Opinion
2021KA0521-R
05-23-2024
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. KYRAN JAVON VAUGHN
J. Collin Sims District Attorney Matthew Caplan Assistant District Attorney Covington, LA Attorneys for Appellee, State of Louisiana Marcus J. Plaisance Mark D. Plaisance Prairieville, LA Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant, Kyran Javon Vaughn
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
On Appeal from the 22nd Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of St. Tammany State of Louisiana Trial Court No. 581744 Honorable Raymond S. Childress, Judge Presiding
J. Collin Sims District Attorney Matthew Caplan Assistant District Attorney Covington, LA Attorneys for Appellee, State of Louisiana
Marcus J. Plaisance Mark D. Plaisance Prairieville, LA Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant, Kyran Javon Vaughn
BEFORE: CHUTZ, HESTER, AND MILLER, JJ.
HESTER, J.
The defendant, Kyran Javon Vaughn, was charged by bill of information with armed robbery with a firearm (Count 1), a violation of La. R.S. 14:64 and La. R.S. 14:64.3; and obstruction of justice (Count 2), a violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1. Following a trial by jury in July of 2017, the defendant was found guilty of the responsive verdict of first degree robbery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:64.1, and guilty as charged of obstruction of justice. Both verdicts were non-unanimous.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The defendant was subsequently adjudicated a second felony offender and, pursuant to Louisiana's habitual offender statute, was ordered to serve an enhanced sentence of twenty years at hard labor for first degree robbery, and an unenhanced sentence of ten years at hard labor for obstruction of justice, to be served concurrently.
This court affirmed the defendant's convictions, habitual offender adjudication, and sentences. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court remanded the matter for resentencing of defendant's enhanced sentence for first degree robbery, pursuant to State v. Lyles, 2019-00203 (La. 10/22/19), 286 So.3d 407 (per curiam). As to the defendant's convictions and habitual offender adjudication, the writ application was denied. See State v. Vaughn, 2018-0344 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/24/18), 259 So.3d 1048, writ granted in part for resentencing, otherwise denied. 2018-01750 (La. 11/25/19), 283 So.3d 494.
On remand, the defendant was resentenced to eighteen years imprisonment at hard labor for first degree robbery. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to reconsider sentence and the defendant again appealed, assigning error under Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S.___, 140 S.Ct. 1390, 206 L.Ed.2d 583 (2020), to the non-unanimous jury verdicts returned in his case, and to the excessiveness of his sentence. Finding merit in the defendant's first assignment of error, this court vacated the defendant's convictions, habitual offender adjudication, and sentences. See State v. Vaughn, 2021-0521 (La.App. 1st Cir. 12/30/21), 2021 WL 6316618 (unpublished).
Although the minutes reflect that the defendant's sentence often years at hard labor for obstruction of justice was also enhanced pursuant to the habitual offender statute, this sentence was not considered at the resentencing hearing on remand, and the defendant did not object to or assign error to this sentence either at the hearing or in the instant appeal. Thus, further consideration of this sentence is pretermitted. See State v. Jarvis, 2021-1181 (La.App. 1st Cir. 2/25/22), 340 So.3d 1137, 1141-42.
In Vaughn, 2021 WL 6316618, this court held that because the defendant's sentence was not final, the defendant's case remained on direct appeal at the time the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in Ramos, thus requiring that the defendant's convictions, habitual offender adjudication, and sentences be vacated, and the case remanded for a new trial. Vaughn, 2021 WL 6316618 at* 4.
The State of Louisiana then sought supervisory review, whereupon the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed this court's ruling vacating the defendant's convictions, habitual offender adjudications, and sentences, and remanded the matter back to this court for consideration of the defendant's remaining assignment of error. See State v. Vaughn, 2022-00214 (La. 5/5/23), 362 So.3d 363, cert, denied, 144 S.Ct. 554, 217 L.Ed.2d 295 (2024). On remand, we now address the defendant's second assignment of error previously raised in Vaughn, 2021 WL 6316618; namely, that his eighteen-year sentence is unconstitutionally excessive.
On review, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that once the defendant's conviction was final, his case was no longer on direct review for purposes of Ramos. Vaughn, 362 So.3d at 367.
FACTS
The facts of this case were fully set forth in the defendant's prior appeal, and show that the victim, Jessie Oates, was robbed by two men while he was walking down the street. Oates testified that one of the men, later identified as the defendant, pointed a gun at him while wearing a hockey mask, and demanded he empty his pockets. Oates then handed over his backpack, containing an iPad and headphones, and ran away unharmed. Oates later received a letter in which he was offered cash in return for dropping the charges against the defendant. Evidence adduced at trial suggested that the letter was written by the defendant. Vaughn, 259 So.3d at 1053-56.
