Opinion
No. 25824-6-III.
January 22, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Spokane County, No. 05-1-02440-3, Gregory D. Sypolt, J., entered December 18, 2006.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Brown, J., concurred in by Schultheis, A.C.J., and Thompson, J. Pro Tem.
Roger Trower appeals his methamphetamine possession conviction, contending his speedy trial rights were violated because the State failed to act with due diligence in attempting to locate him in an Idaho prison and inform him of the Washington charges. We affirm.
FACTS
On August 18, 2004, Corrections Officer Jeff Hawkins arrested Mr. Trower for an Idaho probation violation. During a search of his person, officers found a bottle containing methamphetamine and arrested Mr. Trower for possession of a controlled substance. No Washington charges were filed at the time of arrest, although Mr. Trower first appeared in district court. Mr. Trower remained in the Spokane County jail for the probation violation before being transported to Idaho. An Idaho court sentenced Mr. Trower to 19 months in prison for the probation violation. Mr. Trower did not inform the Washington superior court or the prosecutor of his change in address.
On July 21, 2005, the prosecutor charged Mr. Trower with possession of a controlled substance. The prosecutor conducted an address search, mailing a summons to Mr. Trower's last known address informing him of the August 8, 2005 arraignment. The notice was sent to "222 South Howard St., Spokane, WA." Clerk's Papers at 95. Mr. Trower failed to appear at the arraignment and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest.
In December 2005, Mr. Trower became aware of the arrest warrant through an unknown source, but did not contact the prosecutor's office or the superior court. On March 7, 2006, the prosecutor learned of Mr. Trower's whereabouts, and on March 17, 2006, Mr. Trower was released from Idaho custody. Mr. Trower was arrested on the Washington warrant March 20; he had his first appearance on March 23; and was arraigned on April 5, 2006. Two months later, Mr. Trower moved to dismiss for a speedy trial violation, alleging the prosecutor failed to exercise due diligence in locating him to inform him of the charges. The court denied his motion and found him guilty during a bench trial. Mr. Trower appeals.
ANALYSIS
The issue is whether the trial court erred in denying Mr. Trower's speedy trial motion and rejecting his assertion that the State failed to exercise due diligence in attempting to locate and notify him of the charges causing undue delay.
We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to dismiss for a speedy trial violation. City of Seattle v. Guay, 150 Wn.2d 288, 295, 76 P.3d 231 (2003).
CrR 3.3 guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a speedy trial. State v. Welker, 157 Wn.2d 557, 564, 141 P.3d 8 (2006). This rule imposes a duty on the prosecutor to exercise good faith and due diligence in notifying the defendant of charges filed to obtain the defendant's presence in court without delay. Id. at 564-65; State v. Perry, 25 Wn. App. 621, 623, 612 P.2d 4 (1980). A prosecutor satisfies this duty by mailing a copy of the summons to the defendant's last known address when the defendant is aware of the pending charges. State v. Williams, 74 Wn. App. 600, 603-04, 875 P.2d 1222 (1994); Perry, 25 Wn. App. at 623. Although CrR 3.3(e)(6) excludes "[t]he time during which a defendant is detained in jail or prison outside the state of Washington" from the speedy trial calculation, the prosecutor's duty to exercise good faith and due diligence extends to individuals detained in other states under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), chapter 9.100 RCW, by virtue of CrR 3.3. Welker, 157 Wn.2d at 564-65. "[T]he prosecutor's duty is triggered when he has actual knowledge of an incarcerated defendant's whereabouts in a foreign penal institution." Id. at 566.
Here, the prosecutor sent a copy of the summons to Mr. Trower's last known address. The court found the State had no actual knowledge of his whereabouts, while Mr. Trower knew of the pending charges and failed to provide either the prosecutor or the superior court with his current address. The trial court did not err in denying Mr. Trower's motion to dismiss because the prosecutor satisfied his duty of good faith and due diligence under CrR 3.3 since no duty was triggered under the IAD. Welker, 157 Wn.2d at 565-66; Williams, 74 Wn. App. at 603-04; Perry, 25 Wn. App. at 623.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
WE CONCUR: Schultheis, A.C.J. Thompson, J. Pro Tem.