Opinion
7 Div. 601.
June 29, 1929. Rehearing Denied October 8, 1929. Affirmed on Mandate January 7, 1930.
Appeal from Circuit Court, St. Clair County; Woodson J. Martin, Judge.
Action by the State of Alabama against the Town of Springville to recover fines collected for violation of the Alabama Highway Code. Judgment for defendant, and the State appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Certiorari granted by Supreme Court in State v. Town of Springfield, 220 Ala. 286, 125 So. 387. Affirmed on mandate.
The complaint consisted of four counts. Counts 1 and 2 are for money received by defendant to the use of plaintiff. Counts 3 and 4 are as follows:
"3. The plaintiff claims of the defendant the sum of five hundred sixty-nine and 60/100 ($569.60) dollars, for that heretofore to wit, on the 23d day of August, 1927, section 106 of an act designated as 'the Alabama Highway Code' (General Acts 1927, p. 348) went into full force and effect in the state of Alabama, providing as follows:
" 'Section 106. Fines and Forfeitures. All fines and forfeitures collected upon conviction or upon forfeiture of bail of any person charged with a violation of any of the provisions of this article constituting a misdemeanor shall be within thirty days after such fine or forfeiture is collected forwarded to the state treasurer. All amounts received from such fines or forfeitures shall be credited to the funds of the state highway department, for the maintenance of roads and bridges. Failure, refusal or neglect to comply with the provisions of this section shall constitute misconduct in office and shall be ground for removal therefrom: Provided that all fines and forfeitures collected by recorders' courts or other municipal courts for violation of ordinances, in cities and towns of over two thousand population according to the last or any subsequent census, whether for acts constituting violations of the provisions of this article or not, shall be paid into the treasury of such municipality in which the same was collected.'
"The plaintiff alleges that the defendant comes within the population classification of 2,000 or less as set forth in the act hereinabove quoted, but nevertheless and notwithstanding has not complied with the provisions of said section of said act, in that said defendant, the town of Springville, Alabama, a municipal corporation, has collected a certain sum of money, to wit, five hundred sixty-nine and 60/100 ($569.60) dollars, from the 23d day of August, 1927, to the 23d day of March, 1928, inclusive, as fines and forfeitures from persons charged with the violation of one or more provisions of article 2 of the act, designated as 'The Alabama Highway Code' (General Acts 1927, p. 348), constituting a misdemeanor or misdemeanors, and that thirty days have passed since said defendant collected said amounts as fines and forfeitures arising from said traffic law violations, and said sum so collected by said defendant has not been forwarded to the state treasurer, as provided by law therefor; hence this suit.
"4. The plaintiff claims of the defendant the sum of five hundred sixty-nine and 60/100 ($569.60) dollars, which has been collected by said defendant on account of violations of an ordinance of said town which contains provisions similar to article 2 of the 'Alabama Highway Code,' since the adoption of said Alabama Highway Code, and that thirty days have passed since said defendant collected said amount as fines and forfeitures arising from said traffic law violations, and said sum so collected by said defendant has not been forwarded to the state treasurer, as promised [provided] by law therefor."
Defendant's demurrer to the complaint raises these points: (1) That the whole of the act known as the Alabama Highway Code is void: (a) Because it contains two or more subjects, both in the title and in the body of the act, contrary to section 45 of the Constitution of 1901; (b) because said act was so altered and amended on its passage as to be violative of section 61 of the Constitution of 1901; and (c) because said act provides for the engaging in work of internal improvement by the state, or the lending of credit for the same, contrary to the first amendment to the Constitution. (2) That section 106 of the act is unconstitutional and void: (a) Because the matter in said section is not clearly expressed in the title to the bill, as required by section 45 of the Constitution; and (b) because it is an attempt to make an appropriation to the highway department other than by separate bill, embracing but one subject, as required by section 71 of the Constitution of 1901. (3) That, even if section 106 is not void, it applies to convictions for state offenses or misdemeanors, and does not apply to convictions of municipal regulations, or violations of municipal ordinances.
