Opinion
No. 30810-0-II
Filed: November 30, 2004 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Clallam County. Docket No: 03-1-00138-3. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 08/15/2003. Judge signing: Hon. Kenneth Day Williams.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Sherryl A. Jones, Attorney at Law, PO Box 1869, Port Townsend, WA 98368-0058.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Lauren Michele Erickson, Attorney at Law, Clallam Co Prosc Atty Ofc, 223 E 4th St, Port Angeles, WA 98362-3015.
James M. Wallace appeals convictions for second degree vehicle prowling, two counts of second degree theft, two counts of second degree burglary, and possession of unlicensed explosives. He claims through counsel that the trial court erred by admitting his statements to the police. He claims pro se that the trial court violated his right to speedy trial, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that he was not tried by an impartial jury, and that he was improperly ordered to pay fines and restitution. We affirm.
The City of Forks experienced two burglaries in three days. Tools were missing at its waste water treatment plant and maintenance yard, and the chain link fence surrounding each of those facilities had been cut. Moody Construction, independent contractor for the treatment plant, also reported tools missing from its work site inside the treatment plant.
Several days earlier, LaDawn Justice, a resident of Forks, had reported a vehicle prowl in which a wallet containing both her ATM card and PIN number was taken. When Officer Bill Palmer asked First Federal Savings and Loan whether the missing ATM card had been used, First Federal produced a photograph that showed Wallace using it.
Jennifer Holmes contacted Palmer and Sergeant Tony Domish. She told them that her friend, James Wallace, had brought 15 or 20 tools to her house and stated, `[T]he City of Forks would be pissed off when they found out about this one.' She gave them Wallace's backpack, which contained miscellaneous tools, bolt cutters, a first aid kit, and explosive blasting caps.
3 Report of Proceedings (RP) at 16.
Domish and Palmer contacted Wallace, recognized him as the person in the ATM photograph, and arrested him for vehicle prowl and suspicion of burglary. Wallace asked how the officers knew about the vehicle prowl, and they told him about the ATM photo. Wallace asked if he could see it, Domish put it in front of him, and Wallace volunteered, `that sure could look like me.'
1 RP at 41.
According to the trial court's unchallenged finding, Wallace was then taken to a cell where Domish administered his Miranda rights. Wallace indicated that he might have information regarding some burglaries if Domish could help him take care of a storage unit on which he owed money. Domish said that he would see what he could do, and Wallace said he would speak with Domish later.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d. 694 (1966).
The next day, Domish told Wallace that he could take him out of jail to retrieve some of the stolen property but that he would need to get authorization and have a second officer come along. Wallace responded that Domish should `see what you can do.'
1 RP at 51.
After checking with chief of police and the prosecutor, Domish said he could take Wallace out of jail. Wallace responded, `I think I should talk to my attorney but I'm not going to, I'm going to trust you.' Wallace then directed Domish and Officer Imel to two different locations, from each of them the officers recovered stolen property from the burglaries. When Domish asked Wallace how he moved all the property by himself, Wallace responded that nobody had helped him with the burglaries.
1 RP at 52.
After returning Wallace to jail, Domish asked about a pair of sunglasses that had been recovered. Wallace then asked for an attorney, so Domish ceased questioning.
A week or so later, a friend of Wallace's named Jennifer Pierson told Domish that Wallace wanted to talk to him. Wallace had an attorney at this time. Domish and Pierson then called Wallace on a speaker phone. Domish asked Wallace if he had spoken to his attorney, reminded him of his Miranda warnings, and told him what Pierson had said. Wallace replied that he would selectively answer Domish's questions. When Domish asked if a certain car stereo had been taken out of a log truck, Wallace responded that he had taken the stereo out of a car that had been inside the City's maintenance shop.
After being charged, Wallace moved to suppress his various statements. The trial court denied the motion, and a jury found him guilty on all counts.
