants, and "raped" her. She confirmed that she used the word "rape" to label his act of putting his private part in her private part. The victim indicated that she closed her eyes and cried during the painful incident. The victim further testified that when she heard her aunt's car pull up, the defendant stopped, and she went into the bathroom, noting that she was bleeding at the time. The victim did not immediately tell anyone about the incident, but in early July 2011, she told her close friend, a schoolmate and fellow church member who was thirteen years old at the time of the trial, and the friend's mother, a children's and women's minister at the church.
The offense was reported to the police, and the victim was examined at the Louisiana Children's Hospital emergency room by Dr. Marlene Juarez, an expert in the field of pediatric emergency medicine. During the pre-examination interview, the victim alleged sexual penetration by her uncle with pain and B.R.B. (bright red blood indicating immediate injury and acute bleeding). Dr. Juarez testified that during the physical examination, she found that the victim had a hymen that had a defect in the rim at about the 3:00 position, like a "V" shaped notch instead of a smooth, circular border. She further testified that the results were consistent with the victim's allegations.
Noting that the examination took place nearly two weeks after the incident in question, Dr. Juarez further testified that it was possible that there would have been a more significant defect or injury had the examination been conducted in closer proximity to the incident, explaining the tendency of the vaginal area to heal in a brief amount of time.
Detective Cyprian was assigned to investigate the case. In addition to meeting with the victim and her father and conducting other interviews, on July 13, 2011, Detective Cyprian conducted a controlled recorded telephone call between the victim and the defendant. During the recorded and transcribed conversation, the victim stated she was scared and hurt and asked the defendant if he had anything to say about what he did and if he used a condom. The victim complied when the defendant asked her to repeat the second question, and the defendant then responded, "Yeah." The victim then informed the defendant that she might be pregnant to which he responded, "Oh. Oh okay then. Well look, hey look, we're gonna talk through this when you come down here allright?" The victim also asked the defendant, "Why did you do it?" The defendant responded, "Oh I, hey I really don't know. I don't know. We're going to talk through this later all right?" That same day, the victim was interviewed by JoBeth Rickles, a forensic interviewer at the Children's Advocacy Center, and Detective Cyprian conducted the recorded interview of the defendant the next day, July 14.
COUNSELED ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE
In the first counseled assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession. The defendant notes that Detective Cyprian admitted to speaking to him for as long as one hour before he began to record the interview. The defendant contends that Detective Cyprian promised leniency and that his confession was involuntary as a result of improper inducement and should have been suppressed. The defendant claims that there was no physical corroborating evidence and that the admissions he made outside of the interview in question were not as specific and detailed as his confession to Detective Cyprian.
On the trial of a motion to suppress, the burden is on the State to prove the admissibility of a purported confession or statement by the defendant. La. Code Crim. P. art. 703(D). In addition to showing that the Miranda requirements were met, the State must affirmatively show that the statement or confession was free and voluntary and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements, or promises in order to introduce into evidence a defendant's statement or confession. La. R.S. 15:451; State v. Hunt, 09-1589 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746 (the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was first advised of his Miranda rights). The State must specifically rebut a defendant's specific allegations of police misconduct in eliciting a confession. State v. Thomas, 461 So.2d 1253, 1256 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984), writ denied, 464 So.2d 1375 (La. 1985). In determining whether the ruling on the defendant's motion to suppress was correct, we are not limited to the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion. We may consider all pertinent evidence given at the trial of the case. State v. Chopin, 372 So.2d 1222, 1223 n.2 (La. 1979).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
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The admissibility of a confession is, in the first instance, a question for the trial court; its conclusions on the credibility and weight of the testimony relating to the voluntary nature of the confession are accorded great weight and will not be overturned unless they are not supported by the evidence. See State v. Patterson, 572 So.2d 1144, 1150 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990), writ denied, 577 So.2d 11 (La. 1991). The trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether a confession is admissible. State v. Hernandez, 432 So.2d 350, 352 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983). Testimony of the interviewing officer alone may be sufficient to prove a defendant's statements were freely and voluntarily given. State v. Maten, 2004-1718 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/24/05), 899 So.2d 711, 721, writ denied, 2005-1570 (La. 1/27/06), 922 So.2d 544. Further, when a trial court denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion, i.e., unless such ruling is not supported by the evidence. State v. Green, 94-0887 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, 280-81. However, a trial court's legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. See State v. Hunt, 2009-1589 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 751.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress and again at the trial, Detective Cyprian testified that the defendant voluntarily came to the Sheriff's Office complex where the interview was conducted. He was advised of his Miranda rights and a signed waiver of rights form was executed. The defendant indicated that he fully understood his rights and his waiver thereof. Detective Cyprian further testified that he did not make any promises or threats or coerce the defendant in any way to induce a statement. The defendant spoke freely and voluntarily, wanted to share his side of the story, and never asked to discontinue the interview. Detective Cyprian confirmed that the non-recorded portion of the interview lasted up to one hour. Detective Cyprian indicated that during that time period, after advising the defendant of his rights and executing the signed waiver of rights form, he asked the defendant background information regarding his relationship with the victim and developed a rapport with the defendant. The defendant initially denied ever being alone with the victim or having any sexual contact with her. The detective indicated that he encouraged the defendant to be candid and tell the truth. The detective activated the recording device when the defendant began making statements that he perceived as relevant to the victim's allegations.
