Opinion
{48} L-22-1196
06-30-2023
STATE OF OHIO EX REL., RONALD BLOODWORTH RELATOR v. TOLEDO CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, ET AL RESPONDENTS
Ronald Bloodworth, pro se. Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, and John H. Bates, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for respondents.
Ronald Bloodworth, pro se.
Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, and John H. Bates, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for respondents.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
ZMUDA, J.
{¶ 1} Before the court is a motion to dismiss filed by respondents on December 16, 2022, and subsequently converted into a motion for summary judgment by this court on April 5, 2023. In their motion, respondents argue they are entitled to an order dismissing the mandamus complaint filed by relator, Ronald Bloodworth, on August 30, 2022. In his complaint, relator requested a writ of mandamus ordering respondents to provide records sought by Bloodworth under R.C. 149.43. These records include certain mail-related records, financial records relating to federal civil and appellate litigation, conduct reports, and "the memorandum sent to inmates via email on the Ipay kiosk October 4, 2021." According to relator, he has not yet received the records he requested from respondents.
On September 15, 2022, relator filed an amended motion for leave to proceed, to which he attached his proposed complaint.
{¶ 2} On November 1, 2022, we issued an order granting relator leave to proceed in this original action, and ordering the clerk to file relator's complaint instanter. On that same day, we issued an alternative writ ordering respondents to either do the act requested by relator in his mandamus complaint or show cause why they are not required to do so by filing an answer to relator's complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 8(B) or a motion to dismiss the action pursuant to Civ.R. 12. In our order, we stated that respondents must act within 21 days of the date they were served with the alternative writ.
{¶ 3} On November 8, 2022, the Sheriff's return of service was filed indicating that respondents were served with the alternative writ via residential service at the Toledo Correctional Institute at 2001 East Central Avenue, Toledo, Ohio 43608 on November 3, 2022. Under the comments section of the return, the deputy who delivered the service of process notated that he "left [the service of process] with officer at the front desk."
{¶ 4} Thereafter, respondents filed a notice of appearance of counsel on December 16, 2022. On that same day, respondents filed the present motion to dismiss relator's complaint, in which they argue, inter alia, that relator's mandamus action should be dismissed because relator did not pay $4.15 in copying costs associated with his public records request upon instructions to do so. Respondents assert that relator "failed to cooperate with the successful completion of his public records request and Respondents have complied with all necessary aspects of responding to Relator's public records request."
{¶ 5} On January 3, 2023, relator filed a motion for default judgment, in which he argued that respondents failed to appear, plead, or otherwise defend. Three weeks later, on January 24, 2023, we issued our decision denying relator's motion for default judgment and ordering relator to file his memorandum in opposition to respondents' motion to dismiss within 14 days of service of the order.
{¶ 6} Thereafter, on March 14, 2023, relator filed, inter alia, his memorandum in opposition to respondents' motion to dismiss. In his memorandum, relator argued that the relief sought by respondents was not available under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) because, in advancing their argument, respondents relied upon evidence outside of the pleadings, namely an affidavit from Derek Burkhart, the correctional warden assistant at the Toledo Correctional Institution that processed relator's records request. Because of respondents' reliance upon evidence outside the pleadings, relator argued that respondents' motion should be treated as a motion for summary judgment and disposed of accordingly.
{¶ 7} On April 5, 2023, we issued an order in which we agreed with relator that respondents' motion to dismiss must be treated as a motion for summary judgment under Civ.R. 56 because the motion to dismiss relies upon evidence outside the pleadings. Consequently, we converted the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, and provided the parties notice and an opportunity to present all available evidence allowable under Civ.R. 56(C). Specifically, we allowed respondents a period of 14 days from the date of service of our April 5, 2023 order to introduce any additional evidentiary materials they wished to rely upon in support of summary judgment. Further, we permitted relator to file a memorandum in opposition to the converted motion for summary judgment along with any additional Civ.R. 56 evidence within 28 days of respondents' submission of evidence or, if no such evidence was submitted, within 28 days of the expiration of the 14-day period in which respondents were permitted to submit additional evidence. We then indicated that the matter would be deemed decisional upon the filing of a reply to relator's memorandum in opposition, and noted that this action would be decided without a hearing.
{¶ 8} In the two months that have elapsed since we issued our April 5, 2023 order, respondents have not introduced any additional evidence to support their summary judgment motion. On June 22, 2023, we granted relator leave to file his memorandum in opposition to respondents' converted motion for summary judgment and deemed the memorandum filed instanter. Respondents' have not filed a reply to relator's memorandum. Thus, the matter is now decisional and we will proceed to address the merits of respondents' converted motion for summary judgment.
{¶ 9} Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is appropriate where (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact exists; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 375 N.E.2d 46 (1978).