I. Admission of Statements
Wallace claims the trial court erred in admitting his pre- and post-Miranda statements. We review the trial court's findings of fact for substantial evidence. None of those findings is challenged here, so each is a verity on appeal.
State v. Cerrillo, 114 Wn. App. 259, 264-65, 54 P.3d 1250, (2002) (citing State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 644-45, 870 P.2d 313 (1994)).
State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 697, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997); Hill, 123 Wn.2d at 647.
Wallace argues that his pre-Miranda statement was inadmissible because he made it while being confronted with evidence of a crime. We disagree, as substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings that Wallace's statement was volunteered, spontaneous, and not in response to interrogation.
Wallace claims the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the statements he made and actions he took after receiving his Miranda warnings. He asserts that Domish deceived him by direct or implied promises and that his statements and actions were therefore obtained through improper influence.
The trial court must look to all circumstances to see if the statements were coerced. The court can consider any promises or misrepresentations made by the interrogating officers, but it must decide whether there is a causal relationship between the promise and the statements. The question here is whether Domish's behavior overbore Wallace's will to resist and induced a `not freely self-determined' confession. Domish testified that no deals or promises were made. Wallace testified that he had received and understood his Miranda warnings and that questioning had stopped when he mentioned an attorney. Wallace initiated the suggestion that he disclose the location of stolen property in exchange for Domish's help with his storage unit, so that can hardly have been coerced. Domish clearly stated the persons whose concurrence he would need, and Wallace noted that even though he should speak with his attorney, he had decided not to. There was substantial evidence that Domish did not overcome Wallace's will to resist, and the trial court did not err by declining to suppress Wallace's statements.
State v. Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d 118, 132, 942 P.2d 363 (1997).
State v. Braun, 82 Wn.2d 157, 161-62, 509 P.2d 742 (1973).
II. Pro Se Claims
Wallace claims that his right to speedy trial was violated. The facts needed to support this claim are not in the record, and we will not consider arguments not supported by the record.
State v. Lough, 70 Wn. App. 302, 335, 853 P.2d 920 (1993), aff'd, 125 Wn.2d 847 (1995).
Wallace claims that his counsel was ineffective by not removing a potentially biased juror and by failing to interview potential witnesses. To show ineffective assistance, he must show deficient performance and resulting prejudice. He has provided bare allegations but no evidence to support the claims of juror bias and failure to contact or interview witnesses. Thus, he has not shown ineffective assistance.
State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 226, 743 P.2d 816 (1987).
State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 335, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).
Wallace states the entire community was biased by an article appearing in the local newspaper about his trial. He concludes this made it hard for him to receive an impartial jury. We cannot review this claim because the facts needed to do so are not in the record.
State v. Johnston, 100 Wn. App. 126, 135-36, 996 P.2d 629, review denied, 141 Wn.2d 1030 (2000).
Wallace objects to being assessed $500 for his court appointed attorney, whom he claims was inadequate. RCW 10.01.160 authorizes recoupment of trial expenses from convicted indigent defendants. It is constitutional and does not violate due process and equal protection. The record does not show his counsel was inadequate. This argument fails.
State v. Blank, 131 Wn.2d 230, 239, 930 P.2d 1213 (1997).
State v. Campbell, 84 Wn. App. 596, 601, 929 P.2d 1175 (1997).
Wallace argues the court improperly ordered $1025 in restitution to Moody Construction because it recovered its stolen property. RCW 9.94A.753(5) requires the court to order restitution `whenever the offender is convicted of an offense which results in . . . damage to or loss of property.' Restitution must be based on a causal connection between the crime and the victim's damages. The owner of Moody Construction testified he lost a leaf blower worth $500, a belt sander worth $250, a drill worth $199, and a palm sander worth $350. He paid $1299 for replacements so he could continue his work. This cost was causally related to the burglary, and the trial court did not err. We affirm.
State v. Dedonado, 99 Wn. App. 251, 256, 991 P.2d 1216 (2000).
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
ARMSTRONG and HUNT, JJ., Concur.