This court has carefully reviewed the recorded interview. The defendant initially stated that he only touched the victim's vagina upon her request, but that he never penetrated her. Detective Cyprian stated that he believed most of the defendant's story but felt as though the defendant was not telling him the whole story. The detective reminded the defendant of the fact that he had already changed his story, as he initially indicated that he was never alone with the victim and never had any sexual contact her, and then admitted to touching her vaginal area. The detective further informed the defendant he was giving him an opportunity to tell him everything that happened. The defendant asked if he was going to jail, and the detective stated that he did not know whether the defendant would be going to jail, indicating that he had to discuss the case with his supervisor and make that determination. The defendant stated, "It looks bad for me though," and Detective Cyprian replied, "I wouldn't say it looks bad for you because you're being honest." The defendant then reiterated that he only touched the victim and did not penetrate her or go into a bedroom with her The defendant further reiterated that he was telling the honest truth. At that point, Detective Cyprian stepped out of the interview room for a brief period.
When he returned Detective Cyprian told the defendant that he was doing a good job so far and asked the defendant to repeat his side of the story in his own words. After the defendant again claimed that he only touched the victim, the detective informed the defendant that legwork was completed prior to the interview, including interviews of the victim and an examination of the victim at Children's Hospital, and that he had information that indicated that the defendant was not telling the whole story. The defendant then asked if his DNA was found in the victim. The defendant stated that after he barely touched the victim, he told her that he did not want to continue because it was "not right." After the detective questioned the defendant regarding the recorded telephone conversation between the defendant and the victim, indicating that he already knew the contents of the conversation, the defendant continued to deny any sexual intercourse. The detective repeatedly told the defendant that he did not believe the defendant was telling him the whole story. The defendant again expressed concerns about going to jail, and the detective repeatedly stated that he did not know and that he would discuss the matter with his supervisor. After the detective indicated that he could tell the issue was weighing heavily on the defendant and that he had more to tell, the defendant stated, "Okay, yes I did it ... I had sexual intercourse." At that point, the defendant admitted to placing his penis in the victim's vagina, indicating that it was quick and that he just stuck it in and out. He first indicated that he stopped when the victim started crying, but later clarified that she was not crying but had tears in her eyes.
At the conclusion of the interview, the defendant was allowed to make a telephone call in Sergeant Brian Beech's office. According to Sergeant Beech's trial testimony, during that telephone call the defendant was very apologetic to the recipient of the phone call, whom he presumed to be the defendant's wife. The defendant indicated that he had done something wrong and that he did engage in some type of inappropriate activity with the victim in this case. Sergeant Beech further testified that the defendant stated that he did it just one time and that he only stuck it in a little bit. The defendant did not testify at the hearing or at the trial.
After a careful review of the record, including the recorded statement, we do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to suppress. The testimony, the recorded statement, and the waiver form clearly establish that the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and that he executed a waiver of those rights. Further, the evidence indicates that the defendant knowingly and intentionally waived his rights. Detective Cyprian's testimony at the suppression hearing, which the trial court found credible, and at the trial, showed that the defendant appeared to understand his rights and demonstrated a desire to speak to the police and explain his version of the events. The trial court also found credible Detective Cyprian's testimony that he did not coerce the defendant. Detective Cyprian also testified that he did not make any promises to the defendant in exchange for a confession or threaten the defendant in any way. The defendant was asked to tell the truth and to tell the whole story. That the defendant may have subjectively believed or hoped that if he cooperated with the police he would have been allowed to leave, does not render his confession involuntary. The test for voluntariness of a confession requires a review of the totality of the circumstances under which the statement was given. State v. Lavalais, 95-0320 (La. 11/25/96), 685 So.2d 1048, 1053, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 825, 118 S.Ct. 85, 139 L.Ed.2d 42 (1997). We conclude, as did the trial court, that under a totality of the circumstances, the defendant's confession was not involuntary. The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress. Counseled assignment of error number one is without merit.
