Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3131-12T4
05-29-2015
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. BRIAN WAKEFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (William Welaj, Designated Counsel, on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Daniel I. Bornstein, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Simonelli and Guadagno. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, Indictment No. 01-04-0673. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (William Welaj, Designated Counsel, on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Daniel I. Bornstein, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Brian Wakefield appeals from the July 10, 2012 Law Division order, which denied his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
We derive the following facts from the record. Defendant confessed and pled guilty to the murders of Richard and Shirley Hazard. On March 4, 2004, he was sentenced to death. On May 7, 2007, our Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397 (2007). On July 23, 2007, the Court denied defendant's motion for reconsideration.
On December 17, 2007, capital punishment was abolished in New Jersey, L. 2007, c. 204. As a result, defendant's death sentence was commuted to life without parole. On January 14, 2008, the Supreme Court of the United States denied defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. Wakefield v. New Jersey, 552 U.S. 1146, 128 S. Ct. 1074, 169 L. Ed. 2d 817 (2008).
On September 14, 2010, defendant filed a PCR petition, arguing that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by advising him that he would not receive the death penalty if he pled guilty and by failing to grant him access to discovery and advise him that he could testify at his Miranda hearing.
In a June 22, 2012 written opinion, Judge Mark H. Sandson held that the petition was time-barred by Rule 3:22-12(b) because it was not filed within thirty days of the denial of certiorari. The judge also held that the petition was barred by the five-year requirement of Rule 3:22-12(a), which commenced upon entry of the judgment of conviction and was neither stayed nor tolled by an appellate or other proceeding. The judge determined that defendant failed to show exceptional circumstances for the late filing and the State would be substantially prejudiced.
Addressing the merits, Judge Sandson found no support for defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The judge noted that defendant acknowledged four times during the plea hearing that he could possibly receive the death penalty if he pled guilty, defendant agreed to allow the court to utilize discovery in the case in accepting the plea, and defendant did not complain that he was deprived of discovery. The judge determined that trial counsel made a sound strategic decision to not to have defendant testify at the Miranda hearing and, even if defendant had testified, it would not have changed the outcome.
On appeal, defendant raises the following contentions:
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR [PCR] WITHOUT AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO FULLY ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT HE FAILED TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL REPRESENTATION FROM TRIAL COUNSEL, AS A RESULT OF WHICH HIS ENSUING GUILTY PLEA
WAS NOT FREELY, VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY ENTERED.
A. THE PREVAILING LEGAL PRINCIPLES REGARDING CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ARISING OUT OF THE ENTRY OF GUILTY PLEAS, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS AND PETITIONS FOR [PCR].
B. THE DEFENDANT PRESENTED A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHICH RESULTED IN A GUILTY PLEA WHICH WAS NOT FREELY, KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED, WARRANTING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
1. Factual Background.
2. The relevant legal principles and case law with respect to Miranda hearings, a defendant's right to testify, and requests to withdraw a guilty plea.
3. The need for an evidentiary hearing based upon the defendant's factual contentions.
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR [PCR], IN PART, ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS PURSUANT TO RULE 3:22-12(a).
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR [PCR], IN PART, ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS PURSUANT TO RULE 3:22-12(b).
We have considered these contentions in light of the record and applicable legal principles and conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Sandson in his comprehensive and well-reasoned written opinion.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).