Opinion
20200891-CA
05-05-2022
State of Utah, Appellant, v. Alayne K. Timpson, Appellee.
Troy S. Rawlings and Nathan Lyon, Attorneys for Appellant Scott L. Wiggins, Attorney for Appellee
Second District Court, Farmington Department The Honorable David R. Hamilton No. 191700910
Troy S. Rawlings and Nathan Lyon, Attorneys for Appellant
Scott L. Wiggins, Attorney for Appellee
Judge Michele M. Christiansen Forster authored this Opinion, in which Judges David N. Mortensen and Ryan M. Harris concurred.
OPINION
CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, JUDGE
¶1 Alayne K. Timpson entered into a plea agreement under which the State agreed, among other things, not to oppose that she be allowed to serve part of her jail sentence through a work release program administered at the jail. After Timpson pled guilty to driving under the influence (DUI) with priors, but before sentencing, the work release program shut down due to the outbreak of COVID-19, thereby preventing Timpson from being able to serve her jail sentence through the program. Some months later, the program reopened, but it was no longer administered at the jail: participants were allowed to serve their sentences through home confinement on an ankle monitor. Timpson was sentenced soon after the implementation of the ankle monitor program, and the district court imposed a sentence that permitted her to serve her "jail sentence" through home confinement rather than at the jail.
¶2 The State now appeals, arguing that the imposed sentence is illegal because it allows Timpson to serve less than the statutorily mandated minimum of 62.5 days in jail. We agree with the State and therefore vacate Timpson's sentence and remand for resentencing.
BACKGROUND
¶3 On March 10, 2019, a police officer observed Timpson's vehicle "make a wide turn, crossing over a solid white line and a second lane of traffic before entering the turn lane." During the maneuver, Timpson "failed to signal appropriately." Thereafter, the officer initiated a traffic stop.
¶4 During his first encounter with Timpson, the officer "observed she had relaxed facial features, her eyes were watery and bloodshot, and she was slow to respond to his questions." Based on the officer's experience, he understood these characteristics "were consistent with someone under the influence of a depressant."
¶5 The officer approached Timpson a second time and asked her to exit her vehicle. As Timpson did so, the officer "observed she was slow, deliberate, and appeared unsteady on her feet." The officer noted that these movements were "also consistent with someone under the influence of a depressant."
¶6 Based on these observations, the officer put Timpson through field sobriety tests, which indicated that Timpson was impaired. A subsequent Intoxilyzer test revealed she had a blood alcohol content of 0.151. At the time of the incident, Timpson "was an alcohol restricted driver" with "two prior D.U.I. convictions within the past ten years." As a result, the State charged Timpson with three counts related to the incident: driving under the influence of alcohol with priors (Count 1), alcohol restricted driver (Count 2), and failure to signal (Count 3).
¶7 Timpson and the State negotiated a resolution to the case by way of a plea agreement. Under the terms of the plea agreement, Timpson would plead guilty to Count 1 in exchange for the dismissal of Counts 2 and 3. In addition, the State agreed to not oppose that Timpson be placed into the work release program at the jail. On March 4, 2020, Timpson entered a guilty plea pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, and sentencing was scheduled for May 6, 2020.
¶8 Two days after entry of Timpson's guilty plea, Utah's governor issued an executive order declaring a state of emergency in Utah due to the outbreak of COVID-19. See Utah Exec. Order 2020-1 (March 6, 2020). In response to growing health concerns, the availability of the jail work center "was initially limited" before being completely closed. Consequently, Timpson's sentencing was continued a number of times awaiting a decision on whether the work center would reopen.
¶9 In August 2020, when it became apparent that serving time at the work center pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement "may not be available to her," Timpson filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Among other things, she argued that because "the promises of the State" to allow her to serve her statutory jail time at the work center "cannot be adopted and sentenced," her plea was not entered into "knowingly and voluntarily." The State opposed the motion, contending the plea was entered into knowingly and voluntarily and that Timpson "ha[d] received all the benefits and bargain described in the plea agreement."
