Opinion
COA22-393
12-20-2022
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Plaintiff, v. BRANDON CRAIG TAYLOR, Defendant, JORDAN EARLY, ALLEGHENY CASUALTY COMPANY, Bail Agent/Surety, and THE JACKSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Judgment Creditor.
The Law Offices of Elston, Donnahoo & Williams, P.C., by Brian D. Elston, for Surety-Appellant. Campbell Shatley, PLLC, by Kristopher L. Caudle, for The Jackson County Board of Education, Respondent/Appellee.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 October 2022.
Appeal by the surety of a bail bond from order entered 11 March 2022 by Judge Kristina L. Earwood in Jackson County No. 20 CR 50566 District Court denying surety relief from a judgment of forfeiture of the bond.
The Law Offices of Elston, Donnahoo & Williams, P.C., by Brian D. Elston, for Surety-Appellant.
Campbell Shatley, PLLC, by Kristopher L. Caudle, for The Jackson County Board of Education, Respondent/Appellee.
DILLON, JUDGE
¶ 1 This case involves the interplay of two statutes, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-544.4(e) and 15A-544.8(b) prior to their amendment in 2022, and the impact of these statutes on the forfeiture of bail bonds by sureties. Specifically, the issue before us is whether a trial court had the authority to issue a final judgment against a surety under the former version of Section 15A-544.8(b) where the surety was not previously given notice within 30 days after the date its principal (the defendant) fails to appear in court as required under Section 15A-544.4(e). In this case, Surety Alleghany Casualty Company (the "Surety") appeals from an order denying its motion seeking relief from final judgment forfeiting a bond where it had not been provided notice within 30 days after its principal, Defendant Brandon Craig Taylor failed to appear for his court date.
¶ 2 We agree with Surety that the trial court abused its discretion in this case and should have granted Surety's motion for relief from the final judgment, based on our interpretation of these statutes prior to the 2022 amendments. Accordingly, we reverse.
I. Background
¶ 3 On 27 May 2020, Surety through its bail agent, executed an appearance bond in the amount of $15,000 for Defendant.
¶ 4 On 6 April 2021, Defendant failed to appear for his court date. On 4 June 2021, more than 30 days after Defendant failed to appear, the clerk of court issued a notice of bond forfeiture. Surety moved to set the forfeiture aside, contending that it did not receive notice within 30 days of Defendant's failure to appear. The trial court denied this motion and entered final judgment on the forfeiture on 4 November 2021. Surety paid the forfeiture amount on 23 November 2021.
¶ 5 On 8 February 2022, Surety filed its petition for relief from final judgment based on the inadequate notice it received of Defendant's failure to appear for his court date. By order entered 11 March 2022, the trial court denied Surety's motion. Surety timely appealed.
II. Analysis
¶ 6 On appeal, Surety contends the trial court erred by denying its motion for relief from final judgment. Surety asserts several arguments, but we need only address its argument regarding the trial court's failure to provide notice within the statutorily prescribed 30 days of Defendant's failure to appear.
¶ 7 Prior to the 2022 amendments, our General Statutes provided as follows with respect to a trial court's authority to grant or deny a motion for relief from a judgment of forfeiture:
The court may grant the defendant or any surety named in the judgment relief from a judgment of forfeiture for the following reasons, and none other:
(1) The person seeking relief was not given notice as provided in G.S. 15A-544.4.
(2) Other extraordinary circumstances exist that the court, in its discretion, determines should entitle that person to relief.N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.8(b) (2021).
¶ 8 Our Court has held that it is within the trial court's discretion whether to grant relief from judgment based on "extraordinary circumstances" under subdivision (2) of Section 15A-544.8(b). State v. Gonzalez-Fernandez, 170 N.C.App. 45, 49, 612 S.E.2d 148, 151-52 (2005); State v. McCarn, 151 N.C.App. 742, 745, 566 S.E.2d 751, 753 (2002).
¶ 9 Surety contends that the trial court lacks such authority under subdivision (1), notwithstanding that Section 15A-544.8(b) states that the court "may" grant a surety relief under either subdivisions (1) or (2). Surety essentially argues that the use of the word "may" was not intended to give a trial court discretion under subdivision (1). We agree for the below reasoning.
¶ 10 Subdivision (1) of Section 15A-544.8(b) - prior to the 2022 amendment - authorized a trial court to grant a surety relief from a judgment of forfeiture where the surety was not previously given notice "as provided in G.S. 15A-544.4." We note that where subdivision (2) expressly authorized a trial court to grant relief for extraordinary circumstances "in its discretion", subdivision (1) does not contain the "in its discretion" language.
¶ 11 In any event, subdivision (1) cites the notice requirements of Section 15A-544.4. And subsection (e) of that Section - prior to the 2022 amendment - required that notice of forfeiture be given to the surety within 30 days after the date the defendant failed to appear for his court date. This subsection also provided that "[i]f notice under this section is not given within the prescribed time, the forfeiture shall not become a final judgment and shall not be enforced or reported to the Department of Insurance." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.4(e). We construe this provision by its plain language, that a trial court is not authorized to enter a final judgment of forfeiture against a surety who was not given notice of the defendant's failure to appear within 30 days.