EXCESSIVE SENTENCE
In his sole remaining assignment of error, the defendant contends that his eighteen-year enhanced sentence is unconstitutionally excessive.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 20 of the Louisiana Constitution prohibit the imposition of cruel or excessive punishment. A sentence within statutory limits may still be considered excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense, or is nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. A sentence is grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, the sentence shocks the sense of justice. State v. Anderson, 2022-0587 (La.App. 1st Cir. 12/22/22), 357 So.3d 845, 852, writ denied, 2023-00352 (La. 9/6/23), 369 So.3d 1267.
The trial court has great discretion in imposing a sentence within the statutory limits, and such a sentence will not be set aside as excessive in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 894.1 sets forth the factors for the trial court to consider when imposing a sentence. While the entire checklist of Article 894.1 need not be recited, the record must reflect the trial court adequately considered the criteria. Anderson, 357 So.3d at 852.
The articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of La. Code Crim. P. art. 894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. Where the record clearly shows an adequate factual basis for the sentence imposed, remand is unnecessary even where there has not been full compliance with Article 894.1. The trial judge should review the defendant's personal history, his prior criminal record, the seriousness of the offense, the likelihood that he will commit another crime, and his potential for rehabilitation through correctional services other than confinement. On appellate review, the relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. Anderson, 357 So.3d at 852.
In State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1280-81 (La. 1993), the Louisiana Supreme Court opined that a trial judge would have the option, and indeed the duty, to reduce a sentence if the enhanced punishment mandated by the Habitual Offender Law made no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment. Should the trial judge find that the prescribed sentence amounted to nothing more than the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering and was grossly out of proportion to the severity of the offense, the trial judge could reduce the sentence imposed to one that would not be constitutionally excessive. Id.
In State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 676-77, the Louisiana Supreme Court further examined the issue of when a downward departure from a mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is permitted. Johnson held that to rebut the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence is constitutional, the defendant must clearly and convincingly show that he is exceptional. That is, because of unusual circumstances, this defendant is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offence, and the circumstances of the case. Id. at 676. While both Dorthey and Johnson involve departure from mandatory minimum sentences, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the principles set forth therein apply broadly to the penalties provided by La. R.S. 15:529.1. See State v. Fobbs, 99-1024 (La. 9/24/99), 744 So.2d 1274 (per curiam); State v. Collins, 2009-1617 (La.App. 1st Cir. 2/12/10), 35 So.3d 1103, 1108-09, writ denied. 2010-0606 (La. 10/8/10), 46 So.3d 1265.
First degree robbery is the taking of anything of value belonging to another from the person of another, or that is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, when the offender leads the victim to reasonably believe he is armed with a dangerous weapon. La. R.S. 14:64.1(A). Whoever commits the crime of first degree robbery shall be imprisoned for not less than three years and for not more than forty years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:64.1(B).
Herein, the defendant was adjudicated a second-felony habitual offender under La. R.S. 15:529.1 based upon his 2015 conviction for simple kidnapping. Prior to November 1, 2017, the Habitual Offender Law provided that for a second felony offense, the sentence imposed shall be not less than one-half the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction. See La. Acts 2017, No. 282, § 1. Following its amendment by Act 282, the law now provides for a sentence not less than one-third the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction. See La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1).Accordingly, the defendant faced an enhanced sentencing range of thirteen and one-third years to eighty years imprisonment for the offense of first degree robbery.
Prior to its amendment by La. Acts 2017, No. 282, § 1, the defendant faced a sentencing range of twenty years to eighty years imprisonment for the offense of first degree robbery.
Because the defendant's convictions became final after November 1,2017, he was eligible to receive the benefits of all ameliorative changes made by Act 282. See Lyles, 286 So.3d at 410.
At the defendant's initial sentencing hearing in which he was sentenced as a second felony offender to twenty years imprisonment, the trial court considered "that this was a crime of violence that was conducted with a dangerous weapon, which the testimony indicated was a gun. That any time . . . this happens, the chance of serious bodily injury is there." The trial court further noted that the defendant's first conviction for simple kidnapping, as well as the instant conviction for first degree robbery, were both crimes of violence, and that they were committed in rapid succession to one another. Accordingly, the trial court found that "the defendant apparently does not have a great concern about the safety of others. So, to impose a lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of this offense."
A resentencing hearing was held on August 31, 2020, wherein the defendant argued that he was nineteen at the time the instant offense was committed, and that while incarcerated the defendant was trying to improve himself. Moreover, defense counsel argued the case against the defendant had "some evidentiary issues[,]" pointing to the jury's return of a responsive verdict and the co-defendant's subsequent arrest for attempted murder. The State argued in response that while the defendant's predicate conviction was for simple kidnapping, the details of that incident involved the use of a firearm. Thus, because both of the defendant's convictions involved the use of a dangerous weapon, the State urged the trial court to maintain the defendant's previous sentence of twenty years imprisonment. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court resentenced the defendant to eighteen years imprisonment as a second felony offender.