¶10 While Timpson's motion to withdraw her guilty plea was still pending, the jail initiated a new work release program. Under the revised program, participants do not reside at the jail during their sentence but instead are "under home confinement with an ankle monitor."
¶11 On September 30, 2020, the parties appeared before the district court concerning a motion to continue Timpson's sentencing. A transcript of the hearing was not created; however, based on the court's discussion with defense counsel during the hearing, the State prepared a Sentencing Memorandum.
¶12 In its Sentencing Memorandum, the State outlined its objection to the court's "indicat[ion]" during the September 30 hearing that "it would be willing to entertain a request to have [Timpson] serve the mandatory 62.5 days incarceration through the [jail's] new work release program." The State argued that sentencing Timpson under the new work release program would result in an illegal sentence. It explained that although the new work release program was called "work release," it was actually only "home confinement with an ankle monitor," and therefore it did not satisfy the statutory requirement that all three-time DUI offenders serve "a jail sentence" of at least 62.5 days. Accordingly, the State requested that Timpson be sentenced "to 62.5 days of incarceration at the [jail]."
¶13 One month later, the court held a hearing on Timpson's motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Prior to the formal hearing, the court "had an informal conversation with counsel on the record" regarding the pending motion. However, this conversation was not actually preserved as part of the record.
¶14 During the formal hearing, Timpson withdrew her motion and asked the court to proceed with sentencing. The court, over the State's objection, sentenced Timpson to serve 62.5 days in jail but allowed that sentence to be "facilitated through the ankle monitor program at the [jail]." The court reasoned that the ankle monitor program "is, in fact, the jail sentence carried out through the use of ankle monitor and other features," that the ankle monitor program "is consistent with the circumstances . . . as a form of work release," and that "the release was contemplated and agreed to by the State and [Timpson] given the circumstances at that time."
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶15 The State now appeals, arguing the district court erred in interpreting Utah Code section 41-6a-505(3)(b) to permit home confinement. "We review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness, affording no deference to the district court's legal conclusions." State v. Wilkerson, 2020 UT App 160, ¶ 8, 478 P.3d 1048 (quotation simplified).
Timpson approaches this issue differently, arguing we should affirm the district court's sentence because the court did not abuse its discretion in its sentencing decision. In support, she advances two arguments. First, she asserts the record on appeal is inadequate because the State did not provide transcripts of two "crucial proceeding[s]" during which the court "appears to have expressed some kind of basis or rationale for the sentence so imposed." In light of this deficiency, Timpson contends it is "well settled" that the reviewing court will presume the sentencing decision "is reasonable, supported by the evidence, and did not constitute an abuse of discretion or error," and will therefore affirm the sentence. Second, in a somewhat related vein, Timpson argues the district court did not abuse its discretion when sentencing her because the court's decision was made after it "thoughtfully considered the effects that the unprecedented pandemic had on the sentence to be imposed." Both points miss the mark. District courts are afforded discretion in their sentencing decisions only to the extent the governing statute permits. "Therefore, legal determinations concerning the proper interpretation of the statute which grants the [district] court discretion are reviewed for correctness." State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991). Courts are not allowed to impose an illegal sentence, no matter their rationale. Because we conclude the court's sentence was in fact illegal, it matters not what the court and counsel discussed during the proceedings that were not included in the record on appeal. Nor does it matter that the court's sentence was evidently shaped by the "unusual circumstances" of the time.
ANALYSIS
¶16 The State argues the district court erred in concluding that the term "jail sentence," as used in Utah Code section 41-6a-505(3)(b), includes "home confinement." As a result, it contends Timpson's sentence was illegal because it was less than the minimum sentence mandated by statute.
¶17 Utah Code section 41-6a-505(3)(b) provides that in cases involving three-time DUI offenders, "if the court suspends the execution of a prison sentence and places the defendant on probation, the court shall impose . . . (b) a jail sentence of not less than 1, 500 hours." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-505(3)(b) (LexisNexis 2018) (emphasis added). In interpreting this statute, the district court concluded that in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the "jail sentence" requirement could be "facilitated through the ankle monitor program at the [jail]." This conclusion was incorrect.