¶ 12 Reading Section 15A-544.4(e) and Section 15A-544.8(b) together, we conclude that, prior to the 2022 amendments, a trial court did not have the discretion to deny a surety's motion for relief from a judgment where the surety was not given the required notice. If a trial court wanted to bind a surety where it failed to give proper notice, perhaps the court could schedule a new court date for the defendant to appear and then provide the required notice to the surety for that failure to appear. But that did not happen in this case.
¶ 13 As stated previously, our General Assembly amended both sections in 2022. Specifically, a sentence was added to subdivision (1) of Section 15A-544.8(b), stating that a court "shall not grant relief under this subdivision solely due to the court's failure to provide notice within 30 days as required by G.S. 15A-544.4(e)." And Section 15A-544.4(e) was amended by striking the last sentence therein which had stated that no final judgment could be entered where proper notice was not given. Clearly, under the current version of these statutes, Surety would have a much tougher argument under the facts of the case. However, these amendments became effective "December 1, 2022, and only appl[y] to forfeitures entered on or after that date." 2022 Session Laws 73, sec. 3(e). The forfeiture at issue in this appeal was entered well before the effective date of the 2022 amendments. Therefore, we must apply the sections as codified prior to the 2022 amendments in this appeal.
III. Conclusion
¶ 14 We reverse the trial court's order and remand for entry of an order setting aside the judgment of forfeiture against Surety.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Judge DIETZ concurs.
Judge Arrowood dissents by separate opinion.
Report per Rule 30(e).
ARROWOOD, Judge, dissenting.
¶ 15 I respectfully dissent from the majority's holding that the trial court abused its discretion by denying surety's motion for relief from the final judgment. Accordingly, I would hold the trial court does have the discretion to deny a surety's motion for relief for final judgment, even if the order of forfeiture was not issued in compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.4(e), under the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.8(b). For the following reasons, I would affirm the trial court's order.
I. Background
¶ 16 Due to the importance of the facts in the statutory interpretation of this case, I find it important for this opinion to provide details as to what led to this appeal. On 27 May 2020, surety executed a $15,000.00 appearance bond securing the pretrial release of defendant, on criminal charges pending in Jackson County. After defendant failed to appear on 6 April 2021, the trial court issued an order for his arrest. On 4 June 2021, the trial court ordered that the appearance bond be forfeited. On that same date, surety was served with a copy of the notice of entry of forfeiture by first-class mail.
¶ 17 On 1 November 2021, surety submitted a Motion to Set Aside Bond Forfeiture. Surety argued that because notice was received "fifty-nine (59) days past the date the forfeiture was entered[,]" pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.4(e), the forfeiture was not timely and should not become a final judgment. The Jackson County Board of Education ("the board") objected to the motion, and the trial court heard surety's motion on 23 November 2021. Surety's motion was denied, and the forfeiture was paid.
¶ 18 On 8 February 2022, surety filed a Motion for Relief from Final Judgment pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.8(b)(1). The matter came on for a hearing for surety's motion on 22 February 2022 in Jackson County District Court, Judge Earwood presiding. At the hearing, surety and the board disagreed as to, whether under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.8(b)(1), the trial court had the discretion to grant surety's motion for relief from final judgment.
¶ 19 The trial court denied surety's motion on 11 March 2022 and declared the bond forfeiture a final judgment. In its order, the trial court noted that "[d]efendant's criminal charges were still outstanding . . . and [d]efendant had not been surrendered by [s]urety ...." Furthermore, the trial court concluded it was denying surety's motion "pursuant to N.C. [Gen. Stat.] § 15-544.8(c)(4) . . . in [its] discretion[.]" Surety filed a notice of appeal on 31 March 2022.
II. Discussion
¶ 20 On appeal, surety contends that the trial court erred in failing to provide relief from final judgment when the order of forfeiture was issued beyond the statutory deadline.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 21 "We review a trial court's decision whether to grant a motion for relief from final judgment of forfeiture for an abuse of discretion." State v. Gonzalez-Fernandez, 170 N.C.App. 45, 49, 612 S.E.2d 148, 152 (2005) (citations omitted). "Abuse of discretion results where the court's ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision." State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988) (citation omitted).
B. Motion for Relief from Final Judgment
¶ 22 "Bail bond forfeiture in North Carolina is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-544.1-544.8 . . ." Gonzalez-Fernandez, 170 N.C.App. at 48, 612 S.E.2d at 151. "If a defendant who was released . . . upon execution of a bail bond fails on any occasion to appear before the court as required, the court shall enter a forfeiture for the amount of that bail bond in favor of the State against the defendant and against each surety on the bail bond." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.3(a) (2021).