COUNSELED ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO
In the second counseled assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in excluding his proffered evidence that tended to impeach the victim's credibility. The defendant notes that in order to corroborate his claim that the victim was prone to solicit sexual activity, he sought to present evidence of a prior incident involving the victim. The defendant argues that the admission of the proffered evidence would have allowed the jury to weigh the credibility of the victim and possibly find her testimony unworthy of belief in view of her prior willingness to engage in such behavior. The defendant concludes that the exclusion of the evidence unfairly impinged upon his right to present a defense.
A criminal defendant's right to present a defense is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 16 of the Louisiana Constitution. However, constitutional guarantees do not assure the defendant the right to the admissibility of any type of evidence, only that which is deemed trustworthy and has probative value. State v. Governor, 331 So.2d 443, 449 (La. 1976); State v. Freeman, 2007-0470 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/14/07), 970 So.2d 621, 624, writ denied, 2007-2129 (La. 3/14/08), 977 So.2d 930. "Relevant evidence" is evidence that has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than without the evidence. La. Code Evid. art. 401. The trial judge, in deciding the issue of relevancy, must determine whether the evidence bears a "rational" connection to the fact at issue in the case. State v. Williams, 341 So.2d 370, 374 (La. 1976); State v. Harris, 2011-0779 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/9/11), 79 So.3d 1037, 1046. Except as limited by the Code of Evidence and other laws, all relevant evidence is admissible and all irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. La. Code Evid. art. 402. Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, risk of misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of time. La. Code Evid. art. 403. Ultimately, questions of relevancy and admissibility are discretion calls for the trial court, and its determinations regarding relevancy and admissibility should not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Duncan, 98-1730 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/25/99), 738 So.2d 706, 713.
Where, as in this case, the criminal defendant has confessed to having sexual intercourse with the thirteen-year-old victim, any evidence regarding the victim's sexual history is not relevant. Furthermore, any probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing and misleading the jury. See La. Code Evid. art. 403. We conclude that the trial judge properly excluded the evidence in question. Accordingly, we find no clear abuse of discretion in the trial court's relevancy and admissibility ruling at issue. Counseled assignment of error number two lacks merit.
COUNSELED ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE
In the final counseled assignment of error, the defendant urges this court to conduct a review of the record pursuant to La. Code Crim. P. art. 920(2). We routinely review the record on appeal in accordance with La. Code Crim. P. art. 920(2), even if there is no request for a review. The review is limited to errors discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings without inspection of the evidence. After a careful review of the record in these proceedings, we have found no reversible errors. See State v. Price, 2005-2514 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/28/06), 952 So.2d 112, 123-25 (en banc), writ denied, 2007-0130 (La. 2/22/08), 976 So.2d 1277. Counseled assignment of error number three lacks merit.
PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE
In the first pro se assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by imposing an excessive sentence. In support of this argument, the defendant notes that a punishment is constitutionally excessive if it makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment, is nothing more than the purposeless imposition of pain and suffering, and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the offense. Accordingly, the defendant also notes a trial judge has a duty to reduce such a sentence to one that would not be constitutionally excessive.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 20, of the Louisiana Constitution prohibit the imposition of excessive or cruel punishment. Although a sentence is within the statutory limits, the sentence may still violate a defendant's constitutional right against excessive punishment. In reviewing a sentence for excessiveness, the appellate court must consider the punishment and the crime in light of the harm to society and gauge whether the penalty is so disproportionate as to shock its sense of justice or that the sentence makes no reasonable contribution to acceptable penal goals and, therefore, is nothing more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. See State v. Guzman, 99-1528, 99-1753 (La. 5/16/00), 769 So.2d 1158, 1167.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1 sets forth items that must be considered by the trial court before imposing sentence. The trial court need not recite the entire checklist of Article 894.1, but the record must reflect that it adequately considered the criteria. State v. Leblanc, 2004-1032 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/17/04), 897 So.2d 736, 743, writ denied, 2005- 0150 (La. 4/29/05), 901 So.2d 1063, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 905, 126 S.Ct. 254, 163 L.Ed.2d 231 (2005). The trial court has wide discretion in imposing a sentence within the statutory limits and such a sentence will not be set aside as excessive in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Loston, 2003-0977 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/23/04), 874 So.2d 197, 210, writ denied, 2004-0792 (La. 9/24/04), 882 So.2d 1167.