The trial court overruled the demurrer as to counts 1 and 2 and sustained it as to counts 3 and 4. The cause was submitted on an agreed statement of facts, as follows:
"That the town of Springville, a municipal corporation having a population of less than two thousand inhabitants according to the federal census, had in effect from and after the 27th day of April, 1927, an ordinance of said town, being Ordinance No. 84. the fifth provision or section of which is as follows:
" 'No person shall operate a motor vehicle upon the streets, alleys or other driveways of the town of Springville, Alabama, recklessly or at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper, having regard to the width, traffic and use of the street or driveway, or so as to endanger property or the lives or limb of any person. A rate of speed in excess of twenty miles on the straightaway when there is no intersection, or fifteen miles at intersections shall be presumed evidence of traveling at a rate of speed which is not careful and prudent and is hereby prohibited.'
"That no question is raised as to the procedure of the adoption and publication of said ordinance. That during the times set out in plaintiff's complaint, from and including the 23d day of August, 1927, to and including the 23d day of May, 1928, the town of Springville brought proceedings in the name of the town of Springville, which were heard before its mayor in his jurisdiction as recorder, against various parties, whose names it is not necessary to mention, for the violation of the above set out section of said ordinance. That as fines and penalties the town of Springville has collected during said period, and prior to this suit, sums totaling five hundred dollars ($500.00). That this sum of money is held by said town of Springville as such fines and penalties received from such parties charged with the violation of section 5 of said ordinance above set out. It is agreed that section 5 of said ordinance, and the provisions thereof, are similar to the provisions contained in article 2 of what is known as the Alabama Highway Code.
"It is further agreed that the population of Springville is five hundred; the width of the main street is 30 feet and is a part of the state highway through said town; that the town has 18 business houses and 3 churches, a schoolhouse, and an average attendance of 250 pupils; that the revenue from taxation is approximately $1,200 per year, and a reasonable cost of maintaining a speed officer would be $1,500 a year.
"It is further agreed that the ordinance provides the following penalty in words and figures as follows:
" 'Any person violating any provision of this ordinance shall upon conviction be punished by paying a fine of not more than one hundred dollars, or work on the streets of the town of Springville for not more than 180 days, one or both as the mayor in his judgment may see fit. This ordinance shall be in full force and effect immediately upon publication, or public posting of same.
" 'Adopted this 27th day of April, 1927.'
"That this ordinance, with section 5 as above set out and with the penalty as above set out, was in full force and effect in the town of Springville during the period from the 23d day of August, 1927, to the 23d day of March, 1928, and the money sued for and collected was collected under the provision of the ordinance for violation of section 5 as above set out, and the penalties prescribed as provided by the provisions of the ordinance as above set out."
On said statement of facts, the court, without the intervention of a jury, rendered judgment for defendant, and plaintiff has appealed.
Charlie C. McCall, Atty. Gen., and W. M. Rayburn, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Even though the title is in general terms, every section of the act is germane and complementary to the general subject thereof. Board of Revenue of Jefferson County v. Kayser, 205 Ala. 289. 88 So. 19; Benners v. State, 124 Ala. 97, 26 So. 942; Montgomery M. B. Asso. v. Robinson, 69 Ala. 413; State v. Stripling, 113 Ala. 120, 21 So. 409, 36 L.R.A. 81; Ballentyne v. Wickersham, 75 Ala. 533; Quartlebaum v. State, 79 Ala. 1; Edwards v. Williamson, 70 Ala. 145. The Highway Act is constitutional. Gibson v. State, 214 Ala. 38, 106 So. 231.
Merrill Jones, of Anniston, and Jas. A. Embry, of Ashville, for appellee.