{¶ 10} In his complaint, relator alleges that he has requested certain public records from respondents, and that respondents have failed to produce such records upon his request. Relator's request is governed by R.C. 149.43(B)(1), which provides:
Upon request by any person and subject to division (B)(8) of this section, all public records responsive to the request shall be promptly prepared and made available for inspection to the requester at all reasonable times during regular business hours. Subject to division (B)(8) of this section, upon request by any person, a public office or person responsible for public
records shall make copies of the requested public record available to the requester at cost and within a reasonable period of time.
{¶ 11} Mandamus is the appropriate vehicle to compel compliance with Ohio's Public Records Act. State ex rel. Harm Reduction Ohio v. OneOhio Recovery Foundation, --- Ohio St.3d ----, 2023-Ohio-1547, --- N.E.3d ----, ¶ 10, citing State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 6. "Mandamus is a writ, issued in the name of the state to an inferior tribunal, a corporation, board, or person, commanding the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station." R.C. 2731.01. In order to grant a complaint for a writ of mandamus, the court must find that relator has "a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, that the respondent is under a clear legal duty to perform the requested act, and that the relator has no plain and adequate remedy at law." State ex rel. Hodges v. Taft, 64 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 591 N.E.2d 1186 (1992), citing State ex rel. Harris v. Rhodes, 54 Ohio St.2d 41, 374 N.E.2d 641 (1978). The relator bears the burden to establish all the elements demonstrating entitlement to the writ. State ex rel. Luna v. Huffman, 74 Ohio St.3d 486, 659 N.E.2d 1279 (1996).
{¶ 12} In their motion, respondents assert that they responded to relator's public records request in a timely fashion and offered to produce the requested records upon relator's payment of $4.15 for copying fees. In support, they refer to Burkhart's affidavit, in which Burkhart states: (1) relator filed his public records request on October 14, 2021; (2) Burkhart responded to the request by kite (an electronic institutional communication) and advised relator that he had collected 83 pages of responsive documents and would provide them to relator once he received the $4.15 payment for copying fees; (3) Burkhart received no response from relator or payment for copying fees; (4) Burkhart sent a follow-up kite to relator on November 4, 2021 informing relator that the matter would be closed and advising relator that he would need to pay the copying fee if he wished to further pursue the records request; and (5) relator has not yet responded to Burkhart's communications. Several exhibits are attached to Burkhart's affidavit, including a printout of the kite communications Burkhart sent to relator, which corroborate Burkhart's affidavit testimony summarized above.
{¶ 13} In his memorandum in opposition to respondents' motion to dismiss, relator argues that respondents did not respond to his request for public records in a timely fashion and are thus precluded from judgment in their favor. As to respondents' argument that they complied with their obligations by instructing relator to pay for the costs of furnishing the public records, relator insists that he never received that communication. Relator further asserts that respondents' method of communication, namely an "institutional kite of [his] JPay kite account," was unlawful and unauthorized. According to relator, he "had no way of knowing that [a prison employee] had accessed his JPay Kite account and sent him an electronic institutional kite/communication."
{¶ 14} Based upon our review, we find that Burkhart's affidavit contradicts relator's allegation that respondents failed to respond in a timely fashion to his records request. Only 12 days elapsed between relator's request and Burkhart's response. Thus, there is no undue delay in this case.
{¶ 15} Further, the record demonstrates that relator's inability to secure the records he requested stems from his nonpayment of copying fees, not respondents' refusal to provide public records. While relator argues that he was unaware of the kite communications, he offers no evidence apart from self-serving statements contained in his affidavit filed on March 14, 2023. Further, relator fails to explain why, when he became aware of the communication, he failed to avail himself of the opportunity to receive the records requested by remitting his payment of $4.15 as instructed by Burkhart. "The Ohio Supreme Court has expressly held R.C. 149.43 does not require a public-records custodian to provide copies of records free of charge; instead, the Public Records Act requires only that copies of public records be made available at cost." State ex rel. Clark v. Mahoning County Common Pleas Courts, 2019-Ohio-503, 129 N.E.3d 999, ¶ 14 (7th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Edwards v. Cleveland Police Dept., 116 Ohio App.3d 168, 169, 687 N.E.2d 315 (1996).
{¶ 16} Upon consideration of the record before us, we find that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that, construing the evidence in a light most favorable to relator, respondents are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on relator's mandamus claim. The undisputed evidence in the record establishes that respondents made the records at issue available to relator at cost and in a reasonable time as they were required to do under R.C. 149.43(B)(1). Relator failed to obtain those records not because of any wrongdoing on the part of respondents, but because he did not comply with his obligation to pay for respondents' cost of providing the records. Therefore, respondents' converted motion for summary judgment is well-taken, and it is hereby granted. This mandamus action is dismissed. All other outstanding motions are hereby rendered moot and are denied.
{¶ 17} It is so ordered.
{¶ 18} To the Clerk: Manner of Service.
{¶ 19} Serve upon all parties in a manner prescribed by Civ.R. 5(B) notice of the judgment and its date of entry upon the journal.
Action dismissed.
Thomas J. Osowik, J. JUDGE, Gene A. Zmuda, J. Myron C. Duhart, P.J. JUDGE CONCUR. JUDGE