In State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1280-81 (La. 1993), the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that if a trial judge determines that the punishment mandated by the Habitual-Offender Law makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment or that the sentence amounts to nothing more than the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime, he is duty bound to reduce the sentence to one that would not be constitutionally excessive. However, the holding in Dorthey was made only after, and in light of, express recognition by the court that the determination and definition of acts which are punishable as crimes is purely a legislative function. It is the legislature's prerogative to determine the length of the sentence imposed for crimes classified as felonies. Moreover, courts are charged with applying these punishments unless they are found to be unconstitutional. Dorthey, 623 So.2d at 1278.
Herein, the defendant's habitual offender adjudication as a second felony offender is based on a predicate conviction of possession of MDMA. The adjudication took place in the same proceeding as the original sentencing, just after the defendant admitted to the allegation in the habitual offender bill of information. As a second-felony offender, the defendant was subject, under La. R.S. 15:529.1A(1), to a minimum of ten years imprisonment at hard labor and a maximum of forty years imprisonment at hard labor. See also La. R.S. 14:78.1(D)(1). As previously stated, defendant was sentenced to thirty-five years imprisonment at hard labor. In imposing the original sentence, the trial court noted that it considered the nature of the offense, the tender age of the victim, and the fact that the defendant knew the victim was young, vulnerable, and incapable of resistance due to her youth. The trial court further noted that the defendant used his position within the family to facilitate the commission of the offense. The trial court specifically added, "He certainly knew the offense would create harm to the victim and this type of offense results in significant permanent affects to any victim of that age with the nature of this offense."
The trial court's reasoning and the record provide ample justification for imposition of this sentence. Based on the record before us, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing an enhanced sentence of thirty-five years imprisonment at hard labor. Considering the facts and nature of the offense, the sentence is not shocking or grossly disproportionate to the defendant's behavior. Pro se assignment of error number one is without merit.
PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO
In the second pro se assignment of error, the defendant argues that his punishment was initially enhanced, since pursuant to La. R.S. 15:537, he is ineligible for diminution of sentence. The defendant further contends that the subsequent enhancement of his sentence pursuant to the habitual offender law in La. R.S. 15:529.1 resulted in "double enhancement" or "cumulative and successive punishment" in violation of the Fifth Amendment constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments for a single offense and his constitutional right to due process of law.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Louisiana Constitution Article I, § 15 provide that no person shall twice be placed in jeopardy for the same offense. These clauses protect against three distinct abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Dunn, 96-0289 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/8/96), 682 So.2d 1309, 1311. Herein, the defendant contends his loss of good time credit and the enhancement of his sentence based on his habitual offender adjudication constitute two punishments for the same offense. Thus, the third of these protections is at issue in the present case. The Louisiana Supreme Court ruled in State v. Johnson, 94-0595, 94-1077 (La. 1/16/96), 667 So.2d 510, 513, that with respect to the definition of punishment "for purposes of double jeopardy," the Louisiana State Constitution provided no greater individual rights than the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and applied federal precepts when deciding the matter.
There is no constitutional right to good time. Howard v. La. Bd. of Probation and Parole, 589 So.2d 534, 536 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 590 So.2d 87 (La. 1991). The defendant, upon conviction, has only the right to be eligible for good time if authorized for such by the legislature. Additionally, good time credit is never guaranteed, but is earned through good behavior in prison. State v. Singleton, 96-203 (La. App. 5th Cir. 8/28/96), 680 So.2d 88, 92, writ granted in part, denied in part, 96-2380 (La. 2/7/97), 688 So.2d 486. As noted by the defendant, La. R.S. 15:537(A) requires that diminution of sentence for good behavior be denied to all persons who are convicted of or plead guilty to sex offenses, including aggravated incest. The denial of good time under La. R.S. 15:537 is founded solely on the fact of conviction of one or more of the sex offenses listed in the statute. Thus, in this case, based on the offense committed, the defendant was never entitled to diminution of sentence and there has been no punishment imposed in that regard. At any rate, the loss of good time is not criminal punishment for purposes of double jeopardy. See Duncan, 738 So.2d at 709-10 (holding that loss of previously earned good time credit does not constitute multiple punishment for the same offense and, therefore, does not constitute double jeopardy).
The legal principle of double jeopardy does not apply to habitual offender proceedings. Louisiana's Habitual Offender statute is simply an enhancement of punishment provision. It does not punish status and does not on its face impose cruel and unusual punishment. Dorthey, 623 So.2d at 1278-79 (citations omitted). Thus, the defendant's argument that the denial of good time and enhancement of his sentence under the habitual offender law is somehow double punishment for his offense is without any basis in the law. Based on the foregoing, the defendant has failed to prove any violation of the prohibition against multiple punishments for the same offense or due process. Pro se assignment of error number two is without merit.
CONVICTION, HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION, AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.