The defendant then filed a motion to reconsider sentence under La. Code Crim. P. art. 881.1. The trial court denied the motion after a hearing on the matter, maintaining the eighteen-year sentence.
On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court's sentence failed to account for his age at the time of the predicate offense, noting that he was only seventeen when he committed simple kidnapping. The defendant further contends the trial court failed to take into consideration the fact that the jury returned a non-unanimous, responsive verdict.
A thorough review of the entire record reveals the trial court adequately considered the criteria of La. Code Crim. P. art. 894.1 prior to sentencing. The trial court expressed concern over the defendant's youth, while also noting that both of his convictions were crimes of violence involving the use of a firearm. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 894.1(A)(1), (A)(2), (A)(3), (B)(10), (B)(12), (B)(21). Under the ameliorative changes to the law, the defendant's sentencing range was thirteen and one-third years to eighty years imprisonment at hard labor and the trial court resentenced him on the very low end of this sentencing range. As such, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when sentencing the defendant. See State v. Joseph, 2012-0085 (La.App. 1st Cir. 2/15/13), 2013 WL 596149, *3 (unpublished) (wherein this court affirmed the twenty-year sentence of a first-time felony offender, noting the trial court's finding that the defendant "committed the act of taking property from a victim while armed with a handgun, and there is an undue risk that he would commit another crime during the period of a suspended sentence or probation"); see also State v. Taves, 2003-0518 (La. 12/3/03), 861 So.2d 144,148 (per curiam) ("Although no factor is accorded greater weight than any other factor by the statute, '[i]n assessing the nature and gravity of an offense, the courts have repeatedly emphasized the element of violence and danger to the person."').
While the defendant was a young man at the time both the instant and prior felonies were committed, the offenses were very serious in nature and occurred in rapid succession to one another. In this case, the evidence showed that the defendant, while on felony probation for kidnapping, wore a mask over his face and threatened Oates with a long gun before robbing him of his belongings. The defendant's actions in the instant case evidenced a general disregard for the law and for the safety of others. Moreover, the trial court was clearly aware of the defendant's age as the court noted during the initial sentencing that it was pained "to see a young man such as yourself... where now at twenty (20) years of age you're facing a long stretch in prison[.]"
As to the defendant's assertion that the trial court failed to consider that the jury in his case returned a non-unanimous, responsive verdict, we find this argument unpersuasive. Initially, we note that the fact that the defendant's verdict was responsive and non-unanimous does not detract from the seriousness of his crime or the danger caused by his actions. Furthermore, while the defendant was found guilty of the responsive verdict of first degree robbery, as opposed to the charged offense of armed robbery, the fact that a responsive verdict was returned is not a relevant sentencing consideration. The defendant was sentenced for the crime for which he was convicted, not for which he was originally charged. Finally, given the trial court imposed a sentence at the very low end of the sentencing range that included a maximum sentence of eighty years imprisonment, we find that the sentence imposed herein is not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense and, therefore, is not unconstitutionally excessive. See State v. Chaney, 2020-0981 (La.App. 1st Cir. 6/4/21), 327 So.3d 1038, 1047, writ denied. 2021-01204 (La. 11/10/21), 326 So.3d 1251. This assignment of error is without merit.
PATENT ERROR
Under La. Code Crim. P. art. 920(2), an appellate court is limited in its review to errors discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings without inspection of the evidence. State v. Kimble, 2023-0176 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/21/23), 376 So.3d 869, 877. After a careful review of the record, we have found a patent error.
The trial court resentenced the defendant to eighteen years at hard labor under the provisions of La. R.S. 15:529.1. However, the trial court failed to impose the necessary restrictions to parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. See La. R.S. 14:64.1(B) ("Whoever commits the crime of first degree robbery shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than three years and for not more than forty years, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of imposition or execution sentence.").
Any sentence imposed under the provisions of the Habitual Offender Law shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). Additionally, a sentence enhanced under the Habitual Offender Law is computed by referring to the underlying offense. Therefore, a defendant's enhanced sentences are required to contain the appropriate restrictions of parole from their underlying statute. See State v. Carvin, 2014-1017 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1/15/15), 2015 WL 224063, *8 (unpublished).
When a criminal statute requires that all or a portion of a sentence imposed for a violation of that statute be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, each sentence which is imposed under the provisions of that statute shall be deemed to contain the provisions relating to the service of that sentence without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The failure of a sentencing court to specifically state that all or a portion of a sentence is to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence shall not in any way affect the statutory requirement that all or a portion of the sentence be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:301.1(A).
Therefore, under this self-activating provision, the defendant's sentence is amended to be eighteen years at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. See La. R.S. 14:64.1(B); Carvin, 2015 WL 224063 at *8. We therefore affirm the defendant's sentence as amended, and remand to the trial court for correction of the minutes and the order of commitment.
SENTENCE ON COUNT I AMENDED AND AFFIRMED AS AMENDED; REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF THE MINUTES AND COMMITMENT ORDER.