¶ 23 Notice of forfeiture is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.4. The statute in pertinent part provides:
Notice under this section shall be mailed not later than the 30th day after the date on which the defendant fails to appear as required and a call and fail is ordered. If notice under this section is not given within the prescribed time, the forfeiture shall not become a final judgment and shall not be enforced or reported to the Department of Insurance.Id. § 15A-544.4(e).
¶ 24 When a surety moves for relief from the entry of a bond forfeiture prior to the judgment becoming final, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.5 provides the only means for relief. State v. Roulhac, 273 N.C.App. 396, 400, 848 S.E.2d 512, 514 (2020) (emphasis added citations omitted). This statute provides the only reasons for which a bond forfeiture may be set aside. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.5(b) (2021). When notices of forfeiture are not in compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.4(e) is not one of those grounds for relief. Id. However, "sureties are not without recourse where notices of forfeiture are not in compliance with [the notice requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 15A-544.4." State v. Sanchez, 175 N.C.App. 214, 218, 623 S.E.2d 780, 782 (2005).
¶ 25 Once final judgment is granted, relief "is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A- 544.8." Gonzalez-Fernandez, 170 N.C.App. at 49, 612 S.E.2d at 151. This statute reads:
(a) Relief Exclusive.-There is no relief from a final judgment of forfeiture except as provided in this section.
(b) Reasons.-The court may grant the defendant or any surety named in the judgment relief from the judgment, for the following reasons, and none other:
(1) The person seeking relief was not given notice as provided in G.S. 15A-544.4 .
(2) Other extraordinary circumstances exist that the court, in its discretion, determines should entitle that person to relief. ....
(c) Procedure.-The procedure for obtaining relief from a final judgment under this section is as follows: ....
(4) At the hearing the court may grant the party any relief from the judgment that the court considers appropriate, including the refund of all or a part of
any money paid to satisfy the judgment.N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.8 (2021) (emphasis added). "[When] interpreting statutes, the primary duty of th[e] [c]ourt is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature." Ridge Cmty. Invs., Inc. v. Berry, 293 N.C. 688, 695, 239 S.E.2d 566, 570 (1977).
¶ 26 Surety contends that their motion for relief from the final judgment should have been granted because the order of forfeiture was issued beyond the statutory deadline. Although the majority agrees, I would hold this argument ignores the plain text of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.8.
¶ 27 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.8 is the only statute that provides relief from a final judgment of forfeiture. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.8 (2021). This statute does allow relief to be granted if notice was not given as provided in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.4, but it does not require a trial court to do so. Id. § 15A-544.8(b) ("The court may grant the defendant or any surety named in the judgment relief from the judgment, for the following reasons, and none other ....") (emphasis added). Clearly, the Legislature intended for the trial court to have discretion in granting motions for relief from final judgement. See id.
¶ 28 Furthermore, despite surety's contention that this presents an issue of first impression, this Court has addressed similar issues on two prior occasions. In State v. Sanchez, the surety argued that because the notice of forfeiture was untimely under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.4(e), their motion to set aside the forfeiture should have been granted. Sanchez, at 216, 623 S.E.2d at 781. However, this Court found that "[t]he exclusive avenue for relief from forfeiture of an appearance bond (where the forfeiture has not yet become a final judgment) is provided in [ N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 15A-544.5." Id. (citation omitted). Because the "surety's motion to set aside the entry of forfeiture was not premised on any ground set forth in [this statute] . . . [t]he trial court, then, lacked the authority to grant surety's motion." Id. at 218, 623 S.E.2d at 782 (emphasis in original). This Court further explained "[t]hat the General Assembly . . . omitted [faulty notice] as a ground for relief from an entry of forfeiture . . . suggests the legislature made a conscious choice in this regard." Id.
¶ 29 This Court adopted the Sanchez reasoning in State v. Roulhac. 273 N.C.App. 396, 400, 848 S.E.2d 512, 514-15 (2020). In Roulhac, the surety, again, sought relief from the bond forfeiture under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.4(e). Id. at 397, 848 S.E.2d at 513. This Court found that although the surety "adroitly attempted to recharacterize its efforts to obtain relief" by asking for the forfeiture to be modified instead of set aside, the reasoning in Sanchez was "nevertheless sound and persuasive" and the bond forfeiture was affirmed. Id. at 399-400, 848 S.E.2d at 51415.
¶ 30 Here, I would hold the trial court exercised its statutorily authorized discretion, and the decision does not reflect reasoning that was unsupported or arbitrary. Furthermore, this view is consistent with the previous holding of this Court from Sanchez and Roulhac, which the majority is required to follow under the holding set forth in In re Civil Penalties, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989) (citations omitted) ("Where a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court."). Accordingly, I would find the trial court did not abuse its discretion and would affirm its denial of surety's motion.
III. Conclusion
¶ 31 For the foregoing reasons, because the majority misinterpreted the unambiguous language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.8(b), I dissent from the majority opinion and would affirm.