Opinion
I.D. No. 30903471DI.
Submitted: June 6, 2007.
Decided: July 27, 2007.
This 27th day of July, 2007, it appears to the Court that:
1. In 1989, a jury found Henry R. Taylor, Jr. ("Taylor") guilty of burglary second degree. Taylor was declared a habitual offender because of three prior burglary second degree convictions in 1983 and 1984 and he was sentenced to life in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed Taylor's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Since then, Taylor has filed two motions for postconviction relief, both of which were denied by this Court and subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court. Now before the Court are Taylor's motion for reconsideration for an evidentiary hearing and his third pro se motion for postconviction relief.
IN83-06-1713, IN84-09-0298, IN84-09-0300.
See Docket 34, 37, 45, 50, 64, 67, 73, 79, 80, 82. Taylor initially filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing and a motion for the appointment of counsel. See Docket 76, 77. The Court denied both of those motions. See Docket 78. Taylor has now filed a motion for reconsideration for an evidentiary hearing reiterating his argument that a hearing is necessary to investigate the alleged "unlawful destruction of Court files" by the "Official Court Reporters Office." See Docket 76, 82.
2. Taylor claims he was deprived of his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 7 and 9 of the Delaware Constitution. Specifically, Taylor argues that the Court Reporters' Office's alleged destruction of the "1983 and 1985 files and records" of his cases deprived him of his due process right to have the merits of his guilty plea challenge reviewed. That is, Taylor claims that the Court Reporters' destruction of transcripts of the plea colloquy in criminal action numbers IN84-09-0298 and IN84-09-0300 has deprived Taylor of his right to have the Court review the merits of his challenged guilty plea. Therefore, Taylor contends that, to prevent this injustice from continuing, the fundamental fairness exception under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61") requires that the Court consider the merits of Taylor's motion and either order the Court Reporters' Office "to produce the court records" or, in the alternative, order that Taylor's "burglary second degree convictions entered under IN84-09-0298-0300 be stricken from the record[,] entitling" Taylor to re-sentencing as a non-habitual offender.
See Docket 79, 80. Although Taylor's motion was filed under case number 30903471DI, which resulted in a jury conviction for burglary second degree in 1989, it is clear that his motion relates only to case number 30406643DI, which resulted in Taylor pleading guilty to two counts of burglary second degree in 1984 (IN84-09-0298 and IN84-09-0300). As Taylor states in his memorandum in support of his motion: "For some clarity, the Defendant seeks relief . . . based on the two prior burglary second degree convictions [IN84-09-0298 and IN84-09-0300] that were the basis for enhance [sic] punishment[.]" Docket 80, p. 2.
3. Prior to addressing the substantive merits of any claim for postconviction relief, the Court must first determine whether the defendant has met the procedural requirements of Rule 61. If the procedural requirements of Rule 61 are not met, the Court should not consider the merits of a postconviction claim.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). See also Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del.Super.Ct. 1991).
State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790961, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct. Dec. 28, 1995) (citing Younger, 580 A.2d at 554).
4. Rule 61(i) imposes four procedural imperatives: (1) the motion must be filed within three years of a final order of conviction; (2) any basis for relief must have been asserted previously in any prior postconviction proceeding; (3) any basis for relief must have been asserted at trial or on direct appeal as required by the court rules; and (4) any basis for relief must not have been formerly adjudicated in any proceeding. However, under Rule 61(i)(5), the bars to relief under (1), (2) and (3) do not apply to a "claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction."
The motion must be filed within three years if the final order of conviction occurred before July 1, 2005, and within one year if the final order of conviction occurred on or after July 1, 2005. See Rule 61, annot. Effect of amendments.
5. In applying the procedural imperatives to this case, Taylor's claims are barred. Taylor's challenge of his guilty plea in IN84-09-0298 and IN84-09-0300 is clearly untimely as there was a "final order of conviction" over 20 years ago. Taylor also did not assert a challenge to his guilty plea in a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Therefore, at first glance, it would appear that Taylor's claims are barred under Rule 61(i)(1) and (i)(3). The Court's analysis, however, does not end here.
See Docket 16 for I.D. No. 30406643DI.
