Opinion
No. 4-502 / 03-1486.
September 29, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Douglas F. Staskal, Judge.
Andrew Dwayne Tinlin appeals from his conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Martha Lucey, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kristin Guddall, Assistant Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and Charles Kenville, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Hecht and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Andrew Dwayne Tinlin appeals from his conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(c)(6) (2003). We affirm.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
According to the minutes of testimony, on May 9, 2003, around 11 p.m., Officers Jeff Robinson and Marshall Little responded to a criminal mischief complaint at a Motel 6 in Des Moines. A Motel 6 clerk had complained that "juveniles" were damaging a second-floor welcome sign. When the officers arrived at the motel approximately five to ten minutes after the call was made, they observed three individuals walking together in the parking lot. As they pulled into the lot to investigate, the three individuals began to walk in separate directions. No one else was seen outside the motel.
After getting out of their police car, Officer Little approached two of the men, and Officer Robinson asked Tinlin to "come over here." As Tinlin was walking over, Officer Robinson grabbed the back of Tinlin's clothes and escorted him to his squad car to perform a protective search. The search produced no weapons or contraband However, after the pat-down, Officer Robinson asked Tinlin if he had anything illegal with him, and Tinlin produced a bag containing approximately seven grams of methamphetamine. Officer Robinson placed Tinlin under arrest. A subsequent search of Tinlin's pocket revealed $364 in cash.
The State charged Tinlin by trial information with possession of more than five grams of methamphetamine with intent to deliver in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(b)(7) (Count I), and failure to affix a drug tax stamp in violation of Iowa Code sections 453B.3 and 453B.12 (Count II). Prior to trial, Tinlin filed a motion to suppress requesting "that all evidence obtained though the illegal search, seizure and interrogation be suppressed." The court denied the motion ruling in part, "the officers were justified in stopping Tinlin to investigate the reported mischief and in making the further intrusions that led to [Tinlin's] arrest." The court found the "circumstances were minimally adequate to raise a reasonable suspicion that the individuals were involved in the commission" of the criminal mischief at the Motel 6.
As part of an agreement to try Tinlin on the minutes of testimony, the State amended Count I by decreasing it from a class B to a class C felony, and dismissed Count II. Tinlin was subsequently found guilty and sentenced to a ten-year indeterminate term of imprisonment with a one-third mandatory minimum, and fined $1000. Tinlin appeals.
On appeal Tinlin argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
II. Standard of Review
We review constitutional claims de novo, independently evaluating the totality of the circumstances. State v. Prior, 617 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Iowa 2000).
III. Merits
Tinlin argues he was seized without reasonable suspicion and therefore, the Fourth Amendment precludes the State from using the methamphetamine against him. The State maintains Officer Robinson had reasonable suspicion to temporarily seize Tinlin based on his furtive movements, proximity to the Motel 6, and need for officer safety. Officer Robinson testified that Tinlin was patted-down for "my safety, to see if there were weapons involved. I don't know this guy. It's 11:00 at night in a dark parking lot."
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons from unreasonable government seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of the carefully drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Bradford, 620 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Iowa 2000). One such exception allows an officer "to briefly stop and detain an individual for investigatory purposes, if there exists a reasonable and articulable suspicion the person is intending to or just committed a criminal offense." Collins-Draine v. Knief, 617 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Iowa Ct.App. 2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29-30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884-85, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911 (1968)). "And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search `warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?" Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906. We therefore must determine whether Officer Robinson had reasonable and articulable suspicion to suspect Tinlin was or had been involved in criminal activity when he physically detained Tinlin and subsequently performed a pat-down of his person.
In finding Officer Robinson had reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure, the trial court held:
The question in this case is limited to whether the officers' suspicion that Tinlin was the person who committed the crime was reasonable. It was late at night, Tinlin was on the motel property where the offense had been committed, he was in a group of people, all males, and he and the others fit the limited description given of the perpetrators. When the three saw the officers, Tinlin split off from the other two. When he asked Tinlin to come towards him Tinlin hesitated, unlike the other individuals.
We agree with the trial court. Officers Robinson and Little received a call from dispatch asking them to respond to a destruction of property complaint at the Motel 6. The Motel 6 clerk described the assailants as "juveniles," and Officer Robinson believed they were looking for males. Even though the record shows Tinlin was twenty-three years old at the time, Tinlin was clean-shaven and Officer Robinson believed he fit the general description given by the clerk. When Officers Robinson and Little arrived at the Motel 6 within approximately five to ten minutes of the call, they observed three individuals walking together in the motel's parking lot. As Tinlin saw the Officers approach, he broke away from the group. "[I]t is reasonable for an officer to be suspicious of one who removes himself from the area where a crime is being investigated immediately upon the officer's arrival." State v. Peck, 329 N.W.2d 680, 683 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982). Tinlin argues that he was merely walking toward the Motel 6 because he was staying there for the night. This information was unavailable to Officer Robinson at the time of the stop and therefore, it is not part of our consideration. See State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 642 (Iowa 2002) (determining reasonable suspicion from the information available at the time the decision to stop was made). Moreover, when Officer Robinson asked Tinlin to come over to talk with him, Tinlin appeared hesitant. This behavior could easily be construed as nervous and furtive. The circumstances under which the officer acted must be viewed "through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training." Id. (citation omitted). We find the cumulative facts from the record provide reasonable and articulable suspicion in support of Officer Robinson's actions. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.