The relevant events in this case took place in 2020 and are therefore governed by the version of the statute then in effect. Since the statute has been substantively amended since 2020, we cite the version in effect in 2020.
¶18 When interpreting a statute, "our primary goal is to ascertain the true intent and purpose of the Legislature." O'Hearon v. Hansen, 2017 UT App 214, ¶ 23, 409 P.3d 85 (quotation simplified). Because "the best evidence of the legislature's intent is the plain language of the statute itself," Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863 (quotation simplified), "we determine the statute's meaning by first looking to the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain language unless the language is ambiguous," Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, ¶ 14, 54 P.3d 1177 (quotation simplified). "Additionally, we presume that the expression of one term should be interpreted as the exclusion of another." Marion Energy, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14 (quotation simplified). "When the meaning of a statute can be discerned from its language, no other interpretive tools are needed." Id. ¶ 15 (quotation simplified).
¶19 The plain language of section 41-6a-505(3)(b) requires that as a condition of probation, a court shall impose "a jail sentence of not less than [62.5 days]." Because the word "jail" is not defined by statute, we simply apply the plain meaning of that word. See Wilson, 2002 UT 94, ¶ 14. The plain meaning of "jail" is a place or a building where "persons awaiting trial or those convicted of misdemeanors are confined." See Jail, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also Jail, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/jail [https://perma.cc/GZ5S-3JAF] (defining "jail" as "a place of confinement for persons held in lawful custody"); Jail, Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/englis h/jail [https://perma.cc/ZEV4-AQL7] (defining "jail" as "a place where criminals are kept to punish them for their crimes, or where people accused of crimes are kept while waiting for their trials"). Thus, under the plain meaning of the term, being ordered to serve a "jail sentence" necessarily entails incarceration.
¶20 The legislative intent of section 41-6a-505(3)(b) is further clarified when read in context with other subsections of the same chapter. "When interpreting a statute, we look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms. But we do not interpret statutory provisions in isolation." Hertzske v. Snyder, 2017 UT 4, ¶ 12, 390 P.3d 307 (quotation simplified). Instead, statutes are read "in light of the relevant context of the statute (including, particularly, the structure and language of the statutory scheme)." Bright v. Sorensen, 2020 UT 18, ¶ 59, 463 P.3d 626 (quotation simplified).
¶21 Under Utah Code section 41-6a-505(2)(a)(i), when an individual is convicted of a second DUI, a court has two sentencing options: (1) "a jail sentence of not less than 240 hours" or (2) "a jail sentence of not less than 120 hours in addition to home confinement of not fewer than 720 consecutive hours through the use of electronic monitoring." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-505(2)(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2018) (emphasis added). The legislature's use of the phrase "in addition to" demonstrates that "a jail sentence" and "home confinement" are intended to be two separate methods of punishment. Indeed, if the terms were synonymous, there would be no reason to distinguish between them. Moreover, that the court may reduce the number of hours of incarceration in a "jail sentence" from 240 to 120 if it imposes an additional 720 hours of "home confinement" evinces the legislature's intent that a "jail sentence" does not equate to "home confinement."
¶22 Here, in sentencing Timpson-a thrice-convicted DUI offender-the district court was statutorily mandated to order her to serve a 62.5-day jail sentence as a condition of her probation. The court did not have the discretion to impose home confinement in lieu of incarceration.
CONCLUSION
¶23 The district court erred by interpreting Utah Code section 41-6a-505(3)(b) as allowing a "jail sentence" to include "home confinement." As a result, Timpson's sentence was less than that mandated by statute and therefore illegal. Accordingly, we vacate Timpson's sentence and remand the case for resentencing.
If Timpson determines that serving her sentence in jail violates the terms of her plea agreement, she is not precluded from seeking to withdraw her guilty plea on remand.