6. "The Delaware Supreme Court has held when a defendant `did not file a direct appeal challenging the validity of [his or her] guilty plea, [the defendant] is procedurally barred from raising that claim in aRule 61 motion, unless [he or she] can show cause for relief and actual prejudice.'" "`[C]ause' for a procedural default on appeal ordinarily mandates `a showing of some external impediment preventing counsel from constructing or raising the claim.'" "[U]nless the defendant has made and substantiated a concrete allegation of `cause' and actual `prejudice', any contention amounting to procedural default will be barred[.]"
State v. Blalock, 2005 WL 1231515, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. May 10, 2005) (quoting Blackwell v. State, 736 A.2d 971, 972 (Del. 1999)). See also State v. Brown, 2004 WL 745066, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Apr. 8, 2004) ("Because Defendant failed to file a direct appeal challenging the validity of his guilty plea, his claim is procedurally barred unless he can establish cause and prejudice[.]").
Id. (quoting Younger, 580 A.2d at 556).
Id. (citation omitted).
7. In this case, Taylor has not shown cause for relief and actual prejudice. There is nothing to indicate why Taylor failed to raise his guilty plea challenge much earlier, and presumably before the transcripts of the plea colloquy were destroyed by the Court Reporters' Office in accordance with its 20 year document destruction policy. There is also no implication that some "external impediment" prevented Taylor's counsel from bringing an appeal to the Supreme Court after Taylor's Robinson Plea in IN84-09-0298 and IN84-09-0300. In addition, Taylor has failed to establish "actual prejudice" from any alleged violation of his rights. Therefore, the Court finds that Taylor has not made and substantiated a concrete allegation of cause and actual prejudice. As such, Taylor has not overcome the procedural bar under Rule 61(i)(3).
See Docket 80, App. 56. While Taylor complains because he requested the transcripts before 20 years had passed from the time of his plea (his first request being in 1998), the fact remains that the colloquy transcripts are nevertheless lost or destroyed. See id., App. 7-9, 43-50, 53-54, 56-60.
See Younger, 580 A.2d at 555 ("Applying this test to the instant petition, this Court finds that [defendant] has failed to demonstrate a showing of: a) cause for his failure to raise the issues earlier which might justify relief from his procedural default and b) actual prejudice from any violation of his rights.").
8. As for Rule 61(i)(5), there is no basis upon which to excuse the procedural bars to Taylor's claims under the fundamental fairness exception. A "[p]resumption of regularity attaches to plea proceedings when the transcript has been destroyed pursuant to court policy after the passage of time." While this Court "recognizes the importance of insuring that criminal defendants are afforded their fundamental constitutional rights[,]" the Court "cannot presume that [a defendant's] plea was invalid based on the absence of the colloquy transcript," particularly when the transcript has been destroyed pursuant to standard court policy. Therefore, "the initial burden is on the moving defendant to present some articulable reason which the motion judge deems a credible indicator that the presumptively proper guilty plea proceedings were constitutionally defective." Here, Taylor has failed to meet that initial burden. Taylor merely states that his plea was not voluntary and that, during the plea colloquy, the State did not put on record a "sufficient factual basis." These unsubstantiated and conclusory statements are not a "credible indicator" that the plea proceedings were defective. Therefore, because Taylor has failed to meet his burden, the Court must continue to presume that there were no constitutional defects when taking Taylor's plea. It follows that the destruction or loss of the colloquy transcript does not present "a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction."
State v. Escobales, 2001 WL 493115, at *1 (Del.Fam.Ct. Jan. 24, 2001). See also C N. V v. State, 2000 WL 33200980, at *4 (Del.Fam.Ct. Dec. 22, 2000).
Escobales, 2001 WL 493115, at *1.
Veraga v. State, Del. Fam. Ct., No. AN96-3233, Chapman, J., slip op. at 10 (2000) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lopez, 690 N.E.2d 809, 811-812 (Mass. 1998)).
See Docket 80, p. 3.
Rule 61(i)(5).
9. Lastly, after considering Taylor's motion and the vast record in this case, the Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is not warranted or desirable.
See Rule 61(h)(1): "After considering the motion for postconviction relief, the state's response, the movant's reply, if any, the record of prior proceedings in the case, and any added materials, the judge shall determine whether an evidentiary hearing is desirable." See also Pennewell v. State, 2005 WL 578444, at *2 (Del. Jan. 26, 2005) ("In a postconviction relief proceeding, the Superior Court has broad discretion to determine whether to hold an evidentiary hearing. If the Superior Court determines in its discretion that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary, then summary disposition of the motion is entirely appropriate.").
10. Based on the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED and the motion for postconviction relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.