Section 106 of the act is not clearly expressed in the title, and is void. Its provisions are not cognate to the subject expressed in the title. Const. 1901, § 45; Woolf v. Taylor, 98 Ala. 254, 13 So. 688; Thomas v. State, 16 Ala. App. 145, 75 So. 821; Board of Revenue v. State, 200 Ala. 456, 76 So. 388; State ex rel. Birmingham v. Miller, 158 Ala. 59, 48 So. 496; State v. Southern Ry. Co., 115 Ala. 250, 22 So. 589; Bell v. State, 115 Ala. 87, 22 So. 453; Brown v. State, 115 Ala. 74, 22 So. 458; White v. Burgin, 113 Ala. 170, 21 So. 832; State v. Nelson, 210 Ala. 663, 98 So. 715; Ham v. State, 156 Ala. 645, 47 So. 126; Benton v. State, 168 Ala. 175, 52 So. 842. The provisions of section 106 of the act are an attempt to appropriate large sums of money to the highway department from funds coming into the state treasury which belong to counties and towns, and said section is void under section 71 of the Constitution. Woolf v. Taylor, 98 Ala. 254, 13 So. 688. Section 106 provides for payment into the state treasury of such fines and forfeitures as arise from convictions for violations of the provisions of article II of said act, being misdemeanors, and could not apply to mere violations of town ordinances, which are not misdemeanors, but mere quasi criminal matters. 8 R. C. L. 56; State ex rel. Washington v. Hunter, 67 Ala. 81; McKinstry v. Tuscaloosa, 172 Ala. 344, 54 So. 629; Withers v. State ex rel. Posey, 36 Ala. 252; Russell v. Bessemer, 19 Ala. App. 554, 99 So. 53; Macon v. Anniston, 18 Ala. App. 552, 92 So. 913; Washington v. Tuscaloosa, 19 Ala. App. 228, 96 So. 464; Perry v. State, 1 Ala. App. 253, 55 So. 1035; Casteel v. Decatur, 21 Ala. App. 337, 109 So. 571; Hymes v. State, 209 Ala. 91, 95 So. 383; Brown v. Mayor, etc., 23 Ala. 722; Mayor, etc., v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400; Rosenberg v. Selma, 168 Ala. 195, 52 So. 742. If a statute has two subjects, both expressed in its title and included in the body of the act, the whole act is void. Ballentyne v. Wickersham, 75 Ala. 533.
The defendant (appellee), the town of Springville, is a municipal corporation lying and being situated in St. Clair county, Alabama. Said town, under an ordinance thereof, collected from persons convicted of a violation of the provisions of article 2 of Act No. 347, approved August 23, 1927 (Acts 1927, p. 363 et seq.), certain sums of money, and refused to turn over said money to the state treasurer as provided by section 106 of said act. The state sued the town of Springville for the money so collected.
As a defense to this action defendant insisted that said section 106, supra, is void as being in contravention of section 45 of the Constitution of 1901 of the state, in that the matters provided in said section 106 are not included under the title of said act. Said act (No. 347) relates to public roads, highways, and bridges of the state, their building, maintenance, and the regulation of traffic over them, together with penal violations of the rules of the road, including traffic regulations.
The title of the act specifically names such matters, and it cannot be reasonably held that a statute with such a title goes outside of the title, simply because it provides that: "All fines and forfeitures collected upon conviction or upon the forfeiture of bail of any person charged with a violation of any of the provisions of this article constituting a misdemeanor shall be within thirty days after such fine or forfeiture is collected forwarded to the state treasurer. All amounts received from such fines or forfeitures shall be credited to the funds of the state highway department, for the maintenance of roads and bridges."
The title of the act is broad enough to comprehend all such matters. Generality and comprehensiveness in the title of an act is no objection to it, so long as such title is not made a cover for legislation incongruous in itself, and by no fair intendment connected with and cognate to the subject expressed in the title. Board of Revenue of Jefferson County v. Kayser, 205 Ala. 289, 88 So. 19; Benners v. State, 124 Ala. 97, 26 So. 942.
The objection that the violation of the ordinance was not a misdemeanor is without merit. The acts of which the defendants were convicted were violative of the provisions of article 2 of said act, and did constitute a misdemeanor under the provisions of said act. Said act simply has reference to the violations of the act which are not felonies.
It follows from the foregoing that said section 106 is valid and constitutional, and the trial court erred in rendering judgment for defendant on the agreed statement of facts.
Reversed and remanded.
Affirmed, on authority of State v. Town of Springfield, 220 Ala. 286, 